“A judgment creditor proceeding under Rule 69(a) may utilize either 7 state practice or the Federal Rules for taking depositions.”
How later courts described this case
- “A judgment creditor proceeding under Rule 69(a) may utilize either 7 state practice or the Federal Rules for taking depositions.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 MATTHEW D. VAN STEENWYK, No. 2:20-cv-02375-FLA-AJR
Individually, as Trustee and
12 AMENDED MEMORANDUM
Beneficiary of The Matthew Van
DECISION AND ORDER
13 Steenwyk GST Trust and The GRANTING IN PART
Matthew Van Steenwyk Issue Trust, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO
14 and as Co-Trustee of The Gretchen COMPEL JUDGMENT DEBTOR
Marie Van Steenwyk-Marsh GST DISCOVERY (DKT. 846)
15 Trust and The Gretchen Marie Van
16 Steenwyk-Marsh Issue Trust and
derivatively on behalf of Nominal
17 Defendants APPLIED
TECHNOLOGIES ASSOCIATES,
18 INC., SCIENTIFIC DRILLING
INTERNATIONAL, INC. and ATA
19
RANCHES, INC.,
20
Plaintiff,
21 v.
22 KEDRIN E. VAN STEENWYK, et
al.,
23
Defendants,
24
and
25
APPLIED TECHNOLOGIES
26 ASSOCIATES, INC., SCIENTIFIC
DRILLING INTERNATIONAL,
27 INC., and ATA RANCHES, INC.,
28 Nominal Defendants.
1 INTRODUCTION
2
This is a shareholder derivative lawsuit filed by Plaintiff Matthew D. Van
3
Steenwyk (“Plaintiff”) on behalf of Nominal Defendants Applied Technologies
4
Associates, Inc. (“ATA”), Scientific Drilling International, Inc. (“SDI”), and ATA
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Ranches, Inc. (collectively, the “Nominal Defendants”) against Defendants Kedrin
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E. Van Steenwyk (“Kedrin”), Pamela Pierce, Phillip Gobe, Philip Longorio, Gene
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Durocher, Daniel Carter, Joseph McCoy, and Kieran Duggan (collectively, the
8
“Director Defendants”) for violations of California common law setting forth the
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duties of corporate officers and directors. (Dkt. 179 at 2-3.) Plaintiff also brought
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direct claims as owner of Class A Shares in ATA against Elizabeth A. Van
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Steenwyk (“Elizabeth”) and Kedrin, as Trustee and Successor Trustee of the Donald
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H. Van Steenwyk and Elizabeth A. Van Steenwyk 1996 Revocable Trust, for
13
14 violations of their duties as the holders for all voting shares in ATA. (Id. at 3.)
15 Plaintiff brought additional direct claims against Elizabeth, Kedrin, the Director
16 Defendants, and Defendant Adelaida Cellars, Inc. for breach of fiduciary duties
17 owed by ATA’s controlling shareholders to Plaintiff, or for the aiding and abetting
18 of those breaches owed to Plaintiff. (Id.)
19 On June 24, 2024, a concurrent jury and bench trial commenced on Plaintiff’s
20 legal and equitable claims, respectively. (Dkt. 443.) On July 10, 2024, the jury
21 returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff against the Director Defendants as well as
22 Elizabeth and awarded over $21 million in damages. (Dkts. 485, 489.) On February
23 24, 2025, the District Judge issued an Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part
24 Plaintiff’s Motion for Equitable Relief After Jury Trial, which permanently enjoined
25 ATA and SDI from paying, advancing, or reimbursing any attorneys’ fees or costs
26 incurred by any of the defendants. (Dkt. 692.) On March 7, 2025, the Court entered
27 a Final Judgment in the action. (Dkt. 707.)
28
1 September 8, 2025, the Court held an informal discovery conference to discuss this
2
dispute. (Dkt. 840.) Based on the discussion with the parties at the informal
3
discovery conference, the Court identified a number of gating issues that needed to
4
be resolved so that the parties could further meet and confer in an attempt to resolve
5
the remaining disputes. (Id.) Therefore, the Court directed the parties to brief only
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specific gating issues for resolution and to continue informal efforts to resolve the
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remaining disputes. (Id.)
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On September 16, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Compel Judgment Debtor
9
Discovery (the “Motion to Compel”). (Dkt. 846.) On September 30, 2025, Kedrin
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filed an Opposition to the Motion to Compel (the “Opposition”). (Dkt. 847.) On
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October 7, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Reply in Support of the Motion to Compel (the
12
“Reply”). (Dkt. 848.) On October 28, 2025, the Court issued a Memorandum
13
14 Decision and Order Granting in Part Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Judgment Debtor
15 Discovery (the “October 28, 2025 Order”). (Dkt. 849.)
16 On November 3, 2025, Kedrin filed an Ex Parte Application to Stay October
17 28, 2025 Order (the “Ex Parte Application”). (Dkt. 854.) The Ex Parte Application
18 sought reconsideration and a stay of the Court’s October 28, 2025 Order. (Dkt.
19 849.) On November 4, 2025, Plaintiff filed an Opposition to the Ex Parte
20 Application (the “Opposition”). (Dkt. 857.) On November 5, 2025, the Court held
21 an informal discovery conference to discuss the Ex Parte Application with the
22 parties. For the reasons stated on the record at the informal discovery conference,
23 and as addressed in a separate Order, the Court GRANTS IN PART the Ex Parte
24 Application. Specifically, the Court grants the Ex Parte Application by
25 VACATING the October 28, 2025 Order and replacing it with this Amended Order.
26 As set forth below, the substance of the October 28, 2025 Order remains the same,
27 but the “Conclusion” section has been changed to remove any finding of waiver. As
28 set forth below, the Court still GRANTS IN PART Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel.
1
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II.
3
LEGAL STANDARD
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a)(2) provides that “[i]n aid of the
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judgment or execution, the judgment creditor or a successor in interest whose
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interest appears of record may obtain discovery from any person—including the
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judgment debtor—as provided in these rules or by the procedure of the state where
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the court is located.” “Generally, the scope of post-judgment discovery is broad.”
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Ryan Inv. Corp. v. Pedregal de Cabo San Lucas, 2009 WL 5114077, at *1 (N.D.
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Cal. Dec. 18, 2009). “[T]he judgment creditor must be given the freedom to make a
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broad inquiry to discover hidden or concealed assets of the judgment debtor.” 1ST
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Tech., LLC v. Rational Enters. Ltda, 2007 WL 5596692, at *4 (D. Nev. Nov. 13,
13
14 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Further, due to its broad scope, a party is
15 free to use any means of discovery allowable under the Federal Rules of Civil
16 Procedure.” Ryan Inv. Corp., 2009 WL 5114077, at *1; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 69
17 advisory committee’s note to 1970 Amendment (“The amendment assures that, in
18 aid of execution on a judgment, all discovery procedures provided in the rules are
19 available and not just discovery via the taking of a deposition.”).
20 Where a party fails to provide a discovery response, the requesting party may
21 move to compel a response under Rule 37(a). “Upon a motion to compel discovery,
22 the movant has the initial burden of demonstrating relevance.” Nguyen v. Lotus by
23 Johnny Dung Inc., 2019 WL 3064479, at *2 (C.D. Cal. June 5, 2019) (internal
24 quotation marks omitted). “Thereafter, the party opposing discovery has the burden
25 of showing that the discovery should be prohibited, and the burden of clarifying,
26 explaining or supporting its objections.” Garces v. Pickett, 2021 WL 978540, at *2
27 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2021). “The opposing party is required to carry a heavy burden
28 of showing why discovery was denied.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
1 THE DISCOVERY AT ISSUE
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On April 8, 2025, Plaintiff served post-judgment discovery on Kedrin and
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Elizabeth pursuant to Rule 69(a)(2) consisting of interrogatories and requests for
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production of documents. (Dkt 846 at 10; Dkt. 846-2; Dkt. 846-3; Dkt. 846-4; Dkt.
5
846-5.) The interrogatories seek a broad range of financial information, including
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information related to current assets and liabilities. (Dkt. 846-2; Dkt. 846-3.) The
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requests for production similarly seek a broad range of financial documents
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including tax returns and Forms 1099. (Dkt. 846-4; Dkt. 846-5.)
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Both Kedrin and Elizabeth generally objected to all of the discovery on
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numerous grounds, including the probate exception to federal jurisdiction. (Dkt.
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846-2 at 5-6; Dkt. 846-3 at 4-5; Dkt. 846-4 at 5-6; Dkt. 846-5 at 4-5.) Kedrin and
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Elizabeth also specifically objected to the requests for production seeking tax
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14 returns and Forms 1099 on the grounds that these documents are privileged under
15 California law. (Dkt. 846-4 at 69-73, 117-21; Dkt. 846-5 at 31-32, 48-50.)
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17 IV.
18 DISCUSSION
19 Kedrin contends that Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel should be denied for three
20 reasons. (Dkt. 847 at 7.) First, Kedrin contends that the probate exception to
21 federal jurisdiction applies here and therefore Plaintiff must proceed in state court.
22 (Id.) Second, Kedrin contends that even if the probate exception does not apply,
23 California procedural rules do not permit post-judgment discovery. (Id.) Third,
24 Kedrin contends that even if post-judgment discovery is permitted, tax returns and
25 related documents are privileged under California law. (Id.) For the reasons set
26 forth below, the Court rejects Kedrin’s arguments related to Plaintiff’s post-
27 judgment discovery generally, but agrees with Kedrin’s arguments as to tax returns
28 and related documents specifically. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS IN PART
1 A. Plaintiff Has Met His Initial Burden Of Demonstrating Relevance.
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As an initial matter, Kedrin does not contest the relevance of the discovery
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sought by Plaintiff. (Dkt. 847 (“Importantly, Matthew’s motion does not present a
4
dispute over the scope of discovery . . . .”).) Thus, the Court will address relevance
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only briefly, but has reviewed the discovery requests at issue and finds that the
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requests seek information and documents relevant to collecting on the Final
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Judgment in this action. See, e.g., Ryan Inv. Corp., 2009 WL 5114077, at *1 (“A
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judgment creditor is therefore ordinarily entitled to a very thorough examination of a
9
judgment debtor with respect to its assets, including discovery of the identity and
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location of any of the judgment debtor’s assets, wherever located.” (internal
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quotation marks and brackets omitted)). Because Plaintiff has met his initial burden
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of establishing relevance, the Court must next determine whether Kedrin has met
13
14 her “heavy burden” of showing why the discovery sought should be denied. See
15 Garces, 2021 WL 978540, at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
16 B. The Probate Exception To Federal Jurisdiction Does Not Apply Here.
17 Kedrin contends that any post-judgment discovery in federal court is
18 improper because the probate exception to federal jurisdiction requires Plaintiff to
19 pursue discovery in state court. (Dkt. 847 at 8-9.) The U.S. Supreme Court has
20 explained that “the probate exception reserves to state probate courts the probate or
21 annulment of a will and the administration of a decedent’s estate; it also precludes
22 federal courts from endeavoring to dispose of property that is in the custody of a
23 state probate court.” Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 311-12 (2006). “But it
24 does not bar federal courts from adjudicating matters outside those confines and
25 otherwise within federal jurisdiction.” Id. at 312. Following Marshall, the Ninth
26 Circuit has held “that the probate exception is limited to cases in which the federal
27 courts would be called on to (1) probate or annul a will, (2) administer a decedent’s
28 estate, or (3) assume in rem jurisdiction over property that is in the custody of the
1 marks omitted).
2
Here, Kedrin does not contend that Plaintiff’s discovery would require this
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Court to probate or annul a will, but instead contends the discovery “invites this
4
federal court to exercise jurisdiction in a way that would dispose of trust and estate
5
property.” (Dkt. 847 at 11; id. at 10 (“Matthew asks this Court to direct the
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disposition of estate and trust assets.”).) However, Kedrin’s arguments are focused
7
on the notice of levy and writs of execution that are the subject of other motions
8
pending before the District Judge.1 (Id. at 10-11.) Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has
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explained that “the question is not whether [the federal court] would somehow be
10
duplicating the function of the probate court, or deciding a question the probate
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court will (or might) need to decide,” or even whether the federal court “would be
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interfering with the probate court.” Silk, 65 F.4th at 452 (internal quotation marks
13
14 and brackets omitted). “If the district court would neither be probating or annulling
15 a will (it wouldn’t be here), or administering a decedent’s estate (and again, it
16 wouldn’t be here), the only question is whether it would be assuming in rem
17 jurisdiction over property that is in the custody of the probate court, including by
18 endeavoring to dispose of such property.” Id. The Court easily concludes that
19 Plaintiff’s discovery does not require the assertion of in rem jurisdiction over any
20 property or dispose of any property.
21
22 1 Kedrin relies on Kibbey v. Kibbey, 2021 WL 5798049 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 7,
2021), and Ehret v. Sanchez, 2013 WL 4807165 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2013), for the
23
proposition that “courts have applied the probate exception where administration or
24 disposition of trust or estate assets was implicated by a proposed federal action.”
(Dkt. 847 at 8-9.) However, both cases are clearly distinguishable from the present
25 circumstances where Plaintiff merely seeks discovery. In Kibbey, the court
concluded that the probate exception applied because the plaintiff sought “a
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determination as to whether the current Trustee [wa]s fit to serve in his role as well
27 as other administrative directives.” Kibbey, 2021 WL 5798049, at *2. In Ehret, the
court concluded that the probate exception applied because the plaintiff sought the
28 disposition of trust property. See Ehret, 2013 WL 4807165, at *3.
1 *2 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 19, 2018), for the proposition that there is “no post-judgment
2
discovery allowed where the probate exception applies.” (Dkt. 847 at 11.)
3
However, in Wilmington Tr., N.A., the court exercised its inherent authority to
4
temporarily stay post-judgment discovery in federal court because such discovery
5
would have been duplicative of discovery that could be served in proceedings before
6
the probate court. See Wilmington Tr., N.A., 2018 WL 10159760, at *3 (“To allow
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parallel discovery in both forums would result in duplication of effort,
8
inefficiencies, a potential for inconsistent results, and a waste of judicial
9
resources.”). By contrast here, Kedrin has made no showing that Plaintiff’s
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discovery before this Court would be duplicative of any discovery that could be
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served in proceedings before the probate court. In fact, Kedrin argues that post-
12
judgment discovery is not permitted before the probate court. (Dkt. 847 at 11
13
14 (“Enforcement Against Estate And Trust Assets Should Follow State Procedure,
15 Which Means No Post-Judgment Discovery.” (bold omitted)).) Therefore, the Court
16 declines to limit Plaintiff’s right to post-judgment discovery in federal court based
17 on the potential for duplication of discovery in state court.
18 In sum, the Court concludes that the probate exception to federal jurisdiction
19 does not apply to Plaintiff’s post-judgment discovery because the discovery does not
20 require this Court to probate or annul a will, administer a decedent’s estate, or
21 assume in rem jurisdiction over property that is in the custody of the probate court.
22 See Silk, 65 F.4th at 450. Because the probate exception does not apply, the Court
23 cannot decline jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s post-judgment discovery. See Marshall,
24 547 U.S. at 298–99 (“We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction
25 which is given, than to usurp that which is not given.” (internal quotation marks
26 omitted)).
27 C. Rule 69(a)(2) Permits Discovery Under The Federal Rules Or State Law.
28 Kedrin argues that even if the probate exception does not apply, Plaintiff’s
1 procedure “which does not involve post-judgment discovery.” (Dkt. 847 at 11.)
2
Once again, however, Kedrin’s arguments focus on judgment execution methods
3
and procedures, not on post-judgment discovery, which is the only thing Plaintiff
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seeks in the instant Motion to Compel. (Id. at 11-13.) Indeed, Rule 69 itself
5
specifically distinguishes between judgment execution methods and procedures in
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subsection (a)(1) and post-judgment discovery in subsection (a)(2). Under Rule
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69(a)(1), “[t]he procedure on execution—and in proceedings supplementary to and
8
in aid of judgment or execution—must accord with the procedure of the state where
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the court is located, but a federal statute governs to the extent it applies.” Fed. R.
10
Civ. P. 69(a)(1) (emphasis added). By contrast, under Rule 69(a)(2), “the judgment
11
creditor or a successor in interest whose interest appears of record may obtain
12
discovery from any person—including the judgment debtor—as provided in these
13
14 rules or by the procedure of the state where the court is located.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
15 69(a)(2) (emphasis added).
16 Several courts have recognized that “[t]here is an internal tension between
17 Rule 69(a)(1), which instructs that state procedures must be followed, and Rule
18 69(a)(2), which grants judgment creditors a choice of law.” Pabban Dev., Inc. v.
19 Sarl, 2015 WL 12731928, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2015) (citing cases). “Courts
20 have resolved this tension by interpreting Rule 69(a)(1) and (2) to describe two
21 separate parts of the judgment enforcement process.” Id. (citing cases). “Part one
22 relates to the execution procedures available to the creditors, while part two controls
23 post-judgment discovery in aid of execution.” Id. “Execution methods and
24 procedures must comply with state law, unless they are preempted by a federal
25 statute. When conducting post-judgment discovery, however, judgment creditors
26 can rely on either state or federal law.” Id. (citation omitted).
27 Here, Plaintiff has served interrogatories and requests for production in
28 compliance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Dkt. 846-2; Dkt. 846-3;
1 discovery regardless of the applicable procedures for execution of the judgment
2
under state law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a)(2); Pabban Dev., Inc., 2015 WL
3
12731928, at *3 (“[T]o the extent a judgment creditor elects to conduct post-
4
judgment discovery, Rule 69(a)(2) permits the judgment creditor to choose between
5
the state and federal rules.”); El Salto, S. A. v. PSG Co., 444 F.2d 477, 484 n.3 (9th
6
Cir. 1971) (“A judgment creditor proceeding under Rule 69(a) may utilize either
7
state practice or the Federal Rules for taking depositions.”). Accordingly, the Court
8
concludes that Plaintiff’s interrogatories and requests for production are permissible
9
post-judgment discovery authorized by Rule 69(a)(2).
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D. Plaintiff Has Not Met His Burden To Demonstrate That An Exception To
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California’s Tax Privilege Applies At This Time.
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As set forth above, the Court has rejected Kedrin’s arguments against
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14 Plaintiff’s discovery as a whole. Therefore, the Court now turns to Plaintiff’s
15 argument against producing tax returns and related documents in particular. (Dkt.
16 847 at 14-15.) Specifically, Kedrin argues that even if Plaintiff is permitted to
17 conduct post-judgment discovery, tax returns and related documents are privileged
18 under California law. (Id.) Indeed, under Federal Rule of Evidence 501, state
19 privilege law applies where a federal court sits in diversity jurisdiction, as the Court
20 does here. See, e.g., Iroquois Master Fund, Ltd. v. Glob. ePoint, Inc., 2018 WL
21 6929337, at *4-9 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2018) (holding that under Federal Rule of
22 Evidence 501, state privilege law applies to post-judgment discovery where the
23 court sits in diversity). Thus, the Court concludes that California’s privilege for tax
24 returns applies here.
25 California courts “have interpreted state taxation statutes as creating a
26 statutory privilege against disclosing tax returns.” Li v. Yan, 247 Cal. App. 4th 56,
27 66 (2016). This privilege extends to “information contained in the returns.” Sav-On
28 Drugs, Inc. v. Superior Ct., 15 Cal. 3d 1, 7 (1975); Brown v. Superior Ct., 71 Cal.
1 a taxpayer’s state and federal income tax returns, constitute an integral part of the
2
return and qualify as ‘information contained in the returns’ within the meaning of
3
Sav-On Drugs, Inc., v. Superior Court, supra.”). “The purpose of the privilege is to
4
encourage voluntary filing of tax returns and truthful reporting of income, and thus
5
to facilitate tax collection.” Li, 247 Cal. App. 4th at 66. However, “the privilege is
6
not absolute.” Id. at 67 (internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, “the privilege
7
will not be upheld in three situations: when (1) the circumstances indicate an
8
intentional waiver of the privilege; (2) the gravamen of the lawsuit is inconsistent
9
with the privilege; or (3) a public policy greater than that of the confidentiality of
10
tax returns is involved.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The “last exception
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is narrow and applies only when warranted by a legislatively declared public
12
policy.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
13
14 Plaintiff “bears the burden of demonstrating that an exception to the tax
15 privilege applies.” Goro v. Flowers Foods, Inc., 334 F.R.D. 275, 280 (S.D. Cal.
16 2018). Plaintiff’s only argument in support of an exception to the tax privilege is
17 that “there is a strong public interest in ensuring that Plaintiff, as the prevailing party
18 in this action, receives full redress of his injuries.” (Dkt. 846 at 17.) Plaintiff relies
19 on Hooser v. Superior Ct., 84 Cal. App. 4th 997, 1003 (2000), for the proposition
20 that “[t]he public also has an interest in facilitating the enforcement of judgments,
21 thus ensuring that those injured by the actionable conduct of others receive full
22 redress of those injuries.” (Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).) However,
23 the exception to California’s tax privilege is narrow and only applies when justified
24 by a legislatively declared public policy. See Goro, 334 F.R.D. at 281. Plaintiff has
25 not identified any legislatively declared public policy that is greater than the policy
26 protecting tax returns. See id. at 282 (“Defendant does not argue that a public
27 policy warrants waiver, and the assertion of damages claims that makes the financial
28 information underlying tax returns relevant does not, without more, represent a
1 concludes that Plaintiff has not met his burden to demonstrate that an exception to
2
California’s tax privilege applies at this time.
3
However, Plaintiff may be able to meet this burden in the future based on the
4
California Court of Appeal’s opinion in Li v. Yan.2 In Li v. Yan, the California
5
Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order compelling production of tax returns
6
based on compelling public policy. See Li, 247 Cal. App. 4th at 67. The court of
7
appeal cautioned that “[t]he fact that financial records are difficult to obtain or that a
8
tax return would be helpful, enlightening or the most efficient way to establish
9
financial worth is not enough.” Id. “Likewise, standing alone, a finding of liability
10
for punitive damages is insufficient.” Id. However, the court of appeal explained
11
that “disclosure may be ordered where a defendant has been found liable for
12
punitive damages and the party requesting disclosure establishes (1) the defendant
13
14 has refused to produce relevant nonprivileged financial records or has produced only
15 meaningless and unreliable financial information in response to punitive damage
16 discovery; (2) the defendant has engaged in a pattern of improperly obstructing
17 efforts to obtain financial records through means that do not implicate the privilege
18 and it is reasonable to assume this pattern of conduct will continue; and (3) less
19
20
2 Li v. Yan is the only case cited by Plaintiff finding that an exception to
California’s tax privilege applies. (Dkt. 846 at 16-17; Dkt. 848 at 6.) Plaintiff cites
21 Internet Direct Response, Inc. v. Buckley, 2010 WL 1752181, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Apr.
29, 2010), for the proposition that “[i]n post-judgment discovery proceedings to
22 enforce a judgment in federal court, federal common law regarding privileges apply.
(Dkt. 846 at 16 (internal quotation marks omitted).) In that case, the court applied
23
federal common law regarding privileges to compel the production of tax returns
24 from the judgment debtor’s wife. See id. at *5. The court found in the alternative
that “even if the Court afford[ed] some deference to California’s tax return
25 privilege, the public policy in ensuring federal judgments are enforced [would]
overcome[] Mrs. Buckley’s assertion of privilege in this case.” Id. However, the
26
court did not apply California privilege law and only afforded California’s tax
27 privilege “some deference.” Id. By contrast here, the Court has concluded that
California’s tax privilege applies and therefore must be afforded more than “some
28 deference.”
1 The Court acknowledges that the jury here did not find any defendant liable
2
for punitive damages. (Dkts. 485, 489.) But the rationale in Li may still apply in
3
the future if Plaintiff shows that Kedrin or some other defendant has refused to
4
produce relevant nonprivileged financial records, engaged in a pattern of
5
obstruction, and less intrusive methods to obtain financial records have been
6
unsuccessful. See Li, 247 Cal. App. 4th at 67. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Motion to
7
Compel is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as to Plaintiff’s discovery requests
8
seeking information and documents protected by California’s tax privilege. (Dkt.
9
846.)
10
11
V.
12
CONCLUSION
13
14 Consistent with the foregoing, Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel is GRANTED IN
15 PART. (Dkt. 846.) Specifically, the Court rules as follows:
16 Defendant Kedrin E. Van Steenwyk, individually, as Executor of the Estate of
17 Elizabeth A. Van Steenwyk, as Trustee of the Survivor’s Trust, and as Trustee of
18 her Issue and GST Trusts, is ordered to respond to, and produce documents
19 responsive to, Plaintiff’s Requests for Production of Documents and Interrogatories,
20 served on April 8, 2025. By granting Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel, the Court has
21 overruled Kedrin’s jurisdictional objections and that state law does not authorize the
22 discovery sought by Plaintiff. However, by denying in part Plaintiff’s Motion to
23 compel, the Court has also sustained, for now, Kedrin’s objections based on
24 California’s tax privilege.
25 The Court intends to work with the parties to expeditiously resolve or rule on
26 Kedrin’s remaining objections and set prompt deadlines for substantive responses
27 and document productions. In a separate Order, the Court has set deadlines for the
28 parties to further meet and confer, and then provide further updates to the Court, as
1 well as for the Court to hold a further informal discovery conference.
2 Finally, the Court notes that neither side sought an award of expenses with
3 regard to this discovery dispute. (Dkts. 846, 847, 848.) Under Federal Rule of Civil
4 Procedure 37(a)(5)(C), where a motion to compel is granted in part, the court has
5 discretion to apportion reasonable expenses for the motion. The Court exercises its
6 || discretion to decline to award expenses for the stant Motion to Compel.
7 IT IS SO ORDERED.
8
9 || DATED: November 5, 2025 eb
10 HONMNA. JOEL RICHLIN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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