Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 25-21076-Civ-TORRES

VICTOR GERARD GUYTON II,

Plaintiff,

v.

FRANK BISIGNANO, Acting Commissioner

of the Social Security Administration,

Defendant.

__________________________________________/

ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This cause comes before the Court on competing motions for summary

judgment filed by the pro se Plaintiff [D.E. 7] and Defendant [D.E. 8], on whether the

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) properly weighed the evidence in reaching her

unfavorable decision. Plaintiff also filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

[D.E. 9], which is materially the same as his Motion for Summary Judgment, and

which will also be adjudicated here. Under the limited standard of review governing

this case, the Court finds that the motions are ripe for disposition and that

substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination. For the reasons stated below,

Plaintiff’s Motions are DENIED, Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED, and the decision

of the ALJ is AFFIRMED.

I. BACKGROUND

On August 23, 2023, Plaintiff filed a disability application related to injuries

sustained during a car accident. The agency denied the application, both initially and

on reconsideration. Then, on January 30, 2025, the ALJ issued an unfavorable

decision. The Appeals Council then denied Plaintiff’s request for review, and the

pending case followed.

In his Motion, Plaintiff states a litany of errors (17 to be exact) that the ALJ

ostensibly committed when she entered the unfavorable decision. As to the vast

majority of those 17 issues, Plaintiff does not make meaningful argument, and thus

has waived those issues.1 There are a couple of issues, however, that Plaintiff makes

an effort to flesh out. Those issues are (1) whether the ALJ erred in failing to comply

with the HALLEX, and (2) whether the ALJ properly weighed the medical evidence

(particularly, by emphasizing an X-Ray over an MRI).

1 Battle v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 787 F. App'x 686, 687 (11th Cir. 2019) (internal

citations omitted) (“We review a Social Security case to determine whether the

Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, but we review de novo

whether the correct legal standards were applied. We read briefs filed by pro se

litigants liberally ... [but] issues not briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed

abandoned. … We must conclude that Battle abandoned her arguments on appeal

because she failed to provide any legal authority, citations to the record, or

substantive arguments in her brief.”); Kelliher v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1270, 1274 n. 3

(11th Cir. 2002) (holding that mentioning a claim in the summary of the argument

section is not enough to raise the issue for appeal and that the claim is deemed

abandoned); Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014)

(“Abandonment of a claim or issue can also occur when the passing references to it

are made in the ‘statement of the case’ or ‘summary of the argument,’ as occurred

here.”); Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[A]

legal claim or argument that has not been briefed before the court is deemed

abandoned and its merits will not be addressed.”).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Judicial review of an ALJ’s final decision is limited to an inquiry into whether

there is substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s findings, and whether

the correct legal standards were applied. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Richardson v.

Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Kelley v. Apfel, 185 F.3d 1211, 1212 (11th Cir. 1999).

“Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. It is

such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.” Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983) (citing

Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401); see also Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir.

1996)).

In testing for substantial evidence, a court is not to “reweigh the evidence” or

“decide the facts anew.” Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th

Cir. 2011) (citing another case). Instead, so long as an ALJ’s findings are supported

by substantial evidence, a court must defer to the ALJ’s decision even if the evidence

may preponderate against it. See Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155,

1158-59 (11th Cir. 2004); see also Hunter v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 808 F.3d 818,

822 (11th Cir. 2015) (“In determining whether substantial evidence supports a

decision, we give great deference to the ALJ’s fact findings.”); Miles, 84 F.3d at 1400;

42 U.S.C. § 405(g). However, no presumption of validity attaches to the

Commissioner’s conclusions of law. See Brown v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1233, 1236 (11th

Cir. 1991). A court also reviews an ALJ’s decision to determine whether the correct

legal standards were applied. See Graham v. Apfel, 129 F.3d 1420, 1422 (11th Cir.

1997). In this respect, “the ALJ has a basic obligation to develop a full and fair record,”

as a hearing before an ALJ is not an adversary proceeding. Id. (citing another source).

Ultimately, it is the function of the Commissioner to resolve conflicts in the

evidence and to assess the credibility of the witnesses. See Grant v. Richardson, 445

F.2d 656 (5th Cir. 1971). It is also the responsibility of the Commissioner to draw

inferences from the evidence, and those inferences cannot be overturned if they are

supported by substantial evidence. See Celebrezze v. O’Brient, 323 F.2d 989, 990 (5th

Cir. 1963). We cannot “decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute our

judgment for that of the [ALJ].” Schink v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 935 F.3d 1245, 1257

(11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001)).

Instead, while “scrutiniz[ing] the record as a whole,” we must determine if the ALJ’s

findings were reasonable, Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239, and if the proper legal

standards were applied, Lamb v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 698, 701 (11th Cir. 1988).

III. APPLICABLE LAW AND PRINCIPLES

A disability is defined as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful

activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment

which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or is expected to last for

a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The

claimant bears the burden of producing evidence that proves he or she meets this

statutory definition. “The social security regulations establish a five-step evaluation

process, which is used to determine disability for both SSI and DIB claims” and

“[t]hese regulations place[] a very heavy burden on the claimant to demonstrate both

a qualifying disability and an inability to perform past relevant work.” Moore v.

Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing Spencer v. Heckler, 765 F.2d

1090, 1093 (11th Cir. 1985)).

An ALJ must first determine whether the claimant is presently employed. If

so, a finding of non-disability is made, and the inquiry ends. See 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520(b). In the second step, an ALJ must determine whether the claimant suffers

from a severe impairment or combination of impairments. If an ALJ does not make

such a finding, then the inquiry ends. See id. at § 404.1520(c). At step three, an ALJ

compares the claimant’s impairments with specific impairments under the

regulations that require a finding of disability without further inquiry into the

claimant’s ability to perform other work. See Gibson v. Heckler, 762 F.2d 1516, 1518

(11th Cir. 1985) (“Certain impairments are so severe either when considered alone or

in conjunction with other impairments that, if such impairments are proved, the

regulations require a finding of disability without further inquiry into the claimant’s

ability to work.”). If the claimant’s impairment meets or equals a listed impairment,

the claimant’s disability is presumed, and benefits are awarded. See 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520(d).

Step four involves a determination of whether the impairments prevent the

claimant from performing past relevant work. If the claimant cannot perform past

relevant work, then a prima facie case of disability is established. An ALJ assesses a

claimant’s RFC prior to this stage, based on the other relevant evidence, to determine

the extent of a claimant’s ability to work despite the alleged impairments. See id. at

§ 416.945(a)(1). A claimant’s RFC is an administrative finding of fact concerning the

claimant’s maximum remaining capacity to perform work-related physical and

mental activities on a regular and continuing basis despite the functional limitations

and environmental restrictions imposed by his or her medically determinable

impairment(s).

When making this finding, an ALJ is required to identify the limitations and/or

restrictions imposed by the claimant’s impairments and then assess his or her work-

related abilities on a function-by-function basis. Only upon the conclusion of this

function-by-function analysis may an ALJ express the claimant’s RFC in terms of the

exertional levels of work (i.e., sedentary, light, medium, heavy, and very heavy).

This leads to step five—the final inquiry—where the burden shifts to the

Commissioner to show that there is other work available in the national economy

that the claimant can perform based on the claimant’s RFC, work experience,

education, and age. See id. at § 404.1520(e)-(f).

IV. ANALYSIS

We will address in turn Plaintiff’s two primary arguments: (1) whether the

ALJ erred by failing to comply with the HALLEX, and (2) whether the ALJ properly

weighed the medical evidence of record.

A. HALLEX

Here, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to comply with the guidance found

in the Hearing Appeals and Litigation Law Manual (“HALLEX”), because the ALJ

ostensibly failed to rule on one of Plaintiff’s objections during the hearing. But the

Eleventh Circuit has never held that an ALJ’s failure to comply with the HALLEX is

grounds for remand. See McCabe v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 661 F. App'x 596, 599 (11th

Cir. 2016) (“This Court has not decided whether HALLEX carries the force of law.”).

And aside from that, there is a plethora of authority to suggest that the

HALLEX—an “internal guidance tool”—does not carry the force of law. See

Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (holding that agency

interpretations contained in “policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement

guidelines[ ] all ... lack the force of law”); George v. Astrue, 338 Fed. App’x 803, 805

(11th Cir. 2009) (finding that “to assume that § I–2–8–40 of HALLEX carries the force

of law” would constitute “a very big assumption”); Moore v. Apfel, 216 F.3d 864, 868

(9th Cir. 2000) (holding “that HALLEX is strictly an internal guidance tool, providing

policy and procedural guidelines to ALJs and other staff members” and therefore

“does not prescribe substantive rules and therefore does not carry the force and effect

of law”); Bowie v. Comm'r of Social Sec., 539 F.3d 395, 399 (6th Cir. 2008) (stating

that HALLEX is “not binding on this court”); Bordes v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 235 F.

App'x 853, 859 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that “HALLEX provisions … lack the force of

law and create no judicially-enforceable rights”).

Absent binding authority that non-compliance with the HALLEX requires (or

even authorizes) remand, the Court finds persuasive the opinions of the Third, Sixth,

and Ninth Circuits that reject the argument that an ALJ commits prejudicial error

by not fully complying with or adopting a directive from the HALLEX. This is

particularly true in light of the Eleventh Circuit’s comments that to assume the

HALLEX is binding would be a “very big assumption.” George, 338 F. App’x at 805.

Thus, Plaintiff’s Motion is denied on this score. Even assuming Plaintiff is right that

the ALJ did not strictly follow the HALLEX that would not be sufficient to reject the

findings of the ALJ based on the competent evidence presented.

B. Medical Evidence

Next, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred when considering the medical

evidence of record, because the ALJ afforded more weight to an X-Ray than an MRI.

Specifically, Plaintiff argues that “x-rays are not precise enough to show hairline

fractures and they cannot diagnose soft-tissue injury,” whereas the ALJ “gave little

to no weight to an MRI,” which produces “a much more detailed image of both hard

and soft tissue injuries.” [D.E. at 14].

In its response, Defendant does not directly address this contention. Rather,

Defendant asserts that, as with several of other Plaintiff’s “enumerated errors,”

Plaintiff does not substantiate his argument with authority, and has therefore failed

to carry his burden of demonstrating reversible error.

In her opinion, the ALJ noted that “[a]n X-Ray of the claimant’s left shoulder

noted no acute fracture.” [D.E. 6-2 at 18]. Rather, it showed “subluxation of the

acromioclavicular joint and widening of the coracoclavicular interval.” [Id.]. The MRI

conducted on Plaintiff’s left shoulder, meanwhile, showed a “type III AC joint injury

with separation.” [D.E. 6-3 at 47]. The Court fails to see, then, how the ALJ’s reliance

on the X-Ray yielded a different result than if the ALJ relied on the MRI: both

procedures evidence a joint injury to the shoulder, and neither demonstrate a

fracture. Moreover, while Plaintiff’s opinion may be that the MRI is more telling than

the X-Ray, he has not carried his burden of demonstrating that the ALJ erred in

mentioning the X-Ray.

Even if the ALJ chose not to discuss the MRI results, her opinion was

nonetheless supported by substantial evidence on this score (which included at-length

consideration of state agency consultants and several consultative examiners). And

when substantial evidence is present, it is not within this Court’s province to second-

guess the conclusion of the ALJ. See DeJesus v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 6:20-CV-

1685-LHP, 2022 WL 833677, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 21, 2022) (“To the extent that Dr.

Reback's statement, which is equivocal at best, formed part of his ultimate opinion as

to Claimant's limitations in the area of social interaction, Claimant provides no

argument or explanation as to how the statement conflicts with the RFC. Nor does it

appear to the Court that the statement is inconsistent with the ALJ's ultimate RFC

determination.”); East v. Barnhart, 197 F. App'x 899, 901 (11th Cir. 2006) (“East also

argues that the ALJ erred in failing to consider the consulting psychologist's report

by Dr. Priscilla Wilson. Ph.D. However, any error in failing to address this report

explicitly in the ALJ's determination was harmless given that Dr. Wilson's

observations in the report were consistent with the ALJ's determination.”).

The rest of Plaintiff’s briefing includes only general statements of law,

conclusory descriptions of his alleged disabilities, and dissertations on what evidence

is necessary for the ALJ to make a given finding. But Plaintiff, aside from his

perfunctory “enumeration of error” section, does not meaningfully identify, argue,

and support any apparent errors in the ALJ’s unfavorable decision (aside from non-

compliance with the HALLEX and the ALJ’s attention to Plaintiff’s X-Ray).

Consequently, because we find that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial

evidence, and because Plaintiff has failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating an

issue worthy of remand, Plaintiff’s Motion is denied.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s Motions [D.E. 7, 9] are DENIED,

Defendant’s Motion [D.E. 8] is GRANTED, and the decision of the ALJ is

AFFIRMED.

Finally, because the parties in the case impliedly consented to the exercise of

Magistrate Judge jurisdiction following the direct assignment of the case under

Admin. Order 2024-10, the Court now enters Judgment in favor of Defendant as to

all claims in the complaint and directs that the case now be CLOSED.

DONE and ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida this 4th day of

November, 2025.

/s/ Edwin G. Torres

EDWIN G. TORRES

United States Magistrate Judge