H. Trotman v. Chester County Intermediate Unit (PA Dept. of Ed.)

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Heather Trotman, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 188 C.D. 2025

:

Chester County Intermediate Unit :

(Pennsylvania Department of :

Education), :

Respondent : Argued: October 7, 2025

BEFORE: HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY

JUDGE WOLF FILED: November 4, 2025

Heather Trotman (Trotman) petitions for this Court’s review of the

Secretary of Education’s (Secretary) January 15, 2025 order dismissing her appeal

from her termination by Chester County Intermediate Unit (CCIU). The Secretary

denied Trotman’s appeal on the basis that it lacked jurisdiction to hear her appeal

under the Public School Code of 19491 (School Code), finding that Trotman was not

a professional employee as defined in Section 1101 of the School Code, 24 P.S. § 11-

1101, and therefore did not have the protections of tenure. Upon review, we find

that the Secretary based her findings as to Trotman’s employment upon substantial

1

Act of March 10, 1949, as amended, 24 P.S. §§ 11-101 to 27-2702.

evidence and therefore did not err in dismissing her appeal for a lack of jurisdiction.

Accordingly, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Trotman was employed by CCIU as a Daycare Center Director from

2005 to 2024. The daycare operated by CCIU serves infants and toddlers from 6

weeks to 3 years old. On May 14, 2024, a CCIU administrator informed Trotman

of an incident involving potential child abuse. In what the CCIU alleged is a

violation of organizational and industry standards, Trotman did not inform her

superior, the Childline and Abuse Registry (Childline),2 or the Department of Human

Services. By way of letter sent May 30, 2024, CCIU informed Trotman that it had

charged her with willful neglect of her duties and would recommend her termination

to its board of directors. On June 11, 2024, Trotman mailed a letter to CCIU

requesting a hearing to contest her dismissal. The CCIU denied Trotman’s request

on the stated basis that she was not entitled to a hearing as a professional employee

protected by the tenure provisions in Subarticle XI(c) of the School Code (Tenure

Provisions).3 On June 20, 2024, the CCIU board of directors voted to terminate

Trotman’s employment, and CCIU informed Trotman of same by way of letter dated

June 21, 2024. On July 5, 2024, Trotman appealed her dismissal to the Secretary.

On August 5, 2024, the CCIU filed a Motion to Dismiss Trotman’s appeal, and

Trotman filed her opposition to such motion on August 19, 2024. The appointed

hearing officer dismissed the motion without prejudice.

2

Childline is a free hotline that may be used to report suspected child abuse or neglect to the

Department of Human Services. See 55 Pa. Code § 3490.4.

3

Sections 1121-1133 of the School Code, 24 P.S. §§ 11-1121 to 11-1133.

2

The Secretary held two hearings to determine if Trotman was a

professional employee, and thus entitled to protections under the Tenure Provisions.4

At the hearings, two witnesses testified: Trotman and CCIU Assistant Director

Tamara Acuna. Various documents were also admitted into evidence, including the

description for the position held by Trotman, standards and manuals relevant to the

CCIU daycare program, and classroom schedules for the infant and toddler programs

at the daycare.

In her testimony, Trotman described the various aspects of her

employment with CCIU, as well as the tasks she undertook to support classroom

staff, keep abreast of and in compliance with various programs and regulations, and

ways in which she interacted with the staff and children. Trotman also testified that

she had various teaching certificates, and the nature of each. When asked what

percentage of her time she spends on direct educational activities, she testified that

that “70 to 75 percent of [her] time [was spent] either directly interacting with

children in learning experiences, or supervising staff, or coaching/mentoring.”

Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 93a-94a.

Ms. Acuna testified next. She testified that she was Trotman’s

supervisor at CCIU and testified as to the nature and requirements of the position

held by Trotman, including the programs and initiatives that Trotman was tasked

with overseeing. She also testified as to the standards and curricula implemented

for the infant and toddler programs, as well as where those standards and curricula

came from. She also described the general activities that occur in the infant and

toddler programs as well as which staff were responsible for what tasks in the

4

The protections of the Tenure Provisions grant the Secretary jurisdiction to hear a

professional employee’s termination appeal. 24 P.S. § 11-1131.

3

daycare center. On cross-examination, Ms. Acuna conceded that she could not state

that Trotman’s testimony regarding her allocation of time was incorrect.

The Secretary ultimately concluded that Trotman was not a

professional employee of CCIU, in part based upon the conclusion that “even if [she]

engaged in occasional direct education activities in her work at CCIU, there is

insufficient evidence in the record to support a conclusion that she devoted at least

50% of her time at work on such activities.” R.R. at 452a. In support of the

conclusion that Trotman was not a professional employee, the Secretary also noted

that Trotman was not employed within the scope of any of the educator certificates

she possessed, nor were the staff she supervised required to have educator

certificates. The Secretary also made findings regarding the fact that Trotman did

not have a contract with CCIU, was not required to undergo annual performance

evaluations applicable to professional employees under the school code, and the

children at the daycare center were not subject to attendance requirements and their

participation in the program did not impact their future ability to be placed in K-12

programs.

II. ISSUES

There are two interconnected issues raised before this Court for

consideration on appeal. We consider whether the Secretary properly concluded that

she did not have jurisdiction to hear Trotman’s appeal and whether the Secretary’s

findings of facts in support of such conclusion were based on substantial evidence.

Trotman argues that the Secretary erred in concluding that Trotman was

not a professional employee. In support, she contends that the Secretary improperly

relied upon facts not relevant to the plain statutory language defining professional

employees and teachers, including that Trotman did not have an employment

4

contract with CCIU, did not use her teaching certificates in her position, and the

teachers she supervised did not require teaching certificates. Trotman contends that

the sole deciding factor should have been the determination of whether she devoted

at least 50% of her time to direct educational activities. With respect to such inquiry,

she contends that the Secretary did not have substantial evidence to support a finding

that she did not devote at least 50% of her time to direct educational activities, due

to her testimony that “70 to 75 percent of [her] time [was spent] either directly

interacting with children in learning experiences, or supervising staff, or

coaching/mentoring.” R.R. at 93a-94a; Pet’r Br. at 24-25. She contends that her

supervisor was unable to state that she devoted less than 50% of her time to direct

educational activities, and the other evidence was not sufficient to support such

finding either.

CCIU contends that the Secretary did not err in finding that she lacked

jurisdiction to hear Trotman’s appeal. CCIU argues that the factors relied upon by

the Secretary were proper for determining whether Trotman qualified as a

professional employee under the School Code. It further argues that the Secretary

relied upon substantial evidence in determining that Trotman did not devote at least

50% of her time to direct educational activities. In support, it argues that the

Secretary credited documentary evidence, such as Trotman’s job description and the

infant and toddler room schedules and did not credit Trotman’s testimony as to the

allocation of her time. Therefore, CCIU states that the Secretary’s determination is

one as to credibility, which this Court should not disturb.

III. DISCUSSION

Pursuant to the Tenure Provisions, professional employees of public

schools are afforded various protections of tenure. Tenured employees have a right

5

to a pretermination hearing under Section 1127 of the School Code, and a right of

appeal to the Secretary following dismissal under Section 1131. Section 1101 of the

School Code defines professional employees. Section 1101 provides:

The term “professional employe” shall include those who

are certificated as teachers, supervisors, supervising

principals, principals, assistant principals, vice-principals,

directors of career and technical education, dental

hygienists, visiting teachers, home and school visitors,

school counselors, child nutrition program specialists,

school librarians, school secretaries the selection of whom

is on the basis of merit as determined by eligibility lists

and school nurses.

24 P.S. § 11-1101. Section 1141 of the School Code further defines “teacher”

germane to Section 1101:

“Teacher” shall include all professional employes and

temporary professional employes, who devote fifty per

centum (50%) of their time, or more, to teaching or other

direct educational activities, such as classroom teachers,

demonstration teachers, museum teachers, counsellors,

librarians, school nurses, dental hygienists, home and

school visitors, and other similar professional employes

and temporary professional employes, certificated in

accordance with the qualifications established by the State

Board of Education.

24 P.S. § 11-1141. Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable person would

accept as sufficient to establish the factual determination at issue. Hite v. City of

McKeesport, 312 A.3d 420, 424 n.8 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024). It is within the discretion

of the factfinder to make credibility determinations, and such determinations are not

to be disturbed on appeal. Slater v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 309 A.3d 1144, 1158 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 2024).

6

We constrain our discussion to the Secretary’s conclusion that Trotman

was not a professional employee as she did not devote at least 50% of her time to

direct educational activities, as it is dispositive. The Secretary did not err in

concluding that she lacked jurisdiction to hear the merits of Trotman’s appeal on the

basis that Trotman was not a professional employee, namely a teacher, under the

School Code. The law is clear: if she did not devote at least 50% of her work time

to direct educational activities, she was not a professional employee entitled to

tenure under the School Code. Therefore, we address the substantial evidence

argument raised by Trotman to determine whether the Secretary erred in concluding

that she did not have jurisdiction.

Indeed, the bulk of the documentary evidence provided regarding the

daycare’s classroom schedule and Trotman’s duties as director support a finding that

she did not devote at least 50% of her time to direct educational activities. The

Secretary declined to credit the contrary evidence, namely Trotman’s testimony that

“70 to 75 percent of [her] time [was spent] either directly interacting with children

in learning experiences, or supervising staff, or coaching/mentoring.”5, 6 R.R. at 93a-

94a. Rather the Secretary relied upon Trotman’s job description, policies and

5

Forest Area Sch. Dist. v. Shoup, 621 A.2d 1121, 1124 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993) (“The Secretary

is not required to make specific findings as to the credibility of each and every witness where the

decision itself reflects which witnesses were believed and upon whose testimony the Secretary

relied.”). Here the decision is clear in that the Secretary did not credit Trotman’s testimony with

respect to her estimate of how she spent her time. Rather, the Secretary credited specific details

of her testimony regarding her tasks, as well as the documentary evidence provided by both

Trotman and CCIU.

6

It is also noteworthy that, contrary to Trotman’s contention on appeal, this is not clear

testimony that she devotes 70 to 75% of her time to direct educational activities. Indeed,

supervising staff, coaching, and mentoring may include activities that are not directly educational.

With respect to her direct interaction with children, Trotman testified that “[she] would spend

direct time with the children in the hours when I was covering other staff or covering the classroom

due to child-teacher ratio.” R.R. at 380a.

7

manuals applicable to the daycare center, and schedules7 for the infant and toddler

programs.8 As credibility determinations rest solely with the factfinder, in this case

the Secretary, and the Secretary did not credit Trotman’s testimony with respect to

the allocation of her work, we must defer to that determination. The evidence relied

upon by the Secretary in making its determination that Trotman did not devote at

least 50% of her time to direct educational activities was indeed sufficient that a

reasonable person would accept to determine that fact.9 Therefore, the Secretary

properly dismissed Trotman’s appeal based upon its conclusion that it did not have

jurisdiction to hear the merits of the appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the Secretary’s

order.

7

While Trotman claimed in her testimony that the daycare center did not have such schedules

during her employment, she has not challenged the relevance or competence of such evidence on

appeal. R.R. at 383a. Trotman denied recognizing the toddler schedule, but testified that she

recognized the infant schedule as a “general framework.” Id. at 378a, 380a. Further, the Secretary

credited the schedules and the contents therein in her Findings of Fact but did not credit Trotman’s

testimony that no such schedules were followed during her employment, which is a credibility

determination not to be disturbed by this Court.

8

See Findings of Fact 12-40, outlining Trotman’s various responsibilities at CCIU. R.R. at

441a-47a. The Secretary highlights the non-educational duties of Trotman without crediting

Trotman’s testimony that she devotes 70-75% of her time towards “directly interacting with

children in learning experiences, or supervising staff, or coaching/mentoring.” R.R. at 93a-94a.

These findings are supported by the record as it was before the Secretary. Based upon these

findings, the Secretary found that the record did not support a conclusion that Trotman devoted

more than 50% of her time to direct educational activities.

9

While the Secretary only clearly states this finding/conclusion in the Discussion section of

her Order and Opinion, rather than the Findings of Fact, this finding is, by its nature, a factual

determination.

8

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Secretary is affirmed.

_____________________________________

MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge

9

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Heather Trotman, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 188 C.D. 2025

:

Chester County Intermediate Unit :

(Pennsylvania Department of :

Education), :

Respondent :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 4th day of November 2025, the January 15, 2025 order

of the Secretary of Education in the above-captioned matter is hereby AFFIRMED.

_____________________________________

MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge