Eason

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

SARA J. EASON, ) CASE NO. 4:25-CV-00222-CEH

)

Plaintiff, ) JUDGE CARMEN E. HENDERSON

) UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

v. )

) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, ) ORDER

)

Defendant, )

)

I. Introduction

Sara Eason (“Eason” or “Claimant”), seeks judicial review of the final decision of the

Commissioner of Social Security denying her application for Supplemental Security Income

(“SSI”). This matter is before me by consent of the parties under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed. R.

Civ. P. 73. (ECF No. 21). For the reasons set forth below, the Court REMANDS this case for

further proceedings pursuant to sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

II. Procedural History

On June 28, 2010,1 Eason filed an application for SSI, alleging a disability onset date of

June 17, 2010, and claiming she was disabled due to mood disorder; post-traumatic stress

disorder and delayed academic skills secondary to traumatic brain injury (ECF No. 7, PageID #:

308). On August 15, 2016, the Claimant’s disability was determined to have continued. (ECF

No. 7, PageID #: 206). On June 23, 2022, the SSA found Eason to no longer be disabled. (ECF

1 There is some confusion in the record as to Claimant’s application date—with the ALJ’s

decision containing no filing date (ECF No. 7, PageID #: 127) and other transcript documents

and Claimant’s brief listing the date as June 28, 2010. (ECF No. 7, PageID #: 308; ECF No. 9 at

2).

No. 7, PageID #: 208–10). On March 30, 2023, Eason requested a hearing before an

administrative law judge (“ALJ”). (ECF No. 7, PageID #: 251–52). On December 6, 2023, an

ALJ held a hearing, during which Claimant, not represented by counsel, and an impartial

vocational expert testified. (ECF No. 7, PageID #: 143–69). On, January 16, 2024, the ALJ

issued a written decision finding Eason was not disabled. (ECF No. 7, PageID #: 124). The

ALJ’s decision became final on December 5, 2024, when the Appeals Council declined further

review. (ECF No. 7, PageID #: 28–34).

On May 16, 2025, Eason filed her Complaint to challenge the Commissioner’s final

decision. (ECF No. 1.) The parties have completed briefing in this case. (ECF Nos. 9, 12, 13).

Eason asserts the following assignment of error, “[t]he record contains new and material evidence

that was not submitted for good cause and therefore, under Sentence Six, this case should be

remanded for further proceedings.” (ECF No. 9 at 2).

III. Background

A. Relevant Hearing Testimony

The ALJ summarized the relevant testimony from Eason’s hearing:

The claimant reports the individual and combined effects of the

disorders she experiences have resulted in more than minimal

interruption and alteration of daily routines and ability to function.

Specifically, the claimant alleges she experiences mood swings with

anger, outbursts, and emotional dysregulation. Moreover, the

claimant has a history of exposure to trauma with nightmares.

Furthermore, the claimant states her impairments result in disturbed

sleep, as well as deficits in attention, concentration, memory,

completing tasks, understanding, following instructions, getting

along with others, coping with stress, and dealing with changes in

routine. Additionally, the claimant has medicinal side effects such

as drowsiness and weight gain. Lastly, the claimant posits she

experiences an inability to tend to the full spectrum of routine daily

tasks, secondary to the limitations caused by her impairments

(Exhibits 2E, 3E, 6E, 8E – 10E, 12E, 15E, 17E – 19E and

Testimony).

(ECF No. 7, PageID #: 133).

B. Relevant Medical Evidence

The ALJ also summarized Eason’s health records and symptoms:

As for the medical evidence, first, the statement from Ms. Stephens

establishes the claimant has been engaging in individual

psychotherapy with medicinal management going back to 2014

(Exhibit 12F). This is consistent with treatment notes from the

Counseling Center, from 2015 to 2016, where Ms. Stephens is the

claimant’s case manager. Ms. Stephens reported overall

improvement despite some ongoing difficulties, which is consistent

with these treatment notes (Exhibits 12F and 13F).

Thereafter, ongoing treatment notes from the Counseling Center,

from April 2021 to May 2022, show continued overall stability for

the claimant with management of her impairments (Exhibit 3F). For

example, on December 29, 2021, the claimant reported she was

doing well with a good mood. The claimant denied any medicinal

side effects. The claimant also exhibited a generally benign mental

status upon examination (Exhibit 3F, p. 51).

Going forward, the record tends to show waxing and waning of

symptoms. On June 8, 2022, Ms. Boyle noted the claimant reported

some mood swings and irritability, although the claimant’s mental

status remained generally benign (Exhibit 6F, pp. 17 – 18). On July

20, 2022, the claimant returned to Ms. Boyle, and the claimant

reported symptom improvement. The claimant’s mental status

remained essentially benign (Exhibit 6F, pp. 22 – 23).

Following that, on October 19, 2022, the claimant met with Dr.

Johnson, and she likewise reported the claimant had a benign mental

status (Exhibit 5F). This is consistent with ongoing treatment notes

from the Counseling Center, up to December 2022 (Exhibit 6F). On

January 12, 2023, the claimant returned to the counseling center, and

these records show the claimant had consistently been reporting a

“good” or “pretty good” mood for over a year, but she had some

recent issues after forgetting to take her medication for multiple

days. The claimant’s symptoms again abated with medical

compliance (Exhibit 9F).

In April 2023, the claimant did seek emergent care after a reaction

to a new medication, but this condition did not require inpatient

treatment (Exhibit 10F). Finally, continuation of care records from

the Counseling Center, up to August 2023, show a continuation of

this pattern, with relatively benign mental status examinations and

no more than waxing and waning of symptoms without notable

mention of medicinal side effects (Exhibits 9F and 11F).

(ECF No. 7, PageID #: 133–34).

IV. The ALJ’s Decision

The ALJ made the following findings relevant to this appeal:

1. The most recent favorable medical decision finding that the

claimant continued to be disabled is the determination dated August

15, 2016. This is known as the “comparison point decision” or CPD.

2. At the time of the CPD, the claimant had the following medically

determinable impairments: mood disorder; post-traumatic stress

disorder and delayed academic skills secondary to traumatic brain

injury. These impairments were found to meet section 12.04 of 20

CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 416.920(d)).

4. Since June 1, 2022, the claimant has not had an impairment or

combination of impairments which meets or medically equals the

severity of an impairment listed in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P,

Appendix 1 (20 CFR 416.925 and 416.926).

8. Since June 1, 2022, based on the current impairments, the

claimant has had the residual functional capacity to perform a full

range of work at all exertional levels but with the following

nonexertional limitations: the claimant can understand and

remember simple instructions and can maintain attention,

concentration and persistence to carry out simple instructions. She

cannot perform work requiring a specific production rate, such as

assembly line work or work that requires hourly quotas. The

claimant can use judgment to make simple, work-related decisions.

She can have occasional interaction with supervisors, co-workers

and the public. She can deal with infrequent changes in a routine

work setting.

(ECF No. 7, PageID #: 129, 132).

V. Law & Analysis

A. Standard of Review

The Court’s review “is limited to determining whether the Commissioner’s decision is

supported by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal standards.” Winn v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 615 F. App’x 315, 320 (6th Cir. 2015); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

“[S]ubstantial evidence is defined as ‘more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a

preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

support a conclusion.’” Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting

Cutlip v. Sec’y of HHS, 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994)).

“After the Appeals Council reviews the ALJ’s decision, the determination of the council

becomes the final decision of the Secretary and is subject to review by this Court.” Olive v. Comm’r

of Soc. Sec., No. 3:06 CV 1597, 2007 WL 5403416, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 19, 2007) (citing Abbott

v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 922 (6th Cir. 1990); Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 538 (6th Cir. 1986)

(en banc)). If the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, it must be

affirmed, “even if a reviewing court would decide the matter differently.” Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §

405(g); Kinsella v. Schweiker, 708 F.2d 1058, 1059–60 (6th Cir. 1983)).

B. Standard for Disability

The Social Security regulations outline a five-step process that the ALJ must use in

determining whether a claimant is entitled to supplemental-security income or disability-insurance

benefits: (1) whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not, whether the

claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments; (3) if so, whether that

impairment, or combination of impairments, meets or equals any of the listings in 20 C.F.R. § 404,

Subpart P, Appendix 1; (4) if not, whether the claimant can perform her past relevant work in light

of her residual functional capacity (“RFC”); and (5) if not, whether, based on the claimant’s age,

education, and work experience, she can perform other work found in the national economy. 20

C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)–(v); Combs v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 459 F.3d 640, 642–43 (6th Cir.

2006). The claimant bears the ultimate burden of producing sufficient evidence to prove that she

is disabled and, thus, entitled to benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a). Specifically, the claimant has

the burden of proof in steps one through four. Walters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 529

(6th Cir. 1997). The burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five to establish whether the

claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform available work in the national economy.

Id.

C. Discussion

Eason raises the following issue on appeal, “[t]he record contains new and material

evidence that was not submitted for good cause and therefore, under Sentence Six, this case should

be remanded for further proceedings.” (ECF No. 9 at 2). The Court addresses this issue below.

1. Sentence Six Framework

When determining whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, a

reviewing Court is constrained to reviewing the record that was before the ALJ. Wyatt v. Sec’y of

Health & Hum. Servs., 974 F.2d 680, 685 (6th Cir. 1992); Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d

469, 478 (6th Cir. 2003). However, under sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the reviewing court

“may at any time order additional evidence to be taken before the Commissioner of Social Security,

but only upon a showing that there is new evidence which is material and that there is good cause

for the failure to incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior proceeding.” 42 U.S.C. §

405(g).

The Sixth Circuit has interpreted this statute as creating the

following requirements for a remand to consider new evidence: that

the evidence be “new”- that is, “not in existence or available to the

claimant at the time of the administrative proceeding”; that the

evidence be “material,” which requires showing a “reasonable

probability” that the Commissioner would have reached a different

disposition of the claim if presented with the new evidence; and that

“good cause” exists for not producing the evidence in a prior

proceeding, which requires showing “a reasonable justification for

the failure to acquire and present the evidence of inclusion in the

hearing before the ALJ.”

Phillips v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:19-CV-01261, 2020 WL 1159376, at *10 (N.D. Ohio Mar.

10, 2020) (quoting Foster v. Halter, 279 F.3d 348, 357 (6th Cir. 2001) (citations and internal

quotations omitted)). The party seeking the remand bears the burden of showing that a sentence

six remand is appropriate. Oliver v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 804 F.2d 964, 966 (6th Cir.

1986). However, a court may remand a case under sentence six either upon motion or sua sponte.

Gifford v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., No. 5:20-CV-559, 2021 WL 3737912, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 24,

2021) (citing Street v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 390 F. Supp. 2d 630, 640 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (“[U]nder

the plain language of § 405(g), the Court can properly grant a sentence six remand sua sponte,

based on its finding that the post-decision material is both new and material.”) (internal citation

omitted)).

If a district court remands a claim under sentence six, the court “does not affirm, reverse,

or modify the Commissioner’s decision,” rather, it remands for further administrative proceedings

without ruling on the merits.” Prater v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 235 F. Supp. 3d 876, 880 (N.D. Ohio

2017) (citing Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 98 (1991)). And jurisdiction in the event of such

a remand would remain with the district court, i.e., a sentence-six remand “is not a final judgment

that can be appealed.” Id.

2. Claimant had Good Cause for Failing to Present New, Material Evidence in Earlier

Proceedings.

Following the ALJ’s decision, Claimant presented additional evidence to be considered by the

Appeals Council. That evidence consisted of records from Treatment records from Columbiana

County Mental Health Clinic dated June 24, 2023 through December 26, 2023; Treatment records

from Columbiana County Counseling Center dated January 23, 2024 through May 1, 2024; A

“Mental Health Counselor Statement” by Ms. Stephens dated May 21, 2024; a Medical Opinion

Letter completed by Ms. Boyle and mailed to the Social Security Administration on March 4,

2024; A February 22, 2024 statement by Ms. Boyle; Treatment records from Generational

Behavioral Health dated February 1, 2024 until February 6, 2024; A statement by Jennifer Joseph,

APRN, of Aspire Mental Health dated February 21, 2024; and a treatment record from Trinity

Medical Center dated February 13, 2024. (ECF No. 7, PageID #: 24). Eason asserts that, “[w]hile

some of the treatment records submitted to the Appeals Council were before the ALJ issued a

decision, the majority of the findings including both medical source statements and the letter from

another new provider were all dated after the ALJ’s decision. Thus, they were not in existence at

the time of the administrative proceeding.” (ECF No. 9 at 9). She further asserts, the new evidence

is material as “the evidence specifically identifies several functional restrictions that were far more

limiting than the ALJ’s residual functional capacity” and would bar Eason from competitive

employment. Id.

The Commissioner argues that the “evidence is not new and material, and […] Plaintiff has

not shown that she had good cause for failing to submit it.” (ECF. No. 12 at 8). Specifically,

Commissioner argues that evidence dated before the ALJ’s decision is not new, that all additional

evidence, dated both before and after the ALJ’s decision, is cumulative and therefore not material.

(ECF. No. 12 at 4–5). Furthermore, Commissioner argues that Claimant failed to establish good

cause for her failure to submit the additional evidence to the ALJ earlier. (ECF. No. 12 at 6).

The Court agrees in part with the Commissioner’s sentence six remand analysis and, as

discussed in further depth below, does find some support in the record that the evidence presented

to the Appeals Council was new and material and that good cause exists for Eason’s failure to

present such evidence to the ALJ during the prior administrative proceeding.

i. The Evidence that Eason Asks be Considered by the ALJ Pursuant to Sentence

Six Remand Is New Evidence.

Evidence is considered new, for purposes of a sentence six remand, “only if it was ‘not in

existence or available to the claimant at the time of the administrative proceeding.’” Foster v.

Halter, 279 F.3d 348, 357 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 626

(1990)). Courts within this circuit seem to disagree on what “administrative proceeding” means in

this context. Some assert that to be new, evidence must not have been in existence or available to

the claimant at the time of the ALJ’s decision, see, e.g., Beaty v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:10-

CV-894, 2012 WL 3779700, at *7 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 3, 2012), report and recommendation

adopted, No. 1:10-CV-894, 2012 WL 3779912 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 31, 2012)) (finding that the

records the claimant presented to the Appeals Council were not “new” for sentence six remand

purposes because they were created before the ALJ issued his decision); Long v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec., No. 1:20-CV-1490, 2021 WL 2530216, at *3 (N.D. Ohio June 21, 2021) (finding the claimant

could not show that a record created before the ALJ hearing was new), while others assert that

evidence is new for sentence six remand purposes if it was not in existence or available to the

claimant at the time of the administrative hearing in front of the ALJ. See, e.g., Belcher v. Comm’r

of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 5:22-CV-01903-JRA, 2023 WL 6963544, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 24,

2023), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Belcher v. Comm’r of Soc. Memorandum of

Opinion & Sec., No. 5:22CV1903, 2023 WL 6958661 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 20, 2023) (finding records

submitted to the Appeals Council were new because they pertained to evidence not in existence at

the time of the administrative hearing); Guthrie v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 18-13784, 2019 WL

8435278 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 26, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, No. 18-13784, 2020

WL 913816, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 26, 2020) (finding “medical records created after the date of

the hearing are ‘new’ for purposes of the sentence six remand analysis”). In an abundance of

caution for Claimant’s interests, this Court will consider evidence “new” under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)

if the evidence did not exist or was unavailable to Claimant at the time of the ALJ’s hearing, here,

December 6, 2023.

Thus, the Treatment records from Columbiana County Counseling Center dated January 23,

2024 through May 1, 2024; A “Mental Health Counselor Statement” by Ms. Stephens dated May

21, 2024; a Medical Opinion Letter completed by Ms. Boyle and mailed to the Social Security

Administration on March 4, 2024; A February 22, 2024 statement by Ms. Boyle; Treatment records

from Generational Behavioral Health dated February 1, 2024 until February 6, 2024; Statement by

Jennifer Joseph, APRN, of Aspire Mental Health dated February 21, 2024; and a treatment record

from Trinity Medical Center dated February 13, 2024, are all new as they are dated after December

6, 2023, the date of the ALJ hearing. (ECF No. 7, PageID #: 24). Notably, the Commissioner

concedes that these records are new “because they were not in existence as of the date the ALJ

decision was issued.” (ECF. No. 12 at 5).

In contrast, the Court agrees the majority of the Columbiana County Mental Health Clinic

Records dated June 24, 2023, through December 26, 2023, occurred before the December 6, 2023,

hearing and therefore are not new as they were in existence before the administrative proceeding.

(ECF No. 7, PageID #: 35–61). However, there is one record that occurred after the December 6,

2023, hearing date. The record is dated December 26, 2023. (ECF No. 7, PageID #: 62–63). As

such, this Court finds the Columbiana County Mental Health Clinic record dated December 26,

2023, to be new evidence. (ECF No. 7, PageID #: 62–63).

ii. Claimant Met her Burden showing that Some of her Evidence was Material.

a. The Medical Opinions of Ms. Stephens and Ms. Boyle are not Material

For purposes of a sentence six remand, “evidence is ‘material’ only if there is ‘a reasonable

probability that the [Commissioner] would have reached a different disposition of the disability

claim if presented with the new evidence.’” Foster v. Halter, 279 F.3d 348, 357 (6th Cir. 2001)

(quoting Sizemore v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 865 F.2d 709, 711 (6th Cir.1988)). However,

“Evidence is not material if it is cumulative of evidence already in the record, or if it merely shows

a worsening condition after the administrative hearing.” See Prater v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 235 F.

Supp. 3d 876, 2017 WL 588496 at * 2 (N.D. Ohio 2017). See also Jones v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.,

336 F.3d 469, 478 (6th Cir.2003); Sizemore, 865 F.2d at 712 (“Reviewing courts have declined to

remand disability claims for reevaluation in light of medical evidence of a deteriorated

condition”); Deloge v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 540 Fed. Appx. 517, 2013 WL 5613751 at * 3 (6th

Cir. 2013). Courts within this Circuit also reject claims of new medical opinions suggesting greater

RCF limitations as evidence of materiality. See e.g., Latoya Congress obo J.M. v. Comm’r of SSA,

No. 1:22-cv-01623, 2023 WL 4687624, at *17 (N.D. Ohio July 6, 2023); Kinsley, 2018 WL

3121621, at *21.

Eason argues that “[t]he ‘new’ evidence fits this requirement … as the evidence specifically

identifies several functional restrictions that were far more limiting than the ALJ’s residual

functional capacity. In fact, considering these new limitations, it is clear that Ms. Eason would not

be able to sustain competitive employment if limited in the same capacity.” (ECF No. 9 at 9).

Moreover, Eason contends that:

• First, Ms. Stephens completed an assessment form documenting

several “serious” limitations. Tr 70-71. She found that Ms.

Eason would have serious limitations in accepting instructions,

getting along with coworkers, dealing with stress, and setting

unrealistic goals. Id. While it may not be clear from those

opinions, it is clear from Ms. Stephens’ opinion that Ms. Eason

would miss more than 4 days of work per month. Tr 71. The

vocational witness testified that if an individual would miss

more than 1 day per month, the individual would not be able to

sustain competitive employment. Tr 140. Thus, Ms. Stephens’

assessment was material.

• Second, Ms. Boyle also provided part of a medical source

statement. Tr 72. Likewise she provided opinions regarding

several areas of limitation for Ms. Eason. For example, Ms.

Boyle found that Ms. Eason was unable to meet competitive

standards when it came to completing a normal workday or week

ad [sic.] accepting instructions and responding appropriately to

criticism from supervisors. Id. These limitations, the inability

complete a normal workday or week or respond appropriately to

supervisors, would prevent any individual from performing any

job. Thus, this assessment was material as well.

(ECF No. 9 at 10). The Commissioner argues that the evidence submitted on appeal was

cumulative of evidence already submitted in the record. (ECF. No. 12 at 5). Thus, the evidence

does not rise to the level of materiality required. Id. Specifically, the Commissioner states,

“Plaintiff appears to assume that, if the ALJ had the new opinions of Ms. Stephens and Ms. Boyle,

she would have adopted them and found Plaintiff disabled.” Id. Moreover, the Commissioner

contends, “… it is not enough to simply present new medical opinion evidence providing extra

detail and speculate that an ALJ could have feasibly accepted that evidence.” Id.

The Court agrees with the Commissioner. In regard to the December 26, 2023, Columbiana

County Mental Health Clinic record, this evidence does not appear to differ significantly from

evidence within the record already considered by the ALJ. (ECF No. 7, PageID #: 62–63). And

Eason does not explain how this evidence meaningfully differs from previous examinations so

that it is reasonably probable it will change the ALJ’s mind. Furthermore, the Court agrees with

the Commissioner regarding the materiality of the medical opinions of both Ms. Stephens’ and

Ms. Boyle’s, provider records dated January 23, 2024, through May 1, 2024.

First, in Ms. Stephens’ Mental Health Counselor Statement she opined that Claimant was

“Seriously Limited” in the following categories: accepting instructions and responding

appropriately to criticism from supervisors, getting along with co-workers or peers without

unduly distracting them or exhibiting behavioral extremes, dealing with normal work stress,

setting realistic goals or making plans independently of others, dealing with stress of semiskilled

and skilled work, maintaining socially appropriate behavior, traveling in an unfamiliar place, and

using public transportation. (ECF No. 7, PageID #: 97–98). Notably, pursuant to the Mental

Health Counselor Statement, “‘Seriously Limited’ means your patient has noticeable difficulty

from 11 to 20 percent of the workday or work week.” (ECF No. 7, PageID #: 97).

Second, Ms. Boyle’s Medical Opinion regarding Claimant’s ability to perform work-related

activities opined that Claimant was “Seriously Limited” in various abilities. (ECF No. 7, PageID

#: 99). Specifically, Ms. Boyle found Claimant to be “Seriously Limited” in the following

categories: maintaining attention for two-hour segments, maintain regular attendance and being

punctual within customary, usually strict tolerances, sustaining an ordinary routine without

special supervision, working in coordination with or proximity to others without being unduly

distracted, performing at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest

periods, getting along with co-workers or peers without unduly distracting them or exhibiting

behavioral extremes, responding appropriately to changes in a routine work setting, dealing with

normal work stress, being aware of normal hazards and taking appropriate precautions. (ECF No.

7, PageID #: 99). As stated above, “‘Seriously Limited’ means your patient has noticeable

difficulty from 11 to 20 percent of the workday or work week.” (ECF No. 7, PageID #: 99).

However, Claimant does not demonstrate that Ms. Boyles or Ms. Stevens Medical opinions

are material. Claimant argues that “[t]he ‘new’ evidence [is material under the Sizemore

standard] … as the evidence specifically identifies several functional restrictions that were far

more limiting than the ALJ’s residual functional capacity.” (ECF No. 9 at 10). Yet, a doctor

simply providing extra detail in support of her opinions does not render her post-hearing opinion

material. For example, in Kinsley v. Berryhill, a court in the Northern District of Ohio rejected a

claimant’s similar argument where the claimant argued that the two opinions submitted by the

claimant’s doctor after the ALJ’s decision were material because they were “far more detailed”

than previously submitted opinions. No. 5:17-cv-00604, 2018 WL 3121621 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 24,

2018. Here, both Ms. Boyle and Ms. Stephens previously submitted provided medical evidence

considered by the ALJ. On June 8, 2022, Ms. Boyle noted the claimant reported some mood

swings and irritability, although the claimant’s mental status remained generally benign. (ECF

No. 7, PageID #: 133). On July 20, 2022, the claimant returned to Ms. Boyle and reported

symptom improvement. Id. The ALJ considered Ms. Stephens’ opinion that claimant had

experienced overall improvement “despite some ongoing difficulties.” Id. Therefore, the later

created medical opinions of both Ms. Stephens and Ms. Boyle, dated March 4, 2024, through

May 21, 2024, are not material as Courts in this Circuit do not consider doctors simply providing

extra detail in support of her opinions to be material evidence under sentence six.

b. Claimant’s February 22, 2024, statement by Ms. Boyle, Statement by Jennifer

Joseph, APRN, of Aspire Mental Health dated February 21, 2024, are not

material.

For the same reasons, the February 22, 2024, statement by Ms. Boyle, Statement by Jennifer

Joseph, APRN, of Aspire Mental Health dated February 21, 2024, are not material. First, Claimant

does not address if there is a “reasonable probability that the [ALJ] would have reached a different

disposition of the disability claim if presented with [this] new evidence.” Sizemore v. Secretary of

Health and Human Services, 865 F. 2d 709 (6th Cir. 1988). Claimant’s brief is silent upon this

issue and does not address these opinions. (ECF. No. 9 at 4-6). Additionally, it is within the ALJ’s

discretion to determine the issue of disability, and the ALJ is not required to base his RFC findings

on any one opinion. See Rudd v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 531 Fed. App'x 719, 728 (6th Cir. 2013).

Thus, Claimant does not assert how there is a “reasonable probability” that the submission of these

opinions would have changed the outcome, thus they are not material.

c. Claimant’s Treatment records from Columbiana County Counseling Center

dated January 23, 2024, through May 1, 2024; Treatment records from

Generational Behavioral Health dated February 1, 2024, until February 6,

2024, and a treatment record from Trinity Medical Center dated February 13,

2024, are material.

Although, courts in this Circuit have found that treatment notes of “fairly significant mental

health treatment” to be material under Sentence Six. See Brown v. Colvin, No. 1:13-cv-01242-cgc,

2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21771, at *17 (W.D. Tenn. Feb. 16, 2017) (remanding under Sentence Six

for admission of Claimant’s mental health treatment records). Similarly, the Court finds Treatment

records from Columbiana County Counseling Center dated January 23, 2024, through May 1,

2024; Treatment records from Generational Behavioral Health dated February 1, 2024, until

February 6, 2024, and a treatment record from Trinity Medical Center dated February 13, 2024,

are material. The ALJ’s assessment for all four areas of Claimant’s mental functioning, finds

moderate limitations using the exact same conclusion, “… therapy records show, at worst, waxing

and waning of symptoms with the possibility for good symptom control and benign mental status

examinations with medicinal management. Additionally, the claimant’s impairments have not

required inpatient psychiatric admission during the period at issue.” (ECF No. 7, PageID #: 130).

Specifically, the recent therapy records dated January 23, 2024, through May 1, 2024, and

February 1, 2024, until February 6, 2024, include, a psychiatric hospitalization due to increased

depression and anger, along with suicidal thinking, and self-harm prior to admission (ECF No. 7,

PageID #: 68, and); frequent outbursts (ECF No. 7, PageID #: 78, 87); and medication adjustment

due to severity of symptoms (ECF No. 7, PageID #: 87-95, 108-120). The ALJ explicitly relies

upon Claimant’s lack of symptoms, lack of hospitalization, and consistent management of

medications in order to formulate the RFC. (ECF No. 7, PageID #: 130). The new records contrast

the ALJ’s assessment for all four areas of Claimant’s mental functioning. Therefore, it is

reasonably probable that this evidence could change the ALJ’s RFC determination, and ultimately

her disability determination. Thus, these treatment records are material.

iii. The Record Reflects Good Cause for Eason’s Failure to Present the New and

Material Evidence During the Prior Administrative Proceeding.

For purposes of a sentence six remand, the Sixth Circuit employs the good cause test. The

test requires that a claimant provide “a valid reason for [her] failure to obtain evidence prior to

the hearing.” Oliver v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 804 F.2d 964, 966 (6th Cir. 1986)); see

also Saliba, 2022 WL 18811452, at *9 (“[A] claimant cannot simply point to the fact that the

evidence was not created until after the ALJ hearing but must establish good cause for why she

did not cause the evidence to be created and produced until after the administrative

proceeding.”); Perkins v. Apfel, 14 F. App'x 593, 598-99 (6th Cir. 2001). This includes “detailing

the obstacles that prevented the admission of the evidence.” Courter v. Commr. of Social Sec.,

479 Fed. Appx. 713, 725 (6th Cir. 2012).

Eason contends that her failure to timely provide the new evidence is due to a lack of

representation, significant mental impairments, including a learning disability, and her lack of

education. (ECF No. 9 at 11). The Commissioner argues that Eason failed to establish good cause

as, “Plaintiff was able to not only assist in the development of the record at the ALJ hearing level

(citation omitted) but secure much of the new evidence that she later, through her representative,

provided to the Appeals Council.” (ECF No. 12 at 6).

However, the Commissioner’s argument fails as Courts in this Circuit consider obstacles such

as Plaintiff’s lack of counsel, mental impairment, and lack of education to establish “good cause”

under Sentence Six. See Grant v. Astrue, No. 2:07-CV-344, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114265, at

*11-12 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 6, 2008) (“Given plaintiff’s lack of counsel and apparent mental

impairment, combined with her lack of education, there is no basis for concluding that plaintiff

acted unreasonably in failing to either acquire or present this evidence to the administrative law

judge”); but see Walton v. Astrue, 773 F. Supp. 2d 742, 753 (N.D. Ohio 2011) (“Walton’s limited

finances and lack of health insurance does not excuse his failure to timely either acquire or present

the evidence to the ALJ. Walton was represented by counsel during the administrative hearing

before the ALJ and, overall, the record does not reflect the factors that would distinguish him from

the majority of near destitute claimants who timely submit medical evidence”). In this case, the

Court finds Claimant established good cause as her lack of representation during the ALJ’s

hearing, mental impairment, and lack of education suggest that Claimant did not act unreasonably

in failing to present this evidence in a timely manner. Here, the Court notes that the record reflects

that Claimant requires extensive assistance in filing evidence with the Court. (ECF. No. 7, PageID:

350-365). Claimant largely relies upon her mother, Rachel Eason, to file her records. Id. Claimant

was uncomfortable being alone in the hearing with the ALJ and the ALJ refused to allow her

mother to attend the virtual hearing with her. (ECF No. 7, PageID: 145-47). Based on these

difficulties and Claimant’s lack of counsel or third-party representative present at the ALJ hearing

on December 6, 2023, this Court finds the requisite good cause. (ECF No. 7, PageID: 143).

In sum, the Court finds Claimant had good cause for failing to present the following new,

material evidence in earlier proceedings: Treatment records from Columbiana County Counseling

Center dated January 23, 2024, through May 1, 2024; Treatment records from Generational

Behavioral Health dated February 1, 2024, until February 6, 2024; and a treatment record from

Trinity Medical Center dated February 13, 2024. However, Claimant did not bear her burden in

establishing that the medical statements of both Ms. Stephens LPCC-S and Ms. Boyle MSN, FNP-

BC; A February 22, 2024, statement by Ms. Boyle; and Statement by Jennifer Joseph, APRN, of

Aspire Mental Health dated February 21, 2024, were material evidence. Moreover, Claimant did

not establish that Treatment records from Columbiana County Mental Health Clinic dated June

24, 2023, through December 26, 2023, were new or material.

VI. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that sentence six remand requiring the ALJ to consider

the Treatment records from Columbiana County Counseling Center dated January 23, 2024,

through May 1, 2024; Treatment records from Generational Behavioral Health dated February 1,

2024, until February 6, 2024; and a treatment record from Trinity Medical Center dated February

13, 2024 is proper, as the evidence is new and material, and good cause exists for Claimant’s

failure to incorporate it into the record in an earlier proceeding. Thus, the Court REMANDS this

matter under sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further administrative proceedings and

consideration of new and material evidence including the Treatment records from Columbiana

County Counseling Center dated January 23, 2024, through May 1, 2024; Treatment records from

Generational Behavioral Health dated February 1, 2024, until February 6, 2024; and a treatment

record from Trinity Medical Center dated February 13, 2024. The case is administratively closed,

subject to reopening upon motion by the parties.

IT ISSO ORDERED

Dated: November 3, 2025 s/ Carmen E. Henderson

CARMEN E. HENDERSON

U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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