BATTS

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

LEZQUAN BATTS, et al.,

Plainuff, Civil Action No, 25-14106 (KMW) (BAP)

OPINION

RUTGERS UCHC, et al,

Defendants.

WILLIAMS, District Judge:

This matter comes before the Court on the Court’s sua sponte screening of Plaintiffs’

complaint (ACF No, 1) and the Court’s review of Plaintiffs’ applications to proceed in forma

pauperis (ECF Nos. 8, 11-18). Having reviewed the applications, this Court finds that leave to

proceed in forma pauperis is warranted in this matter for Plaintiffs Batts, Williams, Pettolina,

Tapia-Lobos, Ruiz, Silva, and Jones, and their applications are therefore granted. As none of the

remaining Plaintiffs sought to proceed with this matter, they shall all be dismissed without

prejudice pursuant to this Court’s prior order. (See ECF No. 3.) Because several Plaintiffs shall

be granted in forma pauperis status in this matter, this Court is required to screen their complaint

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and dismiss any claim which is frivolous, malicious, fails

to state a claim for relief, or seeks relief from an immune defendant. For the reasons set forth

below, Plaintiff Batts’s excessive force claim shall proceed as to Defendants Walters and Browne

only, and all other claims and parties shall be dismissed from this matter without prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs in this matter are a number of inmates detained in South Woods State Prison.

(ECF No. 1 at 3-4.) In July 2025, the ventilation system in their prison unit failed, resulting in the

loss of air conditioning and a lack of air flow through their unit, resulting in temperatures of up to

100 degrees during July. (7d, at 8, 11.) Because of this high heat, inmates’ ability to engage in

recreation and exercise was limited during the month of July 2025. Ud. at 11.) Plaimtiffs also

allege that they were exposed to “fumes” of some kind, without elaboration. (/d. at 12.) Plaintiffs

contend that this outage amounts to unlawful conditions of confinement in light of the heat and

lowered air quality they experienced. (7d, at 11-12.) Plaintiffs also allege they went for as long as

“89 hours” without shower during this time. Ud. at 12.)

Plaintiffs also contend that they have received inadequate medical care. Plaintiff Batts

contends that unspecified persons interfered with Batts’s skin medication, and that a Jane Doe

nurse and John Doe officer provided Batts with an injection through a cell door rather than in a

private room, allegedly also violating Batts’s right to privacy. (/d. at 8-10.) Batts also alleges that

grievances have been routinely ignored or denied. (/d. at 45.) Plaintiff Jones contends that he

placed a sick call for a nerve damage issue and unspecified medical officials failed to fully respond

to his request or refer him to a specialist. Ud. at 9.) Plaintiff Silva also alleges that he had leg

wounds from poor circulation which he had difficulty keeping clean, though he does not allege

any specific individual was made aware of or failed to respond to this issue, (/d. at 18.)

Plaintiffs also allege that their religious rights under the Religious Land Use and

Incarcerated Persons Act, “RLUIPA,” have been violated by limited religious services in their unit.

at 31-32.) Although Plaintiffs assert that some unspecified number of them are Christian,

Muslim, or belong to other faiths, they do not allege facts as to their own specific sincerely held

beliefs, nor how their own specific rights have been obstructed, and instead merely provide a

blanket allegation that religious services are limited without elaboration. (/d.)

Plaintiffs also allege that Batts suffered an incident of excessive force on or about July 13,

2025, (ECF No. 1 at 42; ECF No, 1-3 at 5.) According to the complaint, a different inmate flooded

his cell, which flooded into Batts’s cell. Ud. at 5-6.) Batts apparently complained (the complaint

is unclear on what occurred between the flooding and the force incident) and placed arms through

the food port of the cell, Defendant Officer Walters “smash[ed]” Batts’s arms, trying to force them

back into the cell, and Defendant Officer Browne sprayed Batts with pepper spray in an attempt to

aid Walters. (id.at 6.) Batts was then cuffed and removed from the cell, briefly placed in a shower

to wash off the spray, and placed in punitive detention. Ud.) Batts was apparently charged and

found guilty of violating a prison disciplinary rule as a result of this incident. (/d. at 14.)

Plaintiffs also seek to raise claims under HIPPA, the Prison Rape Elimination Act, and a

number of state statutes including the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, and the Isolated

Confinement Restriction Act. (Ud. at 32-42.) In raising these claims, however, Plaintiffs engage

in group pleading — both as to Defendants, who are pled as an amorphous uniform entity

responsible for all wrongs, and as to Plaintiffs themselves who don’t differentiate between

themselves as to which claims apply, and who suffered which specific wrong other than those

discussed above. Cd.) Finally, Plaintiffs seek to raise an equal protection claim, asserting that

they, inmates in restricted custody, are treated differently than those in general population in the

prison. Ud. at 51-54.) Plaintiffs do not, however, explain how they are similarly situated to these

other inmates — who they admit are at a different custody level in the prison — nor do they identify

a specific protected class which applies to them, instead relying on an assumption that one or

another class may apply to various members of the Plaintiff group. (/d.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Because Plaintiff shall be granted in forma pauperis status, this Court is required to screen

his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e}(2)(B), Pursuant to the statute, this Court must sua

sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. /d. “The

legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e}(2)(B) (ii) is the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federa! Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 Gd Cir. 2012) (citing Allah v,

Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 Gd Cir. 2000)).

In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a district court is

required to accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences

from those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny,

§15 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008), but need not accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual

allegations. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). A complaint need not contain “detailed

factual allegations” to survive a motion to dismiss, but must contain “more than an unadorned, the-

defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Igbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A

complaint “that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

of action will not do,’” and a complaint will not “suffice” if it provides only “naked assertion|[s]’

devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” /d. (quoting Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

555, 557 (2007)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Jd, (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S, at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Jd. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A complaint that provides facts

“merely consistent with” the defendant’s liability “stops short of the line between possibility and

plausibility” and will not survive review under Rule 12(b)(6). fd. (quoting Twombly, 555 U.S. at

557). While pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed in conducting such an analysis, pro se

litigants must still “allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim,” Mala vy. Crown

Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir, 2013). ,

Il. DISCUSSION

In their complaint, Plaintiffs raise a number of civil rights claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983 and its state law analogue, the New Jersey Civil Rights Act. Because the same standards and

defenses apply to both equally, this Court will discuss the two together. See, e.g., Trafton v. City

of Woodbury, 799 F. Supp. 2d 417, 443-44 (D.N.J. 2011). Preliminarily, this Court notes that it

observes no basis to dismiss Plaintiff Batts’s excessive force claims against Defendants Walters

and Browne, and that claim shall therefore be permitted to proceed against those two Defendants,

the only two Plaintiff actively identifies as involved in the use of force, at this time.

Aside from this excessive force claim, Plaintiff’s various claims all suffer from similar

issues. First, Plaintiffs engage in group pleading — referring to Defendants as a single bloc and not

differentiating which are involved in which specific issues and how each Defendant violated their

rights. This is improper. See Cheng v. Byrd, No, 24-5345, 2024 WL 3873945, at *2 (D.N.J. Aug.

20, 2024) (civil rights plaintiff cannot state a claim for relief based on personal involvement by

alleging defendants’ responsibility on a group basis without specifying the individual actions of

the defendants). Likewise, to state a claim for a civil rights violation, a plaintiff must generally

specify how each Defendant was personally involved in the alleged wrongs — a defendant may not

be held liable merely as a supervisor, or based on the actions of his underlings. Chavarriaga v.

Dep’t of Corr,, 806 F.3d 210, 222 (3d Cir. 2015); Rode v, Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207-

08 (3d Cir. 1988). Supervisory officials may therefore only be held liable where they can be said

to be personally involved in the alleged wrong — either where they were directly involved, had

knowledge of and acquiesced in the alleged wrong, or put into place a policy, custom, or practice

which was the moving force behind the alleged violation. Chavarriaga, 806 F.3d at 222; see also

Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 583-84 Gd Cir. 2003). Plaintiffs provide

only conclusory allegations of knowledge, acquiescence, or policy issues in their complaints. The

lack of specific allegations as to which Defendants were involved in any given issue requires the

dismissal of the medical claims of Jones and Silva, as well as Plaintiffs’ conditions of confinement

claims, as well as Plaintiff's state law ICRA and NJLAD claims.

Plaintiffs’ conditions of confinement claims also fail to state a plausible claim for relief

because they are based on short term, temporary issues which are largely the result of a mechanical

failure. To plead an Highth Amendment claim based on unduly punitive conditions of

confinement, a plaintiff must plead facts indicating that the defendants subjected him to

“objectively, sufficiently serious” conditions which resulted in the “denial of the minimal civilized

measure of life’s necessities,” and that the prison officials’ actions indicate that he was

“deliberate[ly] indifferen[t] to [the plaintiffs] health or safety” in imposing those conditions, See

Porter v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 974 F.3d 431, 441 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834).

Therefore, although the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of inhumane conditions on

prison inmates, it “does not mandate comfortable prisons.” Farmer vy, Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832

(1994), Here, Plaintiffs largely contend that they were subjected to a lack of air conditioning and

the resulting heat, discomfort, and malaise that come from spending summer days in a cramped

prison unit as a result of a failure in the prison’s ventilation system. They also allege that this

mechanical failure caused smells and other issues related to poor ait flow, as well as limited shower

opportunities, but that this began shortly before their complaint was filed. Given the relatively

short time period at issue here — the approximately two weeks between the failure of the system

and the filing of the complaint and the fact that the conditions discussed are uncomfortable

certainly but not so severe as to deprive Plaintiffs of the minimal measure of life’s necessities,

Plaintiffs’ conditions claim as pled fails to set forth a sufficiently serious condition to support a

plausible claim for relief. Plaintiffs’ conditions of confinement claim must therefore be dismissed

without prejudice in its entirety.

Plaintiffs’ medical claims are also deficient. To plead a medical claim under the Eighth

Amendment, a plaintiff must plead facts which would show that he had a sufficiently serious

medical need, and that the defendant engaged in actions or omissions which indicate that he knew

of and disregarded “an excessive risk to inmate health or safety” presented by that need. Id.

(quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). As noted above, only Plaintiff Batts

actually identifies any actual individuals involved in the denial of medical care — a fictitiously pled

nurse and officer. As the remaining Plaintiffs do not identify any particular Defendant involved

in their medical issues, those claims must be dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff Batts’s medical

claim must also be dismissed because ethe only issue for which Batts identifies Defendants is the

giving of a shot of prescribed medication through a cell door. While this may not be ideal, the

provision of the required medicine cannot be said to be deliberately indifferent to Batts’s needs.

All Plaintiffs’ medical claims are therefore dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a

plausible claim for relief at this time.

Plaintiffs also seek to raise a claim under RLUIPA. In order to plead a RLUIPA claim,

however, a plaintiff must at a minimum identify what sincere religious beliefs he holds, what those

tenets require, and how the defendants are interfering with his meeting of those requirements. See,

Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 356-57 (2015). Here, Plaintiffs only identify that some of their

number belong to various religious sects, and do not delineate their specific beliefs, the

requirements of those beliefs, or how they are being prevented from meeting those requirements

by Defendants. Plaintiffs thus fail to state a plausible claim for relief under RLUIPA.

Plaintiffs next contend that they have been denied their right to petition the Government

insomuch as they believe they have received inadequate responses to their grievances. However,

Prisoners have no constitutional right to an inmate grievance system, nor do they have a right to a

response where the state chooses to create such a system. See, e.g., Roberts v. Aviles, No. 10-

5916, 2012 WL 603790, at *1 n. 4 (D.N.J. Feb, 16, 2012); Wilson v. Horn, 971 F. Supp. 943, 947

(E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 142 F.3d 430 Gd Cir. 1998); see also Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir.

1994) (“the Constitution creates no entitlement to grievance procedures or access to any such

procedure voluntarily established by a state’). Thus, that the state inadequately responds to

grievances does not state a plausible claim for relief.

Plaintiffs next attempt to repackage the claims of Batts related to receiving estrogen shots

through a cell door into a claim for a violation of the right to privacy, a violation of HIPPA, or a

PREA violation. Neither state or federal HIPPA statutes nor PREA, however, provide a private

cause of action for individual plaintiffs. See Bowens v. Wetzel, 674 F. App’x 133, 137 Gd Cir.

2017); Walsh vy. NJ. Dep’t of Corr, No, 17-2442, 2017 WL 3835666, at *4 (D.N.J. Aug. 31,

2017); see also Wade vy. Mills, No. 19-21501, 2021 WL 689106, at *3 (D.N.J. Feb. 23, 2021);

Welch v. Cape May Cnty. Corr. Ctr., No. 15-8745, 2016 WL 686255, at *2 (D.N.J. Feb. 19, 2016).

Plaintiffs’ medical privacy claim could therefore only be brought under the general right

to the privacy of one’s medical information. See, e.g., Archie v. Warren, No., 2022 WL 92804, at

*2 (D.N.J. Jan. 10, 2022). Given the limited privacy accorded to prisoners, courts in this circuit

have only permitted medical privacy claims related to prisoners to proceed where they allege that

the defendants disclosed “an unusual medical condition which, if disclosed unnecessarily, would

likely expose the inmate to ridicule, discrimination, or even potential violence and harm,

particularly when word of the condition is likely to spread through ‘rumor or gossip.’” Jd. (quoting

Smith v. Hayman, No, 09-2602, 2012 WL 1079634 at *18 (D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2012)). Here, Plaintiff

Batts asserts only that staff provided estrogen shots through a cell door, not that they otherwise

announced or made known to all others the exact details of what was being provided. While Batts

does allege that other inmates made snide remarks about Batts identifying as transgender, given

Batts statement that Batts presents as such in general, the complaint does not support an inference

that these other inmates knew of this condition merely because Batts received a shot through a cell

door. The complaint as pled thus does not support the inference that the medical defendants

revealed or otherwise improperly disclosed Batts condition to others by providing medicine

through a cell door, and thus Plaintiffs fail to state a plausible claim for relief for a privacy

violation.

Finally, Plaintiffs seek to raise an equal protection claim. Such a claim generally requires

allegations that a plaintiff is either a member of a protected class who has been treated differently

than others similarly situated because of membership in that class, or that the plaintiff was treated

differently from others similarly situated without a rational basis for the difference in treatment.

See.” Watlington ex, rel. FCT Schuylkill African Am. Inmates v. Reigel, 723 F. App’x 137, 139

(3d Cir. 2018); Wofford v. Lanigan, No. 14-5723, 2015 WL 9480016, at *5 (D.N.J. Dec. 28, 2015)

(citing Vill, of Willowbrook v, Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 563 (2000)). Here, Plaintiffs suggest they

receive different treatment from those in lower security custody in general population, whereas

they are subject to harsher conditions as they are in a more secure custody unit for various reasons.

These allegations thus fail to show that those being treated differently are similarly situated — they

are at the very least at a different security level in the prison, which supports an inference of a

rational difference sufficient to support different treatment — and likewise fail to identify the

specific protected classes that may apply to them. Thus, Plaintiffs fail to plead a plausible claim

for relief under the equal protection clause at this time.

Having reviewed the entirety of the complaint, Plaintiff Batts’s excessive force claim shail

proceed at this time against Defendants Walters and Browne. For all other claims, plaintiffs, and

defendants are dismissed without prejudice. The Court notes, however, that at least some of the

claims, Plaintiffs, and Defendants in this matter may have been improperly joined. Under the

federal rules, multiple plaintiffs or defendants may only be joined in a single case where there is a

right to relief which can be asserted by or against all of them arising out of a single transaction,

occurrence, or series of occurrences, and there are questions of law or fact common to all plaintiffs

or defendants in the case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a). The rules do not permit a kitchen sink

approach in which a plaintiff or group of plaintiffs raise numerous unrelated claims merely because

they all involve the plaintiff or groups of plaintiffs. Thus, should any attempt be made to amend

this matter, Plaintiffs should be mindful that the requirements of the Federal Rules as to joinder of

claims and parties do apply to them and any unrelated claim attempted to be added to this matter

may be dismissed or severed for improper joinder.

Finally, the Court notes that Plaintiff Batts has also filed both a motion to reopen this matter

and a motion seeking appointed counsel. Because this matter shall be reopened, the motion to

reopen is granted. Plaintiff's motion seeking appointed counsel, however, is denied without

prejudice as the sole remaining claim in this matter is not complex, will likely require little

discovery, and Plaintiff Batts has ably demonstrated an ability to present this claim. See Cuevas

v. United States, 422 PF. App’x 142, 144-45 Gd Cir. 2011); Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294 F.3d 492,

498 (3d Cir, 2002); Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 153 (3d Cir. 1993).

WD

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons expressed above, Plaintiffs Batts, Williams, Pettolina, Tapia-Lobos, Ruiz,

Silva, and Jones in forma pauperis applications (ECF Nos.8, 11-18) are GRANTED; Plaintiff

Batts’s excessive force claims shall PROCEED at this time against Defendants Brown and

Walters, and all remaining claims and parties shall be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Plaintiff Batts’s motion to reopen (ECF No. 10) shall be GRANTED; and Plaintiffs’ motion

seeking appointed counsel (ECF No. 7) shall be DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, An order

consistent with this Opinion will be entered.

| 4 oS

Dated: November 3, 2025 “eS me SQ see

’ ah, Karen M. Williams,

United States District Judge

Il