Parnell Dion Lanier v. State of Indiana

FILED

Nov 03 2025, 8:52 am

CLERK

Indiana Supreme Court

Court of Appeals

and Tax Court

IN THE

Court of Appeals of Indiana

Parnell D. Lanier,

Appellant-Defendant

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

November 3, 2025

Court of Appeals Case No.

25A-CR-769

Interlocutory Appeal from the Marion Superior Court

The Honorable Marshelle D. Broadwell, Judge

The Honorable Joel A. Schneider, Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No.

49D07-2405-F5-12646

Opinion by Judge Bradford

Judges Kenworthy and Felix conur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-769 | November 3, 2025 Page 1 of 16

Bradford, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] Following a traffic stop, during which law enforcement discovered contraband,

Parnell Dion Lanier was charged with Level 5 felony unlawful carrying of a

handgun, Level 5 felony possession of cocaine, and Class A misdemeanor

possession of marijuana. Lanier moved to suppress certain evidence, namely

the contraband that had been recovered from his person and his vehicle during

the traffic stop. The trial court denied Lanier’s motion to suppress and, at

Lanier’s request, certified the case for interlocutory appeal.

[2] Lanier contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the

challenged evidence, arguing that the evidence should have been suppressed

because the initial traffic stop was unlawful. For its part, the State argues that

the traffic stop was lawful and the search was reasonable. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History 1

[3] According to the probable cause affidavit and testimony presented during the

hearing on Lanier’s motion to dismiss, on the evening of May 4, 2024,

1

We held oral argument in this matter at Westfield High School on October 17, 2025. We wish to thank the

students, faculty, administration, and staff of Westfield High School for their warm hospitality. We also

commend counsel for the high quality of their arguments.

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Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Officer Collin Poynter 2 was on routine patrol

when he observed a vehicle, which was being driven by Lanier, fail “to signal as

[it] was turning to go eastbound on 30th Street … from a Phillips 66 parking

lot.” Tr. Vol. II p. 5. Officer Poynter knew the area to be “a heavy traffic area”

and “one of the more violent areas. There’s a lot of property crimes, crimes

against people in that area, specifically, and there’s a lot of crimes against the

business.” Tr. Vol. II p. 5.

[4] After observing Lanier’s failure to use a turn signal, Officer Poynter initiated a

traffic stop. As he approached Lanier’s vehicle, Officer Poynter “could smell

the odor of marijuana.” Tr. Vol. II p. 8. Officer Poynter observed “a holstered

SCCY 9mm handgun” in Lanier’s lap. Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 20. Officer

Poynter removed Lanier “from the vehicle and detained him due to his ignoring

commands not to reach for the firearm.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 20. Lanier

acknowledges that contraband was recovered from his person and vehicle.

[5] On May 6, 2024, the State charged Lanier with Level 5 felony unlawful

carrying of a handgun and Class A misdemeanor possession of marijuana. The

State later amended the charging information to include a charge of Level 5

felony possession of cocaine. Lanier moved to suppress “certain evidence,

including contraband, seized from [his person] or his vehicle[.]” Appellant’s

2

It appears that Officer Poynter’s name is misspelled in the transcript. The transcript lists his last name as

Bynter, but the probable cause affidavit authored by this officer spells his last name as Poynter. The parties

also referred to the officer as Officer Poynter at oral argument.

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App. Vol. II p. 61. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Lanier’s motion,

finding that the traffic stop had been “justifiable and reasonable.” Appellant’s

App. Vol. II p. 89. The trial court certified the issue for interlocutory appeal,

and we accepted jurisdiction.

Discussion and Decision

I. Standard of Review and Relevant Authorities

[6] Our standard of review on appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress

evidence is similar to other sufficiency issues. Johnson v. State, 21 N.E.3d 841,

843 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.

We determine whether substantial evidence of probative value

exists to support the court’s denial of the motion. [Westmoreland

v. State, 965 N.E.2d 163, 165 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)]. We do not

reweigh the evidence, and we consider conflicting evidence most

favorably to the trial court’s ruling. Taylor v. State, 689 N.E.2d

699, 702 (Ind. 1997). However, unlike other sufficiency matters,

we must also consider the uncontested evidence that is favorable

to the defendant. Westmoreland, 965 N.E.2d at 165.

Id. “We review de novo a ruling on the constitutionality of a search or seizure,

but we give deference to a trial court’s determination of the facts, which will not

be overturned unless clearly erroneous.” Westmoreland, 965 N.E.2d at 165

(citing Campos v. State, 885 N.E.2d 590, 596 (Ind. 2008)).

[7] A traffic stop is a “seizure” subject to the constraints imposed by

both the Indiana and Federal Constitutions. One exception to

the warrant requirement for a seizure is an investigatory stop

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based on reasonable suspicion. Baldwin v. Reagan, 715 N.E.2d

332, 337 (Ind. 1999); Terry v. Ohio, [392 U.S. 1, 30–31] (1968).

“Reasonable suspicion exists where the facts known to the

officer, together with the reasonable inferences arising from such

facts, would cause an ordinarily prudent person to believe that

criminal activity has or is about to occur.” Baldwin, 715 N.E.2d

at 337.

Campos, 885 N.E.2d at 597.

[8] Prior to January 1, 2023, Indiana Code section 9-21-8-25 read, in relevant part,

that “[a] signal of intention to turn right or left shall be given continuously

during not less than the last two hundred (200) feet traveled by a vehicle before

turning or changing lanes.” As Lanier acknowledges, Indiana Code section 9-

21-8-25 did not include any limitation of where or when use of a turn signal was

required. It is undisputed, however, that Indiana Code section 9-21-8-25 was

repealed effective January 1, 2023.

[9] Also relating to the use of turn signals, Indiana Code section 9-21-8-24 provides

as follows:

(a) A person may not:

(1) slow down or stop a vehicle;

(2) turn a vehicle from a direct course upon a

highway; or

(3) change from one (1) traffic lane to another; unless

the movement can be made with reasonable safety.

(b) Before making a movement described in this section, a person

shall provide notice of the person’s intention by giving:

(1) a clearly audible horn signal if any pedestrian may

be affected by the movement; and

(2) an appropriate stop or turn signal[.]

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Prior to January 1, 2023, Indiana Code section 9-21-8-24 only required the use

of a turn signal if any other vehicle might be affected by the movement. The

fact that the requirement that another vehicle be affected by the movement was

removed from the statute, effective January 1, 2023, indicates that the Indiana

General Assembly intended that use of a turn signal be required in all qualifying

situations, not only when the movement may affect others.

[10] Citing to these statutes, Lanier asserts that since the repeal of Indiana Code

section 9-21-8-25, a driver turning onto a public roadway from a private

roadway or driveway is no longer required to use a turn signal.3 Relying on his

assertion that he was not required to use a turn signal when turning onto 30th

Street from the Phillips 66 parking lot, Lanier contends that the traffic stop was

unlawful and, as such, the search of his person and vehicle was impermissible

under both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution (“the

Fourth Amendment”) and Article 1, Section 11, of the Indiana Constitution

(“Article 1, Section 11”).

[11] The Fourth Amendment, which protects individuals against unreasonable

searches and seizures of persons and property, provides as follows:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,

shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon

3

Lanier also cites to Indiana Code section 9-21-8-34. We note however, that Indiana Code section 9-21-8-

34, which provides that “[a] person who drives a vehicle that is about to enter or cross a highway from a

private road or driveway shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles approaching on the highway[,]” concerns

the right-of-way when entering or crossing a highway, not the use of turn signals.

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probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and

particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons

or things to be seized.

“As a deterrent mechanism, evidence obtained in violation of this rule is

generally not admissible against a defendant absent a recognized exception.”

Johnson v. State, 117 N.E.3d 581, 583 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied.

“Likewise, [Article 1, Section 11,] protects citizens from unreasonable searches

and seizures.” Id. Although the language of Article 1, Section 11, tracks the

Fourth Amendment verbatim,

Indiana has explicitly rejected the expectation of privacy as a test

of the reasonableness of a search or seizure. The legality of a

governmental search under the Indiana Constitution turns on …

1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation

has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion the method of the search

or seizure imposes on the citizen’s ordinary activities, and 3) the

extent of law enforcement needs.

Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 359–61 (Ind. 2005). Thus, “[d]espite the

similarity of the two provisions, Indiana courts interpret and apply [A]rticle 1,

[S]ection 11 independently from Fourth Amendment analysis.” Johnson, 117

N.E.3d at 583 (citing Mitchell v. State, 745 N.E.2d 775 (Ind. 2001)).

II. The Fourth Amendment

[12] Lanier argues that, under the Fourth Amendment, Officer Poynter lacked

probable cause to initiate the traffic stop. “Probable cause to search a vehicle is

established if, under the ‘totality of the circumstances’ there is a ‘fair probability’

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that the car contains contraband or evidence.” U.S. v. Nielsen, 9 F.3d 1487,

1489–90 (10th Cir. 1993) (quoting Ill. v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983))

(emphasis in original). Furthermore, in Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 57

(2014), the United States Supreme Court held that a police officer’s reasonable

mistake of law can give rise to the reasonable suspicion necessary to uphold a

traffic stop under the Fourth Amendment. The Court noted that it had

“repeatedly” affirmed that “‘the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment

is ‘reasonableness.’’” Heien, 574 U.S. at 60 (quoting Riley v. Cal., 573 U.S. 373,

381 (2014)). “To be reasonable is not to be perfect, and so the Fourth

Amendment allows for some mistakes on the part of government officials,

giving them ‘fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community’s protection.’”

Id. at 60–61 (quoting Brinegar v. U.S., 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)).

We have recognized that searches and seizures based on mistakes

of fact can be reasonable.… But reasonable men make mistakes

of law, too, and such mistakes are no less compatible with the

concept of reasonable suspicion. Reasonable suspicion arises

from the combination of an officer’s understanding of the facts

and his understanding of the relevant law. The officer may be

reasonably mistaken on either ground. Whether the facts turn

out to be not what was thought, or the law turns out to be not

what was thought, the result is the same: The facts are outside

the scope of the law. There is no reason, under the text of the

Fourth Amendment or our precedents, why this same result

should be acceptable when reached by way of a reasonable

mistake of fact, but not when reached by way of a similarly

reasonable mistake of law.

Id. at 61.

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[13] Lanier argues that “[i]t is clear that Officer Poynter sought to enforce a non-

existent law … of which he was unaware had been totally repealed.”

Appellant’s Br. p. 13. In making this argument, Lanier alludes to Indiana Code

section 9-21-8-25, which again had been repealed effective January 1, 2023.

Lanier asserts that “Officer Poynter’s testimony shows that he was, in reality,

enforcing a law that no longer exists. Doing so was not a ‘reasonable mistake’

under Heien, and the evidence discovered as a result of the unlawful stop must

be suppressed.” Appellant’s Br. pp. 13–14. In his reply brief, Lanier asserts

that

Officer Poynter mistakenly believed this turn signal statute had

recently been ‘updated’ and apparently was unaware that it had

been repealed – not updated. The reality is that Officer Poynter

stopped [Lanier] for violation of a law that no longer existed and

the [State] is making an effort to justify the stop based on a

statute that has no application here.

Appellant’s Reply Br. p. 5. Lanier claims that “the repeal of the turn signal law

statute is so obvious that an objectively reasonable police officer would have

realized that relying on the repealed statute would not be in objective good faith

and even amounts to inexcusable lack of knowledge.” Appellant’s Reply Br. p.

8. The State does not make any argument relating to Indiana Code section 9-

21-8-25, instead focusing its argument on the reasonableness of the stop under

Indiana Code section 9-21-8-24.

[14] The parties focus their arguments relating to Indiana Code section 9-21-8-24 to

subsection (a)(2), which provides that “[a] person may not … turn a vehicle

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from a direct course upon a highway” without using a turn signal to inform

others of the intended turn. Lanier reads Indiana Code section 9-21-8-24(a)(2)

narrowly, arguing that the phrase “upon a highway” indicates that the vehicle

in question was already on the public highway and would not include a vehicle

turning onto the public highway from a private drive. For its part, the State

reads Indiana Code section 9-21-8-24(a)(2) more broadly, arguing that the

phrase “upon a highway” includes movement taking a driver on-to the highway.

While Lanier and the State both argue that their interpretation is the correct

interpretation that should be applied to Lanier’s case, we find support for both

interpretations in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (Unabridged),

which includes the following definitions for the word “upon”: “in or into close

proximity or contact with by way of” and “on the surface … on it[.]”

WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2517, 2518 (Phillip

Babcock Gove et al. eds., G. & C. Merriam Company 1966). We need not

choose between the parties’ differing interpretations of the meaning of the

phrase “upon a highway,” however, because even assuming that Lanier’s more

limited interpretation was the interpretation intended by the Indiana General

Assembly at the time the statute was written, we conclude that Officer

Poynter’s alleged mistake of the law was reasonable under the Fourth

Amendment.

[15] Indiana Code section 9-21-8-24(a)(3) requires use of a signal if a person intends

to “change from one (1) traffic lane to another; unless the movement can be

made with reasonable safety.” Indiana Code section 9-21-8-24(a)(3) does not

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contain the limiting phrase “upon a highway” that is present in Indiana Code

section 9-21-8-24(a)(2). Pointing to Indiana Code section 9-21-8-24(a)(3), the

State argues that the term “‘traffic lane’ is not defined in the traffic laws, and it

would have been a reasonable belief that the lane of exit and entry of a busy

business like a gas station would constitute a ‘traffic lane[.]’” Appellee’s Br. p.

8. The State further asserts that

[i]t would not be unreasonable to believe that turning onto a

roadway from [a mall, gas station, retail store, etc.] would

constitute a change of travel from one lane to another. In other

words, when a person leaves a private business to turn onto a

roadway, they are changing lanes and changing their direct

course upon a highway. Officer Poynter had a reasonable belief

that one of these two movements, which require signaling,

occurred, and because Lanier did not signal, Officer Poynter

reasonably believed an infraction had occurred.

Appellee’s Br. pp. 8–9. The State claims while Lanier’s interpretation of

Indiana Code section 9-21-8-24 “could surely be a reasonable interpretation of

how the statute applies, but it is just as reasonable as the belief that the statute

sweeps more broadly and applied to Lanier’s conduct in this case, as Officer

Poynter reasonably believed.” Appellee’s Br. pp. 9–10.

[16] We conclude that to the extent that Officer Poynter may have relied on a

mistake of law when he initiated the traffic stop, any mistake of the law was

reasonable under Heien. Again, “[t]o be reasonable is not to be perfect, and so

the Fourth Amendment allows for some mistakes on the part of government

officials, giving them ‘fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community’s

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protection.’” Heien, 574 U.S. at 60–61 (quoting Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 176).

Further, while judges and attorneys interpret the words and phrases contained

in a criminal statute to determine the statute’s intended meaning, police officers

are neither trained nor required to consider all possible interpretations but must

rely on a common-sense understanding of the law before making an on-the-spot

determination as to what conduct is prohibited. Where, as here, multiple

meanings of a particular word or phrase in a statute are possible, when

reviewing police action, the question must be whether the officer’s on-the-spot

determination was reasonable. Because Officer Poynter could have reasonably

believed that Lanier’s conduct was prohibited by Indiana Code section 9-21-8-

24, through either subsection (a)(2), (a)(3), or both, any mistake in the law was

reasonable. The traffic stop, therefore, did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

III. Article 1, Section 11

[17] Lanier also argues that the search was unlawful under Article 1, Section 11.

When considering whether a search is lawful under Article 1, Section 11, we

consider “each case on its own facts to decide whether the police behavior was

reasonable.” Brown v. State, 653 N.E.2d 77, 79 (Ind. 1995). Again, in Litchfield,

the Indiana Supreme Court recognized that while “there may well be other

relevant considerations under the circumstances,” the reasonableness of a

search turns “on a balance of: 1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or

knowledge that a violation has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion the method

of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen’s ordinary activities, and 3) the

extent of law enforcement needs.” 824 N.E.2d at 361.

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[18] Lanier cites this court’s opinion in Mercado v. State, 200 N.E.3d 463, 471 (Ind.

Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied, which indicates that a mistake of law may be

treated differently with regards to Article 1, Section 11, than under the Fourth

Amendment. Although ultimately denying Mercado the requested relief, we

agreed that “if [the police officer had] misunderstood what the law proscribed

when he initiated the traffic stop, Article 1, Section 11, which provides greater

rights to Hoosiers here than the Fourth Amendment does, would be available to

afford Mercado relief.” Mercado, 200 N.E.3d at 471. We disagree, however,

with the Mercado majority’s conclusion that a mistake of law can never be

reasonable under Article 1, Section 11. As the Mercado concurrence provides,

[t]he inescapable corollary to protection from unreasonable

police activity, of course, is that there is no protection from

reasonable police activity. If you also accept the proposition …

that “reasonable men make mistakes of law, too,” [Heien, 574

U.S. at 61], then … you are constrained to conclude that Article

1, Section 11, offers no protection from them.

Id. at 475. We agree that

[t]here is, however, nothing in either the text of Article 1, Section

11, or in the jurisprudence of the Indiana Supreme Court that

provides any support for the proposition that a reasonable

mistake of law should be treated differently than any other

reasonable police activity, i.e., activity from which Article 1,

Section 11, offers no protection.

Id. We further agree that “a blanket ban on evidence recovered as a result of a

reasonable mistake of law goes against the letter and spirit of Article 1, Section

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11” and the reasonableness of an alleged mistake of law should be considered

on a case-by-case basis. Id. As such, we adopt the analysis of the United States

Supreme Court in Heien and believe that the question of whether an alleged

mistake of law is reasonable under Article 1, Section 11, requires a

determination of whether the alleged mistake of the law is reasonable under

Litchfield.

[19] Again, Litchfield requires consideration of “1) the degree of concern, suspicion,

or knowledge that a violation has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion the

method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen’s ordinary activities, and

3) the extent of law enforcement needs” when considering the reasonableness of

police action under Article 1, Section 11. Litchfield , 824 N.E.2d at 361.

Applying the Litchfield factors, we conclude that Officer Poynter’s degree of

suspicion was high as he observed what he believed to be a traffic infraction.

The traffic stop was also minimally intrusive. See Ramsey v. State, 222 N.E.3d

1038, 1048 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (noting that “our Indiana Supreme Court has

held a traffic stop ‘amount[s] to a small intrusion’ on a defendant’s ‘ordinary

activities.’” Marshall v. State, 117 N.E.3d 1254, 1262 (Ind. 2019)), trans. denied.

It also furthered law enforcement needs as Officer Poynter believed that Lanier

had committed a traffic infraction and was acting in furtherance of his duty to

protect the public on Indiana’s roadways. See Marshall, 117 N.E.3d at 1262

(acknowledging that law enforcement has at least a legitimate, if not

compelling, need to enforce traffic-safety laws). Balancing the Litchfield factors,

we conclude that the traffic stop did not violate Article 1, Section 11.

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[20] Moreover, for the reasons stated above, we find that any mistake in the law by

Officer Poynter with regard to whether Lanier had been required to use his turn

signal was reasonable given the requirement in Indiana Code section 9-21-8-

24(a)(2) and (a)(3) that a driver use his turn signal when turning from a direct

course upon a highway or changing from one traffic lane to another. Again,

effective January 1, 2023, the statute was amended to encompass all qualifying

situations, not just those when another driver may be impacted, which could

lead one to reasonably infer that the statute applied to situations like the one at

issue in this case.

[21] In sum, to the extent that Officer Poynter’s belief that he had observed a traffic

infraction may have been a mistake of law, we conclude that any mistake of the

law by Officer Poynter was reasonable under both the Fourth Amendment and

Article 1, Section 11. As such, the traffic stop did not violate either

constitutional provision. The trial court, therefore, did not err in denying

Lanier’s motion to suppress the challenged evidence.

[22] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Kenworthy, J., and Felix, J., concur.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Timothy J. Burns

Abigail H. Kim

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-769 | November 3, 2025 Page 15 of 16

Theodore E. Rokita

Indiana Attorney General

Tyler G. Banks

Supervising Deputy Attorney General

Michelle Hawk Kazmierczak

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

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