Saradeth

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10

11 DARIAN MANUEL POWELL, No. 2:23-cv-00946-DAD-EFB (PC)

12 Plaintiff,

13 v. ORDER AND FINDINGS AND

14 SARADETH, et al., RECOMMENDATIONS

15 Defendants.

16

17 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel and in forma pauperis in this action

18 brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ECF No. 1, 8. On May 24, 2024, the court dismissed plaintiff’s

19 first amended complaint with leave to amend. ECF No. 16. Plaintiff has filed a second amended

20 complaint. ECF No. 17.

21 I. Screening Requirement

22 Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek

23 redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

24 § 1915A(a). The court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion

25 of the complaint, if the complaint “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which

26 relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such

27 relief.” Id. § 1915A(b).

28 ////

1 A pro se plaintiff, like other litigants, must satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)

2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8(a)(2) “requires a complaint to include a short and

3 plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the

4 defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.

5 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554, 562-563 (2007) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)).

6 While the complaint must comply with the “short and plaint statement” requirements of Rule 8,

7 its allegations must also include the specificity required by Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

8 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).

9 To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than “naked

10 assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of

11 action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-557. In other words, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of

12 a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

13 678.

14 Furthermore, a claim upon which the court can grant relief must have facial plausibility.

15 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

16 content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

17 misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. When considering whether a complaint states a

18 claim upon which relief can be granted, the court must accept the allegations as true, Erickson v.

19 Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007), and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the

20 plaintiff, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974).

21 II. Screening

22 Plaintiff’s allegations concern his experiences while incarcerated at California Health

23 Care Facility in Stockton (“CHCF”). The complaint contains allegations concerning what appear

24 to be five separate incidents, perhaps linked through plaintiff’s allegation of a continuing pattern

25 of harassment against him by CHCF staff. See ECF No. 17 at 4.

26 Incident One. Plaintiff alleges that, on September 14, 2022, he “boarded up” his cell to

27 force a sergeant to come and talk to him about various issues. Id. at 1. The sergeant (not named

28 as a defendant in this case) came and asked plaintiff to sit on his bunk so he could enter the cell

1 and discuss plaintiff’s issues. Id. Plaintiff complied. Id. The sergeant left, and defendant

2 officers Truong, Fajardo, and Terrazas entered. Id. Truong directed plaintiff to stand against the

3 wall, and plaintiff complied. Id. While Fajardo was “moving papers,” Truong yelled, “Stop

4 spitting.” Id. Truong and Terrazas grabbed plaintiff, put him on his knees, pushed his head

5 down, repeatedly hit him in the head, face, and back, and kicked and kneed him in his ribs. Id.

6 After the assault, Terrazas and Fajardo escorted plaintiff to the nurses’ station, where “the

7 lieutenants and sergeants” taunted plaintiff. Id. at 2. “They” took plaintiff’s shower shoes and

8 left him to walk sock-footed on the “painful floor.” Id. “They” never returned any of the paper

9 or property plaintiff had in his cell. Id.

10 To state a claim of excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff must

11 allege facts that show that a correctional officer used force against him maliciously and

12 sadistically to cause harm, rather than in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline.

13 Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992). To determine whether the evidence establishes

14 such a scenario, the factfinder may consider: (1) the need for force; (2) the relationship between

15 that need and the amount of force used; (3) the threat reasonably perceived by the officer; (4) the

16 extent of injury suffered by the plaintiff; and (5) any efforts made to temper the severity of the

17 forceful response. Id. at 7.

18 Construed liberally, and for the limited purpose of screening under § 1915A, plaintiff has

19 stated potentially cognizable Eighth Amendment claims against defendants Truong, Fajardo, and

20 Terrazas for subjecting him to excessive force. Plaintiff has not stated cognizable claims through

21 his allegations concerning taunting, shoes, and property, because he has not identified a defendant

22 who committed these alleged wrongs.

23 Incident Two. Plaintiff alleges that, on September 15, 2022, defendant officers Doe No. 2

24 and Doe No. 3 gave him an orange. Id. When plaintiff bit into the orange, he heard a loud crack

25 and felt extreme jaw pain. Id. Plaintiff could not properly open his mouth for several days. Id. at

26 2-3. When he looked inside, he saw that CHCF had “illegally” done surgery on his tooth. Id.

27 ////

28 ////

1 Plaintiff’s allegations regarding this incident are too vague to state a viable claim.

2 Plaintiff does not provide facts from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that defendants

3 Doe Nos. 2 and 3 caused plaintiff’s jaw pain, tooth injury, or surgery.

4 Incident Three. Plaintiff alleges that, while he was housed in CHCF max custody “for

5 assaulting an officer on September 14th 2022,” defendant officer Doe No. 1 dispersed pepper

6 spray into his cell vents until plaintiff could not breathe. Id. at 3. Defendant officer Doe No. 4

7 came to plaintiff’s cell door and “threatened my life by making a gun with his hand and pointing

8 it at me and telling me he was going to kill me when I get out.” Id.

9 These allegations are insufficient to state a viable Eighth Amendment claim. Plaintiff

10 does not provide sufficient facts from which it may be inferred that Doe No. 1 dispersed the

11 pepper spray into his cell maliciously and sadistically to cause harm, rather than in a good-faith

12 effort to maintain or restore discipline. Plaintiff’s allegations against Doe No. 4 fail because mere

13 threats do not give rise to cognizable Eighth Amendment claims. Gaut v. Sunn, 810 F.2d 923,

14 925 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (it “trivializes the Eighth Amendment to believe a threat

15 constitutes a constitutional wrong.”).

16 Incident Four. Plaintiff alleges that, on January 30, 2023, plaintiff boarded up his cell

17 again “because I still had no shoes and staff had been wronging me constantly.” Id. Plaintiff was

18 taken to the nurses’ station where defendant officers Saradeth and Cervantes assaulted plaintiff.

19 Id. Cervantes punched plaintiff six times in his solar plexus while moaning noisily, saying “Oh I

20 think I like this one.” Id. Saradeth moaned and twisted plaintiff’s nipples, saying “You like

21 that,” “Oh he likes it,” and “You like to rape little kids.” Id. at 3-4.

22 Existing case law distinguishes Eighth Amendment claims arising from sexual

assault and makes a few points very clear. First, sexual assault serves no valid

23 penological purpose. Second, where an inmate can prove that a prison guard

committed a sexual assault, we presume the guard acted maliciously and

24 sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm, and the subjective component

of the Eighth Amendment claim is satisfied. Finally, our cases have clearly held

25 that an inmate need not prove that an injury resulted from sexual assault in order

to maintain an excessive force claim under the Eighth Amendment. Any sexual

26 assault is objectively repugnant to the conscience of mankind and therefore not de

minimis for Eighth Amendment purposes.

27

28 ////

1 Bearchild v. Cobban, 947 F.3d 1130, 1144 (9th Cir. 2020). Construed liberally, and for the

2 limited purpose of screening under § 1915A, plaintiff has stated potentially cognizable Eighth

3 Amendment claims against defendants Saradeth and Cervantes.

4 Incident Five. Plaintiff alleges that, at some unspecified time, defendant officer Moua

5 “refused me meals for three days straight.” Id. at 4.

6 The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from inhumane methods of punishment and

7 from inhumane conditions of confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir.

8 2006). Extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim, and

9 only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are

10 sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation. Hudson v. McMillian,

11 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). “Prison officials have a duty to ensure that prisoners are provided adequate

12 shelter, food, clothing, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d

13 726, 731-32 (9th Cir. 2000) (quotations and citations omitted).

14 “The circumstances, nature, and duration of a deprivation of these necessities must be

15 considered in determining whether a constitutional violation has occurred. The more basic the

16 need, the shorter the time it can be withheld.” Johnson, 217 F.3d at 731 (internal quotation marks

17 and citations omitted). Liberally construed, and for the limited purpose of screening under §

18 1915A, plaintiff has stated a potentially cognizable Eighth Amendment claim against defendant

19 Moua.

20 No Leave to Amend. Because plaintiff has had multiple opportunities to amend the

21 complaint, the court recommends that the case proceed on plaintiff’s potentially cognizable

22 claims against Saradeth, Moua, Truong, Fajardo, and Terrazas, and that plaintiff’s non-cognizable

23 claims against Doe Nos. 1-4 be dismissed without further leave to amend. Williams v. California,

24 764 F.3d 1002, 1018-19 (9th Cir. 2014) (affirming district court’s finding that the “fact that

25 Plaintiffs have already had two chances to articulate clear and lucid theories underlying their

26 claims, and they failed to do so, demonstrates that amendment would be futile”).

27 ////

28 ////

1 | Ill. Recommendation

2 Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that:

3 1. The second amended complaint (ECF No. 17) states the following potentially

4 cognizable claims:

5 a. Against Terrazas, Fajardo, and Truong for violation of the Eighth

6 Amendment on or about September 14, 2022;

7 b. Against Saradeth and Cervantes for violation of the Eighth Amendment

8 on or about January 30, 2023; and

9 c. Against Moua for violation of the Eighth Amendment by denying

10 plaintiff meals for three consecutive days.

11 2. The second amended complaint fails to state potentially cognizable claims against

12 defendants Doe Nos. 1-4.

13 It is further RECOMMENDED that the court dismiss plaintiff's claims against Does No.

14 | 1-4 without leave to amend and that the case proceed solely on the potentially cognizable claims

15 || identified above.

16 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

17 || assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen days

18 | after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

19 || objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

20 || “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the

21 || objections shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. The

22 || parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to

23 || appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez

24 | v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

25 || Dated: September 18, 2025 j Boas bile if Bb LNA:

26 EDMUND F. BRENNAN

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

27

28