Acuna

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

LAFAYETTE DIVISION

SARAI ELENA BARRIOS SANDOVAL CIVIL DOCKET NO. 6:25-cv-01467

VERSUS JUDGE DAVID C. JOSEPH

BRIAN ACUNA, ET AL MAGISTRATE JUDGE CAROL B.

WHITEHURST

MEMORANDUM RULING

Before the Court is a PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (the “Petition”)

filed by the Petitioner, Sarai Elena Barrios Sandoval (hereinafter, “Petitioner”).

[Doc. 1]. Respondents Brian Acuna, Kristi Noem, and Pamela Bondi (collectively,

“Respondents”) filed a Response on October 17, 2025, to which Petitioner filed a Reply

on October 26, 2025. [Doc. 10]; [Doc. 13]. For the following reasons, the Petition is

DENIED and DISMISSED.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner is a Colombian native who illegally entered the United States

without being inspected by an immigration officer. [Doc. 10-1, ¶ 3]. Petitioner claims

that she crossed the United States-Mexico border on March 7, 2023, where she then

encountered United States Border Patrol agents. [Doc. 1, ¶ 26]; [Doc. 10-1, ¶ 4].

Petitioner was released on an “alternate to detention” program—allegedly due to lack

of bed space—on March 8, 2023. [Doc. 10- 1, ¶ 3]. Petitioner claims that she was then

ordered to appear for a credible fear interview on September 9, 2025. [Doc. 1, ¶ 26].

After her interview, she alleges that she was detained and sent to the South

Louisiana ICE Processing Center in Basile, Louisiana. [Id.]; [Doc. 10-1, ¶ 11].

According to Respondents, Petitioner filed an application for asylum with the

United States Citizenship and Immigration Service (“USCIS”) on January 24, 2024,

but her application was administratively closed for lack of jurisdiction on September

9, 2025. [Doc. 10-1, ¶ 5]. Petitioner was then served with a Notice to Appear charging

her with removability under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) Sections

212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) and 212(a)(6)(A)(i), which allege that she is an alien present in the

United States who has not been admitted or paroled. [Doc. 10-2, p. 1]; [Doc. 10-3,

p. 1]. As a result, Petitioner is currently considered an “applicant for admission” and

is in removal proceedings under Section 240 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. [Doc. 10- 2,

p. 1]. Since her detention, Petitioner has remained in ICE custody at the South

Louisiana ICE Processing Center. [Doc. 10-1, ¶ 11].

Petitioner was denied bond at a custody redetermination hearing on October

1, 2025, with the immigration court finding that it did not have jurisdiction to conduct

a bond hearing or release her on bond under the precedent set in Matter of Yajure

Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). [Doc. 10- 1, ¶ 9]; [Doc. 10-4].

After being denied a bond hearing, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus with this Court on October 1, 2025. [Doc. 1]. The Court held a status

conference with counsel on October 6, 2025, via Zoom. [Doc. 7]. After the status

conference, the Court issued an expedited briefing schedule, ordering Respondents to

respond to the Petition on or before October 20, 2025, and allowing Petitioner to file

a reply on or before October 27, 2025. [Id.] Respondents filed their Response on

October 17, 2025. [Doc. 10]. Petitioner filed a Reply on October 26, 2025. [Doc. 13].

At bottom, Petitioner argues that she should not be subject to mandatory

detention pursuant to Section 235(b)(2) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), but instead

granted a bond redetermination hearing under Section 236 of the INA, 8 U.S.C.

§ 1226(a), and related agency regulations. See generally [Doc. 1]. In this regard,

Petitioner’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus filed with this Court makes the

following claims for relief—all stemming from Respondents’ alleged failure to provide

Petitioner with a bond hearing: (1) violation of § 1226(a); (2) violation of Petitioner’s

Fifth Amendment right to due process through failure to provide a bond hearing

under § 1226(a) and failure to provide an individualized hearing for domestic civil

detention; and (3) violations of substantive due process. [Id.] Respondents contend

that Petitioner’s detention under § 1225(b) instead of § 1226(a) is consistent with the

plain statutory language and does not deprive Petitioner of due process. See generally

[Doc. 10].

LAW AND ANALYSIS

I. Jurisdiction

A. Writ of Habeas Corpus

“[A]bsent suspension, the writ of habeas corpus remains available to every

individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525

(2004) (citing U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 9, cl. 2). Under § 2241, the writ is extended inter

alia to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the

United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). The Supreme Court has interpreted § 2241 as

granting district courts with jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus challenges to the

legality of the detention of aliens. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 473 (2004). Here,

Petitioner alleges that she is being held in violation of the statutory scheme set forth

in portions of the INA, codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 and 1226. See [Doc. 1, ¶ 34]. Thus,

this Court possesses habeas jurisdiction because Petitioner claims she is being

detained “in violation of the … laws … of the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3);

see also [Doc. 1, ¶ 34].

B. The INA’s Jurisdiction-Stripping Provisions

Clearly having general habeas jurisdiction over aliens, the Court next turns to

Respondents’ contention that this Court nonetheless lacks jurisdiction over the

claims asserted in the Petition because 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(b)(9) and 1252(g) operate to

strip this Court of jurisdiction. [Doc. 10, pp. 32–37]. Petitioner responds that

§ 1252(b)(9) only prohibits challenges to removal orders, not challenges to

unconstitutional detentions, and that § 1252(g) only bars jurisdiction for three

discrete immigration actions that Petitioner is not challenging. [Doc. 13, pp. 10–14].

Because the Court determines that the Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief

under the facts presented, the Court declines to determine the applicability of the

jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the INA cited by the Respondents.

II. Classification Under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 and 1226

Petitioner’s primary argument centers on her detention under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225(b)(2), which mandates detention during the pendency of removal proceedings

and does not allow for the possibility of a bond hearing, instead of 8 U.S.C. § 1226,

under which a detainee may be eligible for a bond hearing. See generally [Doc. 1].

Relying on broad language included in Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018),

Petitioner asserts that § 1225 only applies to “recent arrivals,” such as aliens who are

crossing or have just recently crossed the border, or aliens who petition for admission

at a port of entry. [Doc. 1, ¶ 29]. Petitioner further contends that § 1226 applies to

aliens who enter without inspection and have resided in the country’s interior for an

extended period. [Doc. 1, ¶ 31]. Conversely, Respondents maintain that under a plain

reading of the relevant statutes, § 1225 is a narrower statute applying to all aliens

who are “applicants for admission,” while § 1226 is a broader statute potentially

applicable to any alien. [Doc. 10, p. 13]. With this background—and given the

relative complexity of the subject matter—the Court will engage in a thorough

analysis of the plain language and statutory schemes of the relevant provisions of §§

1225 and 1226 to address Petitioner’s claims.1

1 Respondents also argue that Petitioner should be required to exhaust available

administrative remedies before this Court considers her habeas petition. [Doc. 10, pp. 28–

29]. Petitioner asserts that the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) will hold that Petitioner is ineligible

for bond pursuant to Matter of Yajure Hurtado, and thus the exhaustion of administrative

remedies is futile. [Doc. 1, ¶¶ 26– 27]; [Doc. 13, pp. 29–32].

An exception to exhaustion exists “where the attempt to exhaust such remedies would itself

be a patently futile course of action.” Fuller v. Rich, 11 F.3d 61, 62 (5th Cir. 1994) (per

curiam) (internal quotations omitted). In the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”)

precedential decision in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), the BIA held

that anyone deemed inadmissible under § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) will be subject to mandatory

detention without bond pursuant to § 1225(b)(2). Here, Petitioner was charged with

removability under § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the INA, which is codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).

[Doc. 10-3, p. 1]. Because Hurtado was designated as a precedential decision, it will “serve

as precedent[] in all proceedings involving the same issue or issues” upon BIA review. 8

C.F.R. § 1003.1(g)(2). Thus, an IJ would hold that Petitioner is not eligible for a bond hearing

because she is detained under § 1225(b)(2). Accordingly, the Court finds that the exhaustion

requirement is waived here because Petitioner’s appeal to the BIA concerning her eligibility

for a bond hearing or mandatory detention would be “futile” considering Hurtado. See Fuller,

11 F.3d at 62.

When engaging in statutory interpretation, “[w]e begin, as always, with the

text.” Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 581 U.S. 385, 391 (2017). And “[i]f the statutory

language is plain, we must enforce it according to its term.” King v. Burwell, 576 U.S.

473, 486 (2015).

A. Section 1225: A Provision Applicable to all “Applicants for

Admission”

Section 1225 governs the inspection, detention, and removal of aliens seeking

admission into the United States. Among other things, it provides detailed

procedures for handling “applicants for admission,” such as an expedited removal

process, asylum claim processing, and detention requirements. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225(b)(1)(A)–(B). Important here, § 1225 also has specific detention requirements

for “an alien who is an applicant for admission.” Id. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Accordingly, to

determine the legality of Petitioner’s detention under § 1225(b)(2), the Court must

first determine whether Petitioner is properly classified under the statute as an

“applicant for admission.”

1. Section 1225(a): Defining “Applicants for Admission”

The first part of § 1225, § 1225(a), defines applicants for admission. “An alien

present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United

States … shall be deemed … an applicant for admission.” Id. § 1225(a)(1) (emphasis

added). The “or” in the statute is disjunctive, and thus indicates that there are two

types of aliens who are treated as “applicants for admission”: (1) those who have not

been admitted, and (2) those who arrive in the United States.

An alien who is a statutorily defined “applicant for admission” may be either

inadmissible or not inadmissible. Applicants for admission are not per se

inadmissible if they arrive at a port of entry and present themselves for inspection.

See id. § 1225(a)(1). Conversely, an alien may be an “applicant for admission” who is

also inadmissible by: (1) being present in the United States without having been

admitted or paroled; or (2) arriving at a time or place not designated by the Attorney

General. See id.; see also id. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). An “applicant for admission” may also

be inadmissible if they do not possess “a valid unexpired immigrant visa, reentry

permit, border crossing identification card, or other valid entry document” “at the

time of application for admission.” Id. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I); see also id. § 1225(a)(1).

Thus, under the plain text of § 1225(a)(1), any alien physically present in the

United States who has not been admitted is an “applicant for admission,” regardless

of how long they have been in the country or whether they intended to apply or enter

properly.

2. Section 1225(b): Detention of Applicants for Admission

Although the length of an alien’s presence in the United States is not

determinative of whether they are an “applicant for admission” under § 1225(a)(1), it

does affect the course of an applicant’s removal proceedings. More specifically,

applicants for admission “fall into one of two categories, those covered by § 1225(b)(1)

and those covered by § 1225(b)(2).” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287.

Section 1225(b)(1) “applies to aliens initially determined to be inadmissible due

to fraud, misrepresentation, or lack of valid documentation” and “certain other aliens

designated by the Attorney General.” Id. An alien is a “certain other alien” for

§ 1225(b)(1) purposes if they have “not been admitted or paroled into the United

States and … [have] not affirmatively shown …” that they have “been physically

present in the United States continuously for the 2-year period immediately prior to

the date of the determination of inadmissibility.” Id. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II). No party

has argued that § 1225(b)(1) is relevant here.

In contrast, “[§] 1225(b)(2) is broader” and applies to all “other aliens” who are

not included under § 1225(b)(1) but are nevertheless defined as “applicant[s] for

admission” under § 1225(a). Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287; Id. § 1225(b)(2)(A). In other

words, § 1225(b)(2) “serves as a catchall provision that applies to all applicants for

admission not covered by § 1225(b)(1) (with specific exceptions not relevant here).”

Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), (B)).

Aliens who are subject to removal under § 1225(b)(1) are to be “removed from

the United States without further hearing or review unless the alien indicates either

an intention to apply for asylum … or a fear of persecution.” Id. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i).

These removal proceedings are considered “expedited removal” proceedings because

the alien is to be removed “without further hearing or review.” Id. However, aliens

subject to removal under § 1225(b)(2) are not subject to expedited removal but, rather,

removal proceedings in the ordinary course pursuant to § 1229a. But, important

here, the statute mandates that they nonetheless “shall be detained” for the pendency

of their removal proceedings. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) (emphasis added).

Thus, an alien who is an “applicant for admission” is subject to mandatory

detention regardless of whether they are being processed for removal under the

expedited procedure set forth in § 1225(b)(1) or under the “standard” § 1229a removal

proceedings called for in 1225(b)(2). Both mandate detention throughout the

pendency of the removal proceedings.2 Id. § 1225(b)(1)–(2). Put differently, both

sections require mandatory detention until the conclusion of the inspection process—

whether it is through expedited removal or the conclusion of § 1229a removal

proceedings.

B. Section 1226: A Catchall Provision for All Aliens

“Even once inside the United States, aliens do not have an absolute right to be

here.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288. “[A]liens who were inadmissible at the time of

entry or who have been convicted of certain criminal offenses since admission” are

subject to possible removal under § 1226. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)–(2)).

Section 1226 therefore operates as a catchall provision that “generally governs the

process of arresting and detaining … aliens pending their removal.” Id.

The statutory text of § 1226 bears out that purpose. “On a warrant … by the

Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on

whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); see

also Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288. Under federal regulations, aliens detained under

2 Under § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV), the alien “shall be detained pending a final

determination of credible fear of persecution and, if found to have no such fear, until

removed.” Id. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV) (emphasis added). And under § 1225(b)(2)(A), “the alien

shall be detained for a proceeding under [§] 1229a.” Id. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added).

Thus, both § 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2) mandate the detention of applicants for admission.

§ 1226(a) may be afforded bond hearings at the outset of their detention.3 8 C.F.R.

§§ 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1); see also Jennings, 583 U.S. at 306. Thus, § 1226(a)

operates as a catchall provision for all aliens, including those who enter lawfully but

later become inadmissible.

C. Petitioner is Subject to § 1225(b) Detention as an “Applicant for

Admission,” and the Application of § 1225(b) to Petitioner Does

Not Render § 1226(a) Superfluous

Here, considering the information presented to the Court, Petitioner has been

properly classified as an “applicant for admission.” Again, an “applicant for

admission” is broadly defined by statute as “[a]n alien present in the United States

who has not been admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Petitioner does not argue that

she has been admitted or paroled, and Petitioner’s “Notice of Appearance and

Additional Charges of Inadmissibility/Deportability” charge her with removability

under § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) and § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). See generally [Doc. 1]; [Doc. 10-2];

[Doc. 10-3]. Because Petitioner crossed the United States-Mexico border without

being inspected by an immigration officer, she is therefore also appropriately

categorized as an inadmissible alien under § 1182.4 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i),

3 “Section 1226(c) … carves out a statutory category of aliens who may not be released

under § 1226(a).” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289 (emphasis in original). This Section prohibits

the release of aliens who have committed certain criminal acts or acts of terror. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1226(c). There are exceptions to § 1226(c)’s prohibition on releasing certain criminal aliens,

such as for witness protection purposes, that are not relevant here. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(4).

However, Respondents do not aver that Petitioner is detained pursuant to § 1226(c).

4 As noted above, under § 1182 an alien is inadmissible if they are “present in the

United States without being admitted or paroled, or [] arrive[] in the United States at any

time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).

An “applicant for admission” may also be inadmissible if they do not possess “a valid

(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). The Court therefore concludes that § 1225(b)(2)’s plain language and

the “all applicants for admission” language of Jennings permits the Department of

Homeland Security (“DHS”) to detain Petitioner under § 1225(b)(2). See Jennings,

283 U.S. at 287 (“[Section 1225(b)(2)] serves as a catchall provision that applies to all

applicants for admission not covered by § 1225(b)(1).…”); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1)

(defining an “applicant for admission” as “[a]n alien present in the United States who

has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States.…”).

Moreover, Petitioner does not allege that the Attorney General issued a

warrant for her arrest and detention, further indicating that Petitioner is properly

detained under § 1225(b) as an “applicant for admission,” not § 1226(a). See id.

§ 1226(a) (“On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested

and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the

United States.”) (emphasis added). All told, because Petitioner is an inadmissible

alien who is an “applicant for admission,” § 1225(b) applies to her. She therefore

“shall be detained for a proceeding under [§] 1229a.”5 Id. § 1225(b)(2)(A).

Petitioner’s argument that § 1226 would be rendered superfluous under

Respondents’ interpretation of § 1225(b)(2) is unpersuasive. The statutory scheme of

unexpired immigrant visa, reentry permit, border crossing identification card, or other valid

entry document” “at the time of application for admission.” 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I).

5 The fact that Petitioner may have lacked the subjective intent to ever apply for

admission does not prevent her from being categorized as an “applicant for admission” under

§ 1225. For this Court to hold otherwise would clearly contravene the plain statutory

language and Congress’s intent. See id. § 1225(a).

the INA does not render these two provisions mutually exclusive, and there are many

other categories of aliens to whom § 1226(a) is applicable, but not § 1225(b)(2).

One example is the alien in Jennings, Alejandro Rodriguez. Rodriguez was a

Mexican citizen who had been a lawful permanent resident since 1987. Jennings,

583 U.S. at 289. Rodriguez was convicted of a drug offense in 2004, and the

Government detained him under § 1226 and sought his removal. Id. at 289–90.

Rodriguez was not an inadmissible alien nor an “applicant for admission;” rather, he

was an admitted alien. Thus, Rodriguez’s case discussed in Jennings is a

paradigmatic example of an admitted alien who is not an “applicant for admission”

but who subsequently became subject to removal under § 1226(a).

Decisions from other district courts throughout the United States, including

ones in this district, have rejected Respondents’ argument and found that aliens like

Petitioner are subject to detention under § 1226(a), not § 1225(b).6 Although not

binding upon this Court, this Court will briefly discuss why this Court’s analysis

differs from that of other courts.

6 See e.g., Ventura Martinez v. Trump, 3-25-cv-01445 (W.D. La. Oct. 22, 2025); Kostak

v. Trump, 2025 WL 2472136 (W.D. La. Aug. 27, 2025); Lopez Santos v. Noem, 2025 WL

2642278 (W.D. La. Sept. 11, 2025); Lopez-Arevelo v. Ripa, 2025 WL 2691828 (W.D. Tex. Sept.

22, 2025); Barrera v. Tindall, 2025 WL 2690565 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 19, 2025); Lopez-Campos v.

Raycroft, 2025 WL 2496379 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025); Giron Reyes v. Lyons, 2025 WL

2712427 (N.D. Iowa Sept. 30, 2025); Belsai D.S. v. Bondi, 2025 WL 2802947 (D. Minn. Oct.

1, 2025); Garcia Jimenez v. Kramer, 2025 WL 2374223 (D. Neb. Aug. 14, 2025); Arrazola-

Guzman v. Andrews, 2025 WL 2617256 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2025); but see, e.g., Vargas Lopez

v. Trump, 2025 WL 2780351 (D. Neb. Sept. 30, 3025); Chavez v. Noem, 2025 WL 2730228

(S.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2025); Pena v. Hyde, 2025 WL 2108913, (D. Mass. July 28, 2025); Matter

of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).

First, many of these cases rest upon the premise that §§ 1225 and 1226 are

mutually exclusive. In Jennings, the Supreme Court did not state that § 1225(b)

applies only to aliens seeking entry into the United States; instead, the Jennings

Court stated that Ҥ 1225(b) applies primarily to aliens seeking entry into the United

States.” Jennings, 583 at 297 (emphasis added); see also Vargas Lopez, 2025 WL

2780351, at *9 n.5 (D. Neb. Sept. 30, 2025). Thus, the Jennings Court did not restrict

the application of § 1225(b) only to aliens who are seeking entry into the United

States or aliens who are near the border. Under the plain statutory language of

§ 1225(a)(1) that defines “applicants for admission,” § 1225(b) also applies to those

who are “present in the United States who ha[ve] not been admitted.” 8 U.S.C. §

1225(a)(1). This is precisely Petitioner’s status.

Second, although other district courts correctly found that some petitioners

were subject to § 1229a standard removal proceedings instead of § 1225(b)(1)

expedited removal proceedings, these courts conflated the type of removal proceeding

initiated with the detainee’s eligibility for a bond hearing. As discussed above, aliens

who are subject to removal under both §§ 1225(b)(1) and 1229a are subject to

mandatory detention; the only distinction is the procedure of the removal proceedings

themselves. Therefore, the Court finds these other cases unpersuasive and concludes

that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2), without

eligibility for a bond hearing.

Furthermore, many of these district court cases were decided before—or soon

after—the BIA issued its opinion in Matter of Yajure Hurtado. 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA

2025). In Hurtado, the BIA correctly noted that “applicants for admission … are those

aliens who are seeking admission and who an immigration officer has determined are

‘not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.’” Id. at 218 (citing 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225(b)(2)(A)). Thus, “[t]his category is a ‘catchall provision that applies to all

applicants for admission not covered by’” § 1225(b)(1). Id. (quoting Jennings, 583 at

287). Consequently, “the INA explicitly requires that this … ‘catchall’ category of

applicants for admission be mandatorily detained for the duration of their

immigration proceedings.” Id. at 218–19.

The BIA also correctly observed that § 236 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), “does

not purport to overrule the mandatory detention requirements for arriving aliens and

applicants for admission explicitly set forth in [§] 235(b)(1) and (2) of the INA,

8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), (2).” Id. at 219. And, as this Court noted above, “while an

inadmissible alien who establishes that he or she has been present in the United

States for over 2 years is not subject to the expedited removal process, the alien

nevertheless ‘shall be detained for a proceeding under [§ 1229a].’” Id. at 219–20

(citing INA § 235(b)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)).

And while, of course, the BIA’s precedential decisions are not binding upon this

Court, the BIA is a court that possesses subject matter expertise on immigration

matters. Thus, when considering the BIA’s thorough analysis of the plain statutory

text and legislative history of the INA, this Court finds Hurtado persuasive. See id.

at 222–225 (discussing the legislative history of the INA).

Finally, though not necessary to reach its conclusion, this Court notes that its

analysis comports with the legislative history of the Illegal Immigration Reform and

Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C,

§ 302(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-579, which added § 1225(a)(1) in 1996. Before

IIRIRA, there was “an anomaly whereby immigrants who were attempting to lawfully

enter the United States were in a worse position than persons who had crossed the

border unlawfully.” Torres v. Barr, 976 F.3d 918, 928 (9th Cir. 2020). Congress

remedied this through the addition of § 1225(a)(1), which “ensure[d] that all

immigrants who have not been lawfully admitted, regardless of their physical

presence in the country, are placed on equal footing in removal proceedings under the

INA—in the position of an ‘applicant for admission.’” Id. The plain statutory text

comporting with the legislative history supports this Court’s conclusion.7

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Petitioner is lawfully detained

under § 1225(b)(2) and is therefore not entitled to a bond hearing.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

[Doc. 1] is DENIED and DISMISSED.

7 For this Court to conclude that an alien who has unlawfully entered the United States

and managed to remain in the country for a sufficient period of time is entitled to a bond

hearing, while those who seek lawful entry and submit themselves for inspection are not, not

only conflicts with the unambiguous language of the governing statutes, but would also

seemingly undermine the intent of Congress in enacting the IIRIRA. This Court thus

“refuse[s] to interpret the INA in a way that would in effect repeal [Congress’s] statutory fix.”

United States v. Gambino-Ruiz, 91 F.4th 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2024).

THUS, DONE AND SIGNED in Chambers on this 315 day of October 2025.

Chas C

DAVID C. JOSEPH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Page 16 of 16