Brand

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

)

ARIANNE CRYSTAL BRAND,

)

)

Plaintiff,

)

)

v.

)

) No. 4:24-cv-01386-JMD

LELAND DUDEK, Acting

)

Commissioner of Social Security,1

)

)

Defendant.

)

)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiff Arianne Crystal Brand requests judicial review of the Commissioner of Social

Security’s final decision denying her application for child’s disability insurance benefits and

supplemental social security income under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. 42

U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). But the Commissioner’s determinations as to (1) the treatment

of the consultative examiner’s opinion, (2) the residual functional capacity finding, and (3)

the incorporation of Brand’s mental limitations are supported by substantial evidence.

Under Eighth Circuit precedent, federal court review of the Commissioner’s decision is very

limited and highly deferential. The Court has no legal basis to upend the Commissioner’s

decision and thus AFFIRMS that decision.

1 The Court substitutes newly confirmed Commissioner of Social Security

Frank Bisignano for former Acting Commissioner Dudek where necessary. Fed. R. Civ. P.

25(d); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“Any action instituted in accordance with this subsection shall

survive notwithstanding any change in the person occupying the office of Commissioner of

Social Security . . . .”).

Background

A. Procedural History

Brand filed an application for child’s insurance benefits and supplemental security

income in December 2020. ECF 13 at 1. The Social Security Administration denied her claim

and did so again upon application for reconsideration. Id. Following a June 2023 hearing,

Administrative Law Judge Jan Dutton again denied her claim, determining that Brand was

not eligible to receive these benefits. ECF 10-3 at 27. The agency’s appeals board then

affirmed the administrative law judge’s determination in August 2024. ECF 13 at 3. The

administrative law judge’s decision is the Commissioner’s final decision for purposes of

judicial review.2 ECF 13 at 3; see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.900(a)(5); 416.1400(a)(5).

B. Regulatory Background

To receive benefits under the Act, a potential claimant must prove a disability.

Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 2001); Baker v. Sec’y of Health & Human

Servs., 955 F.2d 552, 555 (8th Cir. 1992). That is a high standard. A person is disabled if he

is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or

which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.”

42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A) (emphasis added). The impairment(s) must be “of

such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his

age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work

which exists in the national economy.” Id. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B) (emphasis added).

2 Because the administrative law judge’s decision stands as the Commissioner’s final

decision, the Court will primarily refer to the Commissioner’s—not the administrative law

judge’s—actions.

To determine whether a claimant is disabled, the Commissioner employs a “five-step

sequential evaluation process.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(1); 416.920(a)(1). If the claimant is

deemed not disabled in either of the first two steps, the evaluation ends in a failed claim. For

the third step, if the claimant does not have an impairment (or combination of impairments)

that matches one (or any combination) listed under the regulations, the analysis continues

to the last two steps. In turn, if the claimant is determined to be able to work under steps

four or five, the request for benefits similarly fails.

Steps one through three examine the claimant’s current work activity and

impairments. First, the Commissioner considers whether the claimant is “working.” Id. §§

404.1520(b), (a)(4)(i); 416.920(b), (a)(4)(i). If the claimant is engaged in “substantial gainful

activity,” the claimant is not disabled. Id. Second, the Commissioner determines whether

the claimant has a severe “impairment” that “significantly limits [his] physical or mental

ability to do basic work activities.” Id. §§ 404.1520(c), (a)(4)(ii); 416.920(c), (a)(4)(ii). If no

impairment exists, the claimant is not disabled. Id. Third, if the claimant has an

impairment, the Commissioner considers its medical severity. If the impairment “meets or

equals” one of the presumptively disabling impairments listed in the regulations, the

claimant is considered disabled. Id. §§ 404.1520(d), (a)(4)(iii); 416.920(d), (a)(4)(iii). If not,

the analysis proceeds to the next step.

As part of his analysis, the Commissioner must assess the claimant’s “residual

functional capacity.” Id. §§ 404.1520(e), (a)(4)(iv); 416.920(e), (a)(4)(iv). Residual functional

capacity represents “the most a claimant can still do despite [his or her] physical or mental

limitations.” Martise v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 909, 923 (8th Cir. 2011) (internal citation omitted).

It is an “administrative assessment” based on “all relevant evidence,” including “medical

records, observations of treating physicians and others, and an individual’s own description

of his limitations.”3 Boyd v. Colvin, 831 F.3d 1015, 1020 (8th Cir. 2016) (internal citation

omitted). “Accordingly, it is the responsibility of the [Commissioner], not a physician, to

determine a claimant’s [residual functional capacity].”4 Id.

Steps four and five examine the claimant’s ability to work. For step four, the

Commissioner assesses the claimant’s “residual functional capacity and [the person’s] past

relevant work.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e)–(f), (a)(4)(iv); 416.920(e)–(f), (a)(4)(iv). If the

claimant has the residual functional capacity to “still do [his] past relevant work,” he is not

disabled. Id. In the final step, the Commissioner considers the claimant’s residual functional

capacity as well as the person’s “age, education, and work experience” to see if the claimant

“can make an adjustment to other work.”5 Id. §§ 404.1520(g), (a)(4)(v); 416.920(g), (a)(4)(v).

If the claimant can make an adjustment to “other work” that “exist[s] in significant numbers

in the national economy,” the Commissioner finds the claimant not disabled. Id.

§§ 404.1560(c)(1); 416.960(c)(1). If not, the claimant is deemed disabled. Id. §§ 404.1520(g),

(a)(4)(v); 416.920(g), (a)(4)(v).

C. The Commissioner’s Final Decision

Because the Commissioner did not supplant the administrative law judge’s

determination, that determination operates as the Commissioner’s final decision. ECF 13 at

3; see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.900(a)(5); 416.1400(a)(5). Applying the five-step sequential evaluation

3 The claimant is responsible for providing evidence related to his residual functional

capacity, and the Commissioner is responsible for developing the claimant’s “complete

medical history, including arranging for a consultative examination(s) if necessary, and

making every reasonable effort to help [the claimant] get medical reports from [his] own

medical sources.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(3).

4 For this reason, “there is no requirement that [a residual functional capacity] finding be

supported by a specific medical opinion.” Hensley v. Colvin, 829 F.3d 926, 932 (8th Cir. 2016).

5 Though the burden of production shifts to the Commissioner at this step, the burden of

persuasion to prove disability remains on the claimant. Hensley, 829 F.3d at 932 (8th Cir.

2016).

process, the Commissioner deemed Brand “not disabled” and concluded that she did not

qualify for the requested child’s insurance benefits or supplemental security income. ECF

10-3 at 27. After finding at step one that Brand had “not engaged in substantial gainful

activity,” the Commissioner determined at step two that she had “the following severe

impairments: diabetes type II with polyneuropathy, obesity, asthma, anxiety, and

schizoaffective disorder, depression.” Id. at 20. He further held for step three that the

claimant did “not have an impairment or combination of impairments” listed in or medically

equal to one contained in the regulations. Id.

Following step three, the Commissioner found that Brand has the residual functional

capacity to “perform light work” subject to certain limitations. ECF 10-3 at 22. Critically, he

held that the claimant is “limited” to “simple routine tasks” and to “no more than occasional

interaction with co-workers, supervisors or the public.” Id. He also noted that the claimant

“can do all postural activities occasionally—climb, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch or crawl.” Id.

Reviewing the “totality of medical evidence,” among other things, the Commissioner

determined that “the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence and

limiting effects of [her] symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and

other evidence in the record.” Id. at 23, 26.

In the last two steps, the Commissioner decided that “there are jobs that exist in

significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform” even though

Brand “has no past relevant work.” Id. at 26. He relied on a vocational expert who testified

that Brand “would be able to perform the requirements of [several] representative

occupations.” Id. at 27. Because he determined that Brand “is capable of making a successful

adjustment to other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy,” the

Commissioner deemed Brand “not disabled” under the Act. Id. In other words, Brand had

not proven that she is “unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any

medically determinable physical or mental impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A)

(emphasis added).

III. Standard of Review

Article III courts have very narrow authority to review the decision of the

Commissioner to grant or deny public benefits. “Congress may allow the Executive Branch

to resolve certain matters free from judicial involvement”—perhaps at all. SEC v. Jarkesy,

603 U.S. 109, 152 (2024) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). These “matters” include the “grant [or

denial] of public benefits.” Id. at 152–53. In this area, Congress has chosen to give federal

courts some (limited) authority to review the decision of the agency, but courts must remain

cognizant of this highly limited role.

Congress has given federal courts authority to review only select matters in this area.

First, courts can review whether the Commissioner’s fact findings are “supported by

substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). If the findings are supported, then the

Commissioner’s findings “shall be conclusive.” Id. Second, if the Commissioner rules against

a petitioner because that petitioner fails to comply with an agency regulation, “the court shall

review only the question of conformity with such regulations and the validity of such

regulations.” Id. Third, courts may (in certain circumstances) “order additional evidence to

be taken before the Commissioner of Social Security, but only upon a showing that there is

new evidence which is material and that there is good cause for the failure to incorporate

such evidence into the record in a prior proceeding.” Id.

Analysis

Brand asserts that the Commissioner’s decision was not supported by substantial

evidence. Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept

as adequate to support a conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019) (internal

citations omitted). “[T]he threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high.” Id. It is

simply “more than a mere scintilla”—evidence sufficient that a “reasonable mind might

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. The Court “consider[s] all evidence in the

record, whether it supports or detracts from the ALJ’s decision.” Reece v. Colvin, 834 F.3d

904, 908 (8th Cir. 2016). Courts “defer heavily to the findings and conclusions of the Social

Security Administration.” Wright v. Colvin, 789 F.3d 847, 852 (8th Cir. 2015) (internal

citation omitted). The Court does not “reweigh the evidence presented to the ALJ.” Reece,

834 F.3d at 908 (internal citation omitted). The Court will not “reverse merely because

substantial evidence also exists in the record that would have supported a contrary outcome,

or because [the Court] would have decided the case differently.” KKC ex rel. Stoner v. Colvin,

818 F.3d 364, 369 (8th Cir. 2016) (internal citation omitted); McNamara v. Astrue, 590 F.3d

607, 610 (8th Cir. 2010).

Under this highly deferential standard, the Commissioner prevails. Brand urges the

Court to upend the Commissioner’s final decision because she believes the administrative

law judge (1) “failed to properly evaluate the opinion of the consultative examiner,” (2)

“crafted” a residual functional capacity “made up out of whole cloth,” and (3) “failed to

incorporate [her] moderate mental limitations.” ECF 13 at 3, 8, 11. But substantial evidence

supports the Commissioner’s determination on all points. While judicial review is “more than

a rubber stamp,” the Court “must uphold” the Commissioner’s decision “if it is supported by

substantial evidence on the administrative record as a whole.” McMillian v. Schweiker, 697

F.2d 215, 220 (8th Cir. 1983); Hensley, 829 F.3d at 931 (internal citation omitted). The

Commissioner met this standard, so Brand’s claims fail.

A. Examiner’s Opinion

Brand first argues that the Commissioner committed a “legal error” in rejecting the

opinion of Dr. Amin, a consultative examiner, as “unpersuasive” and “inconsistent with” the

record evidence. ECF 13 at 4, 6. That argument fails for several reasons.

To begin, the Commissioner is by no means required to defer to the judgment of a

single physician. The Constitution and the laws of the United States do not outsource legal

decision making to doctors. See United States v. Skrmetti, 145 S. Ct. 1816, 1836 (2025);

Brandt ex rel. Brant v. Griffin, 147 F.4th 867, 887 (8th Cir. 2025) (en banc). That “would

reduce judges,” including administrative law judges, “to mere spectators” in our legal system.

Skrmetti, 145 S. Ct. at 1840 (Thomas, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted). Agency

regulations highlight that the Commissioner “will not defer . . . to any medical opinion(s) . . .,

including those from [the claimant’s] medical sources.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a),

416.920c(a). That does not mean, of course, that a medical professional’s opinion is unhelpful

or irrelevant—just that the legal fact finder is not bound by it. “The more relevant the

objective medical evidence and supporting explanations . . . are to support his or her medical

opinion(s)” and “[t]he more consistent a medical opinion(s) . . . is with the evidence from other

medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim,” “the more persuasive the medical

opinion(s) . . . will be.” Id. §§ 404.1520c(c)(1)–(2), 416.920c(c)(1)–(2) (outlining the

supportability and consistency factors).

The Commissioner found the examiner’s opinion unpersuasive for several reasons,

none of which the Court can disrupt. First, the opinion was “inconsistent with” other medical

records. ECF 10-3 at 24. The Commissioner added that, contrary to the examiner’s view

that Brand has “delusions” and “grossly disorganized behavior,” the evidence revealed

“generally normal mental status exams, including intact attention, concentration, and

memory.” Id. “[T]he Commissioner may discount or even disregard the opinion of a treating

physician where other medical assessments are supported by better or more thorough

medical evidence.” Fentress v. Berryhill, 854 F.3d 1016, 1020 (8th Cir. 2017) (internal citation

omitted). Just so here. Having “fully considered the medical opinions and prior

administrative medical findings,” the Commissioner properly concluded that the opinion was

inconsistent with “the totality of medical evidence.” ECF 10-3 at 24, 26.

Second, the Commissioner determined that the examiner’s opinion not only

contradicted the evidence from other medical practitioners, but also contradicted other

evidence. He found that the weight of the record suggested that Brand (though undoubtedly

dealing with serious health issues) improves with medication compliance and engages in a

range of ordinary daily activities. In particular, he held that “the claimant’s intact activities

of daily living”—such as “babysit[ting] her sister’s child,” living alone, and having “no issues

taking care of her daily needs”—undermined the examiner’s conclusions. Id. at 24–25. So

too did record evidence “identif[ying] the claimant’s medication effectiveness.” Id. at 24.

The Court cannot say the Commissioner lacked sufficient basis to deem the examiner’s

opinion unpersuasive after weighing it against medical evidence and related facts in the

record. ECF 10-3 at 24. Contrary to Brand’s argument, the Commissioner did not commit

legal error. Substantial evidence supports his final decision.

B. Residual Functional Capacity Determination

Brand next contends that the assessment of her residual functional capacity—absent

further development of the record—is not supported by substantial evidence. ECF 13 at 8–

11. But the Commissioner “considered all symptoms and the extent to which these symptoms

can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other

evidence.” ECF 10-3 at 22.

The Commissioner methodically evaluated the evidence, including medical evidence,

about Brand’s medical impairments. He reviewed (1) Brand’s testimony and allegations; (2)

longitudinal medical treatment including objective examination findings and observations

that were inconsistent with disabling symptoms and limitations; (3) the nature, compliance,

and consistency of Brand’s treatment; (4) the effectiveness of Brand’s treatment and

medication; and (5) Brand’s activities of daily living that were inconsistent with her alleged

symptoms and limitations. See, e.g., ECF 10-3 at 22–24.

Brand argues that the Commissioner was required, but failed, to consider evidence

from a medical professional supporting the Commissioner’s decision. But the Eighth Circuit

has repeatedly held that a residual functional capacity determination does not need to be

supported “by a specific medical opinion,” but only “by some medical evidence of the

claimant’s ability to function in the workplace.” Twyford v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 929

F.3d 512, 518 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoting Hensley, 829 F.3d at 932); see also Thomas v. Berryhill,

881 F.3d 672, 676 (8th Cir. 2018) (“[The claimant’s] activities—caring for her young son,

preparing his meals, doing housework, shopping for groceries, handling money, watching

television, and driving a car when necessary, among other things—showed that she could

work.”). Medical evidence encompasses more than just medical opinions. It also includes,

among other things, “the medical records, observations of treating physicians and others, and

an individual’s own description of her limitations.” Lawrence v. Saul, 970 F.3d 989, 995 (8th

Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). The Commissioner considered medical opinions as well as many

other things, like Brand’s own testimony and evidence establishing that Brand’s treatment

and medications have been effective. Where, as here, the Commissioner examines a range of

relevant evidence, “there [is] substantial medical evidence to support” his residual functional

capacity determination. Julin v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 1082, 1089 (8th Cir. 2016).

The Court similarly cannot require the Commissioner to rely or fully rely on any

particular medical opinion. The “governing principle” in “evaluating a claimant’s [residual

functional capacity]” is that an administrative law judge “is not limited to considering

medical evidence exclusively.” Harvey v. Colvin, 839 F.3d 714, 717 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting

Cox v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 614, 619 (8th Cir. 2007). The Eighth Circuit has even affirmed agency

decisions that were made without any medical opinion evidence. See, e.g., Steed v. Astrue,

524 F.3d 872, 876 (8th Cir. 2008) (upholding the Commissioner’s decision where the claimant

admitted that the “medical evidence” was “silent” regarding her “work-related restrictions”);

Stringer v. Berryhill, 700 Fed. App’x. 566, 567 (8th Cir. 2017) (upholding the Commissioner’s

decision even though “there were no medical opinions”).

The Court will also not require the Commissioner to supplement the record. Brand

argues that the administrative law judge failed to properly develop the record in crafting the

residual functional capacity. ECF 13 at 11. But the Commissioner “is not required to seek

additional clarifying medical evidence unless a crucial issue is undeveloped.” Steed, 524 F.3d

at 876 (discussing Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 791 (8th Cir. 2005)). So long as the

Commissioner does “not find the doctors’ records inadequate, unclear, or incomplete, nor . . .

find the doctors used unacceptable clinical and laboratory techniques,” he “may discount an

opinion without seeking clarification.” Goff, 421 F.3d at 791. Here, as in Goff, the

Commissioner permissibly “discounted the opinions because they were inconsistent with

other substantial evidence.” Id. The Commissioner did not err in refusing to reopen the

record.

While the Commissioner is not “magically endow[ed]” with “the knowledge necessary

to determine the functional impacts” of Brand’s impairments, ECF 16 at 3, he carefully

discussed the medical and related record evidence in her case. Because he reached a

determination adequately supported by this evidence, the Court will neither reweigh the

evidence in the record nor upend his final decision. The Commissioner also had no obligation

to supplement the record. The Court finds that the Commissioner’s conclusions rested within

his reasonable “zone of choice.” Ross v. O’Malley, 92 F.4th 775, 779 (8th Cir. 2024); cf.

Garland v. Dai, 593 U.S. 357, 366 (2021) (“It does not matter whether the agency accepts all,

none, or some of the [claimant’s] testimony; its reasonable findings may not be disturbed.”).

C. Incorporation of Alleged Mental Limitations

Brand criticizes the Commissioner for not explaining “why [the] step two finding of

moderate mental limitations were not incorporated into [the residual functional capacity]

determination.” ECF 13 at 12. But the Commissioner did account for these limitations. He

included “specific work-related limitations that flowed from [Brand’s] degree of mental

impairment” into her residual functional capacity. ECF 15 at 11. As in this case, “a

limitation to simple routine repetitive work sufficiently accounts for deficiencies in

persistence, concentration, or pace.” Morand v. Berryhill, No. 4:16-cv-01295-DGK-SSA, 2018

WL 1333978, at *3 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 15, 2018) (citing Howard v. Massanari, 255 F.3d 577, 582

(8th Cir. 1997)) (cleaned up). Brand is also unable to counter the Commissioner’s findings

that “medical evidence revealed generally normal mental status exams” and that her

“medication was effective in controlling her symptoms.” ECF 15 at 11. Given the adequacy

of these findings and the sufficiency of the record, Brand’s related claim that the

Commissioner should have asked additional questions on this subject to the vocational expert

lacks force. ECF 13 at 13. The Commissioner’s residual functional capacity findings stand.

V. Conclusion

Based on a fully and fairly developed record, and applying the highly deferential

standard that Congress has created, the Court finds that the Commissioner (1) sufficiently

considered the consultative examiner’s opinion, (2) made a proper residual functional

capacity determination, and (3) incorporated Brand’s moderate mental limitations in the

analysis. The Commissioner’s final decision is supported by substantial evidence.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the final decision of the Commissioner of Social

Security is AFFIRMED.

Dated this 31st day of October, 2025 _

JOSHUA M. DIVINE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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