O'Malley

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

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AMANDA K. CLARK,

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Plaintiff,

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v. )

) No. 2:24-cv-00036-JMD

MARTIN O’MALLEY, Commissioner of

Social Security,1 )

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Defendant.

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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiff Amanda K. Clark requests judicial review of the Commissioner of Social

Security’s final decision denying her application for supplemental social security income

under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1383(c)(3), 405(g). But the

Commissioner’s determinations as to (1) the opinion of Clark’s treating psychiatrist and (2)

her residual functional capacity are supported by substantial evidence. Clark relies heavily

on a check-the-box report by a psychiatrist, but that brief report contradicted the findings of

a separate psychologist and the evidence at the hearing. Under Eighth Circuit precedent,

federal court review of the Commissioner’s decision is very limited and highly deferential.

The Court has no legal basis to upend the Commissioner’s decision and thus AFFIRMS that

decision.

1 The Court substitutes newly confirmed Commissioner of Social Security Frank

Bisignano for former Commissioner O’Malley where necessary. Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d); 42

U.S.C. § 405(g) (“Any action instituted in accordance with this subsection shall survive

notwithstanding any change in the person occupying the office of Commissioner of Social

Security . . . .”).

Background

A. Procedural History

Clark filed an application for supplemental security income in September 2021. ECF

14 at 1. The Social Security Administration denied her claim.2 ECF 1 at 2. Following a

subsequent January 2023 hearing, Administrative Law Judge Janice Barnes-Williams again

denied her claim, determining that Clark was not eligible to receive this income. ECF 1 at

2; ECF 1-3 at 15. The agency’s appeals board then affirmed the administrative law judge’s

determination in February 2024. ECF 1 at 2. The administrative law judge’s decision is the

Commissioner’s final decision for purposes of judicial review.3 See 20 C.F.R. § 416.1400(a)(5).

B. Regulatory Background

To receive benefits under the Act, a potential claimant must prove a disability.

Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 2001); Baker v. Sec’y of Health & Hum.

Servs., 955 F.2d 552, 555 (8th Cir. 1992). That is a high standard. A person is disabled “if

he is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or

which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve

months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A) (emphasis added). The impairment(s) must be “of such

severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age,

education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which

exists in the national economy.” Id. § 1382c(a)(3)(B) (emphasis added).

2 Clark also filed for disability insurance benefits under Title II but withdrew her

application because her amended alleged onset date post-dated her date last insured. ECF

1-3 at 4.

3 Because the administrative law judge’s decision stands as the Commissioner’s final

decision, the Court will primarily refer to the Commissioner’s—not the administrative law

judge’s—actions.

To determine whether a claimant is disabled, the Commissioner employs a “five-step

sequential evaluation process.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(1). If the claimant is deemed not

disabled during the first two steps, the evaluation ends in a failed claim. For the third step,

if the claimant does not have an impairment (or combination of impairments) that matches

one listed under the regulations, the analysis proceeds. In turn, if the claimant is determined

to be able to work under steps four or five, the request for benefits similarly fails.

Steps one through three examine the claimant’s current work activity and

impairments. First, the Commissioner considers whether the claimant is “working.” Id. §

416.920(b), (a)(4)(i). If the claimant is engaged in “substantial gainful activity,” the claimant

is not disabled. Id. Second, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant has a severe

“impairment” that “significantly limits [his] physical or mental ability to do basic work

activities.” Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii), (c). If no impairment exists, the claimant is not disabled.

Id. Third, if the claimant has an impairment, the Commissioner considers its medical

severity. If the impairment “meets or equals” one of the presumptively disabling

impairments listed in the regulations, the claimant is considered disabled. Id. §

416.920(a)(4)(iii), (d). If not, the analysis proceeds to the next step.

As part of his analysis, the Commissioner must assess the claimant’s “residual

functional capacity.” Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv), (e). Residual functional capacity represents “the

most a claimant can still do despite [his or her] physical or mental limitations.” Martise v.

Astrue, 641 F.3d 909, 923 (8th Cir. 2011) (internal citation omitted). It is an “administrative

assessment” based on “all relevant evidence,” including “medical records, observations of

treating physicians and others, and an individual’s own description of his limitations.”4 Boyd

4 The claimant is responsible for providing evidence related to his residual functional

capacity, and the Commissioner is responsible for developing the claimant’s “complete

v. Colvin, 831 F.3d 1015, 1020 (8th Cir. 2016) (internal citation omitted). “Accordingly, it is

the responsibility of the [Commissioner], not a physician, to determine a claimant’s [residual

functional capacity].”5 Id.

Steps four and five examine the claimant’s ability to work. For step four, the

Commissioner assesses the claimant’s “residual functional capacity and . . . past relevant

work.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(iv), (e)–(f). If the claimant has the residual functional

capacity to “still do [his] past relevant work,” he is not disabled. Id. In the final step, the

Commissioner considers the claimant’s residual functional capacity as well as the person’s

“age, education, and work experience” to see if the claimant “can make an adjustment to other

work.”6 Id. § 416.920(a)(4)(v), (g). If the claimant can make an adjustment to “other work”

that “exist[s] in significant numbers in the national economy,” the Commissioner finds the

claimant not disabled. Id. § 416.960(c)(1). If not, the claimant is deemed disabled. Id.

§ 416.920(a)(4)(v), (g).

C. The Commissioner’s Final Decision

Because the Commissioner did not supplant the administrative law judge’s

determination, that determination operates as the Commissioner’s final decision. ECF 1 at

2. Applying the five-step sequential evaluation process, the Commissioner deemed Clark

“not disabled” and concluded that she did not qualify for the requested supplemental security

income. ECF 1-3 at 15. After finding at step one that Clark had “not engaged in substantial

medical history, including arranging for a consultative examination(s) if necessary, and

making every reasonable effort to help [the claimant] get medical reports from [his] own

medical sources.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(3).

5 For this reason, “there is no requirement that [a residual functional capacity] finding be

supported by a specific medical opinion.” Hensley v. Colvin, 829 F.3d 926, 932 (8th Cir. 2016).

6 Though the burden of production shifts to the Commissioner at this step, the burden of

persuasion to prove disability remains on the claimant. Hensley, 829 F.3d at 932 (8th Cir.

2016).

gainful activity,” the Commissioner determined at step two that she had “the following severe

impairments: anxiety disorder, bipolar disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder,

post-traumatic stress disorder, social anxiety disorder, and panic disorder with agoraphobia.”

Id. at 7. He held for step three that the claimant did “not have an impairment or combination

of impairments” listed in or medically equal to one contained in the regulations. Id.

Following step three, the Commissioner found that Clark “has the residual functional

capacity to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels” but with certain

“nonexertional limitations.” Id. at 9. Critically, he determined that the claimant could

engage in a work environment “free of fast-paced production requirements and involv[ing]

only simple, work-related decisions with no more than occasional workplace changes.” Id.

Clark’s impairments rendered her unable to face “public interaction,” but the Commissioner

noted she could “work around coworkers . . . with only occasional interaction.” Id. He also

concluded that “the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting

effects of [her] symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other

evidence in the record.” Id. at 10.

In the last two steps, the Commissioner decided that “there are jobs that exist in

significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform” even though

Clark “has no past relevant work.” Id. at 13–14. He relied on a vocational expert who

testified that Clark “would be able to perform the requirements of [at least three]

representative occupations.” Id. at 14. Because he determined that Clark “is capable of

making a successful adjustment to other work that exists in significant numbers in the

national economy,” the Commissioner deemed Clark “not disabled” under the Act. Id. at 14–

15. In other words, Clark had not proven that she is “unable to engage in any substantial

gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment.” 42

U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A) (emphasis added).

Standard of Review

Article III courts have very narrow authority to review the decision of the

Commissioner to grant or deny public benefits. “Congress may allow the Executive Branch

to resolve certain matters free from judicial involvement”—perhaps at all. SEC v. Jarkesy,

603 U.S. 109, 152 (2024) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). These “matters” include the “grant [or

denial] of public benefits.” Id. at 152–153. In this area, Congress has chosen to give federal

courts some (limited) authority to review the decision of the agency, but courts must remain

cognizant of this highly limited role.

Congress has given federal courts authority to review only a few things. First, courts

can review whether the Commissioner’s fact findings are “supported by substantial

evidence.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). If the findings are supported, then the Commissioner’s

findings “shall be conclusive.” Id. Second, if the Commissioner rules against a petitioner

because that petitioner fails to comply with an agency regulation, “the court shall review only

the question of conformity with such regulations and the validity of such regulations.” Id.

Third, courts may (in certain circumstances) “order additional evidence to be taken before

the Commissioner of Social Security, but only upon a showing that there is new evidence

which is material and that there is good cause for the failure to incorporate such evidence

into the record in a prior proceeding.” Id.

Analysis

Clark asserts that the Commissioner’s decision was not supported by substantial

evidence. Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept

as adequate to support a conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019) (internal

citations omitted). “[T]he threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high.” Id. It is

simply “more than a mere scintilla”—evidence sufficient that a “reasonable mind might

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (internal citations omitted). The Court

“consider[s] all evidence in the record, whether it supports or detracts from the ALJ’s

decision.” Reece v. Colvin, 834 F.3d 904, 908 (8th Cir. 2016). Courts “defer heavily to the

findings and conclusions of the Social Security Administration.” Wright v. Colvin, 789 F.3d

847, 852 (8th Cir. 2015) (internal citation omitted). The Court does not “reweigh the evidence

presented to the ALJ.” Reece, 834 F.3d at 908 (internal citation omitted). The Court will not

“reverse merely because substantial evidence also exists in the record that would have

supported a contrary outcome, or because [the Court] would have decided the case

differently.” KKC ex rel. Stoner v. Colvin, 818 F.3d 364, 369 (8th Cir. 2016) (internal citation

omitted); see also McNamara v. Astrue, 590 F.3d 607, 610 (8th Cir. 2010).

Under this highly deferential standard, the Commissioner prevails. Clark urges the

Court to upend the Commissioner’s final decision because Clark believes the administrative

law judge (1) incorrectly assessed a psychiatrist’s opinion and (2) constructed a residual

functional capacity not supported by the record. ECF 13 at 9. But substantial evidence

supports the Commissioner’s determination on both points. While judicial review is “more

than a rubber stamp,” McMillian v. Schweiker, 697 F.2d 215, 220 (8th Cir. 1983), the Court

“must uphold” the Commissioner’s decision “if it is supported by substantial evidence on the

administrative record as a whole.” Hensley, 829 F.3d at 931 (internal citation omitted). The

Commissioner met this standard, so Clark’s claims fail.

A. The Psychiatrist’s Opinion

Clark first argues that the Commissioner was “simply playing doctor” because the

Commissioner rejected a psychiatrist’s brief report as inconsistent with the record evidence.

ECF 13 at 11. That argument fails for several reasons.

To begin, the Commissioner is by no means required to defer to the judgment of a

single physician. The Constitution and the laws of the United States do not outsource legal

decision making to doctors. See United States v. Skrmetti, 145 S. Ct. 1816, 1836 (2025);

Brandt ex rel. Brant v. Griffin, 147 F.4th 867, 887 (8th Cir. 2025) (en banc). That “would

reduce judges,” including administrative law judges, “to mere spectators” in our legal system.

Skrmetti, 145 S. Ct. at 1840 (Thomas, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted). Agency

regulations highlight that the Commissioner “will not defer . . . to any medical opinion(s) . . .,

including those from [the claimant’s] medical sources.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a). That does

not mean, of course, that a medical professional’s opinion is unhelpful or irrelevant—just that

the legal fact finder is not bound by it. “The more relevant the objective medical evidence

and supporting explanations . . . are to support his or her medical opinion(s)” and “[t]he more

consistent a medical opinion(s) . . . is with the evidence from other medical sources and

nonmedical sources in the claim,” “the more persuasive the medical opinion(s) . . . will be.”

Id. § 416.920c(c)(1)–(2) (outlining the supportability and consistency factors).

The Commissioner found the psychiatrist’s opinion unpersuasive for several reasons,

none of which the Court can disrupt. First, the psychiatrist’s opinion was “unsupported by

objective findings and instead appears based on subjective complaints.” ECF 1-3 at 13. The

Commissioner added that the opinion “overstates” the evidence as to Clark’s alleged

impairments while also ignoring “recent records showing achieved stability and increased

activity.” Id. Second, the Commissioner determined that the psychiatrist’s statement was

inconsistent with the opinions of other medical professionals, including two psychologists.

See, e.g., ECF 15 at 1, 8. “[T]he Commissioner may discount or even disregard the opinion of

a treating physician where other medical assessments are supported by better or more

thorough medical evidence.” Fentress v. Berryhill, 854 F.3d 1016, 1020 (8th Cir. 2017)

(internal citation omitted)). Third, the Commissioner determined that the psychiatrist’s brief

opinion not only contradicted the evidence from other medical practitioners, but also

contradicted other record evidence. The Commissioner found that the rest of the record

evidence revealed that Clark (though undoubtedly dealing with serious mental health issues)

improves with medication compliance and engages in a “wide range” of ordinary daily

activities, including activities for income. ECF 1-3 at 13.

Finally, the psychiatrist’s opinion was brief; the psychiatrist submitted only a three-

page, “check-the-box,” form with just two handwritten sentences discussing the claimant’s

impairments. ECF 15 at 1, 4; ECF 8-9 at 599–601. Check-the-box opinions are generally

insufficient to overcome other medical evidence. The Commissioner is not required to defer

to a “bare” and “formulaic” check-the-box opinion that is “highly inconsistent” with the record

as a whole. Nolen v. Kijakazi, 61 F.4th 575, 577 (8th Cir. 2023); Swarthout v. Kijakazi, 35

F.4th 608, 611 (8th Cir. 2022) (rejecting a check-the-box opinion as “entitled to relatively

little evidentiary value on its face,” “conclusory,” and “therefore properly discounted”).

Where, as here, a treating psychiatrist’s opinion “appears on such a [check-the-box] form,”

the Commissioner “permissibly may rely more heavily on other opinions in the record.”

Swarthout, 35 F.4th at 611.

The Court cannot say that the Commissioner lacked any basis to deem the treating

psychiatrist’s opinion “unpersuasive” after weighing it against “objective medical evidence”

and “evidence from other medical sources” in the record. ECF 1-3 at 13; 20 C.F.R.

§ 416.920c(c)(1)–(2). Contrary to Clark’s argument, the Commissioner did not impermissibly

“play[] doctor.” ECF 13 at 11. Substantial evidence supports his final decision.

B. The Residual Functional Capacity Determination

Clark next contends that the assessment of her residual functional capacity is not

supported by substantial evidence. ECF 13 at 17. But the Commissioner “considered all the

claimant’s impairments, including her numerous mental diagnoses.” ECF 1-3 at 12. The

Commissioner is not required to accept a claimant’s allegations as fact. “[L]ike any

reasonable factfinder,” the Commissioner “is free to credit part of a witness’ testimony

without necessarily accepting it all.” Cf. Garland v. Dai, 593 U.S. 357, 366 (2021) (cleaned

up). “It does not matter whether the agency accepts all, none, or some of the [claimant’s]

testimony; its reasonable findings may not be disturbed.” Id. Just so here. Because the

Commissioner discussed Clark’s testimony and mental health status, and reached a

determination adequately supported by this evidence, the Court will neither reweigh the

evidence in the record nor upend his final decision.

In crafting a residual functional capacity for a claimant with mental impairments or

other subjective symptoms, the Commissioner examines a claimant’s disability by

“consider[ing] all [the claimant’s] symptoms.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(a). This analysis includes

all statements “about [the claimant’s] symptoms” as well as “any description . . . medical

sources or nonmedical sources may provide about how the symptoms affect [the claimant’s]

activities of daily living and . . . ability to work.” Id. The Commissioner will then “determine

the extent to which [the claimant’s] alleged functional limitations . . . due to pain or other

symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the medical signs . . . and other

evidence to decide how [his] symptoms affect [his] ability to work.” Id.

Clark alleges that the evidence “shows [she] does not have the long-term stable mental

health the [Commissioner] purports she has.” ECF 13 at 20. This assertion oversimplifies

the Commissioner’s analysis and the record evidence. In a subsection spanning several

pages, the Commissioner “cited numerous factors” such as “the effectiveness of medical

treatment,” Clark’s “extensive self-reported activities,” and her “work history.” ECF 15 at

10–11; see also ECF 1-3 at 9–13. Clark’s activities include, among other things, “caring for

her three children (ages 13, 8, and 4), cooking, cleaning her house, making and selling craft

name blocks for income, selling items online for friends, maintaining four or five blogs,

attending church, attending her children’s sports activities, and driving her daughter to and

from school.” ECF 15 at 11; see Thomas v. Berryhill, 881 F.3d 672, 676 (8th Cir. 2018) (“[The

claimant’s] activities—caring for her young son, preparing his meals, doing housework,

shopping for groceries, handling money, watching television, and driving a car when

necessary, among other things—showed that she could work.”). Reviewing the

comprehensive assessment, the Court finds that the Commissioner’s conclusions rested

within his reasonable “zone of choice.” Ross v. O’Malley, 92 F.4th 775, 779 (8th Cir. 2024).

Clark’s related claim that the Commissioner “ignore[d] the testimony from the

[vocational expert]” similarly lacks force. ECF 13 at 20. Clark focuses on the vocational

expert’s response to a hypothetical question over whether a claimant’s reported mental

health symptoms could “wax and wane” and, by this oscillation, “result in termination.” Id.

But administrative law judges need not rely on vocational expert testimony regarding a

hypothetical question where, as here, the purported limitations on a hypothetical claimant

are greater than the actual limitations the Commissioner finds in the record. See Kraus v.

Saul, 988 F.3d 1019, 1027 (8th Cir. 2021) (finding the vocational expert’s “answer was not

substantial evidence, as the hypothetical person . . . did not have the same [residual

functional capacity] as [the claimant]”). For these reasons, the Commissioner’s residual

functional capacity findings stand.

Conclusion

Based on a fully and fairly developed record, and applying the highly deferential

standard that Congress has created, the Court finds that the Commissioner (1) sufficiently

considered the treating psychiatrist’s opinion and (2) made a proper residual functional

capacity determination. The Commissioner’s final decision is supported by substantial

evidence.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the final decision of the Commissioner of Social

Security is AFFIRMED.

Dated this 31st day of October, 2025

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JOSHUA M. DIVINE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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