Save Carbon County v. Com. of PA

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Save Carbon County, :

:

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 468 M.D. 2024

: Argued: September 11, 2025

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :

Josh Shapiro, in his official :

capacity of Governor, Pennsylvania :

Department of Environmental :

Protection, Jessica Shirley, in her :

official capacity as Interim Secretary, :

Pennsylvania Public Utility :

Commission, Stronghold Digital :

Mining, Inc., Stronghold Digital :

Mining, LLC, Stronghold Digital :

Mining Holdings, LLC, and Panther :

Creek Power Operating, LLC, :

:

Respondents :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge (P.)

HONORABLE MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BY JUDGE WOJCIK FILED: October 30, 2025

Presently before the Court for disposition are two sets of preliminary

objections to the original jurisdiction Amended Complaint filed by Save Carbon

County (SCC).1 The first set of preliminary objections were filed by the

1

By order dated November 4, 2024, this Court ordered that the Amended Complaint would

be treated as a Petition for Review pursuant to Chapter 15 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate

Procedure. We will therefore refer to the initiating pleading as a Petition for Review (PFR).

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Josh Shapiro in his official capacity as Governor

of Pennsylvania (Governor Shapiro), the Pennsylvania Department of

Environmental Protection (DEP), Jessica Shirley, in her official capacity as Interim

Secretary (Secretary Shirley), and the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission

(PUC) (collectively, Commonwealth Respondents). The second set of preliminary

objections were filed by Stronghold Digital Mining, Inc., Stronghold Digital Mining,

LLC, Stronghold Digital Mining Holdings, LLC, and Panther Creek Power

Operating, LLC (collectively, Stronghold or Stronghold Respondents).

Background

This action pits SCC, a Pennsylvania non-profit corporation dedicated

to saving Carbon County’s rivers, parks, forests, farms, creeks and clean air, against

the Stronghold Respondents who perform the lucrative and allegedly

environmentally harmful activity of crypto mining. For their part, the

Commonwealth Respondents are a party to this action based on the purported breach

of their fiduciary duties as trustee of Pennsylvania’s public natural resources. See

PA. CONST. article I, §27.2

2

Article I, section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution is referred to as the Environmental

Rights Amendment (ERA). It states:

The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the

preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the

environment. Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are the

common property of all the people, including generations yet to

come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall

conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.

PA. CONST. article I, §27

2

SCC commenced this suit in the Court of Common Pleas of

Philadelphia County (trial court). The parties later stipulated that this Court properly

has jurisdiction over the matter. By order dated August 6, 2024, the trial court

transferred the matter to this Court in our original jurisdiction.

The PFR alleges that Stronghold is in the business of cryptocurrency

mining. Per SCC, “cryptocurrency” is a generic form of digital currency that is not

backed by an issuing government. Instead, the value of the cryptocurrency is

determined by market forces. PFR at ¶¶30-33. Bitcoin is the most well known and

most used brand of cryptocurrency. Bitcoin relies on a “blockchain” technology to

“act as a virtual ledger of all Bitcoin transactions.” PFR at ¶¶34-35. Bitcoin’s

blockchain technology requires verification of each and every transaction in an

attempt to ensure that “no single Bitcoin is going through a duplicative transaction.”

Id. at ¶36. “In other words, each Bitcoin can only be transacted one at a time.” Id.

Stronghold Respondents

Stronghold’s business is to verify Bitcoin transactions. In exchange for

verifying transactions, Stronghold (and others like it) receives a reward of a

transaction fee as well as a newly created Bitcoin. This reward for verifying

transactions is referred to as Bitcoin mining or crypto mining. PFR at ¶¶37-38.

Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies are considered “digital assets” and not legal

tender in the United States. Id. at ¶39.

To understand the purpose behind SCC’s PFR we must look to how the

crypto mining process works. SCC alleges that Stronghold uses a “Proof of Work”

verification method. PFR at ¶41. Each transaction is added to a block, which then

needs to be verified through the Bitcoin mining process. Id. at ¶42. In turn, each

3

block “has a certain hash – a long, random, and unique alphanumeric code.” Id. at

¶43. Bitcoin miners use specialized computers to “guess” the correct hash. Id. at

¶44. The best way for a Bitcoin miner to increase its chances of guessing the correct

hash is to “have great quantities of these specialized computers operating around the

clock.” Id. at ¶46. Once the correct hash is guessed, the transaction is verified, and

it is added to the Blockchain. The miner then receives its reward of both a

transaction fee and a newly created Bitcoin. Id. at ¶47.

SCC avers that due to the competitive and randomized nature of Bitcoin

mining, the only way for a company like Stronghold to increase its chances of

obtaining new Bitcoin is by having more computers running more frequently than

its competitors. PFR at ¶48. Bitcoin miners use specialized computers that rely on

electricity to operate, and the energy demands associated with proof of work Bitcoin

mining is “extraordinarily high.” Id. at ¶¶49, 51-52. Indeed, companies that

specialize in Bitcoin mining, like Stronghold, often “operate ten[s] [] of [] thousands

of [specialized computers] at any given point in time, creating a massive electricity

demand.” PFR at ¶53.

Stronghold contends that an alternative to proof of work verification

exists. Known as “proof of stake” verification, this method purportedly does not

require “computational energy” and uses “more than 99% less energy than

proof[]of[]work crypto[]mining.” Id. at ¶¶57-58.

As with any business, Stronghold seeks to operate in a competitive

manner; thus, it possesses tens of thousands of specialized computers that run at its

facilities 24 hours a day. PFR at ¶¶66-69. Stronghold further seeks a competitive

advantage by reducing the cost of its electricity demands by operating its own

4

electric power production plants. Id. at ¶¶69-70. At issue here is Stronghold’s

Panther Creek Plant (Panther Creek) located in Carbon County. Id. at ¶72.

SCC asserts that while Stronghold has access to a large supply of

private electricity, its pollution and emissions “are very much public.” PFR at ¶¶73-

74. SCC avers that Stronghold’s consumption of vast amounts of electricity has

resulted in elevated carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions that negatively impact the

environment. Id. at ¶¶73-74; 80-81. In turn, SCC argues that the Commonwealth

Respondents “have been sitting back and not regulating cryptocurrency mining at

Panther Creek or elsewhere in Pennsylvania.” Id. at ¶82.

SCC notes that Stronghold acquired the Panther Creek facility in

November of 2021. At that time, Stronghold began operating the facility at full

capacity and burning waste coal as a fuel source. PFR at ¶86. SCC observes that

waste coal is “a by-product of the unregulated coal industry from the 20th Century.”

Id. at ¶87. SCC asserts that the burning of waste coal creates substantial carbon

emissions and releases dangerous air pollutants when burned as a fuel source. Id. at

¶89. SCC also avers that Panther Creek’s operations release harmful amounts of

sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxide and mercury. Id. at ¶¶97, 99, 100, 102-04. Finally,

neighbors of the Panther Creek facility have reported issues with waste coal debris

littering their property and area streets. Id. at ¶111.

SCC further asserts that Stronghold is burning tires as a fuel source,

thereby presenting additional environmental concerns. SCC alleges that in June of

2023, Stronghold applied for a DEP permit to burn tires, but the permit request is

still pending. PFR at ¶¶91-92. Furthermore, SCC contends that DEP was aware that

Stronghold was burning tires for fuel without a permit yet did nothing to stop

5

Stronghold from doing so. Id. at ¶95. Emissions and pollution data show that

Stronghold’s operations are harming the environment. Id. at ¶96.

SCC avers that Carbon County’s greatest economic driver is tourism;

however, Stronghold is creating an industrial hazard “without contributing any

meaningful benefits back to the residents of Carbon County.” PFR at ¶¶117-18.

SCC emphasizes that Stronghold keeps the energy it produces rather than selling

some of it back to the grid and, further, that Stronghold has at times even purchased

electricity from the grid (thereby competing with retail customers, increasing

demand, and driving up prices for local residents). Id. at ¶¶120-22.

Commonwealth Respondents

Turning to the Commonwealth Respondents, SCC asserts that the ERA

reflects that the Commonwealth has the duty of a trustee to “conserve and maintain”

Pennsylvania’s public natural resources. PFR at ¶131. Rather than performing its

fiduciary duty, SCC maintains that the Commonwealth has “incentivized and

facilitated Stronghold’s operations[.]” Id. at ¶134. This occurs because the

Commonwealth provides “tens of millions of dollars in tax credits and alternative

energy credits.” Id. at ¶135.

Alternative energy credits are provided through the Alternative Energy

Portfolio Standards Program (AEPS). PFR at ¶138.3 Pursuant to Section 7 of the

AEPS Act, 73 P.S. §1648.7, both the DEP and the PUC are responsible for

overseeing the grant of alternative energy credits. PFR at ¶139. SCC asserts that:

According to Stronghold’s Annual Report for Fiscal Year

ending December 31, 2023, Stronghold received $19.2

3

See the Alternative Energy Portfolio Standards Act, Act of November 30, 2004, P.L.

1672, as amended, 73 P.S. §§1648.1-1648.9.

6

million from alternative energy credits from the

Commonwealth because coal refuse is classified as a Tier

II Alternative Energy Source. In 2022, [Stronghold]

received $9,960,655[.00] from alternative energy credits.

PFR at ¶136. SCC also alleges that Stronghold reported receiving an additional

$2.86 million in waste coal tax credits in 2023 and $1.84 million in 2022. Id. at

¶140. Under Section 1704-J of the Tax Reform Code of 1971 (Tax Reform Code),

72 P.S. §8704-J,4 DEP is responsible for verifying if a company qualifies for waste

coal tax credits based on its electricity generation. Id. at ¶142.

SCC maintains that alternative energy credits and waste coal tax credits

are not designed for private, “vertically-integrated” companies such as Stronghold.

PFR at ¶144. Rather, these credits are intended for companies that produce

electricity for retail electric customers. Id. at ¶145. Since Stronghold produces and

consumes its own electric power and is not generating significant electric power for

retail customers, SCC contends that it is not entitled to either alternative energy

credits or waste coal tax credits. Id. at ¶147. “Yet,” SCC states, “the

Commonwealth, [the] DEP, and [the] PUC ignore this reality and give Stronghold

tens of millions in tax credits per year.” Id. at ¶148.

Petition for Review Count I: Breach of Fiduciary Duty

SCC v. Commonwealth Respondents

Count I of the PFR seeks relief from the Commonwealth Respondents.

It alleges that the Commonwealth Respondents have breached their trustee

obligations and fiduciary duties under the ERA by:

(a) Granting Stronghold AEPS credits and [waste coal] tax

credits to fuel its Bitcoin mining operation;

4

Act of March 4, 1971, P.L. 6, as amended, 72 P.S. §§7101-10004. Section 1704-J was

added by Section 33 of the Act of July 13, 2016 P.L. 526.

7

(b) Granting Stronghold AEPS credits and waste coal tax

credits even though it does not sell the majority of its

electricity generation to retail customers;

(c) Classifying Stronghold as an electric generation

supplier;

(d) Permitting Stronghold to burn waste coal to fuel its

Bitcoin mining operation;

(e) Allowing Stronghold to burn tires without a permit to

fuel its Bitcoin mining operation;

(f) Failing to control all emissions and toxins from

Stronghold’s Panther Creek . . . facility;

(g) Failing to regulate the crypto[]mining industry;

(h) Failing to regulate proof[]of[]work crypto mining;

(i) Failing to regulate energy expenditures of the

cryptocurrency and Bitcoin mining industry;

(j) Failing to develop rules relating to crypto[]mining; and

(k) Failing to consider the concerns of local Carbon

County residents in issuing permits to Stronghold.

PFR at ¶156(a)-(k).

SCC seeks injunctive relief via an order directing the Commonwealth

Respondents to:

(a) Revok[e] Stronghold’s permit to operate until such

time as it fully eliminates its toxic and dangerous

emissions;

(b) Prohibit[] Stronghold from burning tires;

(c) Revok[e] Stronghold’s permit to operate until such

time as it switches to “proof of stake” verification;

8

(d) Require Stronghold to do quarterly emissions

testing and environmental hazard assessments for all

known environmental hazards, to [be] made available to

the public without limitation;

(e) Stop granting AEPS credits, waste coal tax credits,

and other subsidies to Stronghold;

(f) Creat[e] and enforce[e] rules and regulations

relating to energy use by crypto[]mining operations; and

(g) Stop classifying Stronghold[] as an electric

generation supplier.

PFR at ¶158(a)-(g).

Petition for Review Count II: Public Nuisance

SCC v. Stronghold Respondents

Count II of the PFR alleges that Stronghold’s operations, including

transporting waste coal and burning waste coal and tires to fuel its operations, creates

a public nuisance because it causes an invasion of SCC’s and its members’ use and

enjoyment of public land as well as the clean public water and fresh air in public

spaces. PFR at ¶160. SCC avers that Stronghold’s nuisance is unreasonable because

there is no justifiable reason for its operations to invade the public’s use and

enjoyment or to pollute harmful toxins into the air and water. Id. at ¶161. SCC

further avers that Stronghold’s conduct violates the Clean Streams Law,5 because it

pollutes into nearby public waterways and is therefore a per se public nuisance. Id. at

¶162. SCC asks for compensatory and punitive damages from the Stronghold

Respondents individually, jointly and/or severally, together with costs of suit, interest

and attorney’s fees. Count II, Wherefore Clause.

5

Act of June 22, 1937, P.L. 1987, as amended, 35 P.S. §§691.1 - 691.1001.

9

Petition for Review Count III: Private Nuisance

SCC v. Stronghold Respondents

In this Count III, SCC maintains that Stronghold’s operations, including

transporting waste coal and burning waste coal and tires to fuel its operations, create

a private nuisance to SCC and its members because “it causes an invasion to [SCC’s]

members’ properties.” PFR at ¶165. SCC asserts that the interference is intentional

as Stronghold knows that its operations cause emissions and pollution that impacts

SCC’s members’ properties. Furthermore, the conduct is unreasonable because

Stronghold’s Bitcoin mining operation does not justify its emissions and pollution.

Id. at ¶¶166-67. SCC asks for compensatory and punitive damages from the

Stronghold Respondents individually, jointly and/or severally, together with costs of

suit, interest and attorney’s fees. Count III, Wherefore Clause.

Petition for Review Count IV: Products Liability-Design Defect

SCC v. Stronghold Respondents

In Count IV of the PFR, SCC contends that the process for Stronghold to

obtain Bitcoin is defectively designed because it causes environmental harm.

Specifically, “[p]roof []of[]work mining, which is the core of Stronghold’s business,

is inherently defective and dangerous because it requires enormous energy

expenditures to obtain Bitcoin.” PFR at ¶¶171-72. SCC maintains that Stronghold

“doubles down on” this defect, by burning waste coal and tires to fuel its Bitcoin

mining operation. Id. at ¶173. SCC asserts that the social utility of Stronghold

obtaining Bitcoin for its own private gain is not justified by the adverse environmental

and health consequences of its operations. Id. at ¶174. Because Stronghold’s

“defective Bitcoin mining operation” causes direct harm to SCC’s interests and

members, SCC asks for compensatory and punitive damages from the Stronghold

10

Respondents individually, jointly and/or severally, together with costs of suit, interest

and attorney’s fees. Id. at ¶176; Count IV, Wherefore Clause.

Petition for Review Count V: Negligence

SCC v. Stronghold Respondents

Finally, in Count V of the PFR, SCC alleges that Stronghold owes a duty

to exercise ordinary care and diligence to refrain from negligent conduct that would

harm its neighbors and SCC’s members. PFR at ¶178. SCC asserts that Stronghold

has negligently failed to mitigate the harms and risks of proof of work cryptocurrency

mining, including failing to limit significant toxic emissions and pollution due to its

energy generation and consumption. Id. at ¶179. SCC also asserts that Stronghold

proof of work mining has negligently created an enormous electricity demand,

resulting in harm to SCC and its members. Id. at ¶¶180-81. SCC seeks compensatory

and punitive damages from the Stronghold Respondents individually, jointly and/or

severally, together with costs of suit, interest and attorney’s fees. Count V, Wherefore

Clause.

Respondents’ Preliminary Objections

The Commonwealth Respondents raise five preliminary objections

including: (1) sovereign immunity; (2) that Governor Shapiro is an improper party

to the action; (3) failure to exhaust mandatory statutory and administrative remedies;

(4) failure to state a claim against the DEP and Secretary Shirley; and (5) failure to

state a claim against the PUC. In turn, the Stronghold Respondents raise nine

preliminary objections. Three of the preliminary objections relate to SCC’s lack of

standing. The remaining preliminary objections assert ripeness, insufficient

11

specificity in pleading and raise demurrers to SCC’s products liability claim and its

requests for punitive damages and attorneys’ fees.

In ruling on preliminary objections, we accept as true all well-pleaded

material allegations in the petition for review and any reasonable inferences that we

may draw from the averments. Meier v. Maleski, 648 A.2d 595, 600

(Pa. Cmwlth. 1994). The Court, however, is not bound by legal conclusions,

unwarranted inferences from facts, argumentative allegations, or expressions of

opinion encompassed in the petition for review. Id. We may sustain preliminary

objections only when the law makes clear that the petitioner cannot succeed on the

claim, and we must resolve any doubt in favor of the petitioner. Id.

SCC v. Commonwealth Respondents

Lack of Associational Standing: SCC’s ERA Claim

First, we will address Stronghold’s argument that SCC lacks

associational standing to bring its ERA claim.6 Stronghold asserts that SCC has

failed to plead two sets of essential facts to support associational standing for its

6

In Firearm Owners Against Crime v. Papenfuse, 261 A.3d 467, 481 (Pa. 2021), our

Supreme Court recognized that

[s]tanding is a justiciability concern, implicating a court’s ability to

adjudicate a matter. See Robinson [Township v. Commonwealth], 83

A.3d [901, 916 (Pa. 2013)]; see also Town of McCandless v.

McCandless Police Officers [Association], 901 A.2d 991, 1002 (Pa.

2006) (explaining standing, ripeness, and mootness are related

justiciability considerations that “are concerned with the proper

timing of litigation.”). Accordingly, a court must resolve

justiciability concerns as a threshold matter before addressing the

merits of the case. Robinson T[ownship], 83 A.3d at 917.

12

ERA claim.7 First, Stronghold notes, SCC’s PFR does not plead any facts to support

the conclusory allegation in Count I that the Commonwealth Respondents’ alleged

breaches of the ERA directly caused harm to members of SCC. Stronghold’s Brief

at 10. Second, Stronghold contends, even if SCC has identified harm to its members,

it fails to do so with the specificity required for an ERA claim. Id. at 10-11 (citing

Muth v. Department of Environmental Protection, 315 A.3d 185 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024)

and Food & Water Watch v. Department of Environmental Protection (Pa. Cmwlth.

Nos. 565 C.D. 2020, 621 C.D. 2020, 627 C.D. 2020, filed April 12, 2021)). In this

regard, Stronghold emphasizes that SCC’s PFR fails to offer details about the nature

and frequency of its members’ use of the allegedly affected environmental resources

or, for that matter, identify those resources by name.

SCC responds that it does indeed have standing to bring its breach of

fiduciary duty claims under the ERA. Citing to our Supreme Court’s decision in

Robinson Township, 83 A.3d at 901, SCC notes that under Pennsylvania law, an

association has standing as a representative of its members to bring a cause of action

even in the absence of an injury to itself, if the association alleges that at least one

of its members is suffering immediate or threatened injury as a result of the action

challenged. An association seeking standing is not required to disclose the identity

of its affected member, but it must describe the affected member in sufficient detail

to show that the member is aggrieved. Firearm Owners Against Crime v. City of

Harrisburg, 218 A.3d 497, 511 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019), aff’d, 261 A.3d 467 (Pa. 2021)).

7

Curiously, this preliminary objection was not raised by the Commonwealth Respondents

and SCC has not objected to Stronghold raising the standing issue. Accordingly, we believe SCC

has waived any objection to Stronghold’s standing to raise its preliminary objection to Count I of

the PFR. See Bullock v. County of Lycoming, 859 A.2d 518, 523 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004) (the issue of

standing is not jurisdictional and failure to raise it in preliminary objections waives the issue in

future proceedings).

13

Finally, SCC asserts that standing may be shown without identification of individual

members, but only where the complaint’s description of the organization’s members

is sufficient to show that they are aggrieved. Americans for Fair Treatment, Inc. v.

Philadelphia Federation of Teachers, 150 A.3d 528, 534-35 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016).

Citing to this Court’s opinion in Funk v. Wolf, 144 A.3d 228, 244 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 2016), SCC notes that

[p]articularly within the context of environmental

litigation, this Court has cited favorably the United States

Supreme Court holding that “environmental plaintiffs

adequately allege injury in fact when they aver that they

use the affected area and are persons for whom the

aesthetic and recreational values of the area will be

lessened by the challenged activity.”

SCC’s Brief at 44.

SCC believes it has sufficiently pleaded that at least one of its members

would have standing to bring a claim individually against the Commonwealth

Respondents for breaching their fiduciary duties under the ERA. SCC pleaded that

it is an organization made up of about 90 citizens of Carbon County and surrounding

areas, with several members living in Nesquehoning, Pennsylvania where the

Panther Creek facility is located. PFR at ¶4. Furthermore, the PFR asserts that

SCC’s purpose is to “save what its members love about Carbon County: its rivers,

its parks, its forests, its farms, its creeks and its clean air.” SCC’s Brief at 45 (quoting

PFR at ¶2). SCC has alleged that Stronghold’s environmentally harmful conduct

takes place in Carbon County, detailing Panther Creek’s pollution and emissions.

PFR at ¶¶76-80; 89; 97-105. SCC notes that although “Stronghold argues that

[SCC’s PFR] is not specific enough as to the harm suffered to confer standing—that

stems from Stronghold’s own failure to publicly release its full emissions data and

to test for known toxic and carcinogenic substances.” SCC’s Brief at 47. Thus, SCC

14

contends that its members, as nearby residents and individuals who enjoy the natural

resources of Carbon County, have a direct, substantial and immediate interest in the

outcome of this case. Id.

To the extent that Stronghold cites Muth to support its assertion that

SCC failed to aver its ERA claim with specificity, SCC points out that Muth was

adjudicated at the summary judgment stage, which comes with a different

evidentiary standard of proof than is the case here, where the Court is disposing of

preliminary objections.

To have associational standing, the petitioner organization must allege

sufficient facts to show that at least one of its members has a substantial, direct and

immediate interest. Americans for Fair Treatment, 150 A.3d at 533.8

General descriptions of an organization’s members cannot

establish standing if they do not show that a member or

members are sufficiently adversely affected to have

standing. Compare Armstead v. Zoning Board of

Adjustment of City of Philadelphia, 115 A.3d 390, 398,

400 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (en banc) (allegation that

organization’s “members live within one to three blocks

of the proposed sign” was inadequate to establish standing

to challenge the sign) and Concerned Taxpayers of

Allegheny County [v. Commonwealth], 382 A.2d [490,

494 [(Pa. Cmwlth. 1978)] (allegation that members were

residents and citizens of Pennsylvania was inadequate to

establish standing to challenge constitutionality of statute

governing payment of state officials) with Robinson

Township, 83 A.3d at 922 (organization had standing

where it submitted affidavits showing that members

resided in or owned property in zoning districts directly

8

A party has a substantial interest in the outcome of litigation if his interest “surpasses that

of all citizens in procuring obedience of the law.” Funk, 144 A.3d at 244. An interest is direct if

there is a causal connection between the matter complained of and the harm alleged. Id. Finally,

an interest is immediate when the “causal connection is not remote or speculative.” Id. (citing

Fumo v. City of Philadelphia, 972 A.2d 487, 496 (Pa. 2009)).

15

affected by the statute that it challenged) and National

Solid Wastes Management Association [v. Casey], 580

A.2d [893, 899 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990)] (organization had

standing to seek declaratory judgment where it pleaded

that its members had filed permit applications that were

directly affected by the challenged order). Where the

organization has not shown that any of its members have

standing, the fact that the challenged action implicates the

organization’s mission or purpose is not sufficient to

establish standing. Armstead, 115 A.3d at 399–

400; Concerned Taxpayers of Allegheny County, 382 A.2d

at 494.

Id. at 533-34.

Dismissal for lack of standing is proper where the petitioner

organization neither identifies its affected members nor pleads sufficient facts to

permit a court to determine that they have a substantial, direct and immediate

interest. Americans for Fair Treatment, 150 A.3d at 534 (citing Lincoln Party by

Robinson v. General Assembly, 682 A.2d 1326, 1330 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996)).

Admittedly, standing may be shown without identification of individual members,

but only where the complaint’s description of the members is sufficient to show how

they are aggrieved. Id. at 534-35.

Based on our review of the PFR, we cannot say that SCC has adequately

pled that it has associational standing to bring its ERA claims against the

Commonwealth Respondents. It is apparent that the PFR identifies SCC as an

organization of citizens of Carbon County and surrounding areas, with several

members living near the Panther Creek facility. PFR at ¶4. The PFR also identifies

SCC’s mission to save Carbon County’s rivers, parks, forests, farms, creeks and

clean air by ensuring that Carbon County is not polluted by environmental toxins.

Id. at ¶¶2-3. Finally, the PFR contains a multitude of allegations concerning how

Stronghold’s business operations are allegedly harmful to the environment. PFR at

16

¶¶81; 96-98; 100-03; 104-05; and 157. Absent from the PFR, however, are any

allegations as to how the Commonwealth Respondents’ alleged failure to perform

their fiduciary duties under the ERA has caused harm to an SCC member. There are

no allegations in the PFR that an SCC member accesses or uses any of the impacted

portions of the environment. Also absent from the PFR are any allegations as to how

Stronghold’s alleged pollution and emissions have negatively impacted an SCC

member. Without more, simply averring that SCC members wish to protect Carbon

County’s environment, that members of SCC live near the Panther Creek facility,

and that Panther Creek’s operations harm the environment, is not sufficient to confer

standing on the organization.

We emphasize that to be sufficiently specific, the allegations of the PFR

need not exhaustively allege copious facts to meet the standing threshold.

Nevertheless, the PFR must, at a minimum, allege sufficiently detailed facts showing

a causal connection between the matter complained of, i.e., the Commonwealth

Respondents’ failure to fulfill their fiduciary duties under the ERA, and the harm

alleged. Funk. Here, no harm is alleged beyond a generalized harm to the

environment.9 Accordingly, we sustain Stronghold’s preliminary objection and

dismiss SCC’s claims against the Commonwealth Respondents without prejudice to

file an amended PFR.

SCC v. Stronghold Respondents

Lack of Associational Standing: SCC’s Claims for Damages

Next, Stronghold asserts that SCC does not have associational standing

for its monetary damage claims against Stronghold. Stronghold maintains that under

9

While the PFR does indicate there were issues with waste coal debris, PFR at ¶111, and

that an individual’s trees and plants had died, PFR at ¶118, those allegations involve neighbors of

the Panther Creek facility. It was not alleged that these neighbors were members of SCC.

17

Pennsylvania Law, “an organization like SCC can invoke associational standing

only ‘if the nature of the claim asserted and the relief sought does not render the

individual participation of each injured party indispensable to proper resolution of

the issue.’” Stronghold’s Brief at 12 (quoting American Booksellers Association v.

Rendell, 481 A.2d 919, 927 (Pa. Super. 1984)). Here, in Counts II through V of the

PFR, SCC seeks compensatory and punitive damages on behalf of itself as well as

its members. Stronghold posits:

Even considering just compensatory damages, those

damages “are intended to redress the concrete loss that the

plaintiff has suffered by reason of the defendant’s

conduct” and “may include not only out of pocket loss and

monetary harms, but also such injuries as “impairment of

reputation and standing in the community, personal

humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering.” These

factors simply cannot be explored without the individual

participation of each SCC member allegedly so harmed.

Stronghold’s Brief at 13 (quoting Bert Co. v. Turk, 298 A.3d 44, 58 (Pa. 2023))

(footnotes omitted).

Stronghold contends that this Court reached this very conclusion in the

case of Building Industry Association of Lancaster County v. Manheim Township,

710 A.2d 141 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998). Stronghold argues that the instant matter presents

the same complications as in Building Industry. Individual members of SCC will be

affected by Stronghold’s operations, if at all, to different degrees and in different

ways. Stronghold asks that this Court dismiss the SCC claims against Stronghold

that rely on associational standing.

SCC dismisses Stronghold’s assertions, arguing that at this early stage

of the proceedings, it has sufficiently alleged that it has standing to bring claims on

associational standing against Stronghold. SCC emphasizes that Stronghold is not

18

only “damaging the individual members of [SCC], but Stronghold is also harming

the trust property that belongs to members of [SCC] (as well as the people of

Pennsylvania) under the ERA.” SCC’s Brief at 49-50. While harm to any individual

may require an individual assessment of damages, “the harm to the trust property is

an equal amount shared by all members of [SCC].” Id.

We agree with Stronghold and find the Building Industry case

persuasive. Building Industry involved a challenge by an association of building

contractors and real estate developers (Association) to a Manheim Township

(Township) ordinance which imposed an impact fee on developers. The Association

filed a complaint against the Township seeking declaratory relief and a refund of all

impact fees collected under the ordinance. Building Industry, 710 A.2d at 143.

Among the standing issues raised by the Township was whether the Association had

standing as an organization to seek a refund of the impact fees. In determining that

the Association did not have organizational standing, the Court found the following

statement from the United States Supreme Court persuasive:

[I]n the circumstances of this case, the damages claims are

not common to the entire membership, nor shared by all in

equal degree. To the contrary, whatever injury may have

been suffered is peculiar to the individual member

concerned, and both the fact and extent of injury would

require individualized proof. Thus, to obtain relief in

damages, each member of Home Builders who claims

injury as a result of respondents’ practices must be a party

to the suit, and Home Builders has no standing to claim

damages on his behalf.

Building Industry, 710 A.2d at 146 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 515-16

(1975)).

The Building Industry Court theorized that a similar scenario was

before it as the Association’s members had suffered individualized damages that

19

were not shared in amount by all of its members. “Therefore, each member would

need to offer proof as to the amount of injury suffered by that particular member.”

Building Industry, 710 A.2d at 146 (emphasis in original). Thus, the Court reasoned,

each individual member needed to seek a refund of the impact fee, and the

Association had no standing as an organization to do so on behalf of its members.

The same issue is presented here. SCC seeks compensatory and

punitive damages from the Stronghold Respondents in Counts II through V of its

PFR. As was the case in Building Industry, it is apparent that the damages allegedly

suffered by SCC’s members are individualized. Thus, in order to obtain relief in

damages, SCC must heed the directive of the United States Supreme Court in Warth

by naming, as a party to the suit, each member of SCC who claims injury as a result

of Stronghold’s practices.

Accordingly, we sustain Stronghold’s preliminary objection asserting

that SCC does not have associational standing for its monetary and punitive damages

claims against Stronghold and dismiss Counts II through V of the PFR without

prejudice to file an amended PFR.

Conclusion

Because we have sustained Stronghold’s preliminary objections raising

associational standing, Counts I through V of SCC’s PFR are dismissed without

prejudice. SCC may file a Seconded Amended PFR no later than 30 days from the

exit date of this Court’s order disposing of the preliminary objections.10

MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

10

In light of our disposition of this case, we need not address the remaining preliminary

objections.

20

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Save Carbon County, :

:

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 468 M.D. 2024

:

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :

Josh Shapiro, in his official :

capacity of Governor, Pennsylvania :

Department of Environmental :

Protection, Jessica Shirley, in her :

official capacity as Interim Secretary, :

Pennsylvania Public Utility :

Commission, Stronghold Digital :

Mining, Inc., Stronghold Digital :

Mining, LLC, Stronghold Digital :

Mining Holdings, LLC, and Panther :

Creek Power Operating, LLC, :

:

Respondents :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 30th day of October, 2025, the preliminary objections

of Stronghold Digital Mining, Inc., Stronghold Digital Mining, LLC, Stronghold

Digital Mining Holdings, LLC, and Panther Creek Power Operating, LLC raising

Save Carbon County’s (SCC) lack of associational standing are SUSTAINED and

Counts I through V of SCC’s Petition for Review are DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE.

SCC may file a Second Amended Petition for Review within 30 days

of the exit date of this Order.

___________________________

MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge