Dunn

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

MARGARET DUNN,

Plaintiff, Case No. 2:25-cv-375-KCD-NPM

v.

SOCIETY OF ST. VINCENT DE

PAUL SOUTH PINELLAS, INC.,

Defendant,

/

ORDER

Plaintiff Margaret Dunn brings this gender discrimination case against

her former employer, the Society of St. Vincent De Paul South Pinellas, Inc.,

which operates the Fabulous Finds Resale Shop. Defendant moves to dismiss

the complaint for failure to state a claim. (Doc. 17.)1 Dunn has responded in

opposition. (Doc. 18.) For the reasons below, Defendant’s motion is denied.

I. Background2

Dunn began working at the Resale Shop as a Lead Donation Coordinator

in 2023. She applied for a store manager position, and despite her

qualifications and successful track record, Defendant selected a less qualified

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all internal quotation marks, citations, case history, and

alterations have been omitted in this and later citations.

2 “At the motion to dismiss stage, all well-pleaded facts are accepted as true, and the

reasonable inferences therefrom are construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”

Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1273 n.1 (11th Cir. 1999).

male candidate, Sean Milam. Dunn later voluntarily resigned because her

husband’s job relocated him to Pennsylvania

Dunn later resumed employment at the Resale Shop, again as a Lead

Donation Coordinator. She received positive feedback and demonstrated

exceptional performance. But only six days into her reemployment, she was

fired because of a “missing Christmas tree.” Defendant later changed its

justification for her termination, claiming that she had directed the disposal of

sellable items. A male employee, Vinny Carlucci, who was part of the same

incident, received only a verbal warning for identical conduct. When

terminating Dunn, by contrast, Defendant failed to follow the company’s

standard disciplinary procedures.

Dunn sues for gender discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act, and its state-law counterpart, the Florida Civil Rights Act (“FCRA”). (Doc.

1.) The FCRA was patterned after Title VII, so the elements and related case

law are the same. Harper v. Blockbuster Ent. Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1387 (11th

Cir. 1998).

II. Legal Standard

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), an action must be dismissed if the

complaint fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Id. In

assessing a motion to dismiss, conclusory allegations are disregarded, and the

remaining facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The complaint is sufficient if what

remains “contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim

to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id.

III. Discussion

Defendant argues that Dunn fails to allege sufficient facts to show that

similarly situated male employees were treated more favorably under nearly

the same circumstances. (Doc. 17 at 2.) Defendant says that although the

complaint identifies two comparators (Milam and Carlucci), Dunn alleges no

factual detail for these individuals, including their “qualifications, job duties,

disciplinary histories, or the specific circumstances surrounding the

employment decisions.” (Id. at 3.)

In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the Supreme

Court set the evidentiary standard for Title VII claims. McDonnell Douglas

says that when a plaintiff’s claim is based on circumstantial evidence, as Dunn

alleges here, she must prove that “1) [she] was a member of a protected class,

2) she was qualified to do the job, 3) she was subjected to an adverse

employment action, and 4) similarly situated employees outside of the

protected class were treated differently.” Holland v. Gee, 677 F.3d 1047, 1055

(11th Cir. 2012). But this framework is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading

requirement. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002). Thus, “the

complaint need not allege facts sufficient to make out a classic McDonnell

Douglas prima facie case,” but need only “plausibly suggest that the plaintiff

suffered an adverse employment action due to intentional [sex]

discrimination.” Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Found., 789 F.3d 1239, 1246 (11th

Cir. 2015). Once the plaintiff has done so, the burden shifts to the employer to

“articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for the complained-of

act. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; see also Maynard v. Bd. of Regents,

342 F.3d 1281, 1288-89 (11th Cir. 2003) (applying McDonnell burden-shifting

analysis).

Dunn meets the stricter McDonnell Douglas standard in the complaint

anyway. Dunn belongs to a protected class as a female person. (Doc. 1 ¶ 43.)

She reports receiving positive feedback about her performance. (Id. ¶¶ 27, 30.)

She suffered an adverse employment action—she was fired. (Id. ¶ 32.) Lastly,

the complaint states that Defendant treated Dunn differently from similarly

situated employees because they took part in the same incident that led to

Dunn’s firing, but they didn’t fire him, and Defendant hired a less qualified

male candidate. (Id. ¶¶ 45, 48.) And she alleges that the purported reason for

her termination was pretext. (Id. ¶ 57.) Thus, Dunn properly alleges

satisfaction of the McDonnell Douglas elements. The development of evidence

regarding the comparators and pretext is a matter properly addressed through

discovery, not on a motion to dismiss.

Defendant next argues that any claim for hostile work environment fails.

(Doc. 17 at 5.) Although the complaint mentions “hostile work environment,”

there is no stand-alone claim under this theory, and Dunn’s response does not

state that she is bringing such a claim. (Doc. 18.) So the Court need not analyze

whether a nonexistent theory should be dismissed.

Finally, Defendant maintains that Dunn seeks certain categories of

damages that are not recoverable under Title VII or the FCRA, including

“relocation costs, certain fringe benefits, and reputational damages.” (Doc. 1 at

14; Doc. 17 at 4.) Title VII requires that a plaintiff be made whole for

discrimination suffered. See Miranda v. B & B Cash Grocery Store, Inc., 975

F.2d 1518, 1534 (11th Cir. 1992). The damages available for intentional

discrimination in Title VII cases are set forth at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a. It states

that compensatory and punitive damages are recoverable. The amount of

compensatory damages awarded under § 1981a for “future pecuniary losses,

emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of

life, and other nonpecuniary losses,” and the amount of punitive damages

awarded under § 1981a, however, may not exceed the statutory cap set forth

in § 1981a(b)(3). Backpay is also available as a form of equitable relief. See

Brown v. Ala. Dept. of Transp., 597 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010).

“Other nonpecuniary losses” could include reputational damage. See

Hanna v. WCI Cmtys., Inc., 348 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1334 (S.D. Fla. 2004). And

back pay could include fringe benefits, such as health insurance coverage,

vacation, and sick leave. See Munoz v. Oceanside Resorts, Inc., 223 F.3d 1340,

1348 (11th Cir. 2000). Whether “relocation costs” are recoverable under Title

VII is unclear, and Defendant does not cite any authority to preclude such

relief. So, for now, the Court will allow the damages as pled. The Court is not

deciding whether such relief may ultimately be recovered by Dunn in this case.

And to the extent these damages remain part of the case, Defendant can

address them on summary judgment or through an appropriate motion at trial.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED:

1. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 17) is DENIED.

2. Defendant must answer the complaint within fourteen days of this

Order.

ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on October 29, 2025.

Kyle C. Dudek os ot

United States District Judge