Lange

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

MARK PATRICK LANGE,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No.: 2:25-cv-00366-JES-NPM

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF LAW

ENFORCEMENT (FDLE), CARMINE

MARCENO, IN HIS OFFICIAL

CAPACITY AS SHERIFF OF LEE

COUNTY,

Defendants,

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on pro se Plaintiff Mark

Lange’s (Plaintiff or Lange) corrected motion for preliminary

injunction (Doc. #55) filed on September 23, 2025. Defendants,

Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) and Carmine Marceno,

in his official capacity as Sheriff of Lee County, Florida,

(Sheriff Marceno) (collectively the Defendants) filed a joint

Response in Opposition (Doc. #59) on October 3, 2025. Without

leave, Lange filed a Reply (Doc. #60) on October 8, 2025.1 For the

reasons set forth below, the motion is denied.

1 “Except for a reply to a motion for summary judgment or a reply

brief in a social security case, no party may reply without leave.”

M.D. Fla. R. 3.01(d). The Reply is thereby improper, stricken, and

not considered.

I.

In 1995, Lange was convicted of fourth degree criminal sexual

conduct in Minnesota in violation of Minnesota Statute § 609.345,

subd. 1(b).2 (Doc. #55-1, pp. 5-6.)3 The conviction required Lange

to register as a predatory offender in Minnesota. Minn. Stat. §

243.166, subd. 1b(a)(1)(iii).

In 2003, after the Minnesota Probation Office reported that

Lange “had complied with all the terms and conditions of

probation,” and recommended that he be honorably discharged from

probation, a Minnesota state court ordered Lange “discharged from

probation, restored to all civil rights and to full citizenship

with full right to vote and hold office the same as if said

conviction had not taken place.” (Doc. #55-1, p. 5.) Additionally,

the Order provided that the “conviction is deemed to be for a

2 Under § 609.345, subd.1(b), a person who engages in sexual

contact with another person is guilty of fourth-degree criminal

sexual conduct if the victim is at least 13 but less than 16 years

of age and the actor is more than 48 months older than victim.

State v. McFatridge, No. C8-98-1657, 1999 WL 595329, at *3 (Minn.

Ct. App. Aug. 10, 1999); State v. Koerner, No. C3-96-329, 1996 WL

636185, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 1996).

3 Plaintiff labeled this exhibit as “Exhibit E.” However, the

exhibit appears on the Court’s CM/ECF system as Exhibit 1. The

Court will cite each exhibit herein by the numerical number

assigned to it by the Court's CM/ECF system.

misdemeanor” pursuant to Minnesota Statute § 609.13, subd. 1(2).4

(Id.)

Lange relocated to Florida in 2003 and began registering as

sex offender in Florida pursuant to Florida Statute § 943.0435.5

(Doc. #8, p. 3.)

In 2009, a letter from the Minnesota Department of Public

Safety (MDPS) informed Lange that his “registration requirement

[as a sex offender] was fulfilled” as of January 26, 2009, and

that he was “no longer required to register as a Predatory Offender

in the State of Minnesota.” (Doc. #55-1, p. 1.) The letter

continued: “This notice only applies to your registration

requirement for the State of Minnesota. You must contact the

Registry for any other State where you have lived, worked, or

attended school to determine the status of your registration

requirement within that State.” (Id.) Lange’s Minnesota predatory

offender registration file was closed. (Id.)

4 “Notwithstanding a conviction is for a felony,” “the conviction

is deemed to be for a misdemeanor if the imposition of the prison

sentence is stayed, the defendant is placed on probation, and the

defendant is thereafter discharged without a prison sentence.”

Minn. Stat. § 609.13, subd. 1(2). See also State v. Skramstad, 433

N.W.2d 449, 452 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).

5 “Under [§] 943.0435,” known as Florida’s sex offender

registration statute, “any person who is a ‘sexual offender’ (as

defined by subsection [(1)(h)1]) is required to provide specific

information to certain state or law enforcement agencies in order

to satisfy the reporting requirements.” In re Standard Jury

Instructions in Crim. Cases--Rep. No. 2007-4, 983 So. 2d 531 (Fla.

2008)(per curiam).

In 2023, Lange moved for an expungement in a Minnesota state

court. (Id. at p. 12.) The court summarized the prior proceedings,

noting that Lange had been required to register as a sex offender

and that the offense of conviction was now deemed a misdemeanor.

(Id.) The Court expunged Lange’s judicial records pursuant to its

inherent authority, ordering “[a]ll judicial branch records

concerning [Lange’s conviction], including records of arrest,

citation, and charges, relative to the offense(s) shall be sealed.”

(Id. at p. 12.) This Order has been filed in the public records of

Lee County, Florida. (Id. at pp. 11-16.)

Lange now moves to enjoin the Defendants from enforcing any

of Florida’s registration requirements against him on and after

October 1, 2025. He argues Florida Statute § 943.0435(11)(b)

entitles him to this relief because his Minnesota sex offender

designation was removed (as evidenced by the 2023 Minnesota state

court order and the MDPS letter), and he “has no other convictions

or designations that triggers registration under §

943.0435(1)(h)1.” (Doc. #55, pp. 2-3.) He requests the “FDLE to

correct its records and cease unlawful enforcement.” (Id. at p.

4.)

II.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of

the Middle District of Florida authorize a court to issue a

preliminary injunction under certain circumstances. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 65(a); M.D. Fla. R. 6.02. A preliminary injunction will be

issued only if the movant demonstrates: “(1) he has a substantial

likelihood of success on the merits, (2) he will suffer irreparable

injury unless the injunction issues, (3) the injunction would not

substantially harm the other litigant, and (4) if issued, the

injunction would not be adverse to the public interest.” Long v.

Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 924 F.3d 1171, 1176 (11th Cir. 2019). “A

preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy not

to be granted unless the movant clearly establishes the burden of

persuasion as to the four requisites.” Vital Pharms., Inc. v.

Alfieri, 23 F.4th 1282, 1291 (11th Cir. 2022)(quoting Forsyth Cnty.

v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 633 F.3d 1032, 1039 (11th Cir.

2011)).

A movant need only demonstrate a substantial likelihood of

success on one of his claims—not all his claims—to secure a

preliminary injunction. Alabama v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 424

F.3d 1117, 1134 (11th Cir. 2005). Ultimately, “[t]he grant or

denial of a preliminary injunction is a decision within the sound

discretion of the district court.” United States v. Lambert, 695

F.2d 536, 539 (11th Cir. 1983).

III.

Lange fails to satisfy the first requirement for a preliminary

injunction — that he has a substantial likelihood of success on

the merits. Assuming arguendo that the operative complaint

sufficiently states at least one underlying cause of action,6 a

preliminary injunction is not warranted because Lange fails to

show Florida Statute § 943.0435(11)(b) likely exempts him from

Florida’s reporting requirements.

To be eligible for exemption from Florida’s reporting

requirements under this subsection, Lange must: (1) be a sex

offender as defined by sub-subparagraph (1)(h)1.b; (2) show that

his sex offender designation has been removed by the foreign

jurisdiction; and (3) show that he does not meet the criteria for

registration under any other sub-subparagraph of subparagraph

(1)(h)1. Fla. Stat. § 943.0435(11)(b).7 Lange meets the first

6 The Court construes Lange’s motion to be for a “‘traditional’

injunction, which must be based on a cause of action ‘for certain

breaches of common law, statutory, or constitutional rights.’” In

re Bayshore Ford Trucks Sales, Inc., 471 F.3d 1233, 1256 n.41 (11th

Cir. 2006)(quoting Klay v. United Healthgroup, Inc., 376 F.3d 1092,

1097). The operative complaint raises five claims, (Doc. #8, pp.

4-5), which Lange asserts all stem from “a single, ongoing

constitutional violation: FDLE’s refusal to acknowledge [Lange]’s

statutory exemption and Minnesota discharge, resulting in his

continued false classification as a sexual offender in Florida.”

(Doc. #55, p. 4.)

7 The full text of subparagraph (11)(b) is as follows:

Except as provided in s. 943.04354, a sexual offender

must maintain registration with the [FDLE] for the

duration of his or her life unless the sexual offender

has received a full pardon or has had a conviction set

aside in a postconviction proceeding for any offense

that meets the criteria for classifying the person as a

sexual offender for purposes of registration. However,

a sexual offender shall be considered for removal of the

requirement to register as a sexual offender only if the

person:

requirement but fails at the second, and therefore the third

requirement is not reached herein.

Beginning with the first requirement, to classify as a sex

offender under sub-subparagraph (1)(h)1.b, it must be shown “(1)

that [Lange] was ‘designated’ as a sexual predator or other sexual

offender designation in another state or jurisdiction; and (2)

that [Lange] was ‘subjected to registration’ as a result of that

‘designation.’” 8 Jershun v. State, 169 So. 3d 232, 238 (Fla. 4th

....

(b) Maintains registration with the [FDLE] as

described in sub-subparagraph (1)(h)1.b. for the

duration of his or her life until the person

provides the department with an order issued by the

court that designated the person as a sexual

predator, as a sexually violent predator, or any

other sexual offender designation in the state or

jurisdiction in which the order was issued which

states that such designation has been removed or

demonstrates to the department that such

designation, if not imposed by a court, has been

removed by operation of law or court order in the

state or jurisdiction in which the designation was

made, provided that such person no longer meets the

criteria for registration as a sexual offender

under the laws of this state. To qualify for removal

of the registration requirements under this

paragraph, a sexual offender described in sub-

subparagraph (1)(h)1.b. must establish that his or

her designation has been removed and establish that

he or she does not meet the criteria for

registration under any other sub-subparagraph under

subparagraph (1)(h)1.

Fla. Stat. § 943.0435(11)(b).

8 The full text of the sub-subparagraph (1)(h)1.b is as follows:

DCA 2015)(quoting Fla. Stat. § 943.0435(1)(a)1.b).9 “Designation

as a ‘sexual offender’ for purposes of [§] 943.0435 turns on a

single issue—whether one has been ‘[c]onvicted of committing, or

attempting, soliciting, or conspiring to commit’ any of a number

of specified offenses.” Ames v. State, 870 So. 2d 203, 204 (Fla.

1st DCA 2004)(citation omitted).

It is undisputed that Lange classifies as a sex offender under

sub-subparagraph (1)(h)1.b. As stated earlier, Lange was

designated as a predatory offender in Minnesota and required to

register there after being convicted of fourth degree criminal

sexual conduct. Minn. Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1b(a)(1)(iii); (Doc.

#55-1, p. 12)(the 2023 Order stating same). Therefore, the first

requirement is met.

Establishes or maintains a residence in [Florida] and

who has not been designated as a sexual predator by a

court of [Florida] but who has been designated as a

sexual predator, as a sexually violent predator, or any

other sexual offender designation in another state or

jurisdiction and was, as a result of such designation,

subjected to registration or community or public

notification, or both, or would be if the person were a

resident of that state or jurisdiction, without regard

to whether the person otherwise meets the criteria for

registration as a sexual offender[.]

Fla. Stat. § 943.0435(1)(h)1.b.

9 The subsections in the statute were later reorganized by

amendment in 2016 but the substantive requirements remain the same.

See SEX OFFENSES—PREDATORS—REGISTRATION, 2016 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.

Ch. 2016-104 (C.S.H.B. 1333) (WEST).

To be removed from the Florida registration requirements,

Lange must next show that his Minnesota sex offender designation

was removed. Fla. Stat. § 943.0435(11)(b). To show that his

Minnesota sex offender designation was removed, Lange must produce

a Minnesota court order “which states that such designation has

been removed . . . .” Id. Lange has not done so.

The only Minnesota state court order Lange points to is the

2023 Order that “expunge[d] [his] judicial records pursuant to

th[at] court’s inherent authority,” ordering “[a]ll judicial

branch records concerning [Lange’s conviction], including records

of arrest, citation, and charges, relative to the offense(s) shall

be sealed.” (Doc. #55-1, p. 14.) While Lange calls this a

“discharge order,” he fails to show that it states his conviction

was removed. (Doc. #55, p. 3.) Nowhere does the Order explicitly

say the conviction was removed, vacated, set aside, or anything

similar. Additionally, the Minnesota Supreme Court has held that

a Minnesota state court expungement order sealing the judicial

records of a conviction through the court’s inherent authority

does not “remove[], erase[], or destroy[]” the records or the

conviction in the executive branch records. Bergman v. Caulk, 938

N.W.2d 248 (Minn. 2020). Bergman held a law enforcement agency

could still recognize a conviction despite such an order. Id. at

252. Without more, Lange fails to show a substantial likelihood

that his sex offender designation was removed by the 2023 Minnesota

state court order.

Although Lange does not rely on it, the only other Minnesota

state court order he produces also fails to show a substantial

likelihood that his sex offender designation was removed. After a

probation officer recognized Lange had “complied with all the terms

and conditions of probation,” a 2003 Minnesota state court

discharged him from probation and “deemed [the conviction] to be

for a misdemeanor” pursuant to Minnesota Statute § 609.13, subd.

1(2). (Doc. #55-1, p. 5.) But again, that order does not

explicitly, (see id.), or even implicitly, state that his

conviction was removed. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 243.166,

subd.1b(1)(iii)(stating a “person shall register” as a sex

offender under Minnesota law if he “was charged with” fourth degree

criminal sexual conduct and “convicted of or adjudicated

delinquent for that offense or another offense arising out of the

same set of circumstances”). Without more, Lange fails to show a

substantial likelihood that his sex offender designation was

removed by the 2003 Minnesota court order or any other order.

Lange fails to show there is a substantial likelihood that

his sex offender designation was removed, so he is not

substantially likely exempt from the reporting requirements

pursuant to Florida Statute § 943.0435(11)(b). Having failed to

show his foreign sex offender designation was removed in Minnesota,

the Court need not reach the question of whether Lange classifies

as a sex offender in Florida under an alternative definition. Since

all of Lange’s claims hinge on whether he is exempt from the

reporting requirements pursuant to Florida Statute §

943.0435(11)(b), (see Doc. #8);(Doc. #55, p. 4 (Lange admitting

so)), he has not shown a substantial likelihood of success on any

of his claims.

Additionally, Lange has not shown that a preliminary

injunction would not be adverse to the public interest. Lange’s

motion simply asserts “that the requested injunction serves the

public interest.” (Doc. #55, p. 6.) That lone sentence does not

satisfy his burden. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co.,

739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014). Especially here, where the

Florida Legislature has expressly recognized a strong public

interest weighing against Lange’s requested relief:

The Legislature finds that sexual offenders, especially

those who have committed offenses against minors, often

pose a high risk of engaging in sexual offenses even

after being released from incarceration or commitment

and that protection of the public from sexual offenders

is a paramount government interest. Sexual offenders

have a reduced expectation of privacy because of the

public's interest in public safety and in the effective

operation of government. Releasing information

concerning sexual offenders to law enforcement agencies

and to persons who request such information, and the

release of such information to the public by a law

enforcement agency or public agency, will further the

governmental interests of public safety. The designation

of a person as a sexual offender is not a sentence or a

punishment but is simply the status of the offender which

is the result of a conviction for having committed

certain crimes.

Fla. Stat. § 943.0435(12). Lange fails to show that, if issued,

the preliminary injunction would not be adverse to the public

interest.

Accordingly, it is now

ORDERED:

Lange’s corrected motion for preliminary injunction (Doc. #55) is

DENIED.

DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this 29th day of

October 2025.

/ — Ap p

JGHE E. STEELE

Sq IOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

12