Haines

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

DOUGLAS J. HAINES, CASE NO. 1:24-cv-2134

Petitioner, DISTRICT JUDGE

CHARLES ESQUE FLEMING

vs.

MAGISTRATE JUDGE

WARDEN SHELBIE SMITH, JAMES E. GRIMES JR.

Respondent.

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION

Douglas J. Haines filed a Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of

Habeas Corpus. Doc. 1. Haines is currently in custody at the Belmont

Correctional Institution serving a sentence of 28 to 33 years’ imprisonment

imposed by the Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas in State v. Haines,

Case No. 2022cr0016. The Court referred this matter to a Magistrate Judge

under Local Rule 72.2 for the preparation of a Report and Recommendation.

For the following reasons, I recommend that the Court deny Haines’s petition.

Summary of underlying facts

In habeas corpus proceedings brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, factual

determinations made by state courts are presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(e)(1). “This presumption also applies to the factual findings that [a] state

appellate court makes on its review of the state trial record.” Johnson v. Bell,

525 F.3d 466, 474 (6th Cir. 2008). The petitioner has the burden of rebutting

that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. Id.

The Ohio Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Appellate District

summarized the facts underlying Haines’s conviction following his trial as

follows:

{¶2} On January 13, 2022, the Ashtabula County

Grand Jury indicted Haines on one count of Rape

(Count One), a felony of the first degree in violation

of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) and (B), and four counts of

Rape (Counts Two to Five), felonies of the first

degree in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2) and (B).

{¶3} On October 14, 2022, a Written Plea of Guilty

and Plea Agreement was entered in the trial court’s

docket. According to the Agreement, Haines entered

a plea of “guilty” to Rape (Counts Two to Four) in

exchange for the State dismissing the remaining

Rape charges (Counts One and Five). Moreover, the

parties “[s]tipulate[d] to an agreed upon sentence of

9 years on Counts 3 and 4 and 10 years on Count 2,

each count consecutive to one another for a total of

28-33 years in prison.”

{¶4} On the same date, the trial court issued a

Judgment Entry of Guilty to Negotiated Plea and

Sentencing.

State v. Haines, 2023-Ohio-3016, 2023 WL 5529698, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. 2023).

Procedural background

After the trial court entered judgment, Haines filed a notice of appeal.

Doc. 7-1, at 21. In his supporting brief, Haines raised three assignments of

error:

1. The trial court abused its discretion by denying

Appellant’s motion to withdraw plea.

2. The trial court erred in denying Appellant’s

motion to withdraw plea where Appellant was

denied his rights to the effective assistance of

counsel and due process as guaranteed by the

Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.

3. Appellant was not advised on his limited

appellate rights, specifically that he could not

challenge his sentence under R.C. 2953.08,

thereby rendering his plea invalid

Doc. 7-1, at 67–85.

In March 2023, Haines filed in the trial court a motion to withdraw his

plea and a motion to stay his appeal. Id. at 37–49, 51. In the motion, Haines

argued that because he was not told that an agreed sentence could not be

appealed, his guilty “plea was not made knowingly and must be vacated to

correct a manifest injustice.” Id. at 39–41; see Ohio Rev. Code § 2953.08(D)(1)

(“A sentence imposed upon a defendant is not subject to review under this

section if the sentence is authorized by law, has been recommended jointly by

the defendant and the prosecution in the case, and is imposed by a sentencing

judge.”).

Haines also argued that his trial counsel was ineffective. Doc. 7-1, at 42.

In support of this argument, he relied on his appellate counsel’s assertion that

Haines’s trial counsel gave Haines “a proposal and plea paperwork the day of

his scheduled hearing.” Id. Appellate counsel further asserted that Haines had

little “time to review the document with his attorney before being rushed into

the courtroom.” Id. Counsel also asserted that were it not for trial “counsel’s

representations, [Haines] would have proceeded to trial.” Id.

In April 2023, the court of appeals construed the motion to stay as a

motion for a limited remand to allow the trial court to rule on the motion to

withdraw Haines’s plea. Id. at 57. So construed, the court of appeals granted

the motion and directed its clerk to refile the record after the trial court ruled

on the motion to withdraw. Id. at 57–58.

On remand, the trial court “overruled” Haines’s motion. Id. at 63–66.

The trial court first held that, contrary to Haines argument, it had advised him

of his appeal rights. Id. at 64 (citing Doc. 7-2, at 6, 30–31). As to the ineffective-

assistance-based aspect of Haines’s motion, the trial court noted that because

Haines offered no extra-record evidence to support his motion, it was

necessarily “based solely []on the record.” Id. at 65. And the record reflected

that the following colloquy occurred during the plea hearing:

THE COURT: So, you’ve had a chance to go over this Plea

Agreement in detail with your attorney?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Has he answered all your questions?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Has he done what you’ve asked him to do?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Do you need more time to talk to him?

THE DEFENDANT: No.

Doc. 7-1, at 65–66 (quoting Doc. 7-2, at 3). The trial court then noted that

during plea hearing, Haines:

was instructed to read portions of his written plea

agreement into the record, paragraph by paragraph,

and then he was asked whether he understood what

he had read and what rights he was waiving, and

whether he had any questions. The defendant

indicated he understood what he had read and that

he did not have any questions.

Id. at 66. The trial court then remarked that nothing in the record showed that

Haines’s plea was not “knowing[], intelligent[], and voluntar[y].” Id. As a

result, it concluded that there were no grounds to support Haines’s motion. Id.

Haines’s case then returned to the court of appeals. In August 2023, it

affirmed the trial court. Haines, 2023 WL 5529698. It first noted that Haines

failed to present evidence in support of his claim of ineffective assistance and

the record otherwise belied his claim. Id. at *2–3. The court also rejected the

argument “that the reliability of the proceedings was undermined by trial

counsel’s failure to bear skill and knowledge.” Id. at *3.

Finally, the court of appeals rejected Haines’s argument “that his plea

was invalid because ‘the trial court failed to explain that [he] could not appeal

his sentence in this case’ since, ‘[u]nder [Ohio Revised Code §] 2953.08, a

stipulated sentence is not subject to appeal as [of] right.’” Id. at *4. The court

remarked that it:

has expressly rejected the argument raised by

Haines on the grounds that such an advisement is

not required by Criminal Rule 11(C) at the time of

accepting a guilty plea, by Criminal Rule 32(B)(2) at

the time of sentencing, or by any constitutional

requirement: “[T]he trial court does not have a duty

to advise a defendant that a jointly recommended

sentence is precluded from appellate review,” so that

“[t]he trial court’s failure to advise appellant of the

limitation found in R.C. 2953.08(D)(1) was not

error.” State v. Weir, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2017-

A-0039, 2018-Ohio-2827, ¶ 21 (cases cited).

Id.

Haines later filed a notice of appeal with the Ohio Supreme Court,

together with a motion for delayed appeal. Doc. 7-1, at 110–13. After the court

granted the motion to file a delayed appeal, id. at 122, Haines filed a

memorandum in support of jurisdiction in which he raised three propositions

of law:

1. The trial court abused its discretion by denying

Appellant’s motion of withdrawal plea violating his

rights under the Ohio constitution article I, § 10 and

rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments

to the constitution of the United States of America.

2. The trial court erred in denying Appellant’s

motion to withdraw plea where Appellant was

denied his rights to the effective assistance of

counsel and due process as guaranteed under the

Ohio constitution article I, § 10 and rights under the

Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the

constitution of the United States of America.

3. Appellant was not advised on his limited appellate

rights, specifically that he could not challenge his

sentence under Ohio Revised Code § 2953.08,

rendering his plea invalid in violation of his rights

under Ohio constitution article I, § 10 and rights

under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, and

the due process clause of the constitution of the

United States of America.

Doc. 7-1, at 123–40. On April 30, 2024, the Ohio Supreme Court declined under

Rule 7.08(B)(4) of its rules of practice to accept jurisdiction. Id. at 167.

Post-conviction petition

In December 2023, while his Ohio Supreme Court direct appeal was

pending, Haines filed in the trial court a petition under Ohio Revised Code §

2953.21 to set aside his conviction or sentence. Doc. 7-1, at 168–75. The trial

court denied Haines’s petition in January 2024. Id. at 204–05.

Haines appealed the trial court’s order, id. at 206, and raised two

assignments of error:

1. The trial court abused its discretion by denying

Appellant’s post- conviction without a hearing

violating his rights under the Ohio constitution

article I, § 10 and rights under the Fifth and

Fourteenth amendments to the constitution of the

United States of America.

2. The trial court erred in denying Appellant’s post-

conviction petition showing where Appellant was

denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel

and due process as guaranteed under the Ohio

constitution article I, § 10 and rights under the

Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth amendments to the

constitution of the United States of America.

Id. at 219. The court of appeals affirmed in June 2024. See State v. Haines,

2024-Ohio-2321, 2024 WL 3026855 (Ohio Ct. App. 2024).

Haines filed a notice of appeal with the Ohio Supreme Court. Doc. 7-1,

at 283–84. In his memorandum in support of jurisdiction, Haines raised two

propositions of law:

1. The trial court abused its discretion by denying

Appellant’s post-conviction petition without a

hearing violating his rights under the Ohio

constitution’s article I, § 10 and rights under the

Fifth and Fourteenth amendments to the

constitution of the United States of America.

2. The trial court erred in denying Appellant’s post-

conviction petition showing where Appellant was

denied his right to the effective assistance of

counsel and due process as guaranteed under the

Ohio constitution article I, § 10 and rights under

the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth amendments to

the constitution of the United States of America.

Id. at 286. On October 1, 2024, the Ohio Supreme Court declined under Rule

7.08(B)(4) of its rules of practice to accept jurisdiction. Id. at 167.

Federal habeas proceedings

Haines filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus on November 20, 2024.

Doc. 1, at 17; see Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270 (1988) (holding that an

imprisoned petitioner’s petition is deemed filed when he places it in his prison’s

mailing system). He raises the following ground for relief:

Ground One: The trial court abused its discretion by

denying Petitioner’s post-conviction petition without

a hearing violating his rights under the Ohio

Constitution, Article I, § 10 and rights under the

Fifth and Fourteenth amendments to the

Constitution of the United States.

Ground Two: The trial court erred in denying

Petitioner’s post-conviction petition showing where

petitioner was denied his right to the effective

assistance of counsel and due process as guaranteed

under the Ohio Constitution, Article I, § 10 and

rights under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth

amendments to the Constitution of the United

States.

Ground Three: The trial court abused its discretion

by denying Petitioner’s motion to withdraw plea

violating his rights under the Ohio Constitution,

Article I, § 10 and rights under the Sixth and

Fourteenth amendments to the Constitution of the

United States of America.

Ground Four: The trial court erred in denying

Petitioner’s motion to withdraw plea where

petitioner was denied his right to the effective

assistance of counsel and due process as guaranteed

under the Ohio Constitution, Article I § 10 and

rights under the Sixth, and Fourteenth amendments

to the Constitution of the United States of America.

Ground Five: Petitioner was not advised on his

limited appellate rights, specifically that he could

not challenge his sentence under Ohio Constitution,

Article I, § 10 and rights under the Sixth, and

Fourteenth Amendments, and the due process

clause of the Constitution of the United States of

America.

Doc. 1, at 6–13. The Warden filed a return, Doc. 7, Haines filed a traverse, Doc.

10.

Legal Standard

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.

L. 104-132, § 104, 110 Stat. 1214 (AEDPA or “the 1996 Act”), habeas petitioners

must meet certain procedural requirements to have their claims reviewed in

federal court. Smith v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., 463 F.3d 426, 430 (6th

Cir. 2006). “Procedural barriers, such as statutes of limitations and rules

concerning procedural default and exhaustion of remedies, operate to limit

access to review on the merits of a constitutional claim.” Daniels v. United

States, 532 U.S. 374, 381 (2001). Although procedural default is sometimes

confused with exhaustion, exhaustion and procedural default are distinct

concepts. Williams v. Anderson, 460 F.3d 789, 806 (6th Cir. 2006). Failure to

exhaust applies when state remedies are “still available at the time of the

federal petition.” Id. (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 125 n.28 (1982)).

But when “state court remedies are no longer available to a petitioner because

he or she failed to use them within the required time period, procedural default

and not exhaustion bars federal court review.” Id.

Exhaustion

A federal court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus unless the

petitioner has exhausted all available remedies in state court. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(b)(1)(A); Robinson v. Horton, 950 F.3d 337, 343 (6th Cir. 2020). To

exhaust his remedies, a state defendant with federal constitutional claims

must “fairly presen[t]” those claims to the state courts before raising them in

a federal habeas corpus action. Robinson, 950 F.3d at 343 (quoting Duncan v.

Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995)); see also Fulcher v. Motley, 444 F.3d 791, 798

(6th Cir. 2006). A constitutional claim for relief must be presented to the state’s

highest court to satisfy the fair presentation requirement. See O’Sullivan v.

Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845–48 (1999); Caver v. Straub, 349 F.3d 340, 345 (6th

Cir. 2003). And a habeas petitioner must “present[] both the factual and legal

basis for [the] claims to the state courts.” Hanna v. Ishee, 694 F.3d 596, 606

(6th Cir. 2012). This means that the “‘petitioner must present his claim to the

state courts as a federal constitutional issue—not merely as an issue arising

under state law.’” Williams, 460 F.3d at 806 (quoting Koontz v. Glossa, 731

F.2d 365, 368 (6th Cir. 1984)). “‘[G]eneral allegations of the denial of rights to

a “fair trial” and “due process” do not “fairly present claims” that specific

constitutional rights were violated.’” Hand v. Houk, 871 F.3d 390, 418 (6th Cir.

2017) (quoting Slaughter v. Parker, 450 F.3d 224, 236 (6th Cir. 2006)).

Procedural default

Procedural default may occur in two ways. Williams, 460 F.3d at 806.

First, a petitioner procedurally defaults a claim by failing “to comply with state

procedural rules in presenting [the] claim to the appropriate state court.” Id.

In Maupin v. Smith, the Sixth Circuit directed courts to consider four factors

when determining whether a claim is barred on habeas corpus review due to a

petitioner’s failure to comply with a state procedural rule: (1) whether there is

a state procedural rule applicable to the petitioner’s claim and whether the

petitioner failed to comply with that rule; (2) whether the state court enforced

the procedural rule; (3) whether the state procedural rule is an adequate and

independent state ground on which the state can foreclose review of the federal

constitutional claim; and (4) whether the petitioner can demonstrate cause for

failing to follow the rule and actual prejudice by the alleged constitutional

error. 785 F.2d 135, 138 (6th Cir. 1986); see also Williams, 460 F.3d at 806 (“If,

due to the petitioner’s failure to comply with the procedural rule, the state

court declines to reach the merits of the issue, and the state procedural rule is

an independent and adequate grounds for precluding relief, the claim is

procedurally defaulted.”) (citing Maupin, 785 F.2d at 138).

Second, “a petitioner may procedurally default a claim by failing to raise

a claim in state court and pursue that claim through the state’s ‘ordinary

appellate review procedures.’” Williams, 460 F.3d at 806 (quoting O’Sullivan,

526 U.S. at 848); see Woolbright v. Crews, 791 F.3d 628, 631 (6th Cir. 2015)

(“When a petitioner has failed to fairly present … claims to the state courts

and no state remedy remains, [the] claims are considered to be procedurally

defaulted.”) (citing Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 161–62 (1996)). While

the exhaustion requirement is technically satisfied in this circumstance

because state remedies are no longer available to the petitioner, see Coleman

v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732 (1991), a petitioner’s failure to have the federal

claims considered in the state courts constitutes a procedural default of those

claims that bars federal court review, Williams, 460 F.3d at 806.

To overcome a procedural bar, a petitioner must show “cause for the

default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law,”

or show that a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” will result if the

petitioner’s claims are not considered. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.

Merits review

If a state’s courts adjudicated the merits of a claim, a habeas petitioner

may obtain habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, if the petitioner can establish

one of two predicates. To establish the first predicate, the petitioner “must

identify a ‘clearly established’ principle of ‘Federal law’ that” has been

established by a holding of the Supreme Court. Fields v. Jordan, 86 F.4th 218,

231 (6th Cir. 2023) (en banc); see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The petitioner must

then show that the state court’s adjudication “was contrary to,” or “involved an

unreasonable application of” that “clearly established” precedent. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(1); see Fields, 86 F.4th at 232.

To establish the second predicate, the petitioner must show that the

state’s court’s adjudication “resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the

writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the

[United States Supreme] Court on a question of law or” based on “a set of

materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412–13

(2000). “Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court

may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal

principle from th[e] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle

to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. “[A]n ‘unreasonable application

of’” the Court’s holdings is one that is “‘objectively unreasonable,’ not merely

wrong; even ‘clear error’ will not suffice.” White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 419

(2014) (quoting Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75–76 (2003)).

“[A] ‘clearly established’ principle of ‘Federal law’” refers to the

“holdings,” not “dicta,” of the Supreme Court’s decisions. Fields, 86 F.4th at

231 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and Woodall, 572 U.S. at 419). A state court

is not required to cite Supreme Court precedent or reflect an “awareness” of

Supreme Court cases, “so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the

state-court decision contradicts” such precedent. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8

(2002); see Lopez v. Wilson, 426 F.3d 339, 358 (6th Cir. 2005). If the Supreme

Court has not addressed the petitioner’s specific claims, a reviewing district

court cannot find that a state court acted contrary to, or unreasonably applied,

Supreme Court precedent or clearly established federal law. Carey v.

Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006); see White, 572 U.S. at 426 (“Section

2254(d)(1) provides a remedy for instances in which a state court unreasonably

applies this Court’s precedent; it does not require state courts to extend that

precedent or license federal courts to treat the failure to do so as error.”).

In determining whether the state court’s decision involved an

unreasonable application of law, the Court uses an objective standard.

Williams, 529 U.S. at 410. “A state court’s determination that a claim lacks

merit precludes federal habeas review so long as ‘fair-minded jurists could

disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter,

562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664

(2004)); see also Bray v. Andrews, 640 F.3d 731, 738 (6th Cir. 2011). “[A] state

prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented

in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well

understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fair-

minded disagreement.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103.

Discussion

1. Haines’s claims raised in grounds three and four are meritless

For ease of analysis, the Court takes Haines’s grounds for relief out of

order and begins with grounds three and four, which both concern the trial

court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his plea. In ground three, Haines

asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion because

his counsel was ineffective in that (1) counsel advised Haines that he had no

option but to accept a plea deal, (2) counsel failed to conduct a reasonable

investigation, and (3) counsel filed no “substantive motions” and withdrew “a

crucial discovery subpoena.” Doc. 1, at 9. In a supporting memorandum, Haines

elaborates, claiming that he had little time to review his offered plea deal

before being “rushed.” Id. at 37. He also claims that “counsel failed to

negotiate.” Id. Haines adds that he relied on counsel’s advice when he waived

his rights and pleaded guilty. Id. at 38.

In ground four, Haines similarly says that the trial court erred because

counsel’s representation was “inadequate … and but for that representation,

[Haines] would have proceeded to trial.” Id. at 11. Haines asserts under this

ground that counsel failed to take a number of steps to properly represent

Haines. Id. at 42–43. He asserts that “the complete lack of effort by trial

counsel to meet that minimum standard is wholeheartedly indicative of

ineffective assistance of counsel.” Id. at 43. Haines also claims that “Counsel

neglected to negotiate any meaningful plea in his favor.” Id.

Haines raised these issues in his initial appeal before the Ohio court of

appeals. That court found them meritless:

{¶8} “When a defendant enters a plea in a criminal

case, the plea must be made knowingly,

intelligently, and voluntarily. Failure on any of

those points renders enforcement of the plea

unconstitutional under both the United States

Constitution and the Ohio Constitution.” State v.

Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527, 660 N.E.2d 450

(1996). “To ensure compliance with the

constitutional mandates, Criminal Rule 11 was

adopted.” State v. McDaniel, 11th Dist. Portage No.

2017-P-0098, 2020-Ohio-7003, ¶ 11. A trial court’s

compliance with Criminal Rule 11 creates a

presumption that a plea was entered knowingly,

intelligently, and voluntarily. State v. Philpot, 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110828, 2022-Ohio-1499, ¶ 16;

State v. Coffman, 5th Dist. Ashland No. 21-COA-

015, 2022-Ohio-217, ¶ 15; State v. Simpson, 2d Dist.

Greene No. 2020-CA-38, 2021-Ohio-2700, ¶ 8.

{¶9} “When a defendant alleges ineffective

assistance of counsel arising from the plea process,

the defendant must meet the two-prong test set out

in Strickland [v. Washington], 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104

S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674.” State v. Romero, 156

Ohio St.3d 468, 2019-Ohio-1839, 129 N.E.3d 404, ¶

14. “First, the defendant must show that counsel’s

performance was deficient.” Id. at ¶ 15, citing

Strickland at 687. “Second, the defendant must

demonstrate prejudice resulting from counsel’s

deficient performance.” Id. at ¶ 16, citing Strickland

at 687. “The defendant can show prejudice by

demonstrating a ‘reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty

and would have insisted on going to trial.’” Id. at ¶

16, quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106

S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985); State v. Johnson,

11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2016-T-0091, 2018-Ohio-

2465, ¶ 26 (“[t]he ineffective assistance will only be

found to have affected the validity of the plea when

it precluded the defendant from entering the plea

knowingly and voluntarily”) (citations omitted).

{¶10} “A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no

contest may be made only before sentence is

imposed; but to correct manifest injustice the court

after sentence may set aside the judgment of

conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his

or her plea.” Crim.R. 32.1.

{¶11} “Ohio courts have held that ‘manifest injustice

relates to some fundamental flaw in the proceedings

which result[s] in a miscarriage of justice or is

inconsistent with the demands of due process.’”

(Citation omitted.) State v. Bradford, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga Nos. 110907 et al., 2022-Ohio-1503, ¶ 12;

State v. Jones, 4th Dist. Gallia No. 19CA9, 2020-

Ohio-7037, ¶ 21 (“[a] trial court violates a

defendant’s due process rights, and hence may

produce a manifest injustice, if it accepts a guilty

plea that the defendant did not enter knowingly,

intelligently, and voluntarily”) (citation omitted).

Accordingly, “[i]f a defendant shows that he or she

did not enter a plea knowingly, intelligently or

voluntarily, the defendant may establish a manifest

injustice sufficient to warrant withdrawal of the

guilty plea under Crim.R. 32.1.” (Citation omitted.)

State v. Artuso, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2022-A-

0009, 2022-Ohio-3283, ¶ 21; see also State v. Garcia,

11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2022-A-0066, 2023-Ohio-

2446, ¶ 13.

{¶12} “The credibility and weight of the defendant’s

assertions in support of a motion to withdraw a plea

and the decision as to whether to hold a hearing are

matters entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial

court.” Romero at ¶ 34. “[A] trial court need not hold

an evidentiary hearing on a post-sentence motion to

withdraw a guilty plea if the record indicates the

movant is not entitled to relief and the movant has

failed to submit evidentiary documents sufficient to

demonstrate a manifest injustice.” (Citations

omitted.) State v. Kurdi, 2022-Ohio-4459, 203

N.E.3d 796, ¶ 7 (11th Dist.); State v. Miller, 7th Dist.

Mahoning No. 22 MA 0090, 2023-Ohio-2290, ¶ 9 (“[a]

hearing is required on a post-sentence Crim.R. 32.1

motion if the facts alleged by the defendant and

accepted as true by the trial court would require the

court permit a guilty plea to be withdrawn”).

{¶13} “An appellate court reviews a trial court’s

decision on a motion to withdraw a plea under an

abuse-of-discretion standard.” State v. Francis, 104

Ohio St.3d 490, 2004-Ohio-6894, 820 N.E.2d 355, ¶

32; Romero at ¶ 13.

{¶14} Haines argues that trial counsel’s deficient

performance rendered his plea unknowing and

unintelligent: “Appellant was provided a proposal

and plea paperwork the day of his scheduled hearing

on October 12, 2022. Appellant was given little time

to review the document with his attorney before

being rushed into the courtroom to go on the record.

In fact, Appellant was led to believe by his attorney

that he had no other option but to take the plea deal,

as it was offered that day.” Brief of Appellant at 4.

We disagree.

{¶15} As noted by the trial court, Haines did not

submit any evidentiary materials supporting the

foregoing claims or otherwise demonstrating a

manifest injustice. Contrary to Haines’ claims is the

following colloquy from the plea hearing:

The Court: So, you’ve had a chance to go over

this Plea Agreement in detail with your

attorney?

The Defendant: Yes.

The Court: Has he answered all your

questions?

The Defendant: Yes.

The Court: Has he done what you’ve asked him

to do?

The Defendant: Yes.

The Court: Do you need more time to talk to

him?

The Defendant: No.

The court then had Haines read the terms of the

Plea Agreement into the record himself, repeatedly

questioning him if he had questions, understood

what he was reading, and if he agreed. In the

absence of contrary evidence, Haines’ statements at

the plea hearing are conclusive as to whether he had

an adequate opportunity to review the terms of the

Agreement.

{¶16} Haines also asserts ineffective assistance on

the grounds that the reliability of the proceedings

was undermined by trial counsel’s failure to bear

skill and knowledge: “A review of the docket reveals

that trial counsel filed no substantive motions

outside of initial pleadings including entering an

appearance, demanding discovery, requesting a bill

of particulars, and demanding a notice of intent by

the State. The only motion filed outside of standard

initial pleadings was a request for Appellant to

travel out of Ohio for one night. Certainly, a review

of any children service records would be pertinent in

a child rape case, however, defense counsel

withdrew [his] subpoena for the same.” Brief of

Appellant at 9. Again, we disagree.

{¶17} A review of the docket evidences trial counsel’s

due diligence and competence in his representation

of Haines. Counsel withdrew the subpoena duces

tecum issued to the Ashtabula County Children

Services Board in February 2022. The subpoena was

withdrawn, however, “pursuant to [r]epresentation

from the State of Ohio that no other records exist to

its knowledge other than those being produced

pursuant to the discovery requests previously

submitted by Defendant and that if any additional

records that would otherwise have been covered by

the subpoena are discovered the Ashtabula County

Prosecutor’s Office will notify the undersigned

counsel of same so that a new subpoena for same can

be issued.” Under these conditions, there was

nothing derelict about counsel’s withdrawal of the

subpoena.

{¶18} On two occasions trial counsel obtained

continuances of the plea deadline hearing. The first

time was in March 2022. For cause, counsel argued

that, in light of the on-going discovery and serious

nature of the charges, he needed “additional time to

receive, analyze and discuss all of the material that

has been received to date as well as the additional

material that is to be received.” Counsel sought

another extension in June 2022. Counsel requested

additional time to review “tens of thousands of

digital media files” received in discovery the

preceding month. Additionally, counsel advised the

trial court that plea negotiations had been delayed

“due [to] the necessity to reschedule a meeting with

the victim and her family.” Although counsel sought

an extension of at least sixty days, it would be four

months before a plea agreement was reached.

{¶19} In light of this record, Haines’ claim that trial

counsel failed “to take any action in his defense

before encouraging him to plead” is

unsubstantiated. Similarly, Haines’ arguments that

“[c]ounsel neglected to challenge a single piece of

evidence that led to his conviction and failed to

negotiate any meaningful plea in his favor” do not

raise colorable claims of ineffective assistance. Brief

of Appellant at 11. Haines fails to identify any

particular evidence produced by the State or the

grounds on which it could have been challenged. The

State’s several Notices of Submission and Intent to

Use Evidence filed prior to the plea hearing attest

the quantity (if not the quality) of the evidence

against Haines. Moreover, the State agreed to

dismiss Counts One and Five of the Indictment as

part of the Plea Agreement which is significant in

that Count One carried a potential maximum

sentence of life imprisonment. See R.C.

2907.02(A)(1)(b) and (B) and R.C.

2971.03(A)(3)(d)(i).

Haines, 2023 WL 5529698, at *1–3.

To begin with, Haines ignores the court of appeals’ decision and his

burden. He makes no argument that the court of appeals’ decision was contrary

to or involved an unreasonable application of relevant Supreme Court

precedent. See Doc. 1, at 36–44; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). And he makes

no argument that the court of appeals’ decision involved an “unreasonable

application of the facts.” See Doc. 1, at 36–44; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).

These requirements in Section 2254(d) are notably not mere suggestions that

a court can simply ignore. See Blackmon v. Booker, 696 F.3d 536, 557 (6th Cir.

2012) (chiding a district court for “ignor[ing] the myriad of limitations that §

2254(d)(1) imposed on its review”). Rather, section 2254(d) places “a heavy

burden for a petitioner to overcome.” Tibbetts v. Bradshaw, 633 F.3d 436, 442

(6th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added).

Rather than trying to meet his burden Haines simply repeats the

arguments previously made to and rejected by the court of appeals on direct

appeal. Compare Doc. 7-1, at 74, 76–82 (Haines’s brief to the court of appeals

on direct appeal), with Doc. 1, at 36–44 (Haines’s federal habeas corpus

petition). By merely reiterating his argument that the trial court erred or

abuse its discretion, Haines’s fails to overcome the deference this Court owes

to the court of appeals’ decision. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

But even if Haines had attempted to carry his burden, he would fare no

better. For starters, there is no constitutional right to withdraw a guilty plea.

Hynes v. Birkett, 526 F. App’x 515, 521 (6th Cir. 2013). Any right that Haines

might have to withdraw his guilty plea is thus a matter of state law. And state-

law determinations are beyond the scope of federal habeas review, see Estelle

v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991), unless the proceeding or decision at issue

was so fundamentally unfair as to rise to the level of denial of due process, see

id. at 67–68.

In Ohio, a defendant who moves to withdraw a guilty plea after

sentencing must show that a “manifest injustice” will otherwise result if the

motion is not granted. Ohio Crim. R. 32.1; see State v. Young, 2004-Ohio-2711,

2004 WL 1172870, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004). Ohio courts will find a manifest

injustice “only in extraordinary cases.” State v. Smith, 361 N.E.2d 1324, 1326

(Ohio 1977). Under Ohio precedent, “[i]f a defendant shows that he or she did

not enter a plea knowingly, intelligently or voluntarily, the defendant may

establish a manifest injustice sufficient to warrant withdrawal of the guilty

plea under Crim.R. 32.1.” State v. Artuso, 2022-Ohio-3283, 2022 WL 4298181,

at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. 2022). And “[i]neffective assistance of counsel can

constitute a manifest injustice warranting a withdrawal of a guilty plea.” State

v. Davner, 100 N.E.3d 1247, 1259 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017).

In making his argument, Haines seemingly relies on evidence that he

submitted with his later post-conviction petition but failed to submit in support

of his motion to withdraw his plea. See Doc. 1, at 37–38, 43 (making factual

assertions). As the trial and appellate courts remarked, however, Haines did

not submit any evidence to support his motion. See Doc. 7-1, at 65; Haines,

2023 WL 5529698, at *2. Evidence supporting these factual assertions was not

before the court of appeals when it adjudicated Haines’s direct appeal. The trial

and appellate court thus appropriately disregarded Haines’s counsel’s

unsupported assertions and instead focused on what was reflected in the

record. See Doc. 7-1, at 65 (“It is initially noted that the defendant’s attorney

did not submit any evidentiary documents demonstrating manifest injustice.

The determination of alleged ineffectiveness appears to be based solely upon

the record.”); Haines, 2023 WL 5529698, at *2–3.

So Haines’s claim necessarily rests on the argument that, on its face, the

record shows that his counsel was ineffective. Assuming that this question—

whether Haines demonstrated ineffective assistance sufficient to meet the

state-law manifest-injustice test—is cognizable,1 the court of appeals’ decision

neither involved an unreasonable application of relevant Supreme Court

precedent, nor an “unreasonable application of the facts.” See 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d)(1), (2).

First off, the court of appeals recited the standard relevant to claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel. See Haines, 2023 WL 5529698, at *1 (noting

that under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), a petitioner

claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must show deficient performance and

1 See Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990) (“[F]ederal habeas corpus

relief does not lie for errors of state law.”).

resulting prejudice). Haines recites the same test in his petition. See Doc. 1, at

37.

Second, the court of appeals dispatched the notion that the record might

support Haines’s claims. Haines affirmed under oath that he and his counsel

had reviewed his plea agreement “in detail,” that counsel answered all of this

questions, and that he did not need more time to talk to counsel. Haines, 2023

WL 5529698, at *2–3. And then Haines read the terms of the plea agreement

into the record. Id. at *3.

The record also showed that counsel only withdrew a subpoena after the

State represented that no additional responsive records existed and stated that

it would inform counsel if other records were discovered. Id. Also, the record

revealed the affirmative actions that counsel took in representing Haines. Id.

As the court noted, the record belied the assertion that counsel “failed ‘to take

any action’” on Haines’s behalf. Id. Finally, the court remarked on the fact that

Haines had failed to (1) identify evidence that counsel could have challenged,

or (2) account for the fact that under the plea agreement, the State agreed to

dismiss two counts, one of which “carried a potential maximum sentence of life

imprisonment.” Id.

This Court is bound to presume the accuracy of these factual

determinations unless Haines shows otherwise by clear and convincing

evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Johnson, 525 F.3d at 474. But he points to

nothing that would cause the Court to doubt them. So Haines’s third and fourth

grounds are meritless.

2. The court of appeals’ reliance on res judicata bars review of Haines’s

claims raised in grounds one and two.

In grounds one and two Haines alleges that the trial court erred in

denying his post-conviction petition. The basis for his ground one claim is that

the trial court coerced his plea through the use of “psychological tactics to time

pressure” Haines. Doc. 1, at 6. Haines raised this issue as his first claim in his

post-conviction petition, Doc. 7-1, at 170, his first appellate assignment of error

before the court of appeals, id. at 224–28, and his first proposition of law before

the Ohio Supreme Court, id. at 292–96.

The basis for Haines’s ground two claim is that his counsel was

ineffective for not objecting to the trial court’s “‘direct involvement’ and

pressuring [Haines] to enter into a rushed plea agreement.” Doc. 1, at 8. Haines

raised this issue as his second claim in his post-conviction petition, Doc. 7-1, at

172–73, his second appellate assignment of error before the court of appeals,

id. at 228–38, and his second proposition of law before the Ohio Supreme

Court, id. at 296–306.

Haines supported these claims with three affidavits. See id. at 197–203.

Review of the trial and appellate courts’ decisions shows that Haines

has ignored the basis for their decisions. In adjudicating Haines post-

conviction petition, the trial court noted that Haines “raised both the issue of

his guilty plea and the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct

appeal” and the court of appeals “rejected [his] arguments” on direct review.

Doc. 7-1, at 205. The trial court further noted that Haines’s supporting

affidavits spoke “to matters which were known by [Haines] before his guilty

plea and sentence or [that] could have been known through reasonable

diligence.” Id. As a result, the trial court concluded that Haines’s claims were

barred by Ohio’s res judicata doctrine. Id.

On appeal, the court of appeals noted that although Haines “argue[d]

the merits of his Postconviction Petition …[,] [t]he trial court did not deny the

Petition on its merits.” Haines, 2024 WL 3026855, at *2. Rather, the trial court

ruled based on “res judicata[,] … which” was “determinative of [Haines’s]

appeal.” Id.

Before this Court, Haines continues this trend. Indeed, comparison of

Haines’s briefing before the court of appeals and the Ohio Supreme Court and

the memorandum in support of his petition filed in this Court shows that, with

certain immaterial changes, all three documents are functionally identical as

to his first and second grounds for relief. Compare Doc. 7-1, at 170, 172–73,

224–38, 292–306, with Doc. 1, at 21–35.

Oddly enough, even though it was the basis for the court appeals’

rejection of the issues contained in grounds one and two, the Warden does not

fully rely on res judicata. “[I]n the habeas setting,” however, this Court is “not

bound by the state’s litigation decisions.” Whitman v. Gray, 103 F.4th 1235,

1239 (6th Cir. 2024), cert. denied sub nom. Whitman v. Smith, 145 S. Ct. 1060

(2025).

Under Ohio’s res judicata doctrine, “a final judgment of conviction bars

a convicted defendant from raising in any proceeding, except an appeal from

that judgment, any issue that was raised, or could have been raised, at trial or

on appeal from that judgment.” Williams v. Bagley, 380 F.3d 932, 967 (6th Cir.

2004). Importantly, the Sixth Circuit has held that Ohio’s res judicata bar is

“actually” and “consistently” enforced by Ohio’s courts. Hoffner v. Bradshaw,

622 F.3d 487, 498 (6th Cir. 2010); see Whitman, 103 F.4th at 1239. It thus

represents an adequate and independent basis to foreclose federal habeas

review of a constitutional issue. Whitman, 103 F.4th at 1239; Coleman v.

Mitchell, 268 F.3d 417, 427–29 (6th Cir. 2001).

As a result, because the court of appeals enforced Ohio’s res judicata bar

as to Haines’s first and second grounds for relief, the res judicata rule bars

review of Haines’s first and second grounds for relief.

It is true that a habeas court can “consider the merits of procedurally

defaulted claims” if “the petitioner demonstrates cause for the default and

prejudice resulting therefrom, or that failing to review the claim would result

in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Williams, 460 F.3d at 805–06.

Haines, though, does not attempt to show cause or prejudice or that a

fundamental miscarriage of justice would result if his claim were not

considered.2 So there is no basis to excuse his default.

Haines’s first and second grounds are procedurally defaulted.

3. Haines’s ground five claim was not fairly presented, is not cognizable

and, in any event, is meritless.

In his fifth ground for relief, Haines claims error because neither the

trial court nor his counsel “explain[ed] that [he] could not appeal his sentence.”

Doc. 1, at 45. Haines raised a similar argument in his direct appeal to the court

of appeals, although his argument focused only on the trial court. See Doc. 7-1,

at 82–83. The argument he presents now is substantially the same as the

argument that he raised before the Ohio Supreme Court. Compare Doc. 7-1, at

137–40, with Doc. 1, at 44–47.

As noted, to exhaust his remedies, a habeas petitioner must “fairly

presen[t]” his constitutional claims to the state courts before raising them in a

federal habeas corpus action. Robinson, 950 F.3d at 343 (citation omitted). To

satisfy the fair presentation requirement, a habeas petitioner “must present

his claim to the state courts as a federal constitutional issue—not merely as an

2 A claimed fundamental miscarriage of justice rests on a showing of

actual innocence. Lundgren v. Mitchell, 440 F.3d 754, 764 (6th Cir. 2006); see

Patterson v. Lafler, 455 F. App’x 606, 609 (6th Cir. 2012). And a claim of actual

innocence “requires the petitioner to support his allegations of constitutional

error with new reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific

evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence—that

was not presented at trial.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995). Haines,

however, hasn’t presented “new reliable evidence.” So there is no need to

consider whether he’s shown that a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” will

result if his claims are not considered.

issue arising under state law.’” Williams, 460 F.3d at 806 (emphasis added)

(citation omitted).

Haines did not claim before the court of appeals that his counsel failed

to explain that he could not appeal his sentence. See Doc. 7-1, at 82. Rather he

only raised this issue with respect to the trial court. Id. (“In this case, the trial

court failed to explain that Appellant could not appeal his sentence in this

case.”).

Further, review of Haines’s briefing before the court of appeals and the

Ohio Supreme Court reveals that he never presented his ground five claim—

his third assignment of error and third proposition of law, respectively—to

Ohio’s courts as a federal constitutional claim. See Doc. 7-1, at 82–83, 137–40.

Rather, he relied only on Ohio statutes, cases, and rules. See id. at 82–83, 137–

40. And the court of appeals adjudicated Haines’s issue as one raised under

state law; it relied on Ohio statutes, cases, and rules. Haines, 2023 WL

5529698, at *4.

It’s true that Haines mentioned the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments

in the caption to his proposition of law before the Ohio Supreme Court, Doc. 7-

1, at 137, but he did not do the same before the court of appeals, see id. at 82.

Moreover, “‘general allegations of the denial of rights to a “fair trial” and “due

process” do not “fairly present claims” that specific constitutional rights were

violated.’” Hand v. Houk, 871 F.3d 390, 418 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Slaughter

v. Parker, 450 F.3d 224, 236 (6th Cir. 2006)).

The same is true for Haines’s habeas petition. Although he makes a

passing reference the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, his argument

concerns the same Ohio statutes, cases, and rules. But state law issues are not

cognizable in habeas. Cress v. Palmer, 484 F.3d 844, 853 (6th Cir. 2007); see

Lewis, 497 U.S. at 780 (“[F]ederal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of

state law.”). So even putting the fair presentment requirement aside, Haines’s

ground five cannot succeed.

Finally, and in any event, Haines’s ground five claim fails on the merits.

As part of his plea agreement, Haines pleaded guilty to a stipulated sentence

under Ohio Revised Code § 2953.08(D)(1). Doc. 7-1, at 12, 15. That statute

provides that “[a] sentence imposed upon a defendant is not subject to review

under this section if the sentence is authorized by law, has been recommended

jointly by the defendant and the prosecution in the case, and is imposed by a

sentencing judge.” In other words, “as long as the agreed-upon sentence is

‘authorized by law,’ it is shielded from appellate review.” Butler v. Warden,

Lebanon Corr. Inst., 483 F. App’x 102, 107 (6th Cir. 2012).

Haines says that the trial court erred by failing to tell him that he could

not appeal his sentence. But Haines “cites no authority—let alone clearly

established federal law—for the proposition that a trial court has a positive

duty to inform defendants who stipulate to sentences how § 2953.08(D) will

affect their appellate rights.” Id. at 109. “In fact,” as the Sixth Circuit has

noted, “case law suggests the opposite.” Id. (citing Thompson v. Sheets, No.

3:07-cv-2423, 2009 WL 2176050, at *1–3 (N.D. Ohio July 21, 2009) and

Holcomb v. Wilson, No. 3:05-cv-803, 2008 WL 2568303, at *3 (N.D. Ohio June

24, 2008); see Caraballo v. Bracy, No. 1:16-cv-3024, 2018 WL 3640202, *6 (N.D.

Ohio June 12, 2018) (“courts within this circuit applying Ohio law have found

there can be no due process violation based on a trial court's failure to inform,

if there was no underlying right to appeal.”), report and recommendation

adopted, 2018 WL 3632217 (N.D. Ohio July 30, 2018).

Even if Haines had fairly presented his ground five claim and it were

cognizable, it would fail.

Conclusion

For all the above reasons, the Court should dismiss Haines’s petition.

Dated: October 29, 2025

/s/James E. Grimes Jr.

James E. Grimes Jr.

U.S. Magistrate Judge

OBJECTIONS

Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with

the Clerk of Court within 14 days after the party objecting has been served

with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Failure

to file objections within the specified time may forfeit the right to appeal the

District Court’s order. See Berkshire v. Beauvais, 928 F.3d 520, 530–31 (6th

Cir. 2019).