Torix

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

BRIAN T.,1 Case No. 1:24-cv-01738-SB

Plaintiff, OPINION AND ORDER

v.

COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY

ADMINISTRATION,

Defendant.

BECKERMAN, U.S. Magistrate Judge.

Brian T. (“Plaintiff”) filed this appeal challenging the Commissioner of Social Security’s

(“Commissioner”) denial of his applications for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under

Title II of the Social Security Act. The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 405(g), and the parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). For the reasons explained below, the Court reverses the Commissioner’s

decision and remands this case for further proceedings.

1 In the interest of privacy, this opinion uses only the first name and initial of the last

name of the non-governmental party.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“As with other agency decisions, federal court review of social security determinations is

limited.” Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1098 (9th Cir. 2014). That is

because “[f]or highly fact-intensive individualized determinations like a claimant’s entitlement to

disability benefits, Congress places a premium upon agency expertise, and, for the sake of

uniformity, it is usually better to minimize the opportunity for reviewing courts to substitute their

discretion for that of the agency.” Id. (quoting Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 621

(1966)). Adhering to this principle, courts “follow three important rules” in reviewing social

security determinations. Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 2015).

First, courts “leave it to the [agency] to determine credibility, resolve conflicts in the

testimony, and resolve ambiguities in the record.” Id. (quoting Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1098).

Second, courts “will ‘disturb the Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits only if it is not

supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error.’” Id. (quoting Treichler, 775 F.3d at

1098). Third, if the agency “‘commits legal error, [courts] uphold the decision where that error is

harmless,’ meaning that ‘it is inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination,’ or

that, despite the legal error, ‘the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned, even if the agency

explains its decision with less than ideal clarity.’” Id. (quoting Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1098); see

also Smith v. Kijakazi, 14 F.4th 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2021) (“And even where this modest

[substantial evidence] burden is not met, [courts] will not reverse an [agency] decision where the

error was harmless.” (citing Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012), superseded

on other grounds by regulation as recognized in Farlow v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 485, 487 (9th Cir.

2022))).

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BACKGROUND

I. PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION

Plaintiff was forty-two years old on April 23, 2021, his alleged disability onset date.2 (Tr.

28, 176.) Plaintiff has at least a high school education and past work experience as a shipping

checker. (Id. at 27-28.) In his application, Plaintiff alleged disability due to post concussive

syndrome, shattered bilateral lower extremities, depression, and high blood pressure. (Id. at 202.)

The Commissioner denied Plaintiff’s application initially and upon reconsideration, and

on April 6, 2023, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (Id.

at 109-13, 119-24.) On October 26, 2023, Plaintiff, along with his attorney and an impartial

vocational expert (“VE”), appeared and testified at an administrative hearing before an ALJ. (Id.

at 52.)

On January 24, 2024, the ALJ issued a written decision denying Plaintiff’s application.

(Id. at 29.) On October 9, 2024, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review,

making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (Id. at 1-6.) Plaintiff now

seeks judicial review of that decision.

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2 To be eligible for DIB, “a worker must have earned a sufficient number of [quarters of

coverage] within a rolling forty quarter period.” Herbert v. Astrue, No. 1:07-cv-01016 TAG,

2008 WL 4490024, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2008) (citation omitted). Workers accumulate

quarters of coverage based on their earnings. Id. Typically, “the claimant must have a minimum

of twenty quarters of coverage [during the rolling forty-quarter period to maintain insured

status]. . . . The termination of a claimant’s insured status is frequently referred to as the ‘date

last insured’ or ‘DLI.’” Id. (citation omitted). Thus, Plaintiff’s date last insured (“DLI”) of

December 31, 2021 (Tr. 21, 23) reflects the date on which his insured status terminated based on

the previous accumulation of quarters of coverage. If Plaintiff established that he was disabled

on or before December 31, 2021, he is entitled to DIB. See Truelsen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No.

2:15-cv-2386-KJN, 2016 WL 4494471, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2016) (“To be entitled to DIB,

plaintiff must establish that he was disabled . . . on or before his date last insured.” (citing

Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1998))).

II. THE SEQUENTIAL PROCESS

A claimant is considered disabled if he or she is unable to “engage in any substantial

gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment

which . . . has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than [twelve]

months[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). “Social Security Regulations set out a five-step sequential

process for determining whether an applicant is disabled within the meaning of the Social

Security Act.” Keyser v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 648 F.3d 721, 724 (9th Cir. 2011). Those five

steps are: (1) whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the

claimant has a severe impairment; (3) whether the impairment meets or equals a listed

impairment; (4) whether the claimant can return to any past relevant work; and (5) whether the

claimant can perform other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. Id.

at 724-25.

The claimant bears the burden of proof for the first four steps. See Bustamante v.

Massanari, 262 F.3d 949, 953-54 (9th Cir. 2001). If the claimant fails to meet the burden at any

of those steps, the claimant is not disabled. See id. at 954. The Commissioner bears the burden of

proof at step five, where the Commissioner must show the claimant can perform other work that

exists in significant numbers in the national economy, “taking into consideration the claimant’s

residual functional capacity, age, education, and work experience.” Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d

1094, 1100 (9th Cir. 1999). If the Commissioner fails to meet this burden, the claimant is

disabled. See Bustamante, 262 F.3d at 954.

III. THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE’S DECISION

The ALJ applied the five-step sequential evaluation process to determine if Plaintiff is

disabled. (Tr. 21-29.) At step one, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had not engaged in

substantial gainful activity during the period between his alleged onset date, April 23, 2021, and

his date last insured of December 31, 2021. (Id. at 21, 23.) At step two, the ALJ found that

Plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairments: (1) degenerative disc disease of the

lumbar spine, (2) status post multiple bilateral lower extremity fractures, and (3) tremors of the

bilateral upper extremities. (Id. at 23.) At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not

have an impairment that meets or medically equals a listed impairment. (Id. at 25.)

The ALJ then found that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to

perform sedentary work, subject to these limitations: (1) “had to avoid walking on uneven

surfaces,” (2) “could never balance,” (3) “could occasionally climb, stoop, kneel, crouch, or

crawl,” (4) “could frequently handle, finger, and feel bilaterally,” (5) “had to avoid concentrated

exposure to vibration and hazards,” and (6) “had to use a hand-held assistive device to ambulate;

but he could lift and carry up to the exertional limits with the contralateral upper extremity.” (Id.)

At step four, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was unable to perform his past relevant

work as a shipping checker. (Id. at 27.) At step five, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not

disabled because a significant number of jobs existed in the national economy that Plaintiff could

perform, including work as a document preparer, escort driver, and election clerk. (Id. at 28.)

DISCUSSION

The parties agree that the Court should reverse and remand the ALJ’s opinion, but they

disagree about the scope of the remand. (Pl.’s Br. at 27, ECF No. 8; Def.’s Br. at 2-8, ECF No.

10; Pl.’s Reply at 1-5, ECF No. 11.) Plaintiff argues that the Court should remand for the

immediate payment of benefits because he has satisfied the requirements of the credit-as-true

standard, crediting Plaintiff’s testimony or the opinion of his treating physician, Dr. Ashley

Bryson (“Dr. Bryson”), would require a finding of disability, and there is “no serious doubt”

Plaintiff is disabled. (Pl.’s Reply at 1-5.) The Commissioner argues that Plaintiff has not satisfied

the requirements of the credit-as-true standard because significant ambiguities remain, the record

requires further development, and evidence from the relevant time period does not support a

finding of disability. (Def.’s Br. at 2-8.)

I. REMAND

A. Applicable Law

“Generally when a court of appeals reverses an administrative determination, ‘the proper

course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional investigation or

explanation.’” Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 595 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). In

several cases, however, the Ninth Circuit has “stated or implied that it would be an abuse of

discretion for a district court not to remand for an award of benefits when [the three-part credit-

as-true standard is] met.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1020 (9th Cir. 2014) (citations

omitted).

The credit-as-true standard is satisfied if: “(1) the record has been fully developed and

further administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose; (2) the ALJ has failed to

provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, whether claimant testimony or medical

opinion; and (3) if the improperly discredited evidence were credited as true, the ALJ would be

required to find the claimant disabled on remand.” Id. (citations omitted). Even when the credit-

as-true standard is met, the court retains the “flexibility to remand for further proceedings when

the record as a whole creates serious doubt as to whether the claimant is, in fact, disabled within

the meaning of the Social Security Act.” Id. at 1021.

B. Analysis

Applying the credit-as-true standard here, the Court concludes that conflicts and

ambiguities in the record remain and require further administrative proceedings.

For example, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in evaluating Dr. Bryson’s medical

opinion. (Pl.’s Br. at 14-20; see also Tr. 1035-42.) In Dr. Bryson’s opinion, he stated that

Plaintiff had severe physical limitations, including: Plaintiff could sit, stand, and walk for less

than two hours in an eight-hour work day; required an assistive device for ambulation; needed to

elevate his legs hourly; had neuropathy in his hands, resulting in upper extremity limitations; was

unable to use his lower extremities to ambulate more than ten feet or stand for more than ten to

fifteen minutes; and would need to take hourly twenty-to-thirty minute breaks throughout the

workday to recline or lie down due to pain in his legs. (Tr. 1035-42.) However, as the ALJ noted

at the hearing, Dr. Bryson’s opinion is dated August 31, 2023, with no indication that the

limitations Dr. Bryson identified relate back to the relevant period of April 23, 2021 to

December 31, 2021. (Id. at 65-67, 1035-42.) Thus, even if the Court were to credit Dr. Bryson’s

opinion as true, it does not necessarily establish that Plaintiff was disabled during the relevant

time period.3

Further, conflicts remain between the record and Plaintiff’s hearing testimony. At the

hearing, Plaintiff testified that his feet are always swollen, half of his toes do not respond, and

“they’ve never really woken up since the accident.” (Id. at 69.) When discussing how he

ambulates, Plaintiff testified he was in a wheelchair for the first year after the accident, and then

“graduated to a cane.” (Id. at 72.) This testimony conflicts with medical records from a visit

Plaintiff had with a physical therapist on August 26, 2021, when Plaintiff appeared at the

appointment without a wheelchair, walker, cane, or other kind of assistive device. (Id. at 860.)

Plaintiff stated he did not have his cane with him because “he forgot it by the door.” (Id.) This

record conflicts with Plaintiff’s hearing testimony that he was wheelchair-bound for the first year

following the accident. (Id. at 72.)

3 Of note, in a November 18, 2022, medical record, Dr. Bryson stated that “[w]e are just

now starting therapies for pain control and swelling management” and “referral is being place to

[physical therapy] and [occupational therapy] to better quantify limitations.” (Tr. 1034. )

In addition, at a medical appointment with Dr. Edward Van Tassel a few weeks later on

September 7, 2021, Plaintiff reported that he “is now able to walk pretty much like he always

has.” (Id. at 891.) Those medical records are inconsistent with Plaintiff’s symptom testimony and

Dr. Bryson’s medical opinion (if the medical opinion in fact refers to this earlier time frame).

Thus, even if the ALJ were to credit Plaintiff’s testimony as true, the ALJ would need to resolve

the conflicts and ambiguities that remain to determine if Plaintiff was disabled during the

relevant time period.

Further proceedings will allow the ALJ to reevaluate the medical opinions, reevaluate

Plaintiff’s alleged impairments and any resulting functional limitations, reformulate the RFC,

and obtain updated testimony from a vocational expert. Accordingly, further proceedings would

serve a “useful purpose” here. See Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1020; Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1094

(“Given the conflicts and ambiguity that remain in the record, however, we remand for further

proceedings rather than for an award of benefits.”); see also McAuley v. Kijakazi, No. 21-16334,

2022 WL 2235462, at *1 (9th Cir. June 22, 2022) (holding that where “the district court

determined that . . . ‘conflicts and ambiguities’ existed, . . . it was not an abuse of discretion for

the district court to conclude that additional administrative proceedings were warranted” (citing

Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1104-05)).

For these reasons, the Court reverses the Commissioner’s decision and remands this case

for further administrative proceedings to allow the ALJ to reevaluate the medical opinions

(including Dr. Bryson’s opinion), reevaluate Plaintiff’s alleged impairments, reformulate the

RFC, and seek further VE testimony.

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, the Court REVERSES the Commissioner’s decision and

REMANDS this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 29th day of October, 2025.

HON. STACIE F. BECKERMAN

United States Magistrate Judge

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