Casa Express Corp v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela

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FOR PUBLICATION

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 24-11642

____________________

CASA EXPRESS CORP,

as Trustee of Casa Express Trust,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA, et al.,

Defendants-Third Party Defendants,

PLANET 2 REACHING, INC.,

POSH 8 DYNAMIC, INC.,

RIM GROUP INVESTMENTS CORP.,

RIM GROUP INVESTMENTS I CORP.,

RAUL GORRIN BELISARIO, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

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2 Opinion of the Court 24-11642

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cv-23103-BB

____________________

Before JILL PRYOR, LUCK, and HULL, Circuit Judges.

HULL, Circuit Judge:

In 2018, Casa Express Corp. (“Casa”) obtained a $40 million

judgment against the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela

(“Venezuela”) in the Southern District of New York based on

unpaid global bonds and a global note issued by Venezuela. In

2021, Casa initiated supplementary proceedings in the Southern

District of Florida against third-party defendants Raul Gorrin

Belisario (“Gorrin”) and his six corporate entities. Casa sought to

execute the New York judgment against eight real properties

owned by those shell corporate defendants. Importantly, though,

none of the properties are owned by Venezuela, the judgment

debtor.

Nonetheless, in an effort to execute the New York judgment

in Florida, Casa’s amended motion alleged that Gorrin (1) bribed

Venezuelan public officials so that he could obtain foreign currency

exchange contracts from the Venezuelan government; (2) profited

from those unlawfully obtained contracts; and (3) used those

profits to purchase the eight real properties in Florida through the

six corporate defendants. Casa asked the district court to impose a

constructive trust on the eight properties and to find that the

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properties belonged to Venezuela based on Casa’s

constructive-trust theory.

Defendants Gorrin and the six corporate entities moved for

judgment on the pleadings based on the district court’s lack of

ancillary jurisdiction over Casa’s claim and alternatively on the

merits. After the district court granted the defendants’ motion,

Casa appealed.

After review and oral argument, we hold that the district

court lacked ancillary jurisdiction because (1) Casa’s amended

motion seeks to impose liability on third parties who are not

already obligated to pay the New York judgment, and (2) Casa’s

action against the defendants is founded upon different facts and

theories of liability than its lawsuit against Venezuela.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s ancillary-jurisdiction

ruling, vacate its alternative merits rulings, and remand for the

district court to dismiss this case without prejudice for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction.

I. CASA’S NEW YORK LAWSUIT AGAINST VENEZUELA

A. Casa’s Claims Against Venezuela

In December 2018, Casa filed a complaint against Venezuela

in federal court in the Southern District of New York. Casa alleged

that it was the beneficial owner of interests in debt securities,

“global bonds” and a “global note,” issued by Venezuela in 1998

and 2002 pursuant to Fiscal Agency Agreements (“FAAs”). Under

the FAAs, Venezuela was obligated to repay the principal of the

bonds and note in full in August 2018 and to pay interest

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semi-annually starting in February 2018. The FAAs contained a

provision waiving Venezuela’s immunity from suit as to the

securities.

Casa owned a beneficial interest in the bonds in the principal

amount of $1,845,000, as well as a beneficial interest in the note in

the principal amount of $27,170,000, which entitled it to

$125,690.63 per interest payment for the bonds and $1,850,956.25

per interest payment for the note. Casa stated that Venezuela

defaulted on the bonds and note when, in 2018, it failed to repay

the principal and make the required interest payments on time. It

added that interest on principal would continue to accrue until

Venezuela repaid the principal in full.

In the New York case, Casa asserted two claims of breach of

contract against Venezuela based on the bonds and note. Casa

contended that it was entitled to its beneficial interest in the

principal of the bonds and note plus any accrued interest, costs, and

attorney’s fees. Casa moved for summary judgment.

B. 2020 New York Judgment Against Venezuela

In a September 2020 order, the district court in New York

granted summary judgment to Casa as well as to other different

plaintiffs with identical claims in separate suits. The district court

concluded that (1) Venezuela validly waived its immunity from

suit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) in the

FAAs, and (2) Casa was entitled to its requested relief.

On November 23, 2020, the district court entered a final

judgment against Venezuela in favor of Casa (“New York

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judgment”). 1 The judgment stated that Casa was entitled to a total

of $43,360,535.19 plus post-judgment interest from Venezuela.

In June 2021, in New York, Casa filed a motion under 28

U.S.C. § 1610(c) seeking to execute the judgment against

Venezuela’s assets because Venezuela failed to satisfy the

judgment within a reasonable period of time. The district court

granted Casa’s motion because Venezuela had not made any

payments towards the New York judgment.

II. CASA’S FLORIDA LAWSUIT

In August 2021, Casa registered the New York judgment in

federal court in the Southern District of Florida. Casa then filed a

motion to commence supplementary proceedings pursuant to Fla.

Stat. § 56.29. That Florida statute allows a judgment creditor

(Casa) to execute an unsatisfied judgment against property of the

judgment debtor (Venezuela) even if it is in the hands of a third

party. Fla. Stat. § 56.29. A year later, in September 2022, Casa

amended the motion.2 In its amended motion, Casa sought to

execute the New York judgment against eight real properties that

1 The November 23 judgment was an amended judgment that only differed

from the initial judgment in that it included a specified amount of costs and

attorney’s fees to be awarded to Casa to which the parties stipulated.

2 Casa’s initial and amended motions are for the most part substantively the

same, with the primary differences being that in the amended motion Casa

sought for the first time to implead an additional defendant, added allegations

to establish that the district court had personal jurisdiction over Gorrin, and

included further arguments in support of its claim.

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it claimed, under a constructive-trust theory, belonged to

Venezuela under 28 U.S.C. § 1610(c), Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a) and Fla.

Stat. § 56.29.

A. Casa Impleads Nine Third-Party Defendants

Casa’s amended motion sought to implead as third-party

defendants three individuals and six corporate entities, to

wit: (1) Gorrin, (2) Alejandro Andrade Cedeno (“Andrade”),

(3) Claudia Patricia Diaz Guillen (“Diaz”), (4) RIM Group

Investments Corp., (5) RIM Group Investments I Corp., (6) RIM

Group Investments II Corp., (7) RIM Group Investments III Corp.,

(8) Posh 8 Dynamic Inc., and (9) Planet 2 Reaching Inc. Casa asked

the district court to issue statutory notices to appear to these

third-party defendants.

Specifically, Casa’s amended motion sought to execute the

New York judgment, under a constructive-trust theory, against

eight real properties located in Miami, Florida, owned by the

corporate defendants. Here is a summary of the complicated facts

Casa alleged to support its constructive-trust theory.

B. Casa’s Alleged Bribery Scheme by Gorrin and Others

The Venezuelan National Treasury, known in Spanish as

the Oficina Nacional del Tesoro (“ONT”), sold Venezuelan bonds

denominated in U.S. dollars and other foreign currencies. The

ONT then exchanged the foreign-currency proceeds generated

from the bond sales into the Venezuelan national currency,

bolivares, through either (1) the Venezuelan National Bank or

(2) brokerage firms called “casas de bolsa,” at a government

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exchange rate. However, the casas de bolsa had access to a “black

market” exchange rate that was higher than the government rate.

This allowed the casas de bolsa “to sell the preferential dollars at

the higher rate and retain massive profits from the spread.” Only

ONT-approved casas de bolsa could conduct the currency

exchanges for the Venezuelan government.

Gorrin controlled one of the ONT-approved casas de bolsa.

From 2008 through 2017, Gorrin allegedly paid hundreds of

millions of dollars in bribes to Andrade, the Venezuelan National

Treasurer from 2007 through 2011, to secure foreign-currency

exchange contracts with the Venezuelan government. Casa

asserted that these contracts—awarded in exchange for

bribes—breached Andrade’s fiduciary duties to the Venezuelan

government. The awarded contracts allowed Andrade and Gorrin

to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of the Venezuelan

government and people.

When Andrade stepped down from his position as National

Treasurer, Andrade introduced Gorrin to his successor, Diaz.

While Gorrin continued paying bribes to Andrade, Gorrin started

paying bribes to Diaz through her husband for the same purpose.

Casa asserted that Diaz also breached her fiduciary duties to

Venezuela by accepting Gorrin’s bribes.

The U.S. government indicted Andrade, Gorrin, Diaz, and

Diaz’s husband for their roles in the bribery scheme and the

laundering of money obtained through the scheme into the United

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States. Gorrin was never arrested and remains a fugitive. Andrade,

Diaz, and Diaz’s husband were convicted.

In January 2019, the U.S. Department of the Treasury Office

of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) sanctioned Gorrin for his role

in the bribery scheme by placing him on the Specially Designated

Nationals and Blocked Persons List. OFAC also designated as

beneficiaries of the scheme the six corporate defendants here,

which Casa alleged were owned or controlled by Gorrin and his

wife. Those sanctions blocked the sale or transfer of the properties

without a license issued by OFAC. Casa conceded that it did not

have an OFAC license at that time but argued that it did not need

one until the eventual execution sale of the properties.

C. Alleged Constructive Trust Against Eight Properties

Casa then alleged that Gorrin purchased the eight real

properties between 2008 and 2016 through the six corporate

defendants using funds Gorrin misappropriated from Venezuela

through the bribery scheme. As support, Casa retained a forensic

accountant who prepared a report that concluded that Gorrin had

purchased the eight real properties using the funds he obtained

through the bribery scheme. The report was based on the facts

that (1) OFAC had designated the eight real properties as part of its

sanctions against Gorrin, and (2) Gorrin acquired the properties

after the commencement of the bribery scheme.

Casa argued that Fla. Stat. § 56.29 allowed it to execute the

New York judgment against the eight properties even though they

were owned by Gorrin’s corporations because they actually

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belonged to Venezuela. And Casa alleged that those properties

were not entitled to immunity from execution under the FSIA.

Casa asserted that the properties belonged to Venezuela under the

Florida-law constructive-trust doctrine because (1) Andrade and

Diaz breached their fiduciary obligations to Venezuela by

accepting Gorrin’s bribes in exchange for providing him with the

foreign-currency exchange contracts; (2) Andrade, Diaz, and

Gorrin were unjustly enriched through this scheme at the expense

of Venezuela; (3) Andrade and Diaz conferred a benefit to Gorrin

by allowing him to conduct the exchange transactions illegally at a

profit; and (4) during 2008 to 2016 Gorrin used the misappropriated

funds to purchase the eight properties in Florida through the six

corporate defendants.

Casa’s amended motion also alleged that Gorrin was “a

trustee ex maleficio because he obtained Venezuelan funds with

actual knowledge that a breach of trust was being committed by

Andrade.” Casa alleged that Gorrin was accountable for

participating in Andrade’s and Diaz’s breaches of trust to the

Venezuelan government because he committed overt acts in

furtherance of these trust breaches with knowledge that the trust

breaches were being committed. For those reasons, Casa

concluded that it had established every element for the imposition

of a constructive trust as to the eight real properties under

Florida law.

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D. District Court’s Order Granting Casa’s Amended Motion

In a September 2022 order, the district court granted Casa’s

motion to commence the supplementary proceedings and issued

notices to appear to the proposed third-party defendants. The

order directed the third-party defendants to respond to Casa’s

motion and explain why the properties should not be applied to

satisfy the New York judgment.

E. Third-Party Defendants’ Motions for Judgment on the

Pleadings

Gorrin and the corporate defendants filed a response

denying Casa’s allegations and raising multiple jurisdictional,

immunity, and other bars to Casa’s amended motion.

Later on, Gorrin moved for judgment on the pleadings. He

argued that (1) Casa failed to properly serve him, and (2) Casa

failed to establish that the district court had personal jurisdiction

over him.

Additionally, in a separate motion, Gorrin and the six

corporate defendants jointly moved for judgment on the pleadings

on alternative grounds. Their motion argued that (1) the district

court lacked ancillary jurisdiction over the action under Peacock v.

Thomas, 516 U.S. 349 (1996) (“Peacock”); (2) Casa lacked standing to

bring its constructive-trust claim against them on Venezuela’s

behalf; (3) even assuming that the relevant properties belonged to

Venezuela, the properties were immune from attachment and

execution under the FSIA; (4) Casa’s execution efforts were

prohibited by the OFAC sanctions; (5) Casa’s claim was barred by

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the act of state doctrine because it required the court to invalidate

the foreign-currency exchange transactions at the heart of the

bribery scheme, which were sovereign acts of Venezuela; and

(6) Casa failed to allege a viable constructive-trust theory because

it did not establish a financial link between the misappropriated

funds and the purchase of the relevant properties. 3

F. Report and Recommendation

In a report and recommendation (“R&R”), the magistrate

judge recommended that the district court (1) grant in part

Gorrin’s motion for judgment on the pleadings based on lack of

service and personal jurisdiction and (2) grant in part Gorrin and

the corporate defendants’ joint motion for judgment on the

pleadings.

Specifically, the magistrate judge determined, among other

things, that the district court lacked ancillary jurisdiction over the

proceedings under Peacock. In Peacock, the Supreme Court held

that district courts could not exercise “ancillary jurisdiction in a

subsequent lawsuit to impose an obligation to pay an existing

federal judgment on a person not already liable for that judgment.”

516 U.S. at 357. The Supreme Court concluded that the district

court in the case before it lacked ancillary jurisdiction because the

plaintiff was attempting to execute a judgment in a subsequent

3 Andrade, Diaz, and Venezuela did not respond to Casa’s amended motion,

and Casa obtained default judgments against Andrade and Diaz and a partial

default judgment against Venezuela. Andrade, Diaz, and Venezuela did not

appeal.

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lawsuit against an individual not already liable for that judgment

based on new facts and law not at issue in the initial action that

produced the judgment. Id. at 358-59.

The magistrate judge concluded that the district court

lacked ancillary jurisdiction under Peacock because Casa was

attempting to execute a judgment against third parties who had

never been held liable for that judgment on the global bonds and

global note. The magistrate judge also distinguished this case from

National Maritime Services, Inc. v. Straub, 776 F.3d 783 (11th Cir.

2015) (“Straub”), because that decision concerned a

fraudulent-transfer claim rather than a constructive-trust claim.

The magistrate judge also found that Casa failed to establish

personal jurisdiction over Gorrin for several reasons. The

magistrate judge pointed out that Casa had relied on subsections of

Florida’s long-arm statute concerning a nonresident defendant’s

business activity and tortious conduct in Florida. However, Casa

did not adequately allege that Gorrin committed a tortious act

within Florida because the bribery and illegal profits occurred in

Venezuela, not Florida.

Additionally, the magistrate judge concluded that Casa

failed to allege adequately that Gorrin conducted business in

Florida. Casa failed to link any of the tortious conduct—the

allegedly misappropriated Venezuelan funds—to the eight

properties, which was necessary for it to prove its

constructive-trust claim. Lastly, the magistrate judge stated that

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exercise of personal jurisdiction did not comport with the Due

Process Clause.

Casa filed objections to the R&R.

G. District Court’s Order

On April 24, 2024, the district court adopted in part the R&R

and granted in part defendant Gorrin’s motion for judgment on the

pleadings based on lack of service and personal jurisdiction. The

district court also granted in part Gorrin and the corporate

defendants’ joint motion for judgment on the pleadings on

multiple grounds, including lack of ancillary jurisdiction.4 The

district court agreed with the magistrate judge on all but one of the

issues raised by the defendants.

In relevant part here, the district court agreed with the

magistrate judge that it lacked ancillary jurisdiction under the

Supreme Court’s Peacock decision because Casa was effectively

attempting to impose liability for the New York judgment on

Gorrin and the corporate defendants. The district court explained

that Gorrin and the corporate defendants had never been held

liable for the New York judgment based on the unpaid global bonds

and global note. Rather, the whole basis for Casa’s action was to

establish the bribery scheme and a link between the

misappropriated Venezuelan funds and the Florida properties in an

4 The district court also affirmed an order issued by the magistrate judge deny-

ing a motion filed by Casa seeking to extend notices of lis pendens as to the real

properties.

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effort to impose a constructive trust against the properties.

Because the Florida proceedings were based on different parties,

facts, and legal theories than the New York lawsuit, the district

court concluded that Peacock prohibited the exercise of ancillary

jurisdiction. The district court also declined to address new

jurisdictional arguments raised by Casa for the first time in its

objections to the R&R.

The district court also agreed with the R&R’s finding that it

lacked personal jurisdiction over Gorrin because Casa’s allegations

were insufficient to establish that Gorrin conducted business in

Florida by renting the relevant properties for profit. It also stated

that Casa failed to establish connexity between Gorrin’s alleged

tortious conduct and the relevant properties to support a finding of

personal jurisdiction.

Casa timely appealed.

III. DISCUSSION

Federal courts can act only if they have subject matter

jurisdiction. See Santiago-Lugo v. Warden, 785 F.3d 467, 471 (11th

Cir. 2015). At the outset, we are thus obligated to determine

whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction before we

can address the merits of this appeal. Id. We review de novo the

district court’s conclusion that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

Holston Invs., Inc. B.V.I. v. LanLogistics Corp., 677 F.3d 1068, 1070

(11th Cir. 2012).

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A. Ancillary Jurisdiction

“[I]nferior federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.”

Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 409 (11th Cir. 1999).

As such, federal district courts “are empowered to hear only those

cases within the judicial power of the United States as defined by

Article III of the Constitution, and which have been entrusted to

them by a jurisdictional grant authorized by Congress.” Id.

(quotation marks omitted). Typically, where a federal court has

jurisdiction over a case, and a final judgment is entered in that case,

the court’s jurisdiction to act is over. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life

Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 378 (1994).

But in narrow circumstances, federal courts may exercise

what is termed “ancillary jurisdiction.” Id. at 378-79. Under the

doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction, federal courts may exercise

jurisdiction “over some matters (otherwise beyond their

competence) that are incidental to other matters properly before

them.” Id. at 378. The Supreme Court has explained that ancillary

jurisdiction exists in two circumstances: “(1) to permit disposition

by a single court of claims that are, in varying respects and degrees,

factually interdependent; and (2) to enable a court to function

successfully, that is, to manage its proceedings, vindicate its

authority, and effectuate its decrees.” Id. at 379-80 (citations

omitted). Simply put, federal courts have ancillary jurisdiction to

(1) dispose of factually dependent claims, and (2) effectuate their

decrees or judgments.

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Under the second category, “ancillary jurisdiction [may be

used] in subsequent proceedings for the exercise of a federal court’s

inherent power to enforce its judgments.” Peacock, 516 U.S. at 356.

“In defining that power, [the Supreme Court] ha[s] approved the

exercise of ancillary jurisdiction over a broad range of

supplementary proceedings involving third parties to assist in the

protection and enforcement of federal judgments—including

attachment, mandamus, garnishment, and the prejudgment

avoidance of fraudulent conveyances.” Id.

But ancillary jurisdiction does not extend to supplementary

proceedings “to impose an obligation to pay an existing federal

judgment on a person not already liable for that judgment” or to

exercise “jurisdiction over proceedings that are entirely new and

original.” Id. at 357-58 (quotation marks and citations omitted).

Moreover, ancillary jurisdiction is not applicable “where the relief

sought is of a different kind or on a different principle than that of

the prior decree.” Id. at 358 (quotation marks and citations

omitted) (alteration adopted). It does not extend to supplementary

proceedings “founded . . . upon entirely new theories of

liability.” Id.

The Supreme Court addressed the limits of ancillary

jurisdiction in Peacock, which we review in detail.

B. Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349 (1996)

In Peacock v. Thomas, a plaintiff sued his former employer

and an officer and shareholder of the employer under the

Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”). Id. at 351.

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The plaintiff alleged that the defendants breached their fiduciary

duties in their administration of a pension benefits plan. Id. The

district court entered a money judgment against the employer but

concluded that the officer/shareholder was not a fiduciary and so

not personally liable. Id.

The plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to collect the

judgment from the employer. Id. at 352. The plaintiff then sued

the officer/shareholder in federal court, claiming that the

officer/shareholder “had entered into a civil conspiracy to siphon

assets from [the employer] to prevent satisfaction of the ERISA

judgment.” Id. Specifically, the plaintiff sought to execute the

judgment against the officer/shareholder by asserting claims of

“pierc[ing] the corporate veil” and fraudulent transfer. Id. The

district court entered judgment against the officer/shareholder for

the full amount of the initial money judgment even though the

total amount of the alleged fraudulent transfers was less than the

judgment. Id.

The Supreme Court held that the district court lacked

subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 352-60. The Court first concluded

that ERISA and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 did not provide the district court

with jurisdiction. Id. at 352-54. The Court then held that the

district court also lacked ancillary jurisdiction for several reasons.

Id. at 354-60.

The Supreme Court first explained that it had “never

authorized the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction in a subsequent

lawsuit to impose an obligation to pay an existing federal judgment

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on a person not already liable for that judgment.” Id. at 357. Next,

the Supreme Court stated that ancillary jurisdiction should not be

exercised in the second lawsuit because it was “founded not only

upon different facts than the ERISA suit, but also upon entirely new

theories of liability.” Id. at 358. In the second suit, the employee

“alleged civil conspiracy and fraudulent transfer of [the employer’s]

assets, but . . . no substantive ERISA violation.” Id. The claims in

the second suit—“civil conspiracy, fraudulent conveyance, and

‘veil-piercing’—all involved new theories of liability not asserted in

the ERISA suit.” Id. at 358-59. The Supreme Court added that,

other than the money judgment itself, the enforcement action had

“little connection” to the initial action. Id. at 359.

The Supreme Court distinguished the case before it from

cases in which it had concluded that ancillary enforcement

jurisdiction existed because the latter “merely required compliance

with the existing judgment[s] by the persons with authority to

comply.” Id. at 358. The Court made clear that in those cases it

did not “authorize the shifting of liability for payment of the

judgment from the judgment debtor to” third parties, as the

plaintiff was attempting to do. Id. It also “cautioned against the

exercise of jurisdiction over proceedings that are entirely new and

original or where the relief sought is of a different kind or on a

different principle than that of the prior decree.” Id. (quotation

marks and citations omitted) (alteration adopted).

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C. National Maritime Services, Inc. v. Straub, 776 F.3d 783 (11th

Cir. 2015)

Subsequent to Peacock, this Court recently discussed

ancillary jurisdiction in Straub, which we review.

In Straub, this Court applied Peacock in determining whether

a district court had ancillary jurisdiction over a Fla. Stat. § 56.29

supplementary proceeding. In that case, a plaintiff sued Burrell

Shipping Company and its president for breach of contract and

unjust enrichment. Straub, 776 F.3d at 785. The plaintiff obtained

a money judgment against Burrell Shipping but was unable to hold

the president individually liable. Id.

While the action was pending, Burrell Shipping sold its sole

asset to a third party and transferred the proceeds of the sale to the

president. Id. The plaintiff attempted to execute the money

judgment against Burrell Shipping but was unsuccessful because it

had no assets after the sale and transfer. Id.

The plaintiff then initiated § 56.29 supplementary

proceedings in federal court against the president in an attempt to

void the transfer, arguing that it was a fraudulent attempt to avoid

payment of the judgment. Id. The plaintiff initiated the

supplementary proceedings under a provision of § 56.29 that

specifically concerned fraudulent-transfer claims. Id. That

provision in § 56.29 expressly allows a court to void “any gift,

transfer, assignment or other conveyance of personal property

[that] has been made or contrived by the judgment debtor to delay,

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hinder, or defraud creditors[.]” Fla. Stat. § 56.29(3)(b). 5 The district

court concluded that the transfer was fraudulent and entered

judgment against the president in the amount of the initial money

judgment, which was less than the total amount of the transferred

assets. See Straub, 776 F.3d at 785-86.

This Court held that the district court had ancillary

jurisdiction over the supplementary proceedings. Id. at 786-88. We

reasoned that, unlike in Peacock, the plaintiff was seeking to

“disgorge [the company’s president] of a fraudulently transferred

asset, not to impose liability for a judgment on a third party.” Id.

at 787. This Court explained that the president was not personally

liable for the initial money judgment, but rather his liability was

limited to the proceeds that Burrell Shipping fraudulently

transferred to him. Id. This Court emphasized that, if the value of

the transferred proceeds was less than the value of the judgment

against Burrell Shipping, the plaintiff would have no recourse

against the president for the excess amount. Id.

D. Analysis

Applying this precedent, we readily conclude that the

district court lacked ancillary jurisdiction over Casa’s

5 When Straub was decided, the fraudulent-transfer provision of Fla. Stat.

§ 56.29 was located at subsection (6)(b). See Fla. Stat. § 56.29(6)(b) (2014).

However, in 2016, the fraudulent-transfer provision was moved to subsection

(3)(b). See id. § 56.29(3)(b) (2016). The substance of the provision did not

change.

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supplementary proceedings under Fla. Stat. § 56.29 against

defendant Gorrin and the six corporate defendants.

First, a judgment did not already exist in favor of Venezuela

against defendants Gorrin and the corporate entities. Rather, Casa

was attempting to impose a judgment on third persons—Gorrin

and his companies—who did not already owe the New York

judgment.

This is almost identical to the type of case in which the

Supreme Court explained that a district court would lack ancillary

jurisdiction to enforce a judgment. See Peacock, 516 U.S. at 356-59.

Casa was attempting “in a subsequent lawsuit to impose an

obligation to pay an existing federal judgment on a person not

already liable for that judgment.” Id. at 357. It was not merely

seeking “compliance with the existing judgment by the persons

with authority to comply,” but rather was asking the district court

to shift “liability for payment of the judgment from the judgment

debtor to” Gorrin and the corporate defendants by requiring them

to hand over the real properties. Id. at 358.

Second, the supplementary proceedings were “entirely new

and original” and sought relief “of a different kind or on a different

principle than that of the prior decree.” Id. (quotation marks

omitted). Casa obtained the New York judgment based on

Venezuela’s nonpayment of the bonds and the note. That

nonpayment has nothing to do, either factually or legally, with

Gorrin’s alleged bribery and currency-exchange scheme in

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Venezuela or with Gorrin’s purchase of the real properties

in Florida.

We recognize that Casa’s Florida lawsuit was based on a

constructive-trust theory. Specifically, Casa attempted to execute

the New York judgment against the real properties purchased by

Gorrin through the corporate defendants by arguing that those

properties actually belonged to Venezuela under a

constructive-trust theory. 6 Casa asserts three persons—Andrade,

Diaz, and Gorrin—siphoned off Venezuelan funds through bribes

and a currency-exchange scheme and then Gorrin used those funds

to buy properties in Florida. But that is a new theory against three

different people who had nothing to do with the nonpayment of

the bonds held by Casa.

Casa relies on Straub, but that decision is inapposite. First

and foremost, Casa did not assert a fraudulent-transfer claim

against Gorrin and the corporate defendants. Casa did not allege

that Venezuela transferred the Florida real properties to Gorrin and

the corporate defendants for the purpose of Venezuela’s avoiding

payment of the New York judgment. Venezuela, other than not

6 To establish a constructive trust under Florida law, Casa would be required

to show “(1) a promise, express or implied, (2) transfer of the property and

reliance thereon, (3) a confidential relationship, and (4) unjust enrichment.”

Bank of Am. v. Bank of Salem, 48 So. 3d 155, 158 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (quotation

marks omitted). The defendants argue that Casa’s motion failed to adequately

allege those elements, but we need not decide that issue.

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paying the bonds, did not do anything to transfer any bond money

to the third-party defendants. This is not a fraudulent-transfer case.

We also reject Casa’s argument that its constructive-trust

claim is analogous to the fraudulent-transfer claim in Straub. In

Straub, the plaintiff sought to recover assets previously held by the

judgment debtor that it transferred to a third party for the purpose

of avoiding payment of the money judgment. But in this case, Casa

seeks to execute the New York judgment against properties held

by third parties, which Venezuela never possessed, based on facts

and law completely unrelated to the New York suit. Straub, 776

F.3d at 785-88. Further, the assets in Straub undeniably at one point

belonged to the judgment debtor. Id. But the only way that Casa

can show in this case that the real properties belonged to

Venezuela is first by proving Gorrin’s monetary liability for the

bribery and currency-exchange scheme and then by proving that

Gorrin used the specific funds that he obtained from that scheme

to purchase the eight properties.

It is true that, like in this case, the district court in Straub was

required to make factual and legal findings unrelated to the merits

of the initial lawsuit that produced the money judgment in order

to grant the plaintiff relief. See id. However, unlike in this case, the

fraudulent-transfer claim in Straub was directly tied to the district

court’s power to execute the money judgment. See id. The

fraudulent-transfer claim derived from the judgment debtor’s own

active attempts to avoid payment of the money judgment by

transferring assets to a third party, who was also a defendant in the

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initial lawsuit. Id. at 785-86. Therefore, the district court’s ancillary

enforcement jurisdiction in Straub stemmed from its power to

“vindicate its authority” and “effectuate its decrees.” Kokkonen, 511

U.S. at 380.

In stark contrast, Casa’s constructive-trust claim has nothing

to do with the New York judgment and instead is simply an

attempt to shift Venezuela’s liability for that judgment to Gorrin

and the corporate defendants based on completely new facts and

legal theories. Casa’s constructive-trust suit is more like a wholly

independent substantive action than an action filed for the limited

purpose of “enabl[ing] [the] court to function successfully.” Id.

In sum, this case is like Peacock, not Straub. And the district

court clearly lacked ancillary jurisdiction over the supplementary

proceedings.

E. No Alternative Jurisdiction Alleged

As a final matter, we note that the fact that the district court

lacked ancillary jurisdiction does not necessarily mean that it lacked

subject matter jurisdiction altogether. Rather, it simply means that

the district court needed to have a basis for jurisdiction

independent of the New York lawsuit and judgment to rule on the

merits of this case. See, e.g., Jackson-Platts v. Gen. Elec. Cap. Corp.,

727 F.3d 1127, 1132, 1134 (11th Cir. 2013) (noting that a district

court had diversity jurisdiction over claims asserted in Fla. Stat.

§ 56.29 supplementary proceedings).

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In its appellate briefs, however, Casa did not set forth or

argue any alternative substantive ground for the district court’s

subject matter jurisdiction. And we have found none.7

IV. CONCLUSION

We affirm the district court’s ruling that it lacked ancillary

jurisdiction over the supplementary proceedings. Because the

district court lacked jurisdiction, we vacate the district court’s

alternative merits rulings and remand with instructions to the

district court to reenter judgment dismissing the action without

prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See DiMaio v.

Democratic Nat’l Comm., 520 F.3d 1299, 1303 (11th Cir. 2008).

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND

REMANDED.

7 Further, at oral argument, Casa conceded that its argument as to the district

court’s jurisdiction was based solely on ancillary jurisdiction.