The opinion
Case: 24-11048 Document: 87-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/28/2025
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
____________ United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
No. 24-11048
FILED
October 28, 2025
____________
Lyle W. Cayce
Brianna Randle; Sywayne Burgess, Clerk
Plaintiffs—Appellants,
versus
The PNC Financial Services Group; PNC Bank; Cindy
Avina, Individually and in her professional capacity; Ashley Alvarez,
Individually and in her professional capacity; Karina Chapa, Individually
and in her professional capacity; Michelle Nowlin, Individually and in
her professional capacity; The PNC Financial Services Group,
Incorporated; Officer FNU Dixon; Officer FNU Chapel,
#2511; Officer FNU Gomez, #3341; Officer FNU Evans, 2911;
Arlington Police Department,
Defendants—Appellees.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:23-CV-263
______________________________
Before Southwick, Higginson, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam: *
_____________________
*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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No. 24-11048
Sywayne Burgess and Brianna Randle, proceeding pro se and in forma
pauperis, brought this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and
1983 against PNC Bank employee Cindy Avina and City of Arlington Police
Officer Anthony Dixon. Burgess appeals the grant of summary judgment to
Avina, and Randle appeals the dismissal of her claim against Officer Dixon
on grounds of qualified immunity. We AFFIRM.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On December 16, 2022, Burgess visited a PNC Bank branch located
in Arlington, Texas, to withdraw $28,000 from his account. The bank did
not carry that amount of cash but offered to order the funds for him to pick
up at a later date. On December 21, the bank called Burgess to inform him
that his funds were ready. The same day, Burgess, accompanied by Randle,
went to pick up the money.
To complete a cash withdrawal, PNC policy requires the
accountholder to present two forms of identification. Federal law also
requires the bank to file a Currency Transaction Report (“CTR”) of
withdrawals greater than $10,000. A CTR form includes personal
information of the accountholder such as their Social Security number and
occupation.
Burgess initially refused to provide identification or answer questions
pursuant to the CTR. Randle attempted to answer questions on Burgess’s
behalf but was immediately told that since Burgess was the sole
accountholder, the answers could only come from him. Burgess and Randle
believed the questions to be unnecessary and quickly became frustrated with
the bank employees. Avina then took over the transaction in an attempt to
“de-escalate the situation,” and told Burgess that once he answered the
questions the transaction would be complete. Randle then walked away from
the teller window.
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As the transaction was nearing completion, Randle allegedly returned
to the teller window and began accusing Avina and her coworkers of being
racist and threatening them with physical violence and litigation. Randle
denies these allegations and contends that she told Avina only that she would
file complaints against her. Avina then stopped the transaction and went into
the bank vault to call PNC’s loss prevention department. Both Randle and
another PNC employee called the police to the bank. Burgess alleges that
before the police arrived, he requested his credentials back from Avina
because he did not trust her. According to Burgess, Avina replied that she
did not “trust people like y’all,” and clarified that she meant “black
people.” 1 Avina denies making such a statement.
Several police officers — including Officer Dixon — arrived at the
bank. The officers attempted to confer between themselves about how to
resolve the situation and got inside a patrol car to discuss. Randle alleges that
after following the officers outside, Office Dixon intentionally hit her with
the door as he exited the vehicle. Once the situation had calmed, Burgess
provided the required identification and information, and Avina completed
his transaction.
The Plaintiffs filed a nine-count complaint against PNC and several
bank employees under various causes of action. Plaintiffs amended their
complaint to add claims against the City of Arlington Police Department and
several City police officers, including Officer Dixon. The case was assigned
to a United States Magistrate Judge, who in a report and recommendation
urged dismissal of all claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),
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1
Randle testified to hearing Avina make several other allegedly racially charged
statements. Avina denies making such statements, and Plaintiffs do not mention this
evidence on appeal.
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No. 24-11048
except those against Avina and Dixon in his personal capacity. The district
court accepted the magistrate judge’s recommendation.
Avina subsequently moved for summary judgment, and the magistrate
judge recommended that the motion be granted. The recommendation
concluded that Avina “articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason
for stepping away from the transaction,” and that Burgess could not show
that Avina’s conduct was “pretextual.” The district court agreed and
entered judgment for Avina.
Officer Dixon moved for dismissal of Randle’s claims, asserting
qualified immunity. The magistrate judge recommended dismissal and
concluded in its qualified immunity analysis that Randle failed to support
that Officer Dixon violated clearly established law. 2 The district court
adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation and dismissed Randle’s
claim with prejudice.
After the district court entered final judgment, Burgess and Randle
timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Burgess’s central contention is that the district court
improperly drew inferences and otherwise resolved factual disputes in favor
of Avina. We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the
same standard as the district court. Morris v. Town of Independence, 827 F.3d
396, 399 (5th Cir. 2016). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). In
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2
The magistrate judge also concluded that, to the extent Randle alleges a state law
claim against Officer Dixon, the court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.
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considering a motion for summary judgment, we view all facts and draw all
inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Johnson v. PRIDE Indus., Inc., 7
F.4th 392, 399 (5th Cir. 2021).
The principal statute on which Burgess relies provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall
have the same right in every State and Territory to make and
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the
full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens,
and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes,
licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). We have explained that in the “commercial context, in
order to establish a prima facie case under [Section 1981], the plaintiff must
show that (1) he or she is a member of a racial minority; (2) the defendant had
an intent to discriminate on the basis of race; and (3) the discrimination
concerned one or more of the activities enumerated in the statute.” Causey
v. Sewell Cadillac-Chevrolet, Inc., 394 F.3d 285, 288–89 (5th Cir. 2004).
Burgess satisfies the first requirement because he is a member of a
racial minority. We need not analyze the second requirement, whether there
was intentional discrimination, because Burgess cannot satisfy the third —
any discrimination must have interfered with an activity enumerated in the
statute. See Body by Cook, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 869 F.3d 381,
388 (5th Cir. 2017). Section 1981 does not provide a “general cause of action
for race discrimination.” Arguello v. Conoco, Inc., 330 F.3d 355, 358 (5th Cir.
2003). Instead, relief requires that racial discrimination block or impair a
contractual relationship. Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 476
(2006). This includes the “making, performance, modification, and
termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms,
and conditions of the contractual relationship.” Body by Cook, 869 F.3d at
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386 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b)). We have held that to establish the
deprivation of a Section 1981 right, the plaintiff must demonstrate “the loss
of an actual, not speculative or prospective contract interest.” 3 Arguello, 330
F.3d at 358 (quoting Morris v. Dillard Dept. Stores, Inc., 277 F.3d 743, 751–52
(2001)). A plaintiff must prove that “but for race, [he] would not have
suffered the loss of a legally protected right.” Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of
Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 589 U.S. 327, 341 (2020).
Burgess has failed to show that Avina interfered with his contractual
relationship with PNC Bank, i.e., his ability to withdraw funds from his
account. The only evidence offered by Burgess is his own testimony, and we
examine its details. While his affidavit conflicts in some details with Randle’s
testimony, 4 it fails to support the argument that the transaction was delayed
because of his race. Burgess testified that he only needed to provide
identification to receive his funds. When employees began questioning him,
he “expressed [his] desire” for the bank to complete the withdrawal. While
he contends that he “follow[ed] bank policy,” the evidence shows he did not
follow that policy which required answering the questions from the CTR.
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3
Here, the factual context does not affect our decision. But cf. Arguello, 330 F.3d
at 360–61 (“In the retail context . . . the relationship is based on a single discrete transaction
— the purchase of goods[,] . . . [whereas] dining at a restaurant generally involves a
contractual relationship that continues over the course of the meal and entitles the
customer to benefits in additional to the meal purchased.”); Hager v. Brinker Tex., Inc., 102
F.4th 692, 700–01 (5th Cir. 2024) (further discussing the distinction).
4
The parties offer contradictory accounts of whom the funds belonged to, which
employee told Randle to stop answering questions for Burgess, when Randle stepped away
from the teller window, who invited them to the bank that day, and whether they had met
Avina prior to December 21. Additionally, both Burgess and Randle testify that Avina
made discriminatory remarks prior to exiting the teller window, though on appeal they now
allege that these statements came after.
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Burgess argues that the district court failed to consider “police
records” and “video surveillance footage” that disprove Avina’s testimony
and show that Burgess complied with all bank procedure. On the contrary,
the Computer-Aided Dispatch Report discusses the disruptions in detail, and
states that Burgess and Randle assumed that Avina was discriminating
against them by asking questions regarding the transaction. Similarly, the
“footage” is nothing more than a compilation of screenshots from the bank
window on the day in question. Without addressing the obvious concerns
regarding the admissibility of such evidence, we conclude it contains no
probative value and fails to support Burgess’s argument.
It is uncontradicted that Avina and other bank employees were ready
to proceed with the transaction. The bank specially ordered Burgess’s funds
and even sought his presence on the day in question to execute the
withdrawal. Upon arrival at the bank, Avina and other bank employees
requested Burgess’s identification pursuant to bank policy and only
questioned him further to establish information pursuant to the CTR. When
Burgess did not immediately receive his funds, he became frustrated and
refused to answer questions asked by bank employees. When he finally
provided all necessary information and identification, Avina completed his
withdrawal. His own conduct and resistance — not his race — interfered
with his ability to receive his funds. As a result, there is no liability under
Section 1981.
Randle also fails to show reversible error. The magistrate judge
recommended dismissal of Randle’s Section 1983 claim as Randle did not
allege sufficient facts to overcome Dixon’s qualified immunity defense.
Because Randle failed to object to the magistrate judge’s recommendation,
we review her appeal for plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto.
Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), superseded by statute on
other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
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Randle does not identify any error made by the district court, much
less an error that was clear and obvious. See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S.
129, 135 (2009). There are other purported errors asserted, but we conclude
the briefing is inadequate and we need not consider them.
AFFIRMED. 1
1
Judge Higginson concurs in judgment only.
8