The opinion
[Cite as Auburn Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. Sedensky, 2025-Ohio-4911.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
GEAUGA COUNTY
AUBURN TOWNSHIP CASE NO. 2025-G-0012
BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
Plaintiff-Appellee, Civil Appeal from the
Court of Common Pleas
- vs -
DAVID SEDENSKY, et al., Trial Court No. 2023 M 000172
Defendants-Appellants.
OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Decided: October 27, 2025
Judgment: Affirmed
Tonya J. Rogers and Megan L. Haynam, Baker, Dublikar, Beck, Wiley & Mathews, 400
South Main Street, North Canton, OH 44720 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
Monica R. Zibbel, Forbes Law, LLC, 166 Main Street, Painesville, OH 44077 (For
Defendants-Appellants).
EUGENE A. LUCCI, J.
{¶1} Appellants, David and Molly Sedensky, appeal the judgment of the trial
court that granted summary judgment in favor of Auburn Township Board of Trustees
(“the Board”), enjoined the Sedenskys from using certain property as a short term rental,
and dismissed the Sedenskys’ counterclaims. We affirm.
{¶2} In 2021, the Sedenskys purchased real property in Auburn Township in a
district zoned “R-1.” The Sedenskys acquired the property for personal use and for rental
purposes and thereafter listed the property for rent on the internet platforms Airbnb and
VRBO. The Sedenskys rented the property to others through these sites for various
periods of time.
{¶3} On March 21, 2023, the Board filed a complaint for injunctive relief, alleging
that the Sedenskys use of the property as a short term rental violated the Auburn
Township Zoning Resolution (“ATZR”) 4.03(a) and 5.05(b).1
{¶4} The Sedenskys answered the complaint and filed counterclaims seeking
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. In their counterclaims, the Sedenskys asserted
that the ATZR sections at issue violated their rights under the United States Constitution
and the Ohio Constitution.
{¶5} On December 3, 2024, the Sedenskys moved for partial summary judgment
on their counterclaim for declaratory judgment, and the Board moved for summary
judgment on its claim and on the Sedenskys’ counterclaims.
{¶6} On February 28, 2025, the trial court granted the Board’s motion and
entered judgment enjoining the Sedenskys from using their property as a short term
rental. The trial court dismissed the Sedenskys’ counterclaims with prejudice.
{¶7} In their assigned errors, the Sedenskys contend:
[1.] The trial court erred by finding Auburn Township Zoning
Resolutions §§ 4.03 and 5.50(B) are constitutional based
upon stare decisis.
[2.] The trial court abused its discretion when it dismissed
Appellants-Defendants’ action for Declaratory Judgment with
prejudice.
1. The Board’s complaint further requested penalties pursuant to R.C. 519.99. However, the trial court
dismissed the claim for penalties prior to summary judgment proceedings, and the issue of penalties is not
relevant to this appeal.
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{¶8} Judgment in this case was entered at the summary judgment stage of
proceedings. “We review decisions awarding summary judgment de novo, i.e.,
independently and without deference to the trial court’s decision.” Hedrick v. Szep, 2021-
Ohio-1851, ¶ 13 (11th Dist.), citing Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 1996-Ohio-336, ¶ 10.
Civ.R. 56(C) specifically provides that before summary
judgment may be granted, it must be determined that: (1) No
genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated;
(2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law;
and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds
can come to but one conclusion, and viewing such evidence
most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion
for summary judgment is made, that conclusion is adverse to
that party.
Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327 (1977); Allen v. 5125 Peno, LLC,
2017-Ohio-8941, ¶ 6 (11th Dist.), citing Holliman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 1999-Ohio-116. “The
initial burden is on the moving party to set forth specific facts demonstrating that no issue
of material fact exists, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Allen at ¶ 6, citing Dresher v. Burt, 1996-Ohio-107. “If the movant meets this burden, the
burden shifts to the nonmoving party to establish that a genuine issue of material fact
exists for trial.” Allen at ¶ 6, citing Dresher at ¶ 18.
{¶9} Here, as relevant to this appeal, in the Board’s motion for summary
judgment, it maintained that it was entitled to judgment on the Sedenskys’ claim for
declaratory judgment.
{¶10} The Sedenskys sought declaratory judgment pursuant to R.C. 2721.03,
which provides:
Subject to division (B) of section 2721.02 of the Revised
Code, any person interested under a deed, will, written
contract, or other writing constituting a contract or any person
whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a
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constitutional provision, statute, rule as defined in section
119.01 of the Revised Code, municipal ordinance, township
resolution, contract, or franchise may have determined any
question of construction or validity arising under the
instrument, constitutional provision, statute, rule, ordinance,
resolution, contract, or franchise and obtain a declaration of
rights, status, or other legal relations under it.
{¶11} A “dismissal” of a declaratory judgment action is not warranted based on a
trial court’s determination that the party seeking such judgment has advanced a meritless
position with respect to the validity of a law. Weyandt v. Davis, 112 Ohio App.3d 717, 721
(9th Dist. 1996). Instead, the trial court then should proceed to determine the validity of
the challenged law. Id. Nonetheless, a “trial court’s error in dismissing a complaint by
which a declaratory judgment is sought is harmless” if the trial court declared the rights,
status, and other legal relations in its order dismissing a declaratory judgment claim.
(Citations omitted.) Id. at 721-722.
{¶12} Here, the Sedenskys argued in their claim for declaratory judgment that
ATZR 4.03(a) and 5.05(b) are unconstitutional.
{¶13} ATZR 4.03(a) provides, “Lots and structures shall be used in compliance
with Schedule 4.03(k). Only the permitted main uses defined in the Resolution and
specified on the Schedule under a given district shall be permitted in that district; and only
those conditional uses so defined and specified may be approved.”
{¶14} The property at issue here is located in a district zoned “R-1.” Schedule
4.03(k) of the ATZR sets forth the “Permitted Main Uses” for a property zoned “R-1,” as
relevant here, single family dwellings. A “dwelling single family” under the ATZR is defined
as “[a] dwelling consisting of one (1) detached dwelling unit occupied by one (1) family
only.” ATZR 2.02. In turn, ATZR 2.02 defines a “family” as:
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One (1) or more persons related by blood, adoption,
guardianship or marriage, living and cooking together as a
single housekeeping unit, exclusive of live-in hired
employees. A number of persons but not exceeding two (2)
living and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit
though not related by blood, adoption, guardianship or
marriage shall be deemed to constitute a family, exclusive of
live-in hired employees. A family shall not include any society,
club, fraternity, sorority, association, lodge, federation,
coterie, or a like organization; any group of individuals whose
association is temporary or seasonal in nature; and any group
of individuals who are in a group living arrangement as a result
of criminal offenses.
{¶15} Relevant to this appeal, the trial court and this court previously addressed
ATZR 4.03(a) with respect to short term rentals in single family dwellings in the Marra
cases. In Marra v. Auburn Twp. Zoning Inspector, Geauga C.P. No. 19A000662 (May 11,
2020) (“Marra I”), the trial court addressed a property owner’s administrative appeal from
the Board of Zoning Appeals (“BZA”). In that case, the owner of a single family dwelling
in an R-2 district rented her home to others on Airbnb and VRBO. The zoning inspector
notified the property owner that the use of the property for temporary lodging was not
permitted under the ATZR. Marra I. The property owner appealed the zoning inspector’s
determination to the BZA, which denied her request to overturn the zoning inspector’s
determination. Id. The property owner then appealed to the trial court pursuant to R.C.
Ch. 2506. Marra I. The trial court determined that, in an R-2 district the ATZR “does not
permit use of a single family home to provide temporary lodging to the public for a fee.”
Marra I. The trial court therefore affirmed the decision of the BZA. Id.
{¶16} The landowner appealed the trial court’s judgment in Marra v. Auburn Twp.
Zoning Inspector, 2020-Ohio-6678, ¶ 1 (11th Dist.) (“Marra II”). In Marra II, this court
concluded that the property owner did not establish that the use of her home for short
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term rentals was a permitted use. Id. at ¶ 37. Accordingly, we affirmed the decision of the
trial court. Id. at ¶ 38.
{¶17} While Marra II was on appeal to this court, the Board enacted 5.05(b) of the
ATZR, which states:
Short term rental of a dwelling, in whole or in part, involving
transient occupancy for thirty (30) consecutive days or less by
persons other than the owner for which the owner receives
monetary compensation pursuant to a rental agreement shall
be prohibited. This shall not apply to a bed and breakfast for
which a conditional zoning certificate has been issued as set
forth in this Resolution.
{¶18} Thereafter, the Board brought an action for injunctive relief against the
Marra property owner in Auburn Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. Marra, Geauga C.P. No.
21M000174 (Sept. 15, 2022) (“Marra III”). The Board maintained that the property owner
continued to utilize the property for short term rentals in violation of the ATZR. Marra III.
The property owner filed an answer and counterclaim. Id. Although she did not seek
declaratory judgment, the property owner did seek damages and an injunction for four
alleged constitutional violations. Id. On the Board’s motion for summary judgment, the
trial court concluded that the property owner’s claims were “barred by both res judicata
and facts in the record.” Id. Included in its discussion, the trial court determined that the
Board was entitled to summary judgment on the property owner’s claims that the
prohibition on short term rental of her property violated her due process rights and on her
claim that ATZR 5.05(b) violated the property owner’s equal protection rights. Id.
{¶19} In the present case, the Board relied on the Marra decisions in support of
its motion for summary judgment, and the trial court discussed the Marra decisions in its
February 28, 2025 judgment entry, under a heading labeled “stare decisis.” The trial court
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determined that it had previously found the ATZR constitutional when faced with the same
constitutional challenges raised by the Sedenskys.
{¶20} In their first assigned error, the Sedenskys maintain that the trial court
improperly applied stare decisis because the Marra cases were “determined on issues
distinct from those offered for consideration by the Sedenskys[’] claim for declaratory
judgment.”
{¶21} “The doctrine of stare decisis requires a court to recognize and follow an
established legal decision in subsequent cases in which the question of law is again in
controversy.” See New Riegel Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Buehrer Group
Architecture & Eng., Inc., 2019-Ohio-2851, ¶ 18, citing Clark v. Snapper Power Equip.,
Inc., 21 Ohio St.3d 58, 60 (1986).
{¶22} The Sedenskys maintain that the following constitutional questions were in
controversy which were not decided in the Marra cases: whether the definition of “family”
as contained in ATZR 2.02, and thus incorporated in ATZR 4.03(b) through application of
ATZR 4.03(k), is unconstitutional on its face; and whether ATZR 5.05(b) violates equal
protection of the law by treating landlords who rent their properties on a short term basis
differently than those who rent their properties for longer durations.
{¶23} We agree with the Sedenskys to the extent that the Marra decisions were
not procedurally on point with the present case and did not address the same
constitutional challenges as those raised by the Sedenskys. Marra I was an administrative
appeal from the BZA’s determination, and the trial court’s decision did not reach any
constitutional issues. Marra II involved an appeal to this court from the judgment issued
in Marra I, and this court did not decide any constitutional issues. In Marra III, although
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the trial court addressed certain constitutional issues raised by the property owner in her
counterclaim for an injunction, those constitutional challenges were not the same as those
raised in the present case.
{¶24} Therefore, the trial court erred in concluding that the Marra cases addressed
the same constitutional challenges as those advanced in the present case. However,
“‘[p]erhaps the most basic rule of appellate procedure is that “in order to secure reversal
of a judgment, [appellants] must not only show some error but must also show that that
error was prejudicial to [them].”’” State ex rel. Yost v. FirstEnergy Corp., 2024-Ohio-101,
¶ 36, quoting State v. Haynes, 2022-Ohio-4473, ¶ 38 (DeWine, J., dissenting), quoting
Smith v. Flesher, 12 Ohio St.2d 107, 110 (1967).
{¶25} Here, prior to, and independent of, its discussion of the Marra cases in the
February 28, 2025 judgment entry, the trial court addressed the Sedenskys’ constitutional
challenges. Therein, the trial court concluded that the zoning regulations were reasonable
and advanced the government’s legitimate interests, which included preserving the rural
character of the township. The trial court held that the Sedenskys “failed their burden to
prove unconstitutionality beyond fair debate.”
{¶26} The trial court then went on to discuss the Marra cases “[i]rrespective of”
the discussion of the Sedenskys’ challenges. Accordingly, the trial court considered the
Sedenskys’ counterclaims independent of the Marra decisions. Given that the trial court
considered the Sedenskys’ constitutional challenges on the merits, we cannot discern
how the trial court’s separate reliance on the Marra cases for application of stare decisis
resulted in prejudice to the Sedenskys.
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{¶27} In the Board’s answer brief, it also stresses that the trial court’s judgment
did not solely rely on the Marra decisions but, instead, addressed the constitutional issues
relevant to the Sedenskys’ counterclaim.
{¶28} In their reply brief, the Sedenskys maintain that the trial court was precluded
from entering judgment on the merits of the declaratory judgment claim at the summary
judgment stage of proceedings, and they argue that the trial court’s language indicates
that it improperly weighed the evidence in determining that the ATZR was constitutional.
{¶29} However, the Sedenskys did not assign any error or present any argument
in their appellant’s brief that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment to the
Board on their counterclaims; that the Board failed to meet its initial burden of
demonstrating that no triable issue remained as to the Sedenskys’ counterclaims; that the
Sedenskys met their reciprocal burden of establishing a triable issue remained as to the
counterclaims; or that the trial court impermissibly weighed evidence in favor of the Board
when granting its motion for summary judgment. To the extent that the Sedenskys attempt
to raise such arguments in their reply brief, we will not review such arguments, as “[a]n
appellant may not use a reply brief to raise new issues or assignments of error.” (Citation
omitted.) Oko v. Lake Erie Corr. Inst., 2010-Ohio-2821, ¶ 15, fn. 1 (11th Dist.).
{¶30} Accordingly, because the Sedenskys have not established prejudice
resulting from the trial court’s error in relying on the Marra decisions, their first assigned
error lacks merit.
{¶31} In their second assigned error, the Sedenskys maintain that, because the
trial court improperly relied on the Marra cases, a live controversy exists regarding the
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constitutionality of the ATZR, and thus its claim for declaratory judgment should not have
been dismissed.
{¶32} While we agree that “dismissal” of the declaratory judgment claim was not
warranted, the trial court resolved the controversy by determining that the Sedenskys had
not met their burden of establishing that the ATZR was unconstitutional, and, as
discussed above, its judgment in this regard was independent of its reliance on the Marra
cases. Thus, the trial court entered judgment on the merits with respect to the declaratory
judgment counterclaim, and its later statement that the declaratory judgment counterclaim
was “dismissed” was harmless. See Weyandt, 112 Ohio App.3d at 721.
{¶33} Therefore, the Sedenskys’ second assigned error lacks merit.
{¶34} The judgment is affirmed.
ROBERT J. PATTON, P.J.,
MATT LYNCH, J.,
concur.
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Case No. 2025-G-0012
JUDGMENT ENTRY
For the reasons stated in the opinion of this court, appellants’ assignments of error
lack merit. It is the judgment and order of this court that the judgment of the Geauga
County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Costs to be taxed against appellants.
JUDGE EUGENE A. LUCCI
PRESIDING JUDGE ROBERT J. PATTON,
concurs
JUDGE MATT LYNCH,
concurs
THIS DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY
A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate
pursuant to Rule 27 of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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