Boothe

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

RORY BOOTHE; ANDRE ANTROBUS,

Plaintiffs,

25-CV-3210 (KMW)

-against-

BOARD OF EDUCATION NYS; NEW YORK ORDER OF DISMISSAL

CITY,

Defendants.

KIMBA M. WOOD, United States District Judge:

Rory Boothe and Andre Antrobus, proceeding pro se, are currently incarcerated at the

George R. Vierno Center on Rikers Island. Plaintiffs bring this action claiming federal question

jurisdiction, asserting a “fraud” claim. By order dated August 21, 2025, ECF No. 5, the Court

granted Plaintiff Rory Boothe’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without

prepayment of fees.1 For the following reasons, the complaint is dismissed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought

by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a

governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s IFP

complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune

from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been

granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

(2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the Court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

BACKGROUND

The following facts are drawn from the complaint.2 According to Boothe and Antrobus,

the events underlying this matter occurred in New York City, at P.S. 181, John Dewey High

School, George Westinghouse, “from 1970 to 1975, 1975 to 1980, 1980 to 1985, 1990 to ?”

(ECF 1 at 5.) Boothe and Antrobus appear to allege that Defendants committed “[f]raud and mis

representation,” and “operat[ed] prejudicially” in providing them with an education. According

to the complaint, Defendants “frauded the people long enough” that “Christopher Columbus

discovered America lies (Alkehulan people did)”; that “Ben Franklin discovered electricity

(Alkehulan people did)”; that “tom Edison invented the light bulb lies more examples of

deception, trickery and fraud that harmed the people”; that an “apple a day keeps the doctor

away (even small amounts of arsenic makes you doltish and cognitive defects)”; that drinking

“water keeps you Healthy (with Flouride in the water for over a century to 2025 gives cognitive

defects)”; that “[d]ifferent races as in spanish, Chinese and etc (one race of Humanoids which

Black D-N-A is in everyone that’s human)”; and that the “Alamo to etc. History of America is a

illusion a fraud.” (Id.)

In the “Injuries” section of the form complaint, Boothe and Antrobus assert “emotional

distress, mental anguish, prejudice injury to Brains cognitive skills.” (Id. at 6.) Plaintiffs seek

250,000,000,000 dollars in damages. (Id. at 6.)

2 The Court quotes from the complaint verbatim. All spelling, grammar, and punctuation

appear as in the complaint unless noted otherwise.

DISCUSSION

A. Andre Antrobus

To proceed with a civil action in this Court, a prisoner must either pay $405.00 in fees –-

a $350.00 filing fee plus a $55.00 administrative fee –- or request authorization to proceed

without prepayment of fees bysubmitting a signed IFP application and a prisoner authorization.

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1914, 1915. In addition, Rule 11(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

provides that “[e]very pleading, written motion, and other paper must be signed by at least one

attorney of record in the attorney’s name – or by a party personally if the party is unrepresented.”

The Supreme Court has interpreted Rule 11(a) to require “as it did in John Hancock’s day, a

name handwritten (or a mark handplaced).” Becker v. Montgomery, 532 U.S. 757, 764 (2001).

Antrobus, who is listed as a plaintiff in the caption of the complaint, did not sign the

complaint form,pay the filing fees or seek leave to proceed IFP. Ordinarily, the Court would give

Antrobus an opportunity to cure these deficiencies. The Court declines to do so, however,

because Antrobus is barred, under the “three-strikes” provision of the Prison Litigation Reform

Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), from filing any new action IFP while he is a prisoner. See

Antrobus et al v. Dep’t of Corr., No. 24-CV-9474 (LTS) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2025) (listing

strikes).3

As discussed below, this complaint does not show that Antrobus is in imminent danger of

serious physical injury. Because Antrobus is barred from proceeding IFP, and has not alleged

3 Section 1915(g) provides that:

In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action . . . under this section if the prisoner has,

on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an

action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is

frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the

prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.

facts suggesting such imminent danger, the Court dismisses any claims filed on his behalf

without prejudice.

B. Rory Boothe

Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts “to

the resolution of cases and controversies.” Mahon v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 683 F.3d 59, 62 (2d

Cir. 2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Standing to sue or defend is an

aspect of the case-or-controversy requirement.” Arizonians for Off. Eng. v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43,

64 (1997). To demonstrate standing, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he or she has personally

suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the defendant’s alleged illegal conduct;

(2) the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct; and (3) the injury is likely to be

redressed by the requested relief. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Am. United for Separation of

Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982). The burden of establishing standing to sue rests

with the party or parties bringing the action. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561

(1992).

In the complaint, Boothe alleges that the public education system in New York City

committed “fraud” by spreading information he believes to be false. These assertions, however,

are not legal claims because they lack factual support demonstrating that a defendant caused

Boothe to suffer an actual injury that is redressable by a federal court. He therefore lacks

standing to bring this action, and consequently, the Court dismisses Boothe’s claims for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction. See Mahon, 683 F.3d at 62 (noting that where “plaintiffs lack Article

III standing, a court has no subject matter jurisdiction to hear their claim.” (citation omitted)).

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). An imminent danger is one “existing at the time the complaint is filed.”

Malik v. McGinnis, 293 F.3d 559, 563 (2d Cir. 2002). A danger “that has dissipated by the time a

complaint is filed” is not sufficient. Pettus v. Morgenthau, 554 F.3d 293, 296 (2d Cir. 2009).

C. Leave to amend denied

District courts generally grant a pro se plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to

cure its defects, but leave to amend is not required where it would be futile. See Hill v.

Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123–24 (2d Cir. 2011); Lucente v. Int’l Bus. Machines Corp., 310 F.3d

243, 258 (2d Cir. 2002). Because Plaintiffs cannot cure the defects in the complaint with an

amendment, the Court declines to grant Plaintiffs leave to amend the complaint.

CONCLUSION

The Court denies Andre Antrobus’s request to proceed IFP, and dismisses his claims

without prejudice under the PLRA’s “three-strikes” rule.4 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Antrobus

remains barred from filing any future action IFP while he is in custody, unless he is under

imminent threat of serious physical injury.5 Id.

The Court dismisses without prejudice claims set forth by Rory Boothe, under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a)(1), for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

4 Antrobus may commence a new action by paying the filing fee. If he does so, that

complaint will be reviewed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the Court to dismiss any

civil rights complaint from a prisoner if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune

from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

5 The Court may bar any vexatious litigant (including a nonprisoner) from filing future

actions (even if the filing fee is paid) without first obtaining leave from the Court. See In re

Martin-Trigona, 9 F.3d 226, 227-30 (2d Cir. 1993) (discussing sanctions courts may impose on

vexatious litigants, including “leave of court” requirement).

The Court certifies, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this Order would

not be taken in good faith, and, therefore, IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See

Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).

The Court directs the Clerk of Court to enter judgment dismissing this action.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 3, 2025

New York, New York

/s/Kimba M. Wood

KIMBA M. WOOD

United States District Judge