Cross

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

MICHAEL CROSS

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO: 25-01705

FLAGSTAR BANK, FSB; LAKEVIEW SECTION: T (2)

LOAN SERVICING, LLC;

NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE, LLC

d/b/a MR. COOPER; DEAN MORRIS,

LLC; FIRST AMERICAN

MORTGAGE SOLUTIONS, LLC; and

MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC

REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC.

(MERS)

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is a Motion to Remand filed by Plaintiff, Michael Cross. R. Doc. 14.

Defendants Dean Morris, LLC (“Dean Morris”), Lakeview Loan Servicing, LLC (“Lakeview”),

Nationstar Mortgage, LLC d/b/a Mr. Cooper (“Nationstar”), Flagstar Bank, N.A.1 (“Flagstar”),

and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) have submitted responses to

Plaintiff’s Motion, R. Doc 22; R. Doc. 23, and the Motion has been submitted to the Court.2 For

the following reasons, the Motion is GRANTED.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that, on September 15, 2017, he purchased a tract of immovable property

in Assumption Parish Louisiana with the municipal address 159 Patureau Drive, Morgan City,

1 Flagstar Bank, N.A. was erroneously named “Flagstar Bank, FSB” in Plaintiff’s original state court Petition. R.

Doc. 1, p. 1.

2 Defendant First American Mortgage Solutions, LLC (“First American”) has not submitted a response to Plaintiff’s

Motion to Remand.

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Louisiana 70308 (the “Property”). R. Doc. 1-2, p. 3. Plaintiff claims that despite purchasing the

Property with cash funds evidenced by a Cash Sale Deed recorded in Assumption Parish’s public

records, mortgage and promissory note documents that he had purportedly executed that same day

were recorded against the Property. R. Doc. 1-2, pp. 3-4. Plaintiff claims that each of the named

Defendants played a role in an alleged fraudulent mortgage scheme: Flagstar was the originating

lender, Lakeview is the current owner of the promissory note, Nationstar is the servicing agent,

MERS is the nominee mortgagee, First American is a “third-party document preparer/recorder

involved in the assignment(s),” and Dean Morris is the foreclosure counsel. R. Doc. 13, p. 4.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 6, 2025, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed his Petition for Declaratory Judgment,

Cancellation of Fraudulent Instruments, Quiet Title, and Damages against Defendants Flagstar,

Lakeview, Nationstar, Dean Morris, First American, and MERS. R. Doc. 1-2, p. 2. Plaintiff’s state

court Petition, initially filed in the Twenty-Third Judicial District Court for the Parish of

Assumption, Louisiana, alleges: (1) that the purported fraudulent mortgage scheme violates the

Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq.; the Real Estate Settlement Procedures

Act (“RESPA”), 12 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.; and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”),

15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.; and (2) that the alleged fabrication and recordation of mortgage and loan

documents violates several provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code and constitutes fraud,

conspiracy, and slander. R. Doc 1-2, pp. 4-8.

On August 19, 2025, Defendants Flagstar and MERS, with the consent of all other

Defendants, filed a timely notice of removal to this Court. R. Doc. 1, p. 1. Defendants argued that

this Court has original subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s TILA claim because it arises

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under the laws of the United States, thereby making it removable under federal statute. R. Doc. 1,

p. 3 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441(a)). Defendants further asserted that this Court has

supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state-law claims based on the same set of operative facts

that form the basis of the federal claims. R. Doc. 1, pp. 6-8.

On August 24, 2025, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, R. Doc. 13, along with a timely

Motion to Remand, R. Doc. 14. With the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff withdrew his federal law

claims and expressed his intent to “proceed[] exclusively under Louisiana law . . . and seek[] no

relief under any federal statute, including without limitation TILA (15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq.),

RESPA (12 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.), or the FDCPA (15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.).” R. Doc. 13, p. 3.

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint pursues claims for a declaratory judgment of nullity, cancellation

of void instruments, fraud and conspiracy, slander of title, and detrimental reliance, all under

Louisiana state law. R. Doc. 13, pp. 10-15.

Plaintiff argues in his Motion to Remand that (1) because he has withdrawn any federal

claims, remand is mandatory under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) and (2) removal was independently

defective under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) because Dean Morris, a Louisiana limited liability

company whose members are citizens of Louisiana, was a properly joined and served defendant

before removal. R. Doc. 13, pp. 1-3.

Defendants Dean Morris, Lakeview, and Nationstar responded to Plaintiff’s Motion,

stating that “if (and only if) this Honorable Court finds that the Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint

operates to fully withdraw and delete all federal claims in this case, Dean Morris, Lakeview, and

Nationstar agree that the Motion to Remand should be granted and this case remanded back to

state court.” R. Doc. 22, pp. 2-3. Defendants Flagstar and MERS “adopt[] the same position . . .

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and agree[] that this Court would lack subject matter jurisdiction if Plaintiff withdrew any and all

federal law claims or claims that would otherwise invoke this Court’s original jurisdiction.” R.

Doc. 23, p. 2.

III. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A defendant may remove a civil action filed in state court to a federal district court which

would have original jurisdiction over the same suit. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Federal courts are courts

of limited jurisdiction, possessing “only that power authorized by Constitution and statute, which

is not to be expanded by judicial decree.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S.

376, 377 (1994) (citing Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 136-37 (1992); Bender v.

Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986); Am. Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341

U.S. 6, 71 (1951)). Grounds for subject-matter jurisdiction in federal court include diversity

jurisdiction, which is granted in civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds $75,000 and

is between citizens of different states, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), and federal question jurisdiction, which

grants jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the

United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. “A suit most typically falls within that statutory grant ‘when

federal law creates the cause of action asserted.’” Royal Canin U. S. A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 602

U.S. 22, 26 (2025) (quoting Gunn v. Minton, 562 U.S. 251, 257 (2013)). “The presence or absence

of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’ which provides

that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the

plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)

(citing Gully v. First Nat’l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112-13 (1936)).

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Remand is proper if at any time the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §

1447(c). “Any ambiguities are construed against removal because the removal statute should be

strictly construed in favor of remand.” Manguno v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 276 F.3d

720, 723 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Acuna v. Brown & Root, Inc., 200 F.3d 335, 339 (5th Cir. 2000)).

Here, Plaintiff’s initial state court Petition asserted claims under federal law, namely, violations of

the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq.; the Real Estate Settlement

Procedures Act (“RESPA”), 12 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq.; and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act

(“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. R. Doc. 1-2, p. 2. Because federal law creates the causes of

action asserted, the Court had original jurisdiction over these claims at the time of removal.

Plaintiff argues that removal of the action to this Court was defective under 28 U.S.C. §

1441(b)(2) because Dean Morris, a Louisiana limited liability company whose members are

citizens of Louisiana, was a properly joined and served defendant before removal. R. Doc. 14, p.

3. This argument is without merit. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), which Plaintiff refers to in his argument,

allows for removal based on diversity subject-matter jurisdiction, not federal question jurisdiction.

The specific portion of the statute which Plaintiff claims makes removal improper reads, “A civil

action otherwise removable solely on the basis of the jurisdiction under section 1332(a) of this title

may not be removed if any of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a

citizen of the State in which such an action is brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) (emphasis added).

Clearly, this rule applies to cases removed solely based on diversity subject-matter jurisdiction.

Because Defendants removed the case pursuant to federal question subject-matter jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, this rule does not apply, and the fact that Dean Morris was properly joined

and served as a defendant has no bearing on the removal analysis.

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In addition to the purported violations of federal law, Plaintiff’s state court Petition asserts

multiple claims under Louisiana state law. R. Doc. 1-2, pp. 4-8. “[I]n any civil action of which the

district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction

over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that

they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.”

28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). For a district court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related state

law claims, “[t]he state and federal claims must derive from a common nucleus of operative fact.”

United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). Here, Plaintiff’s state law claims

and federal claims derive from a common nucleus of operative fact: the same factual allegations

supporting the state law claims for fraud, conspiracy, and slander (i.e., the purported fraudulent

mortgage scheme involving fabrication and recordation of mortgage documents) form the basis

for Plaintiff’s TILA claim. Therefore, this Court had supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s

state law claims at the time of removal.

However, Plaintiff’s subsequent filing of an Amended Complaint has changed the subject-

matter jurisdiction analysis. In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff withdrew all federal law claims

that formed the basis of this Court’s original jurisdiction. R. Doc. 13, p. 3. Thus, only the state law

claims, which were formerly subject to supplemental jurisdiction, remain. R. Doc. 13, pp. 3-16.

When a plaintiff amends her complaint to delete the federal law claims that enabled removal to a

federal court, leaving only the state law claims behind, the district court loses supplemental

jurisdiction over the state claims, and the case must be remanded to state court. Royal Canin U. S.

A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 601 U.S. 22, 43-44 (2025) (“Regardless of removal, the plaintiff’s

excision of her federal-law claims deprives the district court of its authority to decide the state-law

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claims remaining.”). Accordingly, this Court no longer has jurisdiction over the remaining state

claims, and these claims must be remanded to state court.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Remand filed by Plaintiff, Michael Cross, is

GRANTED.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 24th day of October 2025.

\~ GERARD GUIDRY “|

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE