McLemore

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

IY BY HER PARENT CIVIL ACTION

BRITTANY McLEMORE

NO. 25-1042

VERSUS

SECTION M (5)

BOGALUSA CITY SCHOOL

DISTRICT, et al.

ORDER & REASONS

Before the Court is the motion of plaintiff IY, by her parent Brittany McLemore, to

reconsider this Court’s August 12, 2025 Order & Reasons ruling on defendants’ motion to dismiss

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1 In the August 12 order, this

Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss as to: (1) all of plaintiffs’ claims against the

Bogalusa City School District; (2) plaintiff’s Title IX claims against all defendants; (3) plaintiff’s

procedural due process and equal protection claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all

defendants; (4) plaintiff’s § 1983 substantive due process and improper search claims against

Byron Hurst and Karla McGehee in their individual capacities; and (5) plaintiff’s § 1983

substantive due process and improper search claims against the Bogalusa City School Board, and

those against Hurst, McGehee, and Eddie Walker in their official capacities.2 The Court denied

the motion as to plaintiff’s § 1983 substantive due process and improper search claims against

Walker in his individual capacity.3 Plaintiff, invoking Rules 50, 52, 59, and 60 of the Federal

1 R. Doc. 30 (referencing R. Doc. 25). Plaintiff titles the documents “Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration,

Vacate and Set Aside, Alteration, Amendment, Relief from Judgment, or Alternatively Grant a New Trial and

Memorandum of Law to Support.” Id.

2 R. Doc. 25.

3 Id. Walker filed an answer, joining issue, and a scheduling conference has been scheduled. See R. Docs.

28; 31.

Rules of Civil Procedure and without citing any new evidence or arguments, urges that

reconsideration is warranted because, in her view, the defendants violated Title IX and IY’s

constitutional rights to procedural and substantive due process, to equal protection, and to be free

from improper search.4 Plaintiff also seeks reconsideration of this Court’s August 14, 2025 Order

denying as moot her motion to strike and motion for entry of default, arguing that those motions

were timely filed and should have been granted.5

Defendants respond in opposition, arguing that reconsideration is not warranted under any

of the rules cited by plaintiff, because most of those rules are inapplicable and plaintiff does not

present any new arguments that call into question the Court’s ruling.6 Defendants also argue that

the Court properly denied plaintiff’s motion to strike and motion for entry of default.7

As defendants point out, the rules under which plaintiff seeks reconsideration – Rules 50,

52, 59, and 60 – are inapplicable. This Court’s August 12 Order & Reasons was an interlocutory

order that did not result in a final judgment or disposition of the case. Motions for reconsideration

of interlocutory orders are governed by Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under

that rule, a “court is free to reconsider and reverse its decision for any reason it deems sufficient,

even in the absence of new evidence or an intervening change in or clarification of the substantive

law.” Austin v. Kroger Tex., L.P., 864 F.3d 326, 336 (5th Cir. 2017) (quotation omitted). Rule

54(b) “‘reflect[s] the inherent power of the rendering district court to afford such relief from

interlocutory judgments as justice requires.’” Id. at 337 (quoting Cobell v. Jewell, 802 F.3d 12,

25 (D.C. Cir. 2015)) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, the district court must exercise

this broad discretion sparingly to forestall the perpetual reexamination of orders and the resulting

4 R. Doc. 30.

5 Id. (referencing R. Doc. 27).

6 R. Doc. 32.

7 Id.

burdens and delays. See Calpecto 1981 v. Marshall Expl., Inc., 989 F.2d 1408, 1415 (5th Cir.

1993) (observing that if “the district court was required to reconsider [an interlocutory order]

simply because [the losing party] belatedly came forward with evidence not submitted prior to the

ruling[,] ... the cycle of reconsideration would be never-ending”); Domain Prot., LLC v. Sea Wasp,

LLC, 2019 WL 3933614, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 20, 2019) (“[A]lthough a district court may revisit

an interlocutory order on any ground it sees fit, it may also use its discretion to prevent parties

from, without justification, raising new arguments for the first time.”) (emphasis, alterations, and

quotation omitted); 18B CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER,

FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4478.1 (3d ed. 2019) (“A trial court could not operate if it

were to yield to every request to reconsider each of the multitude of rulings that may be made

between filing and final judgment.”).

Plaintiff has not presented any arguments or evidence in connection with her motion for

reconsideration that would establish that defendants’ motion to dismiss should have been denied

on the claims as to which it was granted. She merely reurges the same arguments and points to

the same evidence thoroughly considered in connection with this Court’s original ruling on the

motion to dismiss. Thus, the motion does not warrant reconsideration. Further, plaintiff has not

demonstrated that this Court erred in denying as moot her motion to strike the motion to dismiss.

Because the motion to strike was filed after the Court ruled on the motion to dismiss, the motion

to strike was indeed rendered moot.8 Moreover, even assuming that defendants’ motion to dismiss

was untimely filed, the clerk of court had not yet entered default when this Court ruled on

8 R. Doc. 27 (citing R. Docs. 17; 26). Plaintiff states that she was not given the opportunity to respond to

“defendants[’] untimely filed August 06, 2025 filing.” R. Doc. 30 at 2 (referencing R. Doc. 23). The referenced filing

was defendants’ reply memorandum in support of their motion to dismiss. R. Doc. 23. Local Rule 7.5 allows for the

filing of a reply memorandum, but the Local Rules do not automatically permit the filing of a surreply. Thus, plaintiff

would have had to seek leave of court to file a surreply, which she did not do. A pro se litigant, like plaintiff, is not

exempt from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law. Birl v. Estelle, 660 F.2d 592, 593 (5th

Cir. 1981).

defendants’ motion to dismiss. The Fifth Circuit has explained that “even in the face of a technical

default, such as when a party files its first responsive pleading late, a movant is not entitled to a

default judgment as a matter of right.” Bloom v. Mem’l Hermann Hosp. Sys., 653 F. App’x 804,

805 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing Ganther v. Ingle, 75 F.3d 207, 212 (5th Cir. 1996)). Thus, this Court

properly found that plaintiff’s motion for entry of default was rendered moot.

Accordingly, having considered the parties’ memoranda, the record, and the applicable

law, and for the foregoing reasons,

IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion to reconsider (R. Doc. 30) is DENIED.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 24th day of October, 2025.

________________________________

BARRY W. ASHE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE