SPENCE-WHITE

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

CAMDEN VICINAGE

TAMMI S.W.

Plaintiff,

v. Civil No. 1:24-cv-09889 (RMB)

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL OPINION

SECURITY,

Defendant.

APPEARANCES

Samuel Fishman

Chermol & Fishman, LLC

11450 Bustleton Avenue

Philadelphia, PA 19116

On behalf of Plaintiff

Catherine Elisabeth Hamilton

Special Assistant U.S. Attorney

c/o Social Security Administration

Office of Program Litigation, Office 3

Office of the General Counsel

6401 Security Boulevard

Baltimore, MD 21235

On behalf of Defendant

RENÉE MARIE BUMB, Chief United States District Judge

This matter comes before the Court upon an appeal filed by Plaintiff Tammi

S.W. (“Plaintiff”) seeking judicial review of the final determination of the

Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (the “SSA”), which denied her

application for Social Security Disability benefits. For the reasons set forth herein, the

Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 31, 2021, Plaintiff filed an application for Social Security Disability

benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act (the “Act”), alleging an onset date of

disability beginning March 11, 2021. [R. at 17.] The claim was first denied on January

18, 2022, and again denied upon reconsideration on June 28, 2022. [Id.]

Plaintiff filed a timely written request for a hearing before an ALJ. [Id.] That

hearing took place on June 28, 2022. [Id.] Plaintiff was represented by an attorney at

the hearing at which the ALJ heard testimony from Plaintiff. [Id.] The ALJ also heard

testimony from a vocational expert, Cherie Plante. [Id.] The ALJ issued her decision

on February 6, 2024, finding that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Act. [See infra at

III.B.] On August 22, 2024, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s renewed request

for review, rendering the ALJ’s decision final. [R. at 1-3.] Plaintiff now seeks this

Court’s review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing a final decision of an ALJ with regard to disability benefits, a

court must uphold the ALJ’s factual decisions if they are supported by “substantial

evidence.” Knepp v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 2000); 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g),

1383(c)(3). “Substantial evidence” means “‘more than a mere scintilla. It means such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.’” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Cons. Edison Co.

v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999).

In addition to the “substantial evidence” inquiry, the court must also determine

whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards. See Friedberg v. Schweiker, 721 F.2d

445, 447 (3d Cir. 1983); Sykes v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 259, 262 (3d Cir. 2000). The Court’s

review of legal issues is plenary. Sykes, 228 F.3d at 262 (citing Schaudeck v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec., 181 F.3d 429, 431 (3d Cir. 1999)).

The Social Security Act defines “disability” as the inability “to engage in any

substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental

impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be

expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. §

1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act further states,

[A]n individual shall be determined to be under a disability only if his

physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that

he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his

age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of

substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless

of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or

whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired

if he applied for work.

42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).

The Commissioner has promulgated a five-step, sequential analysis for

evaluating a claimant’s disability, as outlined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i–v). The

analysis proceeds as follows:

At step one, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is performing

“substantial gainful activity[.]” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i),

416.920(a)(4)(i). If he is, he is not disabled. Id. Otherwise, the ALJ moves

on to step two.

At step two, the ALJ considers whether the claimant has any “severe

medically determinable physical or mental impairment” that meets

certain regulatory requirements. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii),

416.920(a)(4)(ii). A “severe impairment” is one that “significantly limits

[the claimant’s] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.”

Id. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If the claimant lacks such an impairment,

he is not disabled. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). If he has

such an impairment, the ALJ moves on to step three.

At step three, the ALJ decides “whether the claimant’s impairments

meet or equal the requirements of an impairment listed in the

regulations.” [Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 632, 634 (3d Cir.

2010)]. If the claimant’s impairments do, he is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If they do not, the ALJ moves on

to step four.

At step four, the ALJ assesses the claimant’s “residual functional

capacity” (“RFC”) and whether he can perform his “past relevant

work.” Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). A claimant’s “[RFC]

is the most [he] can still do despite [his] limitations.” Id. §§

404.1545(a)(1), 416.945(a)(1). If the claimant can perform his past

relevant work despite his limitations, he is not disabled. Id. §§

404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If he cannot, the ALJ moves on to

step five.

At step five, the ALJ examines whether the claimant “can make an

adjustment to other work[,]” considering his “[RFC,] ... age, education,

and work experience.” Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 416.920(a)(4)(v). That

examination typically involves “one or more hypothetical questions

posed by the ALJ to [a] vocational expert.” Podedworny v. Harris, 745

F.2d 210, 218 (3d Cir. 1984). If the claimant can make an adjustment

to other work, he is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v),

416.920(a)(4)(v). If he cannot, he is disabled.

Hess v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198 201–02 (3d Cir. 2019) (some alterations

omitted).

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Court recites only the facts that are necessary to its determination on

appeal, which is narrow. Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since

the alleged onset date; March 11, 2021. [R. at 19.] Plaintiff met the insured status

requirements of the Act through December 31, 2025, meaning that she had to establish

disability on or before that date to be entitled to benefits. [Id.]

A. Plaintiff’s Educational Work, and Medical History

Plaintiff has at least a high school education and previously worked as a home

attendant. [R. at 31.] The ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial

gainful activity between the alleged onset date and the date Plaintiff was last insured.

[R. at 19.] Plaintiff suffers from the following physical impairments: fibromyalgia,

degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine, asthma, diabetes mellitus, and

tendinopathy with tear of her left shoulder rotator cuff. [R. at 20.] Plaintiff suffers from

the following mental impairments: major depressive disorder and generalized anxiety

disorder. [Id.]

B. The ALJ’s Decision

At Step One, the ALJ found that plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful

activity since the alleged onset date of disability; March 11, 2021. [R. at 19.]

At Step Two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from the following severe

impairments: fibromyalgia, degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine, asthma,

diabetes mellitus, and tendinopathy with tear of her left shoulder rotator cuff. [R. at

20.] However, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s major depressive disorder and generalized

anxiety disorder were not severe. [Id.]

At Step Three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not suffer an impairment or

combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of any Listing.

[R. at 21-22.]

At Step Four, the ALJ found that, during the relevant period, Plaintiff had the

RFC

to perform light work as defined in 20 [§ C.F.R.] 404.1567(b) except that

she must avoid concentrated exposure to extreme heat, extreme cold,

extreme humidity, dust, odors, fumes or other pulmonary irritants;

cannot lift and/or carry any weight with the left, non-dominant upper

extremity; can never reach overhead or in any direction with the left,

upper extremity; cannot climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds or crawl, but

can occasionally climb stairs and ramps, balance, stoop, kneel and

crouch; can occasionally work with moving mechanical parts and

vibrations, but cannot drive a motor vehicle or work with unprotected

heights.

[R. at 23-24.] The ALJ further found that Plaintiff could not perform any past relevant

work. [R. at 31.]

At Step Five, the ALJ found that there were other jobs existing in significant

numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform, considering her age,

education, work experience, and RFC. [Id.] Crediting testimony of the vocational

expert, the ALJ found that Plaintiff would be able to perform the requirements of

representative occupations such as: cashier II, ticket seller, and order caller. [R. at 31-

32.] Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled. [R. at 32.]

IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff raises four arguments in support of remand. First, she argues that the

SSA failed to satisfy its burden under Step Five in violation of Social Security Ruling

(“SSR”) 00-4p by failing to obtain vocational evidence. Second, she argues that the

ALJ failed to account for her cervical functional limitations that were identified by the

consultative examiner, Dr Juan Carlos Cornejo. Third, she argues the ALJ failed to

account for her mental functional limitations. Finally, she asserts that the ALJ’s

decision facially violated SSR 96-8p.

A. The ALJ’s Failure to Satisfy the Burden Imposed by Step 5 by Not

Obtaining Vocational Evidence.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to address and resolve the conflicts between

the vocational expert and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) as two of

the jobs listed, cashier II and order caller, require frequent reaching. [Pl.’s Br. at 3.]

The SSA argues that the ALJ was aware of Plaintiff’s physical limitations as testified

to by the vocational expert and determined there to be no conflict. [Def. Br. at 5-6.]

The DOT defines Cashier II as

Receives cash from customers or employees in payment for goods or

services and records amounts received: Recomputes or computes bill,

itemized lists, and tickets showing amount due, using adding machine or

cash register. Makes change, cashes checks, and issues receipts or tickets

to customers. Records amounts received and prepares reports of

transactions. Reads and records totals shown on cash register tape and

verifies against cash on hand. May be required to know value and

features of items for which money is received. [M]ay give cash refunds

or issue credit memorandums to customers for returned merchandise.

May operate ticket-dispensing machine. [M]ay operate cash register with

peripheral electronic data processing equipment by passing individual

price coded items across electronic scanner to record price, compile

printed list, and display cost of customer purchase, tax, and rebates on

monitor screen. May sell candy, cigarettes, gum, and gift certificates, and

issue trading stamps. May be designated according to nature of

establishment . . . .

[DOT #211.462-010.] Order Caller is defined as

Reads items listed on order sheets to LABORER, STORES (any

industry) who gathers and assembles items or to BILLING TYPIST

(clerical) who prepares bills for items. Indicates on order sheets items

located and items that are not available. May read items to CHECKER

(clerical) I who examines articles prior to shipping. May be designated by

kind of data called out to other worker[s] . . . .

[DOT #209.667-014.] Ticket Seller is defined as

Sells tickets for travel on ferryboats, street railroads, buses, and for

admission to places of entertainment, such as skating rinks, baseball

parks, stadiums, and amusement parks: Depresses key on ticket-

dispensing machine that automatically ejects number of tickets requested

by patron or tears tickets from roll and hands ticket to patron. Accepts

payment and makes change. Answers questions concerning fares, routes,

schedules, and reservations, and gives information concerning coming

attractions. Keeps daily balance sheet of cash received and tickets sold.

May fill reservations for seats by telephone or mail. May sell tickets from

box office and be designated Cashier, Box Office (amuse. & rec.). May

collect fares from repeat riders at amusement park and be designated

Second-Ride-Fare Collector (amuse. & rec.). May collect fares from

railroad passengers at station and sell commuter tickets and be designated

Station Agent . . . .

[DOT #211.467-030.]

None of these definitions are indicative of a frequent reaching requirement for

Plaintiff’s nondominant, left arm. [Pl. Br. at 3, and R. at 23-24.] During the vocational

expert’s testimony, Plaintiff’s counsel inquired if a person without full use of their left

arm could performed the listed jobs, which the expert responded affirmatively so long

as they retained full use of their right arm. [R. at 46.] Nowhere is there a finding that

Plaintiff has any mobility limitations of her dominate, right arm. Plaintiff herself

testified to the ability of using her left arm with the assistance of her right. [R. at 59.]

Further, the vocational expert identified other potential conflicts between the

occupations as listed in the DOT and provided explanations how they were identified

and resolved. [R. at 44-46.] Therefore, the ALJ obtained the necessary vocational

evidence required in determining Plaintiff’s ability to perform occupations listed in the

DOT. See Diehl v. Barnhart, 357 F.Supp.2d 804, 822 (E.D.Pa. 2005) (Finding no

conflict to exist when a Plaintiff can “satisfy the requirements of the job by reaching,

handling, and fingering with his left hand with occasional assistance from his right

hand.”); SSR 00-49, 2000 WL 1898704.

B. The ALJ’s Failure to Account for Plaintiff’s Cervical Range of Motion

Limitations.

Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ failed to consider the significant limitations

Plaintiff’s lack of cervical range imposed upon her ability to perform light work. [Pl.

Br. at 8-9.] The SSA argues that the ALJ did, in fact, thoroughly address why Plaintiff

did not require her cervical range of motion limitations to be considered. [Def. Br. at

6.]

“During step three, the ALJ compares the medical evidence of a claimant's

impairments with those listed in the Impairment List, which are presumed severe

enough to preclude any gainful work.” Kenneth S. v. O’Malley, 2025 WL 866008, at *6

(D.N.J. March 19, 2025) (citing Holley v. Colvin, 975 F.Supp. 2d 467, 476 (D.N.J.

2013)). Listings included in the Impairment List “are descriptions of various physical

and mental illnesses and abnormalities, most of which are categorized by the body

system they affect . . . [and are] defined in terms of several specific medical signs,

symptoms, or laboratory test results.” Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 529-30 (1990).

To establish that a claimant’s impairment “matches a listing, it must meet all of the

specified medical criteria. An impairment that manifests only some of those criteria,

no matter how severely, does not qualify.” Id. at 530.

ALJ’s need not “use particular language or adhere to a particular format in

conducting [their] analysis.” Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 505 (3d. Cir. 2004).

Rather, they must “ensure that there is sufficient development of the record and

explanation of findings to permit meaningful review.” Id. (citing Burnett v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d 112, 119-20 (3d. Cir. 2000)). Further, “[a]n ALJ’s decision

at step three need not address every single piece of medical evidence in the record.”

Kenneth S., 2025 WL 866008, at *7.

Here, the Court finds substantial evidence in support of the ALJ’s step three

determination as they made specific findings and cited to specific evidence in finding

the severity of Plaintiff’s cervical spine impairment as applied to the Impairment List.

The relevant listing is Listing 1.15 (disorders of the skeletal spine resulting in

compromise of a nerve root(s)). This Listing requires a showing of

pain, paresthesia and/or muscle fatigue; Radicular distribution of

neurological signs present during physical examination or on a diagnostic

test and evidenced by muscle weakness, sign(s) of nerve root irritation,

tension, or compression, consistent with compromise of the affected

nerve root and sensory changes evidenced by decreased sensation or

sensory nerve deficit . . . on electrodiagnostic testing or decreased deep

tendon reflexes; Findings on imaging consistent with compromise of a

nerve root(s) in the cervical . . . spine; and Impairment-related physical

limitation of musculoskeletal functioning that has lasted . . . for a

continuous period of at least [twelve] months, and medical

documentation of at least one of the following: a documented medical

need for a walker, bilateral canes, or bilateral crutches or a wheeled and

seated mobility device involving the use of both hands; an inability to use

one upper extremity to independently initiate, sustain and complete

work-related activities involving fine and gross movements, and a

documented medical need for a one-handed, hand-held assistive device

that requires the use of the other upper extremity or a wheeled and seated

mobility device involving the use of one hand; and/or an inability to use

bot upper extremities to the extent that neither can be used to

independently initiate, sustain, and complete work-related activities

involving fine and gross movements.

[R. at 21-22 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.15).] The ALJ’s determination clearly

acknowledges that the diagnostic evidence produced by Plaintiff “showed

degenerative changes of the cervical spine with four large protrusion herniations,” it

did not show any “evidence of nerve root compromise.” [R. at 22, 359-59, 675, 683.]

Additionally, Plaintiff failed to produce any evidence of a documented medical need

for an assistive device, which is required by the listing. 20 C.F.R. § 404.15(d)(1). Thus,

the ALJ did not fail to account for Plaintiff’s cervical spine impairment, but rather

properly found that Plaintiff did not satisfy all criteria of the listing to qualify as

impaired. Sullivan, 493 U.S. at 530.

C. The ALJ’s Failure to Account for Plaintiff’s Mental Functional

Limitations.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to account for its Step Two findings of

mental functional limitations in her RFC determination. [Pl. Br. at 12.] The SSA

asserts that no mental functional limitations were established by the record and

therefore did not require consideration in the final determination. [Def. Br. at 11.]

RFC “is defined as that which an individual is still able to do despite the

limitations caused by [their] impairment(s).” Burnett, 220 F.3d at 121 (quoting

Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 359 n. 1 (3d Cir.1999)); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)

(“Your [RFC] is the most you can still do despite your limitations.”). The ALJ must

consider “all the relevant evidence in [the] case record” when determining an

individual's RFC. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a); see also Burnett, 220 F.3d at 121. Such

evidence includes “medical records, observations made during formal medical

examinations, descriptions of limitations by the claimant and others, and observations

of the claimant's limitations by others.” Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 41 (3d

Cir.2001). The ALJ’s determination must be “accompanied by a clear and satisfactory

explication of the basis on which it rests.” Id. at 41 (quoting Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d

700, 704 (3d Cir.1981)).

In the present instance, the ALJ conducted a thorough analysis, reaching a

conclusion unfavorable to Plaintiff. [R. at 25, 28-29.] In Plaintiff’s RFC analysis, the

ALJ noted that Plaintiff declined treatment with a mental health professional and was

not engaged in counseling, rather choosing to receive her mental health treatment from

her primary care provider. [R. at 28-29, 54-66, 427, 1240-42, 1384.] Plaintiff testified

that “she requires no reminders to tend to her personal care needs or take her

medications and she is capable of handling her own finances.” She further stated, “she

is able to shower, dress, and prepare herself for the day [and] . . . follow directions well

and pay attention for long periods.” [Id. at 28, 221-22, 225.]

Therefore, Plaintiff’s assertion that “the ALJ included precisely zero mental

functional limitations in her RFC finding” is contrary to the record. [Pl. Br. at 12.]

Rather, the ALJ identified conflicting areas of testimony as pertained to Plaintiff’s mild

mental impairments while considering “all the relevant evidence in [the] case record”

when determining her final RFC. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a).

Plaintiff also argues that she is precluded from the occupations of cashier II and

ticket seller due to the significant amount of social interaction required, resulting in

only 11,037 jobs available in the national economy. [Pl. Br. at 13 (citing R. at 32).]

This argument is baseless as this Court found that the ALJ did consider Plaintiff’s

mental limitations when determining her RFC which the vocational expert concluded

her able to perform the requirements of more than 470,000 jobs in the national

economy. [R. at 25-32]; see Hess, 931 F.3d at 210 (“[T]he functional limitation findings

do not dictate the terms of the ALJ’s statement of the claimant’s limitation in the final

analytical steps.”); Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 554 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[T]he ALJ

must accurately convey to the vocational expert of all of claimant’s credibly established

limitations.”).

D. SSR 96-8p.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s determination is legally defective as it “failed to

indicate with specificity the claimant’s functional abilities with respect to each

individual physical activity such as lifting, standing, walking, and sitting.” [Pl. Br. at

15.] This is not so. The language of SSR 96-8p “does not command ALJs to make

specific, written findings on dozens of individual work function categories.” Bencivengo

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 251 F.3d 153 (table), slip op. at *6 available at 2000 U.S. App.

LEXIS 38785, 2000 WL 1929759 (3d Cir. Dec. 19, 2000 (citing SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL

374184, at *7). Rather, “the ALJ need only articulate how the evidence in the record

supports the RFC determination, discuss the claimant’s ability to perform sustained

work-related activities, and explain the resolution of any inconsistences in the record.

Id. at *6-7.

Here, the ALJ provided a thorough narrative discussion of the medical

evidence, explaining which evidence they relied upon for Plaintiff’s RFC

determination. [R. at 23-30.] The ALJ then discusses in great detail Plaintiff’s

testimony, her husband’s statements, entire medical record, and reports prepared for

the hearing clearly identifying how each factored into the RFC determination. [Id.]

Plaintiff’s claims that the ALJ violated SSR 96-8p in utilizing in the term “light”

as a restriction without further explanation is without proper context. [Pl. Br. at 15

(citing SSR 96-8p at *3 (“[T]he RFC must not be expressed initially in terms of the

exertional categories of “sedentary,” “light,” “medium,” “heavy,” and “very heavy”

work”).] The SSR goes on to state that a claimant’s “RFC may be expressed in terms

of an exertional category, such as light, if it becomes necessary to assess whether an

individual is able to do his or her past relevant work as it is generally performed in the

national economy.” SSR 96-8p at *3.

In its determination, the ALJ stated that Plaintiff was able to perform “light

work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b)” which defines “light work” as “lifting no

more than [twenty] pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects

weighing up to [ten] pounds. . . . [A] job in this category when it requires a good deal

of walking or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with some pushing

an pulling of arm or leg controls.” [R. at 23-24.]; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b). While the

ALJ did not do a function-by-function analysis, the record indicates the ALJ properly

questioned Plaintiff as to the work she previously performed, physical limitations, and

abilities. Garret v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 274 Fed.Appx. 159, 164 (3d Cir. 2008) (Holding

a function-by-function analysis is not necessary if the ALJ properly inquires into and

considers a claimant’s physical and mental limitations.) As it is clear the ALJ

considered Plaintiff’s responses, as well as medical examinations into account when

determining Plaintiff’s RFC and clearly explained her findings, the ALJ’s

determination was not in violation of SSR 96-8p.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the ALJ is AFFIRMED. An

accompanying Order shall issue.

October 24, 2025 s/Renée Marie Bumb

Date RENÉE MARIE BUMB

Chief United States District Judge