T.I.B. v. P.M.P.

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0604-24

T.I.B.,1

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

P.M.P.,

Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________

Argued October 7, 2025 – Decided October 24, 2025

Before Judges Firko and Perez Friscia.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,

Chancery Division, Family Part, Monmouth County,

Docket No. FV-13-2223-24.

Greg S. Gargulinski argued the cause for appellant

(Solop Bondarowicz & Gargulinski, attorneys; Greg S.

Gargulinski, of counsel and on the briefs; Rebecca P.

Rosenthal, on the briefs).

1

We use initials to protect the confidentiality of the victim in these proceedings.

R. 1:38-3(d)(10).

Emeka Nkwuo argued the cause for respondent

(Lomurro Munson LLC, attorneys; Emeka Nkwuo, of

counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant P.M.P. appeals from the October 23, 2024 amended final

restraining order (FRO) entered against him under the Prevention of Domestic

Violence Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35. Defendant argues the trial

judge erred in finding he committed the predicate act of harassment and that an

FRO was necessary to ensure plaintiff T.I.B.'s future protection. As our review

of the record demonstrates the trial judge's findings are supported by sufficient

credible evidence, we affirm.

I.

The parties had a dating relationship that began in the Fall of 2021. They

met while working as dispatchers for the Monmouth County Sheriff's Office

(MCSO). After about ten months of dating, plaintiff ended the parties'

relationship in September 2022. During her relationship with defendant, she

had also maintained a dating relationship with another man, N.C. Defendant did

not want to terminate the parties' relationship. Plaintiff attempted a friendship

with defendant but terminated it in October 2022. Thereafter, plaintiff told

defendant not to contact her. Defendant contacted plaintiff by phone and text

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messages between October 2022 and January 2023. In January 2023, plaintiff

blocked his cell phone number from her phone.

On June 17, 2024, plaintiff obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO)

after filing a domestic violence complaint. She alleged defendant committed the

predicate act of harassment. One month later, plaintiff amended her TRO,

incorporating the parties' prior history of alleged domestic violence and

referencing the parties' 2023 cross-TRO trial.

In October 2023, the first judge presided over a three-day domestic

violence trial regarding the parties' cross-TROs. At the conclusion of the trial,

the first judge dismissed the cross-TROs. During the trial it was undisputed

defendant had tried to call plaintiff "from private numbers," sent her text

messages, and had sent gifts to her house after plaintiff ended their relationship,

wanting no further contact. The first judge found plaintiff failed to prove a

predicate act of harassment because there was no evidence defendant had "acted

with the purpose to harass her." The first judge reasoned "the law must have

some tolerance for a disappointed suitor trying to repair a romantic relationship,

when his conduct is not violent or abusive or threatening but merely

importuning."

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After finding the evidence presented was "in equipoise," the first judge

directed "if for any reason, there is communication [or] contact, [plaintiff] can

come back. She can file for a new restraining order." The first judge also noted

plaintiff had "now . . . made it abundantly clear that she does[ not] want to be

friends, or exchange pleasantries . . . with" defendant and that "the

circumstances may not be the same the next time." Regarding defendant's TRO,

the first judge relayed it was "one of the most absurd TROs [she had] ever seen"

and denied defendant's FRO application.

At the present FRO trial, defendant moved to bar plaintiff's testimony

regarding any "prior history" because the first judge found plaintiff's previously

alleged predicate acts were not "acts of domestic violence." Defendant argued

plaintiff was "precluded under the principles of res judicata and collateral

estoppel from relitigating the allegations which [had] been decided adversely to

her in the earlier hearing." Regarding plaintiff's ability to introduce evidence of

defendant's prior communications with N.C., defendant's counsel stipulated

N.C. "did not testify at the last trial" and did not "disagree with [plaintiff's]

[c]ounsel with regard to" N.C.'s testimony. The second trial judge found

plaintiff may not "relitigate" the prior alleged acts of harassment and allowed

"limited testimony" to "provide the context" for plaintiff's new predicate offense

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allegations. Defense counsel apparently stipulated to the second judge's limited

review of the prior FRO hearing transcript.

Plaintiff testified in the present matter that during the parties' dating

relationship, she was also dating N.C. In September 2022, plaintiff ended the

relationship with defendant and shortly thereafter told defendant she wished to

have no further contact. She blocked defendant's number on her phone, because

he continued to try to communicate with her. Plaintiff continued dating N.C.

Between February and March 2024, plaintiff received three calls on her

cell phone from the number 908-433-**31. Over the Memorial Day weekend,

she received separate text messages from the number 906-415-**40 stating:

"You messed up and one day you will realize"; and "You'll figure that out one

day, hopefully sooner rather than later for your sake." After plaintiff read the

messages at work, she had to take a break because she was upset. Plaintiff later

learned the text messages came from a cell phone owned by a woman who

volunteered with defendant at Keansburg Emergency Medical Services (EMS) .

Plaintiff acknowledged she had "no objective information . . . [defendant] ever

asked [the woman] . . . to [contact her.]" After receiving the text messages,

plaintiff learned a few hours later that N.C. also received a text message. The

text message to N.C. came from the same cell phone number that had called her

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in February and March 2024. Plaintiff only realized defendant had tried to call

her after reviewing her cell phone for the number that sent N.C. the text message.

Plaintiff reviewed her "secondary spam blocker" history and found the calls to

her cell phone.

Plaintiff testified that she had blocked defendant in the past, but he had

called her from blocked phone numbers. She felt "harassed by [the] phone calls

and text messages" because defendant was not "respecting [her] wishes of no

communication and not to contact [her]." After going "through a [prior] trial,"

plaintiff relayed defendant "continues . . . to escalate contact and find other

means of contact, . . . even though . . . it's pretty well established at this point

that [she] do[es] not want any form of any contact from him whatsoever."

Plaintiff asserted defendant told her in the past that if she did not "talk to him

and tell him what was going on, that [defendant] was going to reach out to

N[.C.]"

After plaintiff briefly referenced defendant's voluminous earlier text

messages presented at the prior trial, she conveyed she continually requested

defendant to leave her alone from the time she ended the relationship. Plaintiff

reiterated defendant had continued trying to communicate.

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N.C. testified that in August 2023 defendant contacted him through

Instagram. In an initial Instagram message defendant had sent N.C., defendant

stated, "I[ a]m [going to] end up ruining your life, and I do[ no]t want to."

Defendant also messaged N.C. and requested that N.C. call him. During the

2023 telephone conversation, defendant revealed he was dating plaintiff. After

N.C. inquired if defendant had any pictures, defendant forwarded photographs

of plaintiff, including one of her scantily dressed. N.C. testified defendant

acknowledged in a message that if plaintiff learned defendant contacted N.C.,

"she was going to apply a restraining order against him." Regarding the tone of

defendant's messages, N.C. was concerned because defendant "kind of alluded

to . . . [wanting] to cause some self-harm." N.C. messaged defendant stating,

"If you don't stop talking like that, I'm going to get a[n ambulance] to pick you

up." Defendant then "deflected from the conversation."

N.C. testified that in May 2024 he believed defendant again reached out

by text from a cell phone number listed as 908-433-**31. The text message

stated, "Pal, you messed up, your girl loves that kid P*** and you amount to

nothing. You f[**]ked up treating her the wrong way [and] she will realize he's

the better choice."

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During the trial, defendant testified that he works for the MCSO but in a

different division than plaintiff. While he steadfastly maintained that he did not

send any of plaintiff's alleged recent communications, defendant admitted "[t]he

908-433-[**]31" number was his "secondary phone number." Defendant

explained that he kept two cell phones. He introduced a "Verizon[] security

assistance team's" receipt of "a call detail explanation," showing there was no

record he had called plaintiff's cell phone. He also acknowledged the woman

with whom he volunteered at EMS owned the cell phone that originated the

messages to plaintiff, but defendant testified he did not ask her to send the text

messages and never told her about his relationship with plaintiff.

Regarding the 2023 Instagram messages to N.C., defendant conveyed he

was "clearing the air and taking the weight off [his] shoulders" and the messages

were not meant to harass. He further explained that he sent N.C. a photograph

of plaintiff in her "underwear and bra" because N.C. had inquired whether

defendant had pictures of plaintiff. Defendant maintained he did not intend to

embarrass her.

During cross-examination, defendant acknowledged he received a 2022

text message from plaintiff stating, "Yes[,] it actually is threatening because [I

a]m asking you to respect me and what [I] want and not talk to me[,] and you[

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a]re demanding I call you or else you[ a]re going to contact my boyfriend." He

also admitted to previously calling plaintiff from a "blocked" number and at

different hours of the day, including 4:00 a.m. Regarding the Verizon call log,

he conceded it did not include whether text messages were sent. While

defendant acknowledged plaintiff produced a cell phone "screenshot" of calls

from his second phone's number, he explained he did not make the calls and they

were "possibly a spoof." Although the text message to N.C. was from his

secondary phone number and referenced defendant's name, he believed someone

else used his number.

After hearing the testimony and reviewing the evidence, the second judge

issued an FRO accompanied by an oral decision. She found plaintiff proved by

a preponderance of the evidence the predicate act of harassment. The second

judge explained she had observed the witnesses' "demeanor, . . . candor or

evasion, willingness or reluctance to answer," and found "[d]efendant to be not

credible." She was also unpersuaded by defendant's explanation that he

contacted N.C. in "good faith" and noted "[t]here was no reason for him to send

pictures of [plaintiff] in her underwear." The second judge found the first judge

admonished defendant, "[d]on't contact her," and noted "yet, here we are." After

comparing "the verbiage" of the text messages, the second judge was convinced

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they "us[ed] the same type of language." Emphasizing that she had "to weigh

the credibility," the second judge found plaintiff proved by a preponderance of

the evidence that defendant "did send those text messages."

The second judge also referenced the context of the parties' history, and

found defendant "was warned" and the communication "continued." As to the

relevance and admission of the prior alleged domestic violence incidents during

the first trial, the second judge specifically noted she was "not looking at the

previous history as establish[ing] domestic violence" but to show the continued

communications were unwanted and "cross[ed] the line."

Regarding the determination of whether an FRO was necessary to protect

plaintiff from immediate or future acts of domestic violence, the second judge

found defendant "will continue to find a way to send these little digs at her."

The second judge also determined defendant "would continue if I didn't enter a

restraining order."

On appeal, defendant contends reversal is warranted because the second

judge erred in finding: defendant committed acts of domestic violence that were

supported by adequate, substantial, or credible evidence; he committed the

predicate act of harassment; and that a final restraining order is necessary to

protect plaintiff from further abuse.

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II.

Our review of an FRO issued after a bench trial is limited. T.B. v. I.W.,

479 N.J. Super. 404, 412 (App. Div. 2024). In reviewing "a trial court's order

entered following trial in a domestic violence matter, we grant substantial

deference to the trial court's findings of fact and the legal conclusions based

upon those findings." J.D. v. A.M.W., 475 N.J. Super. 306, 312-13 (App. Div.

2023) (quoting N.T.B. v. D.D.B., 442 N.J. Super. 205, 215 (App. Div. 2015)).

Trial court findings are "binding on appeal when supported by adequate,

substantial, credible evidence." G.M. v. C.V., 453 N.J. Super. 1, 11 (App. Div.

2018) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998)). "We defer to

the credibility determinations made by the trial court because the trial judge

'hears the case, sees and observes the witnesses, and hears them testify,'

affording it 'a better perspective than a reviewing court in evaluating the veracity

of a witness.'" Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015) (quoting Cesare, 154

N.J. at 412).

We do not disturb a trial judge's factual findings unless they are "so

manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant[,] and

reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice." S.D. v.

M.J.R., 415 N.J. Super. 417, 429 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at

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412). "We accord substantial deference to Family Part judges, who routinely

hear domestic violence cases and are 'specially trained to detect the difference

between domestic violence and more ordinary differences that arise . . . .'" C.C.

v. J.A.H., 463 N.J. Super. 419, 428 (App. Div. 2020) (quoting J.D. v. M.D.F.,

207 N.J. 458, 482 (2011)). We, however, review de novo a trial judge's legal

conclusions. Id. at 429.

The New Jersey Legislature enacted the PDVA "to assure the victims of

domestic violence the maximum protection from abuse the law can provide."

N.J.S.A. 2C:25-18. The PDVA defines a "[v]ictim of domestic violence" as

"any person who has been subjected to domestic violence by a person with whom

the victim has had a dating relationship." N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(d); R.G. v. R.G.,

449 N.J. Super. 208, 219-20 (App. Div. 2017) (recognizing the amended

definition of "[v]ictim of domestic violence" evinced "the Legislature's intent to

broaden the application" of the PDVA).

The entry of an FRO under the PDVA requires the trial judge to make

certain findings pursuant to a two-step analysis delineated in Silver v. Silver,

387 N.J. Super. 112, 125-27 (App. Div. 2006). Initially, "the judge must

determine whether the plaintiff has proven, by a preponderance of the credible

evidence, that one or more of the predicate acts set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a)

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has occurred." Id. at 125 (citing N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)). The judge is also

required to consider "any past history of abuse by a defendant as part of a

plaintiff's individual circumstances and, in turn, factor that history into its

reasonable person determination." Cesare, 154 N.J. at 403. "'A single act can

constitute domestic violence for the purpose of the issuance of an FRO,' even

without a history of domestic violence." C.C., 463 N.J. Super. at 434-35

(quoting McGowan v. O'Rourke, 391 N.J. Super. 502, 506 (App. Div. 2007)).

Second, if a predicate act is proven, the judge must determine whether a

restraining order is necessary to protect the plaintiff from immediate harm or

further acts of abuse. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 127. A previous history of

domestic violence between the parties is one of six non-exhaustive factors a

court is to consider in evaluating whether a restraining order is necessary to

protect the plaintiff. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(1); see also D.M.R. v. M.K.G., 467

N.J. Super. 308, 324-25 (App. Div. 2021) (holding whether a judge should issue

a restraining order depends, in part, on the parties' history of domestic violence).

Harassment, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4, is a predicate act of domestic violence

enumerated under the PDVA. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a)(13). Under N.J.S.A.

2C:33-4(a), a person commits harassment "if, with purpose to harass another, he

[or she] . . . [m]akes, or causes to be made, one or more communications

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anonymously or at extremely inconvenient hours, or in offensively coarse

language, or any other manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm."

To commit harassment, a defendant must "act with the purpose of

harassing the victim." D.M.R., 467 N.J. Super. at 323. "'A finding of . . .

purpose to harass may be inferred from the evidence presented' and from

common sense and experience." Ibid. (quoting H.E.S. v. J.C.S., 175 N.J. 309,

327 (2003)). "Although a purpose to harass can be inferred from a history

between the parties, . . . that finding must be supported by some evidence that

the actor's conscious object was to alarm or annoy; mere awareness that someone

might be alarmed or annoyed is insufficient." J.D., 207 N.J. at 487. A judge

must consider "the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the

harassment statute has been violated." H.E.S., 175 N.J. at 326 (quoting Cesare,

154 N.J. at 404).

III.

We first address defendant's contentions that the second judge improperly

found defendant committed the predicate act of harassment by relying: on

credibility determinations "rather than the substance of the evidence and the

testimony presented"; and "solely" based "on the parties' prior history." A

review of the second judge's nineteen-page oral decision demonstrates these

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arguments are without merit as sufficient evidence supports the finding that

defendant's communications constitute harassment.

After considering the testimony and admitted evidence, the second judge

found plaintiff was credible and defendant's explanation regarding the

communications lacked credibility. The second judge found plaintiff

established that defendant committed harassment by a preponderance of the

evidence because he sent her and N.C. unwanted text message communications

with no legitimate purpose. In finding defendant sent the messages with the

purpose to harass plaintiff, the second judge highlighted that defendant knew

plaintiff wanted no further contact from him and felt harassed by his earlier

communications. The second judge explained in finding harassment that "it's

not necessarily the content of the communications" but that "he's still

communicating" with her "after being warned if he did," a future FRO could be

entered against him.

Based on the evidence presented at trial, the second judge specifically

reasoned that defendant committed harassment because: defendant knew not "to

communicate" with plaintiff but "he did"; defendant "continued to"

communicate "after being warned" not to "contact her"; the three text message

"communications came from" defendant, with one sent from a colleague

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volunteer's cell phone even though the woman was not told "about his

relationship"; and defendant "relentless[ly] refus[ed] to leave her alone,"

causing plaintiff "stress." The second judge also found defendant's explanation

for having two phones and switching his phone number did not "make sense."

While the second judge did not explicitly cite subsection (a) of N.J.S.A.

2C:33-4,2 her findings of fact correlate to each of the subsection's elements.

After the second judge referenced the prior FRO trial transcript, she noted the

first judge had determined plaintiff failed to prove defendant's earlier

communications were more than defendant "trying to win her back" and sent

with the requisite purpose to harass. Specifically, in line with the first two

elements of subsection (a), the second judge explained that in the present case

defendant acted purposely in sending the "communications," because "I have to

2

On appeal, defendant argues the second judge failed to make any findings of

fact or conclusions of law but does not specifically raise that the second judge

failed to cite the applicable harassment subsection. "A trial judge must state

clearly the factual findings and correlate them with relevant legal

conclusions . . . so that parties and the appellate courts may be informed of the

rationale underlying the conclusion." Monte v. Monte, 212 N.J. Super. 557, 565

(App. Div. 1986). We are satisfied the second judge has fulfilled this obligation.

Cf. State v. Pillot, 115 N.J. 558, 566 (1989) (upholding a court's sentence

because it was "possible in the context of this record to extrapolate without great

difficulty the court's reasoning"). While the second judge's opinion provides

findings that track the elements of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a), we note the better course

would have been to reference the exact subsection relied on.

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look at it in terms of the fact that . . . the communications, unwanted

communications, that at that point didn't rise -- cross the line, but the

continuation of it does." She emphasized that there was "no reason for them to

communicate" and defendant continued to send multiple text messages.

Consistent with subsection (a) of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4, which also requires a

finding that defendant's communications were "likely to [cause] . . . alarm," the

second judge credited plaintiff's testimony that receiving defendant's text

messages was "shock[ing]" after the parties' history and that she was

"panicking." The record amply supports the second judge's Silver prong one

finding that defendant committed the predicate act of harassment by purposely

sending multiple communications in a manner that caused plaintiff to be

alarmed.

We next address defendant's contention that the second judge erred in

considering the parties' history. Our Supreme Court has held that "not only may

one sufficiently egregious action constitute domestic violence under the

[PDVA], even with no history of abuse between the parties, but a court may also

determine that an ambiguous incident qualifies as prohibited conduct, based on

a finding of violence in the parties' past." Cesare, 154 N.J. at 402. Further, the

Court in State v. Hoffman elucidated that when a trial judge is "determining

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whether a defendant's conduct is likely to cause the required annoyance or alarm

to the victim, that defendant's past conduct toward the victim and the

relationship's history must be taken into account. The incidents . . . must be

examined in light of the totality of the circumstances." 149 N.J. 564, 585 (1997).

We have also recognized that "[d]omestic violence is ordinarily more than an

isolated[,] aberrant[,] non-violent act." Kamen v. Egan, 322 N.J. Super. 222,

227-28 (App. Div. 1999).

Defendant's argument that the second judge found the predicate act of

harassment based solely on the parties' prior history and defendant's prior

communications, which the first judge found were not harassment, is

unsupported by the record. The second judge found the predicate act of

harassment based in the new allegations and considered for context the parties'

"prior history." The second judge correctly considered the prior history for the

"limited purpose" of showing that defendant knew "that any further

communication . . . would [be] consider[ed] to be harassing" and "to provide

context as to why she feels harassed by these new communications."

Additionally, the second judge made clear she was not "going to

relitigate . . . those underlying acts" in the present FRO and appropriately

narrowed consideration of the parties' history to providing context. We note that

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after the second judge ruled on the defendant's motion to bar, defendant's

counsel "conditionally stipulated" to the admission of the evidence "for that

limited purpose." Also, defendant admitted knowing plaintiff wanted no further

contact and he did not deny it was clear she would deem any further

communications harassing. For these reasons, we find no error in the second

judge's consideration of the parties' prior history for context in determining

whether plaintiff proved defendant committed the newly alleged predicate act

of harassment.

We also reject defendant's reliance on J.F. v. B.K. to support his

contention that "the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel" barred the

second judge from considering the parties' prior history. 308 N.J. Super. 387

(App. Div. 1998). Defendant misconstrues our holding in J.F. as preventing an

FRO trial court from ever considering a defendant's alleged prior acts, which are

contained in a new TRO's prior history section, if an earlier court has found the

acts were not domestic violence. In J.F., we determined the trial court violated

res judicata because it found the defendant committed harassment based on the

plaintiff's previously alleged "prior acts" that an earlier court determined were

not domestic violence after a trial. 308 N.J. Super. at 392. Notably, the trial

"court's opinion" in J.F. "did not mention the [defendant's acts] which had been

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the subject of [the plaintiff's] complaint." Id. at 391. We recognized in J.F. that

the plaintiff could have presented evidence of surrounding circumstances to

support "a finding that . . . ordinarily innocuous conduct constituted an act of

harassment." Ibid. Here, the second judge did not violate res judicata because

she found plaintiff proved defendant committed a new predicate act and

rightfully considered the parties' prior history to provide context for the

allegations and to analyze the second Silver prong.

Defendant's contention that the second judge shifted the burden of proof

to him is also without merit. The record is bereft of any statement that defendant

had "to prove that [the communications] did not occur." To the contrary, the

record demonstrates the second judge rightly placed the burden on plaintiff.

Regarding Silver prong two, we discern no error in the second judge's

finding that plaintiff requires an FRO for her future protection. The second

judge found plaintiff "does not want to be contacted by" defendant and his

communications cause her distress. Plaintiff testified to needing an FRO

because it had "been years . . . [of] dealing with this" and defendant continued

to contact her. She explained the stress defendant's recent messages caused and

that when defendant had shared revealing pictures of her that she "felt upset"

and "scared." After the second judge found harassment based on defendant's

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new communications and considered the context of the acts, she found it was in

plaintiff's "best interest" to protect her "from any further communication with

[defendant]." We discern no basis to disturb the second judge's Silver prong

two findings, which are sufficiently supported by the substantial credible

evidence in the record.

To the extent not addressed, defendant's remaining contentions lack

sufficient merit to warrant discussion in our written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.

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