Sabrina Solomon and Stanford Solomon v. AIG Property Casualty Company

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

SABRINA SOLOMON and

STANFORD SOLOMON,

Plaintiffs,

v. Case No. 8:24-cv-2650-VMC-NHA

AIG PROPERTY CASUALTY COMPANY,

Defendant.

/

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court pursuant to

Plaintiffs Sabrina and Stanford Solomon’s Daubert Motion to

Exclude Causation and Appropriateness of Treatment Opinions

of Defendant’s Expert, Dr. Richard Ofstein (Doc. # 50), filed

on October 1, 2025. Defendant AIG Property Casualty Company

responded on October 15, 2025. (Doc. # 53). For the reasons

that follow, the Motion is denied.

I. Background

Plaintiffs initiated this underinsured motorist benefits

and loss of consortium case in state court in July 2024. (Doc.

# 1-1). Plaintiff Sabrina Solomon was involved in a motor

vehicle accident (“MVA”) in April 2021 that left her with “a

permanent injury to the body as a whole.” (Id. at 2). After

a non-diverse tortfeasor defendant was dismissed (Doc. # 1-

4), Defendant removed the case to this Court based on

diversity jurisdiction. (Doc. # 1).

The case proceeded through discovery, and both sides

disclosed expert witnesses. One of Defendant’s expert

witnesses is Dr. Richard Ofstein, a radiologist with over

forty years’ experience. (Doc. # 50-3). He is board certified

in Diagnostic Radiology and has a Certificate of Added

Qualifications in Neuroradiology. (Id. at 4). He is currently

an Adjunct Assistant Professor of Radiology at the University

of Utah and previously worked as an Assistant Clinical

Professor of Radiology at the UCLA School of Medicine. (Doc.

# 50-1 at 1). Additionally, Dr. Ofstein worked in private

practice for most of his career. (Id.). He is “thoroughly

familiar with the imaging findings seen in the setting of

trauma. In most cases, these findings can be distinguished

from findings related to normal aging and other nontraumatic

disease processes.” (Id.).

In reaching the opinions outlined in his report, Dr.

Ofstein consulted the medical records for Plaintiff Sabrina

Solomon that were provided to him, including numerous

diagnostic images (MRIs and angiograms). (Id. at 1-2). Dr.

Ofstein’s report concludes with the following summary of his

opinions:

There are well-known findings radiologists look for

on diagnostic imaging in the setting of head

trauma. Some of these findings are associated with

long-term cognitive dysfunction and other

neurological clinical findings. The 5/11/2021 Brain

MRI does not demonstrate findings supportive of a

[traumatic brain injury (“TBI”)]. The clinical

presentation at the time of the 4/29/2021 [MVA] is

not consistent with a TBI.

There are also well-known findings radiologists

look for on diagnostic imaging in the setting of

spine and shoulder trauma. There is no objective

imaging evidence that Sabrina Solomon sustained

injuries to her cervical or lumbar spine nor her

shoulders from the 4/29/2021 MVA. Specifically, she

did not sustain traumatic disc protrusions,

fracture, or other injuries to the spine. The

diagnostic imaging finding of bilateral rotator

cuff tears is not indicative of shoulder trauma. In

fact, when combined with the clinical presentation

and knowledge of the commonality of rotator cuff

tears in an asymptomatic population, without a

history of trauma, the diagnostic imaging strongly

indicates that this pathology is not a result of

the 4/29/2021 MVA.

The surgeries Sabrina Solomon underwent, namely the

left shoulder and lumbar spine surgeries, were not

necessitated by the 4/29/2021 MVA. The pathologic

basis or clinical indication for the surgeries she

anticipates will be performed in the future, namely

right shoulder and cervical spine surgery are not

related to injuries sustained on 4/29/2021.

The above opinions are based primarily on

comprehensive diagnostic imaging, objective data.

However, they are supported by and concordant with

the clinical presentation at the time of the

4/29/2021 MVA. She literally and figuratively

walked away from the accident. She did not request

nor require medical attention at that time. In any

other personal injury litigation, the fact that

Sabrina Solomon did not suffer “bodily injury

including a permanent injury to the body as a

whole,” as claimed, would be considered a blessing.

The opinions stated above are to a reasonable

degree of medical certainty, on a more probable

than not basis.

(Doc. # 50-1 at 11) (emphasis added). Dr. Ofstein emphasized

that Plaintiff Sabrina Solomon’s brain imaging was “most

consistent with, if not diagnostic for, an incidental

cavernous angioma,” rather than a TBI. (Id. at 3). As for her

spine and shoulder injuries, Dr. Ofstein opines these were

consistent with aging or “degenerative” changes or disease,

rather than an acute trauma. (Id. at 3-4, 10-11). After his

report was disclosed, Plaintiffs took the deposition of Dr.

Ofstein. (Doc. # 53-2).

Now, Plaintiffs move to exclude Dr. Ofstein from

testifying at trial. (Doc. # 50). According to them, “Dr.

Ofstein is not qualified to give such opinions,” “his opinions

are not based on sufficient facts and data,” and “his opinions

are not based on a reliable scientific methodology.” (Id. at

2). Defendant has responded (Doc. # 53), and the Motion is

ripe for review.

II. Legal Standard

“Federal law applies to the admissibility of expert

testimony in this case.” Magbegor v. Triplette, 212 F. Supp.

3d 1317, 1323 (N.D. Ga. 2016); see also Hendrix ex rel. G.P.

v. Evenflo Co., 609 F.3d 1183, 1193 (11th Cir. 2010)

(“Although the standards for finding causation are governed

by Florida law, we apply federal law to determine whether the

expert testimony proffered to prove causation is sufficiently

reliable to submit it to the jury.”).

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 states:

A witness who is qualified as an expert by

knowledge, skill, experience, training, or

education may testify in the form of an opinion or

otherwise if: (a) the expert’s scientific,

technical, or other specialized knowledge will help

the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to

determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is

based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the

testimony is the product of reliable principles and

methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied

the principles and methods to the facts of the case.

Fed. R. Evid. 702.

Implementing Rule 702, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms.,

Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), requires district courts to ensure

that any scientific testimony or evidence admitted is both

relevant and reliable. See Id. at 589–90. District courts

must conduct this gatekeeping function “to ensure that

speculative, unreliable expert testimony does not reach the

jury under the mantle of reliability that accompanies the

appellation ‘expert testimony.’” Rink v. Cheminova, Inc., 400

F.3d 1286, 1291 (11th Cir. 2005).

The Eleventh Circuit “requires trial courts acting as

gatekeepers to engage in a ‘rigorous three-part inquiry.’”

Hendrix, 609 F.3d at 1194. The district court must assess

whether:

(1) the expert is qualified to testify competently

regarding the matters he intends to address; (2)

the methodology by which the expert reaches his

conclusions is sufficiently reliable as determined

by the sort of inquiry mandated in Daubert; and (3)

the testimony assists the trier of fact, through

the application of scientific, technical, or

specialized expertise, to understand the evidence

or to determine a fact in issue.

Id. The proponent of the expert testimony must show, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that the testimony satisfies

each requirement. Id.

III. Analysis

Plaintiffs only challenge Dr. Ofstein’s qualifications

and methodology. (Doc. # 50 at 4-10). The Court addresses

each in turn.

A. Qualifications

The first question under Daubert is whether an expert is

qualified to testify about the matters he or she intends to

address. City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d

548, 563 (11th Cir. 1998). An expert may be qualified “by

knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.” Fed.

R. Evid. 702. “Determining whether a witness is qualified to

testify as an expert ‘requires the trial court to examine the

credentials of the proposed expert in light of the subject

matter of the proposed testimony.’” Clena Invs., Inc. v. XL

Specialty Ins. Co., 280 F.R.D. 653, 661 (S.D. Fla. 2012)

(citation omitted).

“This inquiry is not stringent, and so long as the expert

is minimally qualified, objections to the level of the

expert’s expertise [go] to credibility and weight, not

admissibility.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted). The Court is mindful that its “gatekeeper role under

Daubert ‘is not intended to supplant the adversary system or

the role of the jury.’” Maiz v. Virani, 253 F.3d 641, 666

(11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Allison v. McGhan, 184 F.3d 1300,

1311 (11th Cir. 1999)).

Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Ofstein is not qualified to

give the opinions from his report. (Doc. # 50 at 4-5).

According to them, “[a]lthough Dr. Ofstein might be qualified

to give radiology opinions, i.e., what he sees on Plaintiff’s

diagnostic imaging, he is not qualified to give opinion

testimony on the specific causation of injury that might arise

as a result of a motor vehicle accident, nor the

appropriateness or relatedness of any treatment incurred or

to be incurred by Plaintiff” Sabrina Solomon. (Id. at 5).

The Court disagrees. There is no doubt that Dr. Ofstein,

as a radiologist with decades of experience, is qualified to

testify about his review of Plaintiff Sabrina Solomon’s

radiological imaging. Contrary to Plaintiffs’ argument, a

radiologist may opine on the likely cause of an injury

observed in radiological imaging, such as whether an injury

results from an acute trauma or degeneration. Indeed, “[i]t

is within the province of radiologists to view an MRI and

differentiate between evidence of acute injury versus

evidence of degeneration due to the aging process.” Bostick

v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 8:16-CV-1400-VMC-AAS,

2017 WL 2959060, at *2 (M.D. Fla. July 11, 2017).

Furthermore, Dr. Ofstein made clear in his deposition

that he was not opining on the medical appropriateness of

Plaintiff Sabrina Solomon’s spinal and shoulder surgeries.

Rather, Dr. Ofstein clarified that he was “addressing . . .

the relationship of the need for surgery and the accident at

issue.” (Doc. # 53-2 at 76:21-22). His opinion was that “the

crash did not necessitate her left shoulder and lumbar spine

surgeries” because Plaintiff Sabrina Solomon did “not

suffer[] a traumatic injury on the date of the motor vehicle

accident.” (Id. at 76:24-77:9). Thus, Dr. Ofstein’s opinion

on the surgeries was appropriately limited to the fact that

the injuries addressed by those surgeries were not caused by

the motor vehicle accident. This opinion falls within the

expertise of a radiologist.

In short, Dr. Ofstein is at least minimally qualified to

offer his opinions at trial. Demeritt v. Wal-Mart Stores E.,

LP, No. 6:20-cv-89-PGB-GJK, 2021 WL 2835363, at *2 (M.D. Fla.

May 17, 2021) (“Plaintiff suggests in passing that Dr.

Koenigsberg is unqualified to offer opinions on differential

diagnosis or causation. . . . Dr. Koenigsberg is a board-

certified radiologist. . . . He completed a residency and

fellowships in radiology, and he has been a Medical Doctor

for almost 40 years. The Court finds that Dr. Koenigsberg is

sufficiently qualified to opine on radiology studies.”).

Plaintiffs’ arguments primarily go to the weight of Dr.

Ofstein’s opinions and should be addressed through cross-

examination at trial. “Vigorous cross-examination,

presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on

the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means

of attacking [debatable] but admissible evidence.” Maiz, 253

F.3d at 666 (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted)).

B. Methodology

The second question is whether an expert’s methodology

is reliable. “Exactly how reliability is evaluated may vary

from case to case, but what remains constant is the

requirement that the trial judge evaluate the reliability of

the testimony before allowing its admission at trial.” United

States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1262 (11th Cir. 2004)

(citing Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000

amendment). There are four recognized, yet non-exhaustive,

factors a district court may consider in evaluating

reliability:

(1) whether the expert’s methodology has been

tested or is capable of being tested; (2) whether

the technique has been subjected to peer review and

publication; (3) the known and potential error rate

of the methodology; and (4) whether the technique

has been generally accepted in the proper

scientific community.

Seamon v. Remington Arms Co., 813 F.3d 983, 988 (11th Cir.

2016) (citations omitted). A district court can take other

relevant factors into account as well. Id. (citations

omitted).

“If the [expert] witness is relying solely or primarily

on experience, then,” in establishing reliability, “the

witness must explain how that experience leads to the

conclusion reached, why that experience is a sufficient basis

for the opinion, and how that experience is reliably applied

to the facts.” Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1261 (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted). The Court’s analysis as to

reliability “focus[es] ‘solely on principles and methodology,

not on the conclusions that they generate.’” Seamon, 813 F.3d

at 988 (citation omitted).

According to Plaintiffs, Dr. Ofstein’s methodology in

reaching his opinions was unreliable. They complain that “Dr.

Ofstein’s opinions are not founded on any established

scientific method” because “he solely relies on the

deposition of the Plaintiff in performing his clinical

correlation and coming to his opinions.” (Doc. # 50 at 9-10).

Plaintiffs also contend Dr. Ofstein’s “opinions are not based

on sufficient facts or data”: “Dr. Ofstein’s deposition

testimony shows that his opinions on causation and

relatedness or appropriateness of treatment were based only

on him looking at the radiological studies and medical records

from [Plaintiff Sabrina Solomon’s] treating providers after

the subject accident.” (Id. at 6-7). Thus, in Plaintiffs’

view, “Dr. Ofstein’s opinion in this case lacks the proper

informational foundation to opine on causation and

relatedness or appropriateness of medical treatment.” (Id. at

8).

Again, the Court disagrees. Dr. Ofstein used a

trustworthy methodology in reviewing Plaintiff Sabrina

Solomon’s radiological images in reaching his conclusions.

“The methodology used by Dr. [Ofstein] is standard and

consistent with the literature and methodology used by

radiologists in the United States. It is within the province

of radiologists to view an MRI and differentiate between

evidence of acute injury versus evidence of degeneration due

to the aging process.” Bostick, 2017 WL 2959060, at *2; see

also Ostroski v. United States, No. 06-80327-CIV, 2007 WL

9701868, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 23, 2007) (“Applying the

relevant Daubert standards, it is clear that Dr. Elster

applied the same methodology used by radiologists in everyday

practice - he looked at the pertinent film and relied on a

basic understanding of the nature of the Plaintiff’s injury

and the context in which it occurred to draw a well-reasoned

conclusion.”); Derochers v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., No. 6:15-

cv-2151-DCI, 2018 WL 1988861, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 1, 2018)

(“The methodology Dr. Jenkins employed during his evaluation,

especially his review of radiological films, appears to be

sufficiently reliable in determining whether the changes to

Plaintiff’s cervical and lumbar spine were degenerative in

nature, or the result of an acute event.”).

The fact that Dr. Ofstein “did not review any of

Plaintiff’s medical records outside of the radiology reports

produced by Plaintiff’s treating physicians” does not render

his methodology unreliable. (Doc. # 50 at 6); see Ostroski,

2007 WL 9701868, at *2 (“The fact that [the expert

radiologist] did not review Plaintiff’s complete medical

records does not preclude him from making this observation or

go to the threshold admissibility of his opinion. In fact, it

is consistent with the way that radiologists interpret films

every day.”). Dr. Ofstein’s review of the radiological

imaging, the radiology reports from Plaintiff Sabrina

Solomon’s treating physicians, as well as the police report

from the accident and Plaintiff Sabrina Solomon’s deposition,

supports that he applied a sufficiently trustworthy

methodology in reaching his opinions. See Demeritt, 2021 WL

2835363, at *3 (“Dr. Koenigsberg’s review of Plaintiff’s

radiological films — coupled with his training and experience

in reviewing similar films — is sufficiently reliable to

support a determination that Plaintiff displayed the physical

signs of degenerative disease. By extension, this methodology

supports Dr. Koenigsberg’s ultimate opinion that the changes

to Plaintiff’s spine and knees were degenerative in nature

rather than the result of an acute trauma event (such as a

fall).”).

“Any claimed weakness in the factual basis for his

conclusion in this regard goes at best to weight and

credibility, and can certainly be explored on cross

examination.” Ostroski, 2007 WL 9701868, at *2; see also Maiz,

253 F.3d at 666 (“Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of

contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of

proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking

[debatable] but admissible evidence.” (citations and internal

quotation marks omitted). The Motion is denied.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:

Plaintiffs Sabrina and Stanford Solomon’s Daubert Motion

to Exclude Causation and Appropriateness of Treatment

Opinions of Defendant’s Expert, Dr. Richard Ofstein (Doc. #

50) is DENIED.

DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this

23rd day of October, 2025.

lage 9n. Henenby Couch

VIRGINIA M. HERNANDEZ*COVINGTON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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