Sparkman

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

PAUL E. SPARKMAN, SR.,

individually and as administrator of No. 4:24-CV-01338

THE ESTATE OF PAUL E.

SPARKMAN, JR., (Chief Judge Brann)

Plaintiff,

v.

POTTER COUNTY, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

OCTOBER 23, 2025

I. BACKGROUND

On August 8, 2024, Plaintiff Paul E. Sparkman, Sr. filed a five-count

complaint against a number of Defendants related to the Potter County,

Pennsylvania Jail (“PCJ”). As relevant to the currently pending motions, the

Defendants include the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center Charles Cole

Memorial Hospital (“UPMC”) and Dr. Aaron Hill (“Hill”), a doctor employed by

UPMC who treated patients at PCJ on the night of the incident.

The claims in this case arise from the death of Plaintiff’s son, Paul E.

Sparkman, Jr. (“Decedent”), by suicide while incarcerated at PCJ. In essence,

Plaintiff alleges that PCJ personnel failed to provide necessary medical care to his

son and thereby caused his suicide. He further alleges that Hill and UPMC were

deficient in their care for him, leading to Decedent’s unfortunate death.

Previously, UPMC filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.1 The Court granted UPMC’s

motion and dismissed Plaintiff’s original complaint without prejudice, finding that

Plaintiff had not sufficiently pled that UPMC or its agents breached a duty owed to

Decedent.2 After the Court ordered as much, Hill also filed a 12(b)(6) motion to

dismiss,3 which the Court denied as moot.4 Plaintiff then filed an amended

complaint5 and now both UPMC and Hill have moved to dismiss this amended

complaint under rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.6

The motions are now ripe for disposition. For the reasons that follow,

UPMC’s motion is denied, and Hill’s motion is denied in part and granted in part.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Dismiss Standard

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), courts dismiss a complaint,

in whole or in part, if the plaintiff fails to “state a claim upon which relief can be

granted.” Following the landmark decisions of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly7 and

1 Doc. 13 (Mot. to Dismiss); Doc. 23 (Br. in Supp.).

2 Doc. 39 (Memo. Op.).

3 Doc. 41 (Mot. to Dismiss).

4 Doc. 51 (Memo. Op.).

5 Doc. 40 (Amend. Compl.).

6 Doc. 53 (Mot. to Dismiss, UPMC); Doc. 55 (Mot. to Dismiss, Hill).

7 550 U.S. 544 (2007).

Ashcroft v. Iqbal,8 “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.’”9 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has instructed

that “[u]nder the pleading regime established by Twombly and Iqbal, a court

reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint must take three steps”: (1) “take note of the

elements the plaintiff must plead to state a claim”; (2) “identify allegations that,

because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of

truth”; and (3) “assume the[] veracity” of all “well-pleaded factual allegations” and

then “determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”10

When deciding a motion to dismiss, a court considers only the allegations in

the complaint, exhibits attached thereto, and facts of public record.11 In this case,

parties have both attached exhibits to their briefs, specifically including deposition

testimony.12 The depositions attached are neither integral to Plaintiff’s complaint,

nor explicitly relied upon inside the complaint, and will not be considered for

purposes of the instant motions lest this stage devolve into a summary judgment

proceeding.13

8 556 U.S. 662 (2009).

9 Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

10 Connelly v. Lane Construction Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotations

and citations omitted).

11 Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010).

12 Doc. 62 (Br. in Supp., UPMC); Doc. 66 (Br. in Supp., Hill); Doc. 71 (Br. in Opp. to UPMC);

Doc. 76 (Br. in Opp. to Hill).

13 Sube v. City of Allentown, 974 F. Supp. 2d 754, 763 (E.D. Pa. 2013); Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d

331, 339 n.3 (3d Cir. 1989); United States Express Lines, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002).

B. Facts Alleged in the Complaint

The facts alleged in the complaint, which this Court must accept as true for

the purposes of this motion, are as follows.

On August 7, 2022, Decedent arrived at PCJ and went through the inmate

intake procedure.14 As part of this procedure, Decedent completed a variety of forms,

including “Application for Defender Services,” a “Pre-Acceptance Qualification

Form,” an “Inmate Classification Form,” a “Receiving Screening Form,” and a

“Brief Jail Mental Health Screen.”15 On these forms, Decedent disclosed a host of

mental health difficulties, including “post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD),

separation anxiety, ADD [(attention deficit disorder)], ADHD [(attention deficit

hyperactivity disorder)], bipolar [disorder], intermittent explosive disorder (IED),

and depression.”16 Decedent also stated that he was prescribed the antidepressants

Wellbutrin (bupropion) and Remeron (mirtazapine), and the alpha-blocker

Minipress (prazosin).17

On August 10, 2022, Registered Nurse Valerie Tinder (“Nurse Tinder”), a

PCJ employee and Defendant, conducted a “Nursing Assessment” of Decedent as

part of the intake process.18 It appears that Decedent communicated his mental health

The Court finds that certain documents were explicitly relied upon in the complaint, including

but not limited to Doc. 71-6 (Exhibit E – Agreement for Physician Services).

14 Doc. 49 (Amend. Compl.) at ¶¶ 18-21.

15 Id.

16 Id. at ¶ 18.

17 Id.

18 Id. at ¶ 23.

issues to Nurse Tinder.19 He explained that he was under the care of “Dr. Nancy

Allen” at a treatment facility called “New Beginnings,” and provided contact

information for both his doctor and her practice.20 Decedent also informed Nurse

Tinder that he had last filled his prescriptions for “Lexapro, Mirtazapine, and

Wellbutrin on March 8, 2022—155 days earlier.”21 At the end of the Nursing

Assessment, Nurse Tinder inexplicably checked “No” in the fields for “Psychiatric

Problems,” “Hospitalizations,” “Psychiatrist,” “Counselor,” and “Suicidal Ideas

Now” and “In Past,” declined to refer Decedent to a counselor, and wrote that

“[i]nmate denies any acute medical problems at this time.”22

UPMC contracts with PCJ to provide certain medical care to inmates.23 The

contract requires UPMC to provide an on-site physician (or Physician’s

Assistant/Certified Nurse Practitioner) to PCJ at least once a week.24 The physician’s

duties include “evaluat[ing] ill inmates,” “perform[ing] physicals on newly

committed inmates, trustees for kitchen duty and kitchen employees,” and ordering

necessary medications, among others.25 Plaintiff pleads that UPMC did not provide

specialized training to its physicians regarding their duties at PCJ, did not provide

policies regarding suicide prevention or intervention to its treating physicians, did

19 Id.

20 Id.

21 Id. at ¶ 26.

22 Id. at ¶¶ 27-28.

23 Id. at ¶ 9.

24 Doc. 71-6 (Exhibit E – Agreement for Physician Services) at ¶ 1.

25 Id.

not communicate with the PCJ warden to establish protocols for physician standards,

and did not have in place any guidelines for how to triage patients.26 Essentially,

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that treating physicians at PCJ had virtually no

oversight from UPMC.27

The physician assigned to PCJ on the evening of August 11, 2022 was Dr.

Aaron Hill, Defendant in this case and a movant here.28 Hill arrived at PCJ around

6:10 pm, and would have met with Nurse Tinder upon arrival that evening.29 This

meeting, and the information discussed therein, is crucial to the instant motions.

Plaintiff pleads that, in that meeting, Nurse Tinder would have provided Hill with a

schedule of patients for the evening, explaining to him each patient’s medical

history, list of medications, and her written nursing assessment.30 Specifically,

Plaintiff pleads that Hill “would have learned by approximately 6:15 pm that

Sparkman was a new inmate who had treated with Dr. Allen at New Beginnings, and

that he had been taking three anti-depressant, psychotropic medications, Lexapro,

Mirtazepine, and Wellbutrin, last filled . . . on April 6, 2022 (Lexapro) and March 8,

2022 (Mirtazepine and Wellbutrin).”31 Plaintiff specifically notes that Nurse Tinder

did not share with Hill other information she had about Decedent, including: “(a)

26 Id. at ¶ 31.

27 Id.

28 Doc. 49 (Amend. Compl.) at ¶ 37.

29 Id. at ¶ 38.

30 Id. at ¶¶ 38-39.

31 Id. at ¶ 40.

diagnoses of PTSD, separation anxiety, ADD, ADHD, bipolar, IED, and depression;

(b) that he wished to see the counselor soon; (c) that he was suffering from stress,

depression, and anxiety.”32

After the meeting, Nurse Tinder and Hill walked to the nearby examination

room and asked a correctional officer to bring the inmates in “one by one, in the

order that Nurse Tinder planned for Dr. Hill to see them, beginning around 6:15.”33

Between 6:15 and 6:30, Hill and Nurse Tinder examined patients other than

Decedent.34 None of the patients examined first had the same “grave concerns” that

Decedent did, including not having access to psychotropic medications.35

Unfortunately, before Hill examined Decedent that evening, Decedent hanged

himself in his cell sometime before 6:30 pm.36 The correctional officer who

discovered him retrieved Hill and Nurse Tinder, who attempted to perform CPR to

no avail.37

Plaintiff initiated the instant suit to recover for his son’s death. His amended

complaint brings claims, as relevant to the moving defendants, for state law medical

negligence and a violation of the Eight Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual

32 Id. at ¶ 41.

33 Id. at ¶ 42.

34 Id. at ¶ 43.

35 Id. at ¶ 43.

36 Id. at ¶ 47.

37 Id. at ¶¶ 47-48.

punishment.38 He asserts his right to bring these claims under Pennsylvania’s

Wrongful Death and Survivorship Acts.39

C. Analysis

Plaintiff brings claims against Hill and UPMC for medical negligence,

wrongful death, survival, and violations of Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983.40 As a private

corporation, UPMC is not a person under the Section 1983 statute and Plaintiff

agrees that dismissal of this claim is proper for UPMC.41 Accordingly, Defendant

UPMC’s motion to dismiss the Section 1983 claim is unopposed and granted.

Against UPMC remains the medical negligence claims and the attached

wrongful death and survival claims. Against Hill remains the same in addition to the

Section 1983 claim. Defendants UPMC and Hill have moved to dismiss these claims,

and Hill has moved additionally to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims of punitive damages

against him.42 I address first the medical negligence claims, then medical

negligence’s progeny (wrongful death and survival). I then move to the Section 1983

claim and finish with punitive damages.

38 Id. at ¶¶ 82-85, 103, 111, 114.

39 Id.

40 Id. at ¶¶ 28-40.

41 Doc. 71 (Br. in Opp. to UPMC) at 13-14.

42 Doc. 53 (Mot. To Dismiss, UPMC); Doc. 55 (Mot. To Dismiss, Hill); Doc. 66 (Br. in Supp.,

Hill) at 17-18.

1. Medical Negligence

Plaintiff’s claim of medical or professional negligence requires him to prove

that 1) Defendant owed a duty to a patient; 2) Defendant breached that duty through

an “unwarranted departure from the generally accepted of medical practice”; 3) that

the breach was the direct and proximate cause of the harm suffered, and; 4) that the

damages suffered were a direct result of the harm.43 Plaintiff claims medical

negligence against UPMC directly, against UPMC vicariously through Hill, and

against Hill directly.44 I analyze first UPMC’s direct liability, then jointly analyze

UPMC’s vicarious liability and Hill’s direct liability, as those claims rise and fall

together.

a. UPMC’s Direct Liability

In his amended complaint, Plaintiff has added a direct negligence claim for

UPMC’s “corporate negligence.”45 “A hospital, or other medical provider, may be

held directly liable for its own ‘institutional’ negligence if it fails in its nondelegable

duty to uphold the proper standard of care it owes to a patient.”46 This direct theory

43 See Doe v. Hospital of Univ. of Pa., 546 F. Supp. 3d 336, 344-45 (E.D. Pa. 2021); Hickey v.

Merritt-Scully, No. 18-CV-1793, 2022 WL 883851, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 2022).

44 Doc. 49 (Amend. Compl.) at ¶¶ 101, 103, 105, 108.

45 Doc. 49 (Amend. Compl.) at ¶ 108.

46 Estate of Goldberg v. Nimoityn, 193 F. Supp. 3d 482, 492 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (citing Thompson v.

Nason Hosp., 527 Pa. 330, 339 (1991)).

of liability appears on its face to be a mere negligence claim, but it is also a medical

negligence claim.47

Pennsylvania law decrees that “the hiring, training, supervising, and

monitoring of employees who assist with the care and treatment of a health care

professional’s patients is considered an integral part of providing professional

services” and, accordingly, negligent hiring or supervision claims stemming from

medical acts should be treated as medical negligence.48 Therefore, the same elements

of medical negligence as described above apply, and Plaintiff must show that UPMC

breached their duty by deviating from the acceptable professional standard for

similar healthcare providers.49 Additionally, to establish a breach of institutional

duty, Pennsylvania law requires a plaintiff to prove that the healthcare provider had

“actual or constructive knowledge of the defect or procedures which created the

harm and that the hospital’s negligence was a substantial factor in bringing about the

harm.”50

47 See Ditch v. Waynesboro Hosp., 917 A.2d 317, 322-23 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (defining medical

malpractice as the “unwarranted departure from generally accepted standards of medical

practice resulting in injury to a patient, including all liability-producing conduct arising from

the rendition of professional medical services.”) (emphasis added) (internal quotation omitted).

In determining whether a claim sounds in medical negligence, courts look to two

characteristics: whether the action could only occur within the course of a professional

relationship and whether the claim necessarily raises questions involving medical judgment.

See Doe, 546 F. Supp. 3d at 345.

48 Ditch, 917 A.2d at 322; Doe, 546 F. Supp. 3d at 344-45 (collecting Pennsylvania cases).

49 See id.

50 Estate of Goldberg, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 492. Unless a hospital’s negligence is “obvious,” expert

testimony will be required to establish breach and the substantial factor components of an

institutional duty claim. Id.

First, Plaintiff must plead that a duty arose, or attached, between UPMC and

the Decedent. Healthcare providers operating in a manner other than the traditional

hospital setting may still be charged with a duty to patients.51 Pennsylvania has set

out two methods for analyzing whether a duty attaches in healthcare-provider cases:

application of relevant sections of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, or analysis of

the Althaus factors.52 The relevant provision of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,

§324A, provides for liability as follows:

One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to

another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third

person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm

resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his

undertaking, if

(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such

harm, or

(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third

person, or

(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third

person upon the undertaking.53

51 See Scampone v. Grane Healthcare Company, 169 A.3d 600, 619 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017)

(finding a healthcare company had a duty of care to patients of a nursing home by contractually

undertaking to manage their care); Johnson v. Lutton, 466 F. Supp. 3d 472, 476 (M.D. Pa.

2020) (“A hospital, therefore, may owe a non-delegable duty of care to its patient even if the

hospital does not serve as a comprehensive health center.”) (internal quotation omitted).

52 See Johnson, 466 F. Supp. 3d at 476 (citing Scampone v. Highland Park Care Center, LLC.,

618 Pa. 363, 396 (2012); see also Scampone v. Grane Healthcare Company, 169 A.3d 600,

617 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017). The Althaus factors include weighing “(1) the relationship between

the parties; (2) the social utility of the actor’s conduct; (3) the nature of the risk imposed and

foreseeability of the harm incurred; (4) the consequences of imposing a duty upon the actor;

and (5) the overall public interest in the proposed solution.” Althaus ex rel. Althaus v. Cohen,

562 Pa. 547, 553 (2000). The Althaus factors are an alternative to the Restatement, “most

relevant to the creation of new duties than the vindication of existing ones.” Alderwoods Pa.

Inc. v. Duquesne Light Co., 630 Pa. 45, 66 (2014); see also Ramsey v. Salvation Army, No.

2:21-CV-557, 2023 WL 5098500, at *11 (W.D. Pa. June 9, 2023).

53 Restatement (Second) of Torts §324A. The Restatement (Second) of Torts §323 is similar, but

applies when the provider treats directly with the patient, or owes the duty directly to him,

Despite Plaintiff’s addition of a direct liability claim against UPMC, all parties’

briefings lack any legal analysis on whether a duty arose between UPMC and

decedent under these standards.54 At this point, however, the Court finds that

Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to plausibly create a duty between UPMC and the

patients in the PCJ. Specifically, the Court finds it plausible, based on the pleadings,

that the Restatement (Second) of Torts §324A has been met: UPMC undertook to

provide care to patients, it should have recognized this undertaking as necessary to

the protection of patients’ wellbeing, and this duty was owed to the patients by PCJ

and shared through contract to UPMC.55

Given that a duty plausibly arose between UPMC and Decedent, the

subsequent question is what, specifically, that duty entails and whether Plaintiff has

pled it through to completion. Plaintiff sets out four alleged duties that UPMC had

to Decedent directly: 1) the duty to use reasonable care in the maintenance of safe

instead of through third person liability. Courts frequently cite these two provisions in

determining whether a healthcare provider owed a patient the duty of care. See, e.g., McClure

v. Parvis, 294 F. Supp. 3d 318, 327-29 (E.D. Pa. 2018).

54 See Doc. 62 (Br. in Supp., UPMC) at 10-11 (providing no legal support for why a duty should

not arise between healthcare providers and patients); Doc. 71 (Br. in Opp. to UPMC) at 15-17

(providing no case law support or analysis on why a duty should be imposed between UPMC

and Decedent in the “duty” section of his brief), 22-23 (spending one paragraph defending the

entire corporate negligence claim with no support for imposing a duty); Doc. 77 (Reply Br.,

UPMC) at 3-6 (arguing that there could be no breach of duty or duty imposed, but failing to

provide any legal support or analysis on either); Doc. 78 (Reply Br., Hill) at 2-3 (arguing there

was no breach).

55 Parties are encouraged to address the issue at summary judgment, but for purposes of this

motion, Defendant UPMC has waived the argument by failing to support it with legal citations

or analysis.

and adequate facilities and equipment; 2) the duty to select and retain only competent

physicians; 3) the duty to oversee all persons who practice medicine within their

walls (or the walls of PCJ) as to patient care; and 4) the duty to formulate, adopt and

enforce adequate rules and policies to ensure quality care for patients.56 For each

duty theory, Plaintiff must plead facts to show that that duty was breached, and that

the breach of that duty caused harm.57 A theory that does not sufficiently plead each

element will be dismissed.

First, Plaintiff claims that UPMC violated its duty to use reasonable care in

the maintenance of safe and adequate facilities.58 For this theory, Plaintiff has not

pled that Decedent used or was harmed by unsafe facilities or equipment under the

responsibility of UPMC. Nor has Plaintiff pled or explained why Defendant would

be responsible for maintenance of PCJ’s facilities where the injury at hand occurred.

Therefore, this theory of duty is insufficiently pled and, accordingly, dismissed.

Plaintiff’s next three duty theories work in tandem and, as such, I will address

them together. Plaintiff alleges that UPMC fell below the professional standard of

care in failing to select and retain competent physicians and in failing to oversee

those physicians through the creation and enforcement of policies.59 The Court

56 Doc. 49 (Amend. Compl.) at ¶108. These are the four non-delegable duties that Pennsylvania

law generally recognizes for hospitals. See Estate of Goldberg, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 492,

Thompson, 591 A.2d at 707.

57 See Perotti v. Festival Fun Parks, LLC, No. 2:19-CV-1176, 2021 WL 3173463, at *1 (W.D.

Pa., July 21, 2021) (citing Krentz v. Consol. Rail Corp., 910 A.2d 20, 27-28 (Pa. 2006)).

58 Doc. 49 (Amend. Compl.) at ¶ 108.

59 Doc. 49 (Amend. Compl.) at ¶ 108.

believes that what Plaintiff is pleading here is that had UPMC hired a competent

doctor instead of Hill60, or had Plaintiff created and enforced policies for patient

care61, the treating doctor would have gone directly to Decedent62 which would have

prevented Decedent’s death.63

Plaintiff certainly could be more explicit in tying these causal chains together

through effective pleading. However, at this point, Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts

to raise an expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the elements of his

claim.64 Plaintiff has pled that UPMC was under contract with Potter County to

provide medical care to PCJ prisoners.65 Plaintiff has pled that UPMC did not

provide Hill with training for his work at PCJ nor with any policies about suicide

prevention.66 Plaintiff has pled that Hill was underqualified to be providing medical

care.67 Plaintiff has pled that Hill should have but did not immediately attend to

Decedent based upon the information provided at his arrival to PCJ.68 Plaintiff has

pled, albeit indirectly, that this delay in attending to Decedent stemmed either from

60 Doc. 49 (Amend. Compl.) at ¶ 30 (noting that Hill was not board certified).

61 Doc. 49 (Amend. Compl.) at ¶¶ 31-32, 103 (f).

62 Doc. 49 (Amend. Compl.) at ¶ 103 (g), (h), (i); Doc. 71 (Br. in Opp. to UPMC) at 20-21.

63 Doc. 49 (Amend. Compl.) at ¶¶ 43-46, 103 (g), (h), (i); Doc. 71 (Br. in Opp. to UPMC) at 20-

21.

64 Lutz v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, 49 F.4th 323, 328 (3d Cir. 2022); Fought v. City of

Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, 466 F. Supp. 3d 477, 508 (M.D. Pa. 2020).

65 Doc. 49 (Amend. Compl.) at ¶ 9.

66 Id. at 31.

67 Id. at ¶¶ 30-32

68 Id. at ¶¶ 38, 43-44.

Hill’s lack of qualifications or the lack of policies in place by UPMC.69 Finally,

Plaintiff has pled that Decedent would still be alive but-for Hill’s delay in attending

to him.70 These pleadings meet the elements of medical negligence against UPMC:

duty, breach, cause, harm.

Additionally, Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to establish that UPMC had

constructive notice of its alleged breaches of duty, as is required under this theory of

liability.71 Given that UPMC employed Hill, the Court can reasonably infer that

UPMC should have been aware of his qualifications. Moreover, UPMC is on

constructive notice of its own lack of policies.72 Therefore, Plaintiff has pled

sufficient facts to be “entitled to develop a factual record to support the applicability

of the corporate negligence theory to [Defendant].”73 Accordingly, Defendant

UPMC’s motion to dismiss is DENIED for the direct medical negligence claims.

69 Id. at ¶¶ 28-36, 103(g), (h), (i), (f).

70 Doc. 49 (Amend. Compl.) at ¶¶ 43-46, 86, 103 (g), (h), (i); Doc. 71 (Br. in Opp. to UPMC) 20-

22.

71 See Estate of Goldberg, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 492.

72 Graham v. Barolat, No. 03-CV-2029, 2004 WL 2668579, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 2004)

(explaining that a hospital is deemed to be on constructive notice where its failure to have an

adequate policy in place or enforce an otherwise acceptable policy caused the injury); Rauch

v. Mike-Mayer, 783 A.2d 815, 828 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) (holding that “constructive notice

must be imposed when the failure … is caused by the absence of supervision.”).

73 McClure v. Parvis, 294 F. Supp. 3d 318, 329 (E.D. Pa. 2018). Whether the alleged fifteen-

minute delay in attending to Decedent is a breach of the appropriate professional standard of

care, and whether UPMC’s negligence was a “substantial factor” in bringing about Decedent’s

harm, are questions that discovery and expert testimony will reveal. See Munoz v. Children’s

Hospital of Philadelphia, 265 A.3d 801, 806 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2021) (noting that in medical

malpractice cases, an expert must testify that the defendant deviated from acceptable standards

of care and that the conduct increased the risk of the harm sustained. Then, the trier of fact

determines whether that conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the harm.).

b. Hill’s Direct and UPMC’s Vicarious Liability

“[T]raditional vicarious liability rules ordinarily make principals or employers

vicariously liable for acts of their agents or employees in the scope of their authority

or employment.”74 Parties do not dispute that Hill is an agent for UPMC and that his

actions could make UPMC vicariously liable.75 So, if Hill was medically negligent

in the course of his employment, then so too was UPMC.

Upon first reading Plaintiff’s amended complaint, it appeared that Plaintiff

was pleading UPMC could be vicariously liable based on the actions of both Hill

and Nurse Tinder.76 The introductory section of Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition

makes several allusions to this effect.77 Curiously, though, Plaintiff abandons this

theory of vicarious liability by the argument section, instead addressing only Hill’s

74 Garafola v. Lackawanna Cnty. Corr. Care, Inc., No. 3:07CV2305, 2008 WL 4861992, at *3

(M.D. Pa. Nov. 6, 2008) (citing Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 285 (2003)).

75 Doc. 62 (Br. in Supp., UPMC) at 7. In Hill’s brief in support, he states that he was merely

“filling in” for a colleague. Doc. 66 (Br. in Supp., Hill) at 3. The Court notes that whether Hill

is an agent of UPMC or an independent contractor could change the legal analysis determining

whether Hill’s actions can impute liability to UPMC. See Green v. Pa. Hosp., 633 Pa. 18, 29-

30 (2015). However, by not contesting the agency of Hill, Defendant UPMC has waived this

argument for purposes of the instant motion.

76 See Doc. 49 (Amend. Compl.) at ¶ 33 (stating Nurse Tinder was “employed as a registered

nurse at UPMC Cole at all material times when working several partial days each week at

PCJ”); id. at ¶ 106 (“UPMC Cole is vicariously liable to Plaintiff for the acts and omissions of

Nurse Tinder, who was acting as employee, agent and/or ostensible agent of UPMC Cole.”).

77 Doc. 71 (Br. in Opp. to UPMC) at 1 (naming Nurse Tinder as an “agent/employee” of UPMC);

id. at 5 (naming Nurse Tinder in the subsection’s heading); id. at 10 n.8 (stating Nurse Tinder

was “employed as a registered nurse at UPMC Cole at all material times when working several

partial days each week at PCJ.”).

negligence.78 Indeed, Plaintiff even expressly disclaims this theory for the instant

motion, stating that “Nurse Tinder was employed as a registered nurse at UPMC

Cole during the time she served as the PCJ nurse, including on August 10-11[,] 2022,

and her agency as well as UPMC Cole’s vicarious liability for her (in addition to Dr.

Hill) will be questions for another day, after the parties have engaged in full

discovery.”79 The Court is not sure what day Plaintiff is waiting for, given that

UPMC’s vicarious liability is for its agents the main question of the instant motion.

Taking a closer look at Plaintiff’s amended complaint, Plaintiff did not state

sufficient facts to support the conclusion that “UPMC Cole is vicariously liable to

Plaintiff for the acts and omissions of Nurse Tinder, who was acting as employee,

agent and/or ostensible agent of UPMC Cole.”80 The complaint states that Nurse

Tinder was “employed as a registered nurse at UPMC Cole at all material times when

working several partial days each week at PCJ”81 but, notably, Plaintiff does not

make any connection between UPMC’s employment of Nurse Tinder and her job at

PCJ.82 For instance, Plaintiff does not plead that Nurse Tinder was under contract

78 Id. at 11 (Stating the question presented as UPMC’s vicarious liability “for its employee/agent,

Dr. Hill”); id. at 14 (only addressing Hill as an agent of UPMC); id. at 15-22 (analyzing only

agency liability for Hill).

79 Id. at 19 (emphasis added).

80 Doc. 49 (Amend. Compl.) at ¶106.

81 Id. at ¶ 33

82 To support a claim of vicarious liability as an agent, plaintiff “must allege facts that, if proved,

would establish that the alleged agent had express, implied, or apparent authority to act on

behalf of the principal.” Simmons v. Galin, No. 97-CV-6151, 1999 WL 639843, at *2 (E.D.

Pa. Aug. 23, 1999) (citing Volunteer Fire Co. of New Buffalo v. Hilltop Oil Co., 412 Pa. Super.

with UPMC to go to PCJ, like Hill.83 It appears that Nurse Tinder’s employment at

UMPC may have been entirely independent from and unrelated to her employment

at PCJ.

Regardless, the Court need not address whether the facts as pled raise an

inference of agency, as Plaintiff has expressly disclaimed the Nurse Tinder theory

of vicarious liability.84 The Court will not second guess that decision and, therefore,

will proceed with Hill as the sole agent relevant to the vicarious liability inquiry.

Plaintiff’s claim against Hill for medical negligence and for UPMC’s

vicarious liability rise and fall together, as the underlying analysis is the same for

both. Accordingly, I address them together. The elements for medical negligence as

recited above apply here: duty, breach of the professional standard of care, proximate

cause, and harm.85

First, whether Hill owed Decedent any duty. Plaintiff has alleged that Hill had

a duty of care to Decedent, namely the duty to “comply with generally accepted

medical and mental health standards of care in their medical treatment of

140, 146-47 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)). Plaintiff has not alleged facts beyond that Nurse Tinder

was employed at both places simultaneously.

83 The absence of this connection is stark when contrasted with the similar pleadings of Hill’s

involvement. Compare Doc. 49 (Amend. Compl.) at ¶ 10 (“Defendant Aaron Hill, M.D. . . .

was, at all relevant times, a non-board certified hospitalist physician under contract with

UMPC Cole who was assigned to work at PCJ”) with ¶ 11 (“Defendant Valerie Tinder, RN .

was, at all relevant times, a registered nurse who was working under contract at PCJ.”).

84 Doc. 71 (Br. in Opp. to UPMC) at 19.

85 See Doe, 546 F. Supp. 3d at 344-45; Hickey v. Merritt-Scully, 2022 WL 883851, at *7.

Sparkman.”86 Duty is the stickiest legal question in this case. Under Pennsylvania

law, the question of whether a duty attached is a legal one for the Court to decide,

while the scope of that duty is generally a factual question for the jury.87 There are

two avenues for attaching a duty between Hill and Decedent in this case: first, the

responsibilities enumerated in the contract between PCJ and UPMC; second, the

duties imposed on Hill arising under the independent doctor-patient relationship.

Beginning with the duties imposed on Hill under the contract between PCJ

and UPMC, the Court finds the analysis from the previous motion to dismiss largely

the same.88 Plaintiff points repeatedly to the contract between PCJ and UPMC as a

basis for imposing duties on Hill.89 The Court will accept that the contract imposes

some duties on Hill. Specifically, Plaintiff pleads that the contract creates a duty to

administer a patient physical within a set number of days of admittance90 and a duty

to prescribe medications.91 Neither of these two avenues ultimately survive a motion

86 Doc. 49 (Amend. Compl.) at ¶ 102.

87 K.H. v. Kumar, 122 A.3d 1080, 1096 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015) (noting that whether a duty attaches

is a separate inquiry from “the precise contours of what care was appropriate under the

circumstances of that case. Rather, we addres[s] the particular standard of care and the doctor’s

satisfaction thereof as a question of fact.”).

88 Doc. 39 (Memo. Op.) at 18-19.

89 Doc. 49 (Amend. Compl.) at ¶¶ 10, 103; Doc. 76 (Br. in Opp. to Hill) at 15-18. Doc. 71 (Br.

in Opp. to UPMC) at 15-18. Hill argues in his brief in support that he was not a party to the

contract between UPMC and PCJ and, therefore, cannot be bound by the duties imposed in

that contract. Doc. 66 (Br. in Supp., Hill) at 9. Defendant’s point is well taken. However,

because the Court finds that no theory of duty arising from the contract supports a viable claim

for medical negligence, the point is moot and shall not be decided here.

90 Doc. 49 (Amend. Compl.) at ¶ 103; Doc. 76 (Br. in Opp. to Hill) at 16-18; Doc. 54 (Answer to

Amend. Compl.) ¶ 37.

91 Doc. 49 (Amend. Compl.) at ¶ 103 (l). Plaintiff has not pled that this contract imposes a general

duty to abide by the accepted medical standard of care.

to dismiss. Indeed, Hill was under a duty to conduct a patient physical within a set

number of days of admittance, but as the Court previously discussed in its

memorandum opinion, there was no breach of this duty.92 Additionally, assuming

for a moment that Hill was in breach of his duty to prescribe medications to

Decedent, Plaintiff has not explained how that breach caused Decedent’s death.

Even if Hill had prescribed medication immediately upon receiving Decedent’s file,

Plaintiff has not pled that these medications would have been delivered to Decedent

within the fifteen-minute interval, nor that the medications would have been

effective during that time. Moreover, Plaintiff has not pled facts indicating a duty

between Hill and Decedent arose before Hill arrived at PCJ that evening that would

have required him to prescribe medication earlier. Therefore, neither of these

contractually-imposed duty theories can support the weight of a full negligence

claim. The duty to provide a physical does not survive past breach, and the duty to

prescribe medication crumbles at causation, if not earlier.

92 Doc. 39 (Memo. Op.) at 18. In briefing, Plaintiff argues that the inmate physicals ought to have

been conducted within seven days of admittance and points out that a visit on Thursday, August

18 would have occurred four days late. Doc. 76 (Br. in Opp. to Hill) at 16. Decedent was

admitted on August 7 and died on August 11. Doc. 49 (Amend. Compl.) at ¶¶ 17-18. The Court

fails to see how Hill was somehow in breach of the policy by having Decedent’s physical

scheduled for August 11, and certainly does not see the relevance of the August 18 date.

Regardless of whether the physical needed to happen within seven days of admittance or

fourteen, Hill was not yet in breach when Decedent passed away four days after admittance.

Moreover, Plaintiff has not pled or effectively argued why the contractual duty to give

Decedent a physical within seven days provides a duty to see Decedent first that evening.

Next, the Court turns to the more general doctor-patient duty. A physician has

a duty to their patient to exercise reasonable medical care.93 The duty arises at the

“inception” of a physician-patient relationship.94 At this point, Plaintiff has pled facts

sufficient to indicate that a doctor-patient relationship could have existed on August

11. Plaintiff has pled that Hill was responsible for providing healthcare services to

inmates and arrived at PCJ on August 11th to do so.95 Plaintiff has pled that Hill was

“scheduled” to see certain patients,96 and that Decedent was one of the patients Hill

was scheduled to see.97 Plaintiff has pled that Nurse Tinder would have informed

Hill of some of Decedent’s history, including his treatment at New Beginnings and

that he was prescribed (but did not have access to) anti-depressant, psychotropic

medications.98 From these pleadings, there was plausibly a doctor-patient

relationship between Hill and Decedent. Indeed, that Hill had reviewed some of

Decedent’s history/file and was scheduled to see him minutes later weighs in favor

93 Munoz v. Child.’s Hosp. of Phila., No. 1388-EDA-2024, 2025 WL 1504354, at *17 (Pa. Super.

Ct. May 27, 2025); K.H. v. Kumar, 122 A.3d at 1097.

94 K.H. v. Kumar, 122 A.3d at 1097. The exact moment of onset for a doctor-patient relationship

is not widely discussed in Pennsylvania law. See White v. Cornish, No. 1806-EDA-2014, 2015

WL 1641517, at *5 (Pa. Super. Ct. Apr. 13, 2015) (analyzing cases from other jurisdictions

about onset of doctor-patient relationship based on a phone call conversation). Language in

one Pennsylvania Superior Court opinion suggests that factors to consider in this determination

are whether a doctor examines the patient, reviews his records, or anticipates a physician-

patient relationship. See id. Similarly, language from the neighboring state of New Jersey

suggesting the onset occurs when a doctor “takes a case.” See Schueler v. Strelinger, 43 N.J.

330, 344 (1964).

95 Doc. 49 (Amend. Compl.) at ¶¶ 10, 38.

96 Id. at ¶ 38.

97 Id. at ¶¶39-43.

98 Id. at ¶ 40.

of finding the relationship existed. Hill “took” Decedent’s case—the contractual

obligation to see patients left him no choice but to do so. Accordingly, Plaintiff

sufficiently pleads that Hill, as a medical practitioner, was under “a duty to comply

with generally accepted medical and mental health standards of care” in treating

Decedent.99

As Plaintiff has plausibly pled that Hill had a duty to Decedent, the Court will

turn briefly to the other elements. Plaintiff has pled that Hill breached this duty of

care in a variety of ways, including his delay in attending to Decedent.100 Plaintiff

has also pled that the delay in attending to Decedent, among various other

deficiencies, caused Decedent’s death.101 At this stage, the Court must accept

allegations as true and draw inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. In

doing so, the Court finds Plaintiff’s medical negligence claim against Hill plausible.

99 Doc. 49 (Amended Compl.) at ¶ 102. The difference between this duty and the contractual

duties analyzed in the preceding paragraph is how the duty arises and the breadth of its scope.

A duty arising through contractual obligations includes only the responsibilities in that contract

as pled, while a more general duty arising under an independent doctor-patient relationship can

be breached by violating the standard of care. The litany of deficiencies that Plaintiff alleges

in paragraph 103 of his amended complaint may very well fall under this general duty if they

are required by the appropriate standard of care. In this framework, deficiencies such as those

alleged in paragraph 103 should be analyzed under breach rather than duty. The Court believes

that this framework most closely aligns with Pennsylvania law and guidance. See K.H. v.

Kumar, 122 A.3d 1080, 1097 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015).

100 Doc. 49 (Amended Compl.) at ¶¶ 43, 103 (g), (h), (i). The Court need not accept as true

conclusory allegations, but this allegation has some logical support. The Court finds it plausible

that failing to prioritize urgent patients over non-urgent ones could be a breach of the medical

standard of care. Accordingly, the issue of whether Defendant Hill breached his duty of care

is for discovery, expert testimony, and a jury if necessary.

101 Doc. 49 (Amend. Compl.) at ¶¶ 43-46, 103 (g), (h), (i); Doc. 71 (Br. in Opp. to UPMC) at 20-

21.

Accordingly, the medical negligence claims against Hill and, vicariously, UPMC

survive, and Defendants’ motions to dismiss are denied.

2. Wrongful Death and Survival

Plaintiff has also brought claims under the Pennsylvania Wrongful Death and

Survival Statutes.102 These claims rise and fall with the underlying tort alleged; a

plaintiff must state a valid claim for the predicate tort to state a claim for survival or

wrongful death.103 Parties are in agreement about this correlation—Defendants argue

only that the medical negligence claim has not been met and that, therefore, Plaintiff

has not successfully plead these claims either.104 Because Plaintiff has stated a valid

medical negligence claim against UPMC and Hill, so too has he stated valid

wrongful death and survival claims. Accordingly, Defendants’ motions will be

denied on these claims.

3. Section 1983

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a procedural vehicle for private plaintiffs to

enforce the Constitution when they suffer violations under color of state law.105 To

plead a Section 1983 claim, “a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured

by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged

102 42 Pa. C.S. §§8301 and 8302, respectively. Doc. 49 (Amend. Compl.) at ¶¶109-112; 113-115.

103 Simmons v. Simpson House, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 3d 200, 209 (E.D. Pa. 2017).

104 Doc. 62 (Br. in Supp., UPMC) at 11-12; Doc. 66 (Br. in Supp., Hill) at 18-19.

105 Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002).

deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.”106 Plaintiff

contends that Decedent’s Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual

punishment was violated when he was provided with such deficient medical care

that he committed suicide.107

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits

infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments.”108 “Deliberate indifference to

serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton

infliction of pain’ proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.”109 “A particular

vulnerability to suicide represents a serious medical need.”110 The Third Circuit has

established a framework for analyzing Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference

to medical needs claims in the context of prison suicides. To make out an Eighth

Amendment claim, “a plaintiff in a prison suicide case has the burden of

establishing three elements: (1) the detainee had a ‘particular vulnerability to

suicide,’ (2) the custodial officer or officers knew or should have known of that

106 West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Defendant Hill does not contest that he was acting

under color of law enforcement, and, accordingly, the Court will not analyze that question now.

Doc. 66 (Br. in Supp., Hill) at 11-13.

107 Doc. 76 (Br. in Opp. to Hill) at 20-22.

108 U.S. CONST. AMEND. VIII.

109 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173

(1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ.))

110 Woloszyn v. Cnty. of Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314, 320 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Colburn v. Upper

Darby Twp., 946 F.2d 1017, 1023 (3d Cir. 1991) (“Colburn II”)).

vulnerability, and (3) those officers ‘acted with reckless indifference’ to the

detainee’s particular vulnerability.”111

The Court need not decide the first element, because the claim fails plainly

on the second and third elements.112 Beginning with the second element, Plaintiff

must plead that Defendant knew or should have known of an inmate’s particular

vulnerability to suicide.113 The Third Circuit has explained this element as such:

“[S]hould have known,” . . . is a phrase of art with a meaning distinct from its

usual meaning in the context of the law of torts. It does not refer to a failure

to note a risk that would be perceived with the use of ordinary prudence. It

connotes something more than a negligent failure to appreciate the risk of

suicide presented by the particular detainee, though something less than

subjective appreciation of that risk. The “strong likelihood” of suicide must

be “so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for”

preventative action[;] the risk of self-inflicted injury must be not only great,

but also sufficiently apparent that a lay custodian's failure to appreciate it

evidences an absence of any concern for the welfare of his or her charges.114

111 Colburn II, 946 F.2d at 1023 (citing Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 838 F.2d 663, 669 (3d Cir.

1988) (“Colburn I”)) (emphasis added)

112 The Court notes that there is some consternation in the Pennsylvania jurisprudence over what,

exactly, a particular vulnerability to suicide requires. See Doc. 39 (Memo. Op.) at 12 n. 62.

Precedent indicates that a plaintiff may be required to plead that the inmate had recently stated

his desire to commit suicide or had actually attempted to do so. See, e.g., Bingham v. Lancaster

Cnty., 709 F. Supp. 3d 176, 185-86 (E.D. Pa. 2024) (plaintiff was particularly vulnerable to

suicide when he “had attempted suicide twice before his July 17 death and had exhibited

suicidal ideation on at least three separate occasions . . . [and] [h]is two most recent instances

of suicidal ideation occurred in the days before his death”). It is clear, at least, that a showing

of particular vulnerability requires a “strong likelihood, rather than a mere possibility” that an

inmate will harm himself. Id. at 185. Regardless, the Court need not analyze the question here

and continues without deciding whether Decedent had a particular vulnerability to suicide.

113 Colburn II, 946 F.2d at 1023.

114 Colburn II, 946 F.2d at 1025 (internal citations omitted).

To find as much, the probability of suicide need be apparent to any person with

similar education to the defendant.115

Plaintiff’s claims fall far short of this standard. The facts as pled by Plaintiff

indicate that Nurse Tinder was told that Decedent 1) treated previously at a

different mental health facility; 2) was prescribed anti-depressant, psychotropic

medications; and 3) had not had his medications refilled.116 Plaintiff specifically

pleads that Nurse Tinder would not have shared with Hill “other available

information in Sparkman’s records, including: (a) [his] diagnoses . . . (b) that he

wished to see the counselor soon; (c) that he was suffering from stress, depression,

and anxiety.”117 Many people, especially criminal defendants, have a history of

mental health treatment.118 This, combined with the fact that Decedent was out of

his medication, does not give rise to a situation so dire that the risk of suicide

should have been obvious to any medical practitioner. The information provided to

115 Estate of Kempf v. Wash. Cnty., No. 15-CV-1125, 2018 WL 4354547 at *15 (W.D. Pa. Sept.

12, 2018) (citing Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 266 (3d Cir. 2003)).

116 Doc. 49 (Amend. Compl.) at ¶ 40.

117 Id. at 41. In his brief in opposition, Plaintiff argues that discovery would shed light on “any

other information [Nurse Tinder] may have shared, such as [Decedent’s] anxiety, depression,

and bipolarism.” Doc. 76 (Br. in Opp. to Hill). However, this is flatly inconsistent with the

pleading, where Plaintiff states that Nurse Tinder did not share that information with Hill. Doc.

49 (Amend. Compl.) at ¶ 41.

118 Plaintiff only pleads that Nurse Tinder told Hill that Decedent was “a new inmate who had

treated with Dr. Allen at New Beginnings.” Doc. 49 (Amend. Compl.) at ¶ 40. This at most

implies that Hill knew Decedent had been seen psychologically before by a medical provider.

It says nothing about the tenor of his medical treatment or the extent of his psychological needs.

Hill is not enough to establish that any doctor should have immediately recognized

an obvious danger of suicide, and, therefore, Plaintiff’s claim fails.

Turning to the third element, to establish a claim for a Section 1983

violation, Defendant must have acted with reckless or deliberate indifference

toward Plaintiff’s specific vulnerability.119 Reckless or deliberate indifference

means something “beyond mere negligence.”120 Plaintiff’s main contention in

support of this claim is that Hill did not overrule Nurse Tinder’s order of viewing

patients that evening.121 However, based on the limited information he received,

Hill was not deliberately or recklessly indifferent to a particular vulnerability of

suicide by not going to see Decedent first. 122 Plaintiff’s pleadings are insufficient

119 Colburn II, 946 F.2d at 1023.

120 Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 224 (3d Cir. 2017).

121 In his brief in opposition of Hill’s motion, Plaintiff again changes course from the pleading

and argues that Hill may have ignored Nurse Tinder’s suggestion that he go to Decedent first.

Doc. 76 (Br. in Opp. to Hill) at 23. This is contrary to Plaintiff’s pleadings, where he states

expressly that Nurse Tinder established the order of seeing patients and claims that Hill’s

deficiency was merely failing to change this order. Doc. 49 (Amend. Compl.) at ¶ 44. In

considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, courts consider only the information contained

in the pleadings, not facts that debut in the briefs. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); Elliot v. Pa.

Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n., Inc., 486 F. Supp. 3d 838, 843 (M.D. Pa. 2020) (Brann, J.). I

will take Plaintiff’s allegations in the pleading as true over the characterization of those facts

in his brief.

122 Specifically, Plaintiff’s pleadings establish that Nurse Tinder set the schedule and contend that

Defendant was deficient in not affirmatively overriding that order. Doc. 49 (Amend. Compl.)

at ¶¶ 38, 42. The Court finds unpersuasive Plaintiff’s implication that Defendant Hill should

have asked more questions to determine if a patient was in crisis when Nurse Tinder had the

patient information and, presumably, would have shared any known news of urgent patients

without prompting from Hill.

to establish something more than mere negligence and, accordingly, Defendant

Hill’s motion to dismiss is granted for this claim.123

4. Punitive Damages:

In his complaint, Plaintiff requested to recover punitive damages for each

count.124 Preliminarily, punitive damages are not recoverable under the Wrongful

Death Act.125 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages as a theory of

recovery for wrongful death will be dismissed for all Defendants.

Defendant Hill has moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for punitive damages

relevant to him.126 Punitive damages are awarded to punish a defendant for

“outrageous conduct.”127 This is defined as either “an evil motive or reckless

indifference to the rights of others,” including intentional, willful, wanton, or

123 Plaintiff cites this Court’s decision in McGarry v. Yeager for the contention that the issue of

reckless indifference ought to be decided by the jury. See Doc. 76 (Br. in Opp. to Hill) at 26;

No. 24-CV-01829, 2025 WL 1311914, at *18 (M.D. Pa. May 6, 2025). McGarry, while

similar, is distinguishable to the case at bar in that Defendants were “concededly aware of

[decedent’s] suicidal tendencies” as the decedent had threatened to commit suicide several

times in the days leading up to his death. Id. In McGarry, this Court found the allegations of

misconduct sufficiently serious to send to a jury the question of whether failure to act “in

response to an unambiguous and urgent warning of serious consequences” was recklessly

indifferent. Id. This is not the case here, as Plaintiff’s claim is wholly implausible on the facts

as pled.

124 Doc. 49 (Amend. Compl.) at ¶¶ 91, 100, 108, 112, 115.

125 Amesbury v. CSA, Ltd., No. 10-CV-1712, 2014 WL 279724, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 23, 2014).

126 Doc. 66 (Br. in Supp., Hill) at 16-18. Defendant UPMC has not moved to dismiss this theory

of recovery and, accordingly, the Court will not do so sua sponte now. UPMC may raise the

issue at subsequent proceedings including summary judgment.

127 Lomas v. Kravitz, 130 A.3d 107, 128 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015).

reckless conduct.128 The “reckless” mental state in the punitive damages context

requires a showing that Defendant consciously disregarded a known risk of harm.129

For largely the same reasons that Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim was

insufficient, this claim fails too; Plaintiff has not pled facts to support a finding of

reckless indifference. There is simply no allegation that Hill was aware of a serious

risk of harm to the defendant.130 Without such an allegation, under Pennsylvania law,

Plaintiff’s complaint does not state a claim for punitive damages. Accordingly,

Defendant Hill’s motion to dismiss is granted in this regard, and Plaintiff’s claim for

punitive damages against him will be struck.

III. CONCLUSION

Defendant UPMC’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED with prejudice for the

Section 1983 claim but DENIED for the medical negligence claim, the wrongful

death claim, and the survival claim. Defendant Hill’s motion to dismiss is

GRANTED with prejudice for the Section 1983 claim and for punitive damages

128 Id. (citing J.J. DeLuca Company, Inc. v. Toll Naval Associates, 56 A.3d 402, 415-16 (Pa.

Super. Ct. 2012).

129 Stroud v. Abington Memorial Hosp., 546 F. Supp. 2d 238, 257 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (citing

Hutchinson ex. Rel. Hutchinson v. Luddy, 582 Pa. 114, 123-24 (2005).

130 The closest Plaintiff comes to alleging as much is arguing that Hill did not take measures that

would have informed him of the risk. Doc. 76 (Br. in Opp. to Hill) at 20-21 (“[Hill] was not

actively involved with Sparkman’s care because he consciously disregarded the need to

activate such care.”). However, even construing this argument generously, nowhere in the

factual pleadings does Plaintiff offer support for the contention that Hill realized and

appreciated a serious risk of harm to the Decedent. Indeed, the complaint as the Court reads it

stands at most for the proposition that Hill should have been aware of such a risk. That is

insufficient to meet the standard for punitive damages as described supra.

but DENIED for the medical negligence claim, the wrongful death claim, and the

survival claim. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against UPMC and

Hill are dismissed with prejudice. All of Plaintiff’s punitive damages claims

against Hill, in addition to the wrongful death punitive damages claim against all

Defendants, are dismissed with prejudice.

An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann

Matthew W. Brann

Chief United States District Judge