BONDI

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JEFRY JOSUE DEL CID DEL )

CID and MARLON LETONA )

MARROQUIN MARROQUIN, )

)

Petitioners, )

V. ) Case No. 3:25-cv-00304

) Judge Stephanie L. Haines

PAMELA BONDI, Attorney )

General of the United States, )

In Her Official Capacity, )

)

Respondents. )

OPINION

Petitioners Jefry Josue Del Cid Del Cid “Mr. Del Cid’) and Marlon Letona Marroquin

Marroguin (“Mr. Marroquin”) (collectively, “Petitioners”) have both been granted Special

Immigrant Juvenile Status (“SIJ Status” or “SIJS”) in accordance with legal process. Petitioners

have filed a habeas petition, naming as Respondents: Pameli Bondi, Attorney General of the

United States; Sirce E. Owen, acting director of the Executive Office for Immigration Review (the

“EIOR”); the EIOR; Kristi Noem, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”);

DHS; Todd Lyons, acting director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”); ICE;

Joseph B. Edlow, director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”); USCIS; Brian

McShane, director of the Philadelphia Field Office of ICE’s Enforcement and Removal Operations

Division; and Leonard Oddo, the warden of Moshannon Valley Processing Center (“MVPC”)

(collectively, “Respondents”). Mr. Marroquin is currently detained at MVPC—the same location

where Mr. Del Cid was detained until his recent release from immigration custody.

Currently pending before the Court is Petitioners’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. □

(ECF No. 16). Broadly speaking, Petitioners contend that their SIJ Status entitles them to certain

legal protections that Respondents are not affording them. Specifically, Petitioners argue that

Respondents are (in the case of Mr. Marroquin) or were (in the case of Mr. Del Cid) errantly

deeming them subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (“§ 1225”), and that

Respondents must instead deem them subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (“§ 1226(a)”),

which would permit them to seek release on bond. They therefore request several forms of relief

from this Court. (ECF No. 16 at 3-4).

As the Court has previously explained, its unflagging obligation is to apply the law as

written. 4.S.R. v. Trump, 782 F. Supp. 3d 224, 253 (W.D. Pa. 2025). When the Court does so, it

finds that the law affords Petitioners an opportunity to seek adjustment of status to that of lawful

permanent residents, Cortez-Amador vy. Att’y Gen., 66 F.4th 429, 433 n.12 (3d Cir. 2023), and the

Court relatedly finds that the law affords Petitioners an opportunity to be granted bond pending

their removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). The Court therefore GRANTS Petitioners’ request

for a preliminary injunction insofar as the Court: (1) finds that Mr. Marroquin cannot currently be

detained pursuant to § 1225, but rather is detained pursuant to § 1226(a)' and (2) orders that

Respondents afford Mr. Marroquin a bond hearing pursuant to § 1226(a) and all related provisions

of law within seven (7) days.” The Court DENIES Petitioners’ other requests for injunctive relief.?

1 Likewise, in the event that Mr. Del Cid is re-detained in the future, and in the event that his factual circumstances

are the same at that time as they are now (ie., he is still an SIJ beneficiary and he still has no criminal record), the

Court finds that he may not be detained pursuant to § 1225 but rather must be detained (if at all) under § 1226(a).

2 In the event that Respondents re-detain Mr. Del Cid in the future, and in the event that he still has SIJ Status and no

criminal record at that time, Respondents shall likewise provide him with a bond hearing under § 1226(a) and all

related legal principles within seven (7) days of his re-detention.

3 The Court notes that Petitioners are seeking a declaratory judgment from the Court. (See, e.g., ECF No. 16 at 20).

The Declaratory Judgment Act (“DJA”):

[Authorizes the court in a case of actual controversy within the court’s jurisdiction to “declare the

rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not

further relief is or could be sought,” and “such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final

judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201. The DJA “permits a federal

court the discretion to ‘declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking

I. Background

This case is primarily about the legal protections due to individuals who have been granted

SIJ Status and who have no criminal history, such as Petitioners here. The Court therefore begins

by explaining certain legal provisions and developments that have significant bearing on

Petitioners’ claims. The Court then overviews the factual history and procedural background

germane to Petitioners’ requests.

A. Legal Background .

1. The Contours of SIJ Status

a. SIJ Status in General

At the outset, the Court offers the following background regarding SIJ Status in general:

Congress established SIJ [S]tatus in 1990 in order to “protect abused, neglected or

abandoned children who, with their families, illegally entered the United States,”

Yeboah v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 345 F.3d 216, 221 Gd Cir. 2003); 8 U.S.C. §

1101(a)(27)(J), and it entrusted the review of SIJ petitions to USCIS, a component

of DHS.

Alien children may receive SIJ [S]tatus only after satisfying a set of rigorous,

congressionally defined eligibility criteria, including that a juvenile court find it

would not be in the child’s best interest to return to her country of last habitual

residence and that the child is dependent on the court or placed in the custody of

the state or someone appointed by the state. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J); 8 C.F.R. §

204.11(c). The child must also receive approval from USCIS and the consent of the

Secretary of Homeland Security to obtain the status. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J).

such declaration,’ when there is a ‘case of actual controversy.’” Abraham y. Del. Dep’t of Corr.,

331 F, App’x 929, 931 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2201). In determining whether a

declaratory action is sufficiently ripe to constitute a “controversy,” the Third Circuit instructs that

courts focus on the following factors: (1) “the adversity of the interests of the parties;” (2) “the

conclusiveness of the judicial judgment;” and (3) “the practical help, or utility, of that judgment.”

Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 912 F.2d 643, 647 (3d Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).

LVL Co., LLC v. Atiyeh, 469 F. Supp. 3d 390, 425-26 (E.D. Pa. 2020). While this standard may well be met in this

case, the parties have not developed this issue in their briefing relative to Petitioners’ Motion for a Preliminary

Injunction. (ECF Nos. 16, 17). The Court therefore declines to enter an order that has the “force and effect of a final

judgment” at this juncture. Instead, the Court today enters preliminary injunctive relief and will permit the parties to

provide argument regarding how this case should progress moving forward.

Once attained, SIJ classification conveys a host of important benefits. For purposes

of 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a), which describes adjustment of status, SIJ designees are

“deemed ... to have been paroled into the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(h)(1).

Moreover, the INA automatically exempts SIJ designees from a set of generally

applicable grounds of inadmissibility and provides that other grounds of

inadmissibility also may be waived at the Attorney General’s discretion. 8 U.S.C.

§§ 1255(h)(2), 1182(a). Of particular note, the [Immigration and Nationality Act

(the “INA”)] exempts SIJ designees from inadmissibility based on the lack of “valid

entry document[s.]” Id. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(@(1). Additionally, Congress has granted

SIJ designees various forms of support within the United States, such as access to

federally funded educational programming and preferential status when seeking

employment-based visas. See id. §§ 1232(d)(4)(A), 1153(b)(4).

Finally, SIJ [S]tatus, once granted, may not be revoked except “on notice,” 8 C.F.R.

§ 205.2, and upon the Government’s compliance with a series of procedural

safeguards: The Secretary of Homeland Security must find “good and sufficient

cause” for revocation; the agency must provide notice of intent to revoke; and the

SIJ designee must be given the opportunity to present evidence opposing

revocation. 8 U.S.C. § 1155; 8 C.F.R. § 205.2.

Osorio-Martinez v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 893 F.3d 153, 163-64 (3d Cir. 2018) (cleaned up).

Because of the “statutory and constitutional rights of SIJ designees[,]” the Osorio-Martinez

Court awarded the petitioners before it, who were individuals with SIJ Status and whom the

Government was seeking to remove via expedited orders of removal, temporary injunctive relief

as against those orders. Jd. at 178-79.

b. SIJ Status and Its Relationship to Lawful Permanent Residency

As the Third Circuit’s discussion in Osorio-Martinez makes clear, S1J Status has significant

bearing on an individual’s ability to apply for lawful permanent resident (“LPR”) status. That is

because, generally speaking, an alien must be “admitted or paroled into the United States” before

applying for adjustment to LPR status. Osorio-Martinez, 893 F.3d at 171 n.14 (citing 8 U.S.C. §

1255(h)(1), 1255(g)). However, Congress provided aliens seeking SIJ Status with special benefits

in seeking adjustment of status. Congress did so via § 1255, which provides, in relevant part, that:

(a) The status of an alien who was ... paroled into the United States [may be

adjusted to legal permanent resident] ... if [certain requirements are met, including

that] the alien is ... admissible to the United States for permanent residence[.]

(h) In applying this section to a special immigrant ...

(1) such an immigrant shall be deemed, for purposes of subsection (a), to

have been paroled into the United States; and

(2) in determining the alien’s admissibility as an immigrant—

(A) paragraph[] ... (6)(A) ... of section 1182(a) of this title shall not

apply[.|

8 U.S.C. § 1225(a), (h).

So, then, “SIJ designees [are] ‘deemed, for purposes of [adjustment of status to lawful

permanent resident under § 1255(a)], to have been paroled into the United States,’ 8 U.S.C. §

1255(h)(1)[.]” Osorio-Martinez, 893 F.3d at 170-71. Congress also “enlarged the chance that

[individuals with SIJ Status will be] successful in their applications for adjustment by exempting

them from a host of grounds that would otherwise render them inadmissible[.]” /d. at 171. Clearly,

individuals with SIJ Status are exempted from inadmissibility on those grounds insofar as their

adjustment of status is concerned. But are they also exempted from inadmissibility on those

grounds insofar as their potential removal from the country is concerned? The Third Circuit left

that question open in Osorio-Martinez, see id. at 171 n.14, and ultimately answered it in the

negative in Cortez-Amador y, Att'y Gen., 66 F.4th 429 (3d Cir. 2023), the case to which the Court

now turns.

Cc. Individuals with SIJ Status Are Not Thereby Exempted from Removal

Altogether

In Cortez-Amador, the petitioner argued to the Third Circuit that “special immigrants such

as himself are exempt from removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i)” because the “plain

language of 8 U.S.C. § 1255(h)(2) clearly states that 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)@)—which permits

the removal of immigrants present without admission or parole—does not apply to [an immigrant

with SIJ Status].” Cortez-Amador, 66 F.4th at 432 (emphasis added). The respondents countered

by arguing that the “preface of § 1255(h) limits the scope of subsection (h)(2) to adjudicators

‘applying this section,’ i.e., to applications for status adjustment.” Id. (emphasis in original).

Confronted with this dispute, the Third Circuit ruled as follows:

Section 1255(h) expressly states that a noncitizen with SIJ[ Status] shall be deemed

to have been paroled for purposes of subsection (a) of that section, i.e., for

adjustment of status to a legal permanent resident only. Under normal canons of

statutory construction, “courts should construe statutory language to avoid

interpretations that would render any phrase superfluous.” U.S. v. Cooper, 396 F.3d

308, 312 (3d Cir. 2005). The plain language of this subsection applies the “deemed

to have been paroled” language only to subsection (a) and no other provision of the

INA. If we were to read the statute as Petitioner suggests, “for purposes of

subsection (a)” would be rendered superfluous. Conversely, if in § 1255(h)

Congress had intended a noncitizen with SIJS to be deemed paroled for purposes

of removal, it would have included reference to removability or 8 U.S.C. § 1182.

Accordingly, the plain language demonstrates that Petitioner is removable despite

his SIJS[.]

Cortez-Amador, 66 F.4th at 433 (cleaned up); see also id. at 433 n.11 (“Congress could have

rationally decided that SIJS recipients should be given the opportunity to apply for adjustment of

status, while also contemplating that they may be removed if their application is denied or for

another appropriate basis.”). Further, the Cortez-Amador Court explained that “Osorio-Martinez

[was] distinguishable because the Court [there] did not hold that SIJS recipients are exempt from

removal due to inadmissibility, but only that Congress intended to provide SIJS recipients with an

opportunity to pursue adjustment of status.” /d. at 433 n.12.

In short, based on the foregoing, two legal principles emerge relevant to individuals with

SIJ Status. First, the Government must provide them an opportunity to pursue adjustment of status,

and the way in which the Government seeks to remove them must adequately take stock of their

. 6

SIJ Status. See Osorio-Martinez, 893 F.3d 153. Second, the Government may ultimately remove

an individual with SIJ Status from the country, so long as it complies with the first principle.

Cortez-Amador, 66 F.4th 429; see also Benito Vasquez v. Moniz, 788 F. Supp. 3d 177, 181 (D.

Mass. 2025) (“Other federal courts have routinely recognized that SIJ [S]tatus alone does not

render an alien lawfully present in the country ... nor does it prevent the government from

affecting his removal.”); Cruz-Gonzalez on behalf of D.M.S.C. vy. Kelly, No. 16-CV-5727, 2017

WL 3390234, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 7, 2017) (“Additionally, Cruz-Gonzalez’s SIJ [S]tatus does not

change our analysis and the SIJ designation itself provides no separate basis to review their

removal.’’) (cleaned up).

With those principles in place, the Court proceeds to consider 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 and 1226

because they are the specific provisions of law that are especially germane to Petitioners’

detention.

2. Sections 1225 and 1226

Turning first to § 1225, the Supreme Court has explained that:

[The process of beginning to decide who may enter the country and who may stay

here after entering] generally begins at the Nation’s borders and ports of entry,

where the Government must determine whether an alien seeking to enter the

country is admissible. Under § 302, 110 Stat. 3009-579, 8 U.S.C. § 1225, an alien

who “arrives in the United States,” or “is present” in this country but “has not been

admitted,” is treated as “an applicant for admission.” § 1225(a)(1). Applicants for

admission must “be inspected by immigration officers” to ensure that they may be

admitted into the country consistent with U.S. immigration law. § 1225(a)(3).

As relevant here, applicants for admission fall into one of two categories, those

covered by § 1225(b)(1) and those covered by § 1225(b)(2). Section 1225(b)(1)

applies to aliens initially determined to be inadmissible due to fraud,

misrepresentation, or lack of valid documentation. See § 1225(b)(1)(A)(@) (citing

§§ 1182(a)(6)(C), (a)(7)). Section 1225(b)(1) also applies to certain other aliens

designated by the Attorney General in his discretion. See § 1225(b)(1)(A)Gi1).

Section 1252(b)(2) is broader. It serves as a catchall provision that applies to all

applicants for admission not covered by § 1225(b)(1) (with specific exceptions not

relevant here). See §§ 1225(b)(2)(A), (B).

Both § 1225(b)(1) and § 1225(b)(2) authorize the detention of certain aliens. Aliens

covered by § 1225(b)(1) are normally ordered removed “without further hearing or

review” pursuant to an expedited removal process. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(@i). But if a §

1225(b)(1) alien “indicates either an intention to apply for asylum ... or a fear of

persecution,” then that alien is referred for an asylum interview. §

1225(b)(1)(A)(ii). If an immigration officer determines after that interview that the

alien has a credible fear of persecution, “the alien shall be detained for further

consideration of the application for asylum.” § 1225(b)(1)(B)(i). Aliens who are

instead covered by § 1225(b)(2) are detained pursuant to a different process. Those

aliens “shall be detained for a [removal] proceeding” if an immigration officer

“determines that [they are] not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted”

into the country. § 1225(b)(2)(A).

Regardless of which of those two sections authorizes their detention, applicants for

admission may be temporarily released on parole “for urgent humanitarian reasons

or significant public benefit.” § 1182(d)(5)(A); see also 8 C.F.R. §§ 212.5(b), 235.3

(2017). Such parole, however, “shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien.”

8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Instead, when the purpose of the parole has been served,

“the alien shall forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which he was

paroled and thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner

as that of any other applicant for admission to the United States.” Ibid.

Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 286-88 (2018).

As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, individuals deemed subject to § 1225(b)(1) and

(b)(2) are typically detained throughout the removal process.

Shifting to § 1226, the Supreme Court has explained that:

Even once inside the United States, aliens do not have an absolute right to remain

here. For example, an alien present in the country may still be removed if he or she

falls “within one or more ... classes of deportable aliens.” § 1227(a). That includes

aliens who were inadmissible at the time of entry or who have been convicted of

certain criminal offenses since admission.

Section 1226 generally governs the process of arresting and detaining that group of

aliens pending their removal. As relevant here, § 1226 distinguishes between two

different categories of aliens. Section 1226(a) sets out the default rule: The Attorney

General may issue a warrant for the arrest and detention of an alien “pending a

decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” § 1226(a).

“Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section,” the Attorney General “may

release” an alien detained under § 1226(a) “on ... bond” or “conditional parole.”

Ibid.

Section 1226(c), however, carves out a statutory category of aliens who may not be

released under § 1226(a). Under § 1226(c), the “Attorney General shall take into

custody any alien” who falls into one of several enumerated categories involving

criminal offenses and terrorist activities. § 1226(c)(1). The Attorney General may

release aliens in those categories “only if the Attorney General decides ... that

release of the alien from custody is necessary” for witness-protection purposes and

“the alien satisfies the Attorney General that the alien will not pose a danger to the

safety of other persons or of property and is likely to appear for any scheduled

proceeding.” § 1226(c)(2). Any release under those narrow conditions “shall take

place in accordance with a procedure that considers the severity of the offense

committed by the alien.” Jbid.

In sum, U.S. immigration law authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens

seeking admission into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2). It also

authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens already in the country pending

the outcome of removal proceedings under §§ 1226(a) and (c).

Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288-89 (emphasis in original).

Clearly, the decision of whether an alien is detained pursuant to § 1225, which generally

requires detention pending removal, or § 1226(a), which permits the Attorney General to release

a detained alien on bond pending the outcome of removal proceedings, is of great consequence to

the issue of whether the alien is at liberty pending his removal proceedings.

With that legal framework in place, the Court now overviews recent decisions by the

Board of Immigration Appeals (the “BIA”) that have bearing on Petitioners’ claims.

3. Recent Decisions by the BIA

The first relevant decision is the BIA’s May 15, 2025, ruling in Matter of Li, 29 1. & N.

Dec. 66 (BIA 2025), in which the BIA was tasked with resolving an appeal by Q., Li (“Li”). On

June 27, 2022, Li “crossed the southern border of the United States without being inspected and

admitted or paroled. A [DHS] officer encountered her approximately 5.4 miles away from a

designated port of entry and 100 yards north of the border.” Jd. at *67. The officer arrested Li and

took her to a processing center. Jd. DHS then released her the next day on parole, subject to the

condition that she was required to regularly report to a DHS field office. Jd.

On October 30, 2024, “Interpol informed DHS that a Red Notice had been issued seeking

[Li’s] arrest because she is wanted in Spain for travel document forgery and human smuggling

crimes.” Jd. When Respondent “reported to a DHS field office for a scheduled appointment on

November 25, 2024, DHS officers took her into custody and issued her a notice to appear for

removal proceedings and a notice of custody determination.” Jd. While in custody, Li requested a

custody redetermination, which the Immigration Judge denied because he concluded that Li was

detained under § 1225(b)(2)(A), and “thus ineligible for release on bond.” Jd.

On appeal, the BIA held that an “applicant for admission who is arrested and detained

without a warrant while arriving in the United States, whether or not at a port of entry, and

subsequently placed in removal proceedings is detained under section 235(b) of the INA, 8 U.S.C,

§ 1225(b)[.]” Jd. at *69. That applicant for admission is “ineligible for any subsequent release on

bond under section 236(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).” Jd. The BIA therefore dismissed Li’s

appeal of the Immigration Judge’s decision. /d. at *71.

The second relevant decision is Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025),

which the BIA issued on September 5, 2025. Therein, the BIA affirmed the Immigration Judge’s

determination that “he did not have authority over the bond request because aliens who are present

in the United States without admission are applicants for admission as defined under section

235(b)(2)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), and must be detained for the duration of their

removal proceedings.” Jd. at *220. In doing so, the BIA rejected Respondent Jonathan Javier

Yajure Hurtado’s (“Hurtado”) argument that he was not subject to § 1225(b)(2)(A) because he had

been “residing in the interior of the United States for almost 3 years[.]” /d. at *221. In rejecting

this argument by Hurtado, the BIA reasoned that it “is not supported by the plain language of the

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INA, and actually creates a legal conundrum. If he is not admitted to the United States (as he

admits) but he is not ‘seeking admission’ (as he contends), then what is his legal status?” Jd.

As the foregoing demonstrates, the BIA has recently begun treating aliens arrested within

the United States as subject to § 1225 and therefore deciding that they must be detained during

their removal proceedings.

B. Factual Background

With that legal framework in place, the Court shifts its attention to the factual

circumstances surrounding Mr. Del Cid and Mr. Marroquin’s entry into the country, SIJ Status,

and detention.

Turning first to Mr. Del Cid, Petitioners have supplied the Court with his I-213. (ECF No.

16-2). That document indicates that Mr. Del Cid is currently twenty-one (21) years old. at 3).

According to the I-213, Mr. Del Cid “was encountered by Border Patrol Agents on or about July

26, 2021[, at] the El Paso, TX Border Patrol Sector. During that encounter, [he] claimed to be a

citizen and national of HONDURAS, without the necessary legal documents to enter, pass through,

or remain in the United States.” (Jd). He further “admitted to illegally crossing the international

boundary without being inspected by an immigration officer at a designated Port of Entry.” □□□□

He was then released to non-detained proceedings on or about July 31, 2021. Ud).

Petitioners have also provided the Court with Mr. Del Cid’s I-360. (ECF No. 16-1). That

document, which is dated April 18, 2022, indicates that Mr. Del Cid has been afforded SIJ Status

and provides the following:

Your Form I-360 petition has been approved, but you do not yet have a visa

available to file an application for adjustment of status. USCIS has determined that

you warrant a favorable exercise of discretion to receive deferred action. As a result,

you have been placed in deferred action and you may be issued an employment

authorization document. Deferred action is an act of administrative convenience to

11

the government which gives some cases lower priority for removal from the United

States for a specified period of time.

Your grant of deferred action will remain in effect for a period of four years from

the date of this notice unless terminated earlier by USCIS.

(Id. at 3).

In terms of Mr. Del Cid’s arrest, his I-213 indicates that, on July 13, 2025:

[A]n operation was conducted at 121 South Main Street, Hatfield[,] PA 19440 to

locate and arrest subject Edwin GUERRA-MARTINEZ. A male resembling the

target was seen leaving the target residence entering a[n] older Ford SUV with

Pennsylvania tags. ICE officers in government vehicles followed the subject as [he]

left the residence. Approximately 3 minutes after leaving residence, ICE officers

initiated a vehicle stop at 1209 School Road, [H]atfield, PA 19440. ICE Officers

conducted field interviews with subjects and determined that the subject matching

the description of PUAS RAMIREZ [sic] was not in the vehicle but subject [Mr.

Del Cid.] This information was provided through his work authorization card,

which he handed to ICE Officers when identification was requested. [Mr. Del Cid]

was taken into custody and transported to Philadelphia Field Office for processing.

(ECF No. 16-2 at 4). The I-213 charges Mr. Del Cid with being removable under

212(a)(6)(A)(i) and 212(a)(7)(A)G@)(). Ud. at 5).

On August 6, 2025, an Immigration Judge denied Mr. Del Cid’s request for custody

redetermination because he found that he lacked jurisdiction under Matter of Q. Li, 29 I. & N. 66

(BIA 2025). (ECF No. 16-5 at 3-4). However, at Mr. Del Cid’s final removal hearing on

September 23, 2025, the Immigration Judge “terminated Mr. Del Cid’s removal proceedings

without prejudice, and he was subsequently released from immigration detention.” (ECF No. 16

at 4-5).

Indeed, Petitioners have submitted the Immigration Judge’s Renewed Termination

Decision, in which the Immigration Judge terminated the immigration proceedings without

prejudice based on “the Court’s discretion under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.18(d) in light of the unique

circumstances of the case.” (ECF No. 16-9 at 3, 5). Specifically, the Immigration Judge considered

12

“the totality of the circumstances including [Mr. Del Cid’s] age at entry ... the humanitarian

protections Congress built into the SIJS framework, the grant of deferred action, and [] efficiency

and docket management concerns[.]” (/d. at 5). The Immigration Judge also noted that the

“Department of State’s October 2025 Via Bulletin reflect[s] movement in the EB-4 category that

will materially affect [Mr. Del Cid’s] ability to apply for adjustment of status.” (/d. at 4). Finally,

the Immigration Judge noted that Mr. Del Cid has no criminal record. (/d.).

Turning to Mr. Marroquin, his I-213 indicates that he is currently twenty (20) years old.

(ECF No. 16-4 at 3). Mr. Marroquin entered the United States in March 2023, at which time:

A Border Patrol Agent encountered [him] in the El Paso, Texas Border Patrol

Sector. A Border Patrol Agent determined that [Mr. Marroquin] unlawfully entered

the United States from Mexico, at a time and place other than as designated by the

Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security of the United States. After

determining that [Mr. Marroquin] was an alien who illegally entered the United

States, [he] was arrested and transported to the Central Processing Center (CPC) in

El Paso, Texas for further processing.

At the CPC, [he] was advised of [his] administrative rights in removal proceedings.

[Mr. Marroquin] acknowledged understanding these rights. [He] claimed to be a

citizen and national of Guatemala without the necessary legal documents to enter,

pass through, or remain in the United States. [Mr. Marroquin] also admitted to

illegally crossing the international boundary without being inspected by an

immigration officer at a designated Port of Entry.

(Id. at 4). The I-213 further indicates that Mr. Marroquin was to remain at the CPC until placement

was obtained. (/d. at 5). Finally, the 1-213 appears to indicate that Mr. Marroquin does not have a

criminal record. (/d. at 3).

Petitioners have also provided the Court with Mr. Marroquin’s I-360. (ECF No. 16-3). That

document was issued on June 4, 2024, and it indicates that he has been afforded SIJ Status. (/d. at

3). As with Mr. Del Cid, Mr. Marroquin’s 1-360 provides that:

Your Form I-360 petition has been approved, but you do not yet have a visa

available to file an application for adjustment of status. USCIS has determined that

you warrant a favorable exercise of discretion to receive deferred action. As a result,

13

you have been placed in deferred action and you may be issued an employment

authorization document. Deferred action is an act of administrative convenience to

the government which gives some cases lower priority removal from the United

States for a specified period of time.

Your grant of deferred action will remain in effect for a period of up to four years

from the date of this notice unless terminated earlier by USCIS.

Ud.).

According to Petitioners, Mr. Marroquin was “taken into immigration custody and placed

into removal proceedings on the detained docket on July 6, 2025.” (ECF No. 16 at 5). Respondents

represent that ICE officers arrested Mr. Marroquin in Chester, Pennsylvania. (ECF No. 17 at 2).

Petitioners have also provided to the Court the Immigration Judge’s July 28, 2025, Order

denying Mr. Marroquin’s request for a custody redetermination because the Immigration Judge

found that he is “subject to mandatory detention due to Matter of Q Li (BIA 2015) and,

alternatively, Jennings v. Rodriguez[.]” (ECF No. 16-7 at 3) (cleaned up). According to Petitioners,

Mr. Marroquin subsequently asked the Immigration Judge to reconsider termination, but the judge

again denied Mr. Marroquin’s motion based, “in part, on the unavailability of a visa and the need

for finality in detained removal proceedings. Mr. Marroquin remains detained at [MVPC.]” (ECF

No. 16 at 5). According to Respondents, ICE has charged Mr. Marroquin with being inadmissible

pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(A)@) and 1182(a)(7)(A)G@)(). (ECF No. 17 at 2).

Finally, Petitioners represent that they both have “pending applicants for adjustment of

status[.]” (ECF No. 16 at 30).

C. Procedural History

Petitioners filed their habeas petition in this matter on September 17, 2025. (ECF No. 1).

On September 25, 2025, they filed a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (“T.R.O.”). (ECF

No. 4). Therein, they requested a T.R.O. barring Respondents from: (1) removing them from the

14

United States, (2) removing them from this jurisdiction during the pendency of this proceeding,

and (3) “ordering their immediate release from immigration detention or, in the alternative,

directing DHS and EOIR to schedule a custody redetermination hearing before a neutral

adjudicator.” Ud. at 2).

On September 26, 2025, the Court entered an Order granting Petitioners a limited T.R.O.—

_ the Court barred Respondents from removing Petitioners from the country until further order of

Court. (ECF No. 6 at 2). However, the Court declined to bar Petitioners’ movement to another

jurisdiction. (/d. at 2 n.2). Finally, the Court found that it could neither grant Petitioners release

nor order a custody redetermination without first hearing from Respondents. (/d. at 2). The Court

therefore set an expedited briefing schedule. (/d. at 2--3).

After receiving briefing, the Court entered a Memorandum Order on October 9, 2025,

extending its previously-entered T.R.O. barring Respondents from removing Petitioners from the

country until October 24, 2025, at 2:15 P.M. (ECF No. 13 at 4). The Court also scheduled a hearing

and set a briefing schedule on Petitioners’ request for a Preliminary Injunction. (/d.). /

The Court held a Zoom Preliminary Injunction Hearing on October 15, 2025. (ECF No.

15). On October 17, 2025, Petitioners submitted their Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. (ECF

No. 16). Therein, they seek the following five pieces of injunctive relief:

1. Immediate release of Mr. Marroquin from immigration detention, or in the

alternative, order Respondents to hold a bond hearing within seven days under

normal procedures before an impartial adjudicator.

2. Declare that Petitioners are subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1226 detention rather than §

1225 detention.

3. Declare that the detention and process that has been applied to Petitioners by

Respondents violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S.

Constitution, the [INA], the Administrative Procedures Act [(the “APA”)], and

their related federal regulations.

15

4. Declare that Petitioners have a right to remain in the United States to pursue their

adjustment of status before an appropriate adjudicator.

5. Issue a stay of removal unless and until visas are available and Petitioners’

applications for adjustment of status are processed by Respondents.

(Id. at 3-4). On October 20, 2025, Respondents filed their Response in Opposition to Petitioners’

Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. (ECF No. 17).

IL. Threshold Issues

Before addressing the merits of Petitioners’ requests for relief, the Court must resolve three

threshold issues raised by Respondents—whether Mr. Del Cid’s requests satisfy Article III’s

requirements, whether the Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate this dispute, and whether the Court

should require Mr. Marroquin to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to proceeding in front

of this Court.

A. Mr. Del Cid’s Requests Satisfy Article III’s Case or Controversy Requirement

Because Respondents have terminated Mr. Del Cid’s immigration proceedings without

prejudice and have released him from custody, Respondents argue that the Court should dismiss

his habeas petition and deny his requests for injunctive relief as moot. (ECF No. 10; ECF No. 17

at 28-29). For the following reasons, the Court holds that Mr. Del Cid’s requests continue to satisfy

Article III’s requirements.

The Third Circuit recently offered the following articulation of the law as it pertains to

standing:

The jurisdiction of the federal courts extends only to “Cases” and “Controversies.”

U.S. Cont. art. I, § 2. And “[u]nder Article III, a case or controversy can exist only

if a plaintiff has standing to sue.” Associated Builders & Contractors W. Pa. v.

Cmty. Coll. of Allegheny Cnty., 81 F.4th 279, 286 (3d Cir. 2023) (citation omitted).

To establish Article III standing, a [petitioner] must “show that she has suffered, or

will suffer, an injury that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly

traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling.” Murthy

v. Missouri, 603 U.S. 43, 57 (2024) (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568

16

398, 409 (2013)) (cleaned up). The [petitioner] has to satisfy these requirements,

which []he must do “for each form of relief that [he] seek[s].” TransUnion LLC v.

Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 431 (2021).

Reading v. N. Hanover Twp., N.J., 124 F.4th 189, 196 (3d Cir. 2024) (cleaned up).

Here, when Mr. Del Cid filed his habeas petition on September 17, 2025, he possessed SIJ

Status, yet Respondents were detaining him at MVPC pursuant to § 1225(b)(2), meaning that they

had not afforded him a bond hearing and were continuously refusing to afford him one (all of this

constituted a concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent injury fairly traceable to the

challenged action). See supra Section I.B. Further, Mr. Del Cid sought relief from this Court in

the form of a bond hearing pursuant to § 1226(a), among other pieces of relief, which would, if

granted by this Court, redress the injury caused by Respondents. (ECF No. 1 at 49-50). Therefore,

the Court finds that, at the time Mr. Del Cid filed his habeas petition, he had standing to litigate

his claims. See Gulden vy. Exxon Mobil Corp., 119 F.4th 299, 306-07 (3d Cir. 2024).

But what about the fact that Mr. Del Cid is no longer detained and therefore no longer

inhibited by Respondents from seeking adjustment of status to that of a LPR? Those facts implicate

mootness.

As the Third Circuit has explained, the “loss of Article III standing by itself ... does not

moot a case; the [respondents] must also demonstrate that no mootness exception applies.” Id. at

305. Indeed, a “case cannot be moot if a [petitioner] establishes Article III standing, and the

[respondent] is unable to demonstrate both the loss of standing and the inapplicability of the

exceptions to mootness.” Id.

Therefore, assuming without deciding that Mr. Del Cid’s habeas petition and requests for

injunctive relief are now moot, the Court inquires whether an exception to mootness applies.

17

The two most likely potential exceptions here are voluntary cessation and capable of

repetition yet evading review. Jd. at 308. With respect to voluntary cessation, that exception

“applies when a [respondent(s)] ceases the allegedly illegal conduct that caused the injury but

remains free to return to his old ways.” Jd. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The

Court holds that that exception is present here.

Indeed, an Immigration Judge, who works within EIOR, Office of the Chief Immigration

Judge, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, https://www .justice.gov/eoir/office-of-the-

chief-immigration-judge (last accessed Oct. 22, 2025), which is one of the named Respondents in

this case, terminated Mr. Del Cid’s removal proceedings without prejudice. See supra Section I.B.

Further, Respondents have provided the Court with neither a legal provision nor a sworn

declaration indicating that they are unable to re-detain Mr. Del Cid tomorrow. (ECF No. 17 at 28—

29). Therefore, because Respondents voluntarily ceased their unlawful conduct in this case but

apparently remain free to return to it tomorrow, the Court finds that this exception to mootness is

applicable in this case.

The second exception to mootness, capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review has two

prongs. Guldon, 119 F.4th at 309. The first—capable-of-repetition—requires “a reasonable

expectation or a demonstrated probability that the same controversy will recur involving the same

complaining party.” Jd. (cleaned up). As the Court explained above, Respondents detained Mr.

Del Cid while apparently looking for another individual. See supra Section I.B. Thus, even if

Respondents are not actively seeking to re-detain Mr. Del Cid at this time, there is a very real

chance that they may re-detain him while they enforce immigration policies and laws generally.

Further, the BIA has begun to apply § 1225 to aliens arrested within the United States, subjecting

them to continued detention during their removal proceedings. See supra Section I.A.3. All of this

18

demonstrates that, in the face of Respondents’ concerted effort to enforce immigration policies

and laws, Mr. Del Cid has a very real chance of being re-detained in the near future and again

subjected to mandatory detention under § 1225. The Court therefore deems the first prong of this

exception satisfied.

The second prong—evading-review—requires that the “challenged action [must be] in its

duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration|.]” Id (cleaned up). As

the facts now before the Court demonstrate, Respondents are very much capable of detaining Mr.

Del Cid for a fairly significant period of time without bond and then releasing him before the Court

renders a reasoned decision on the merits of his claims. See supra Section I.B. Nothing in the

record indicates that the exact same events that transpired relative to Mr. Del Cid between July

and September could not reoccur between November and January. Accordingly, the Court holds

that the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception to mootness likewise applies in this

case. Diop v. ICE/Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d 221, 227-28 (3d Cir. 2011); Brown v. U.S. DHS, 827

F. App’x 174, 175 (3d Cir. 2020) (explaining that Diop held that a “noncitizen’s release from pre-

removal-order custody under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 did not moot his habeas petition where ... there was

a non-speculative possibility that the petitioner could be subject to the complained-of detention

again” and noting that Diop was abrogated in part on other grounds by the Supreme Court in

Jennings).

In short, for all of the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the case or controversy

requirement is satisfied here. The Court therefore turns its attention to the issue of jurisdiction.

B. The Court Has Jurisdiction Over Petitioners’ Claims

19

Respondents next contend that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) bars this Court from exercising

jurisdiction over Petitioners’ claims. (ECF No. 17 at 18-23). For the following reasons, the Court

finds that it does not.

§ 1252(g) provides that:

Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other provision of law

(statutory or nonstatutory), including section 2241 of Title 28, or any other habeas

corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of this title, no court shall have

jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of an alien arising from the

decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate

cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this chapter.

8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (emphasis added).

In Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999) (“AADC”), the

Supreme Court rejected the “unexamined assumption that § 1252(g) covers the universe of

deportation claims—that it is a sort of ‘zipper’ clause that says ‘no judicial review in deportation

cases unless this section provides judicial review.’” AADC, 525 U.S. at 482. Instead, what §

1252(g) “says is much narrower. That provision only applies to three discrete actions that the

Attorney General may take: her ‘decision or action’ to ‘commence proceedings, adjudicate cases,

or execute removal orders.’” Jd. (emphasis added). Further, the Supreme Court held that it is

“implausible that the mention of three discrete events along the road to deportation was a shorthand

way of referring to all claims arising from deportation proceedings.” /d. Finally, the Supreme Court

indicated that § 1252(g) was intended to insulate executive discretion in deciding whether or not

to undertake those three discrete actions (commencement of proceedings, adjudication of cases,

and execution of removal orders). Jd at 483-87 (calling § 1252(g) a “discretion-protecting

provision”); see also Tazu v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 975 F.3d 292, 297 (3d Cir. 2020) (“As the Supreme

Court has noted, § 1252(g) was directed against a particular evil: attempts to impose judicial

20

constraints upon prosecutorial discretion.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis

added).

Based on the Supreme Court’s decision in AADC, the Third Circuit has held that § 1252(g)

to be read narrowly and precisely’ to prevent review only of the three narrow discretionary

decisions or actions referred to in the statute.” Garcia v. Att'y Gen. U.S., 553 F.3d 724, 729 (3d

Cir. 2009) (finding that § 1252(g) was not implicated where petitioner was “not challenging the

discretionary decision to commence proceedings, but [was] challenging the government’s very

authority to commence those proceedings after the limitation period [had] expired”).

Here, Petitioners are not challenging Respondents’ exercise of discretion to commence

removal proceedings against them, adjudicate their cases, or execute removal orders (which have

not been issued relative to Petitioners). Instead, Petitioners are arguing that Respondents, having

already exercised their discretion to commence and adjudicate removal proceedings against them,

are exceeding their Jegal authority in terms of how they conduct those proceedings, given the fact

that Petitioners have SIJ Status. (See ECF Nos. 1, 16). The Court therefore finds that § 1252(g)

does not bar its consideration of Petitioners’ claims. Garcia, 553 F.3d at 729; Sean B. vy.

McAleenan, 412 F. Supp. 3d 472, 482 (D.N.J. 2019) (finding that § 1252(g) barred consideration

of petitioner’s claims where he did not “raise any arguments concerning the propriety of his

confinement”).4

4 The Court also observes that the plurality opinion in Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018), offers additional

support for this Court’s conclusion in the text above.

In Jennings, the plurality stated that it was called upon to “decide ‘questions of law,’ specifically, whether ... certain

statutory provisions require detention without a bond hearing.” Jd. at 292. Although neither party raised the issue of

whether § 1252(b)(9) deprived the Court of jurisdiction to consider those claims, the Supreme Court had “an

‘independent obligation’ to assess whether it” did indeed deprive the Court of jurisdiction. Jd. at 315-16 (Thomas, J.,

concurring). Fulfilling that obligation, the plurality concluded that § 1252(b)(9) did not bar consideration of the

“questions of law” before it. Jd. at 292-95.

21

Having resolved the issue of jurisdiction, the Court turns its attention to the final threshold

issue—exhaustion of administrative remedies.

C. The Court Will Not Require Mr. Marroquin to Exhaust His Administrative

Remedies Before Proceeding Before This Court

Respondents note that Mr. Marroquin has a bond appeal pending before the BIA, (ECF No.

17 at 30), and they contend that this Court should require him to exhaust his administrative

remedies and dismiss or stay this matter until he does. (/d. at 30-33). However, Respondents

recognize that, in this case, exhaustion of administrative remedies is a prudential matter—tt 1s not

statutorily required. (/d. at 30).

“Exhaustion is the rule in most cases, and failure to exhaust will generally preclude habeas

review.” Stokes v. Warden of FCI-Allenwood, No. 1:24-CV-1048, 2024 WL 4567287 at *2 (M.D.

Pa. Oct. 24, 2024) (citing Moscato v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 98 F.3d 757, 761 (3d Cir. 1996));

see also Callwood y. Enos, 230 F.3d 627, 643 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Although there is no statutory

exhaustion requirement attached to § 2241, we have consistently applied an exhaustion

requirement to claims brought under § 2241.”). “Only in rare circumstances is exhaustion of

administrative remedies not required.” Jd. For example, “exhaustion is unnecessary if the issue

presented is one that consists purely of statutory construction.” Jd. (citing Vasquez v. Strada, 684

F.3d 431, 433-34 (3d Cir. 2012)). And exhaustion “is likewise not required when it would be

futile.” Jd. (citing Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 516 n.7 (1982)).

What, then, does the plurality opinion in Jennings have to do with the case before this Court? The Court briefly

answers that question.

The Jennings plurality operated from a position in which it was considering jurisdiction sua sponte. Further, § 1252(g)

is a jurisdictional provision that the plurality mentioned in Jennings, 583 U.S. at 294, and that the plurality was also

duty-bound to consider sua sponte. Yet, even after noting that it had to consider jurisdiction sua sponte, and even after

mentioning § 1252(g), the plurality still found that it was permitted to consider whether certain statutory provisions □

require detention without a bond hearing, implying that § 1252(g) did not bar such consideration. Certainly, then, the

plurality opinion in Jennings strongly supports this Court’s decision to consider the legal questions implicated by the

intersection of Petitioners’ SIJ Status and their detention under § 1225, even given § 1252(g).

22

Here, as the Court’s discussion below indicates, see infra Section II.B, a primary issue

presently before the Court is whether Petitioners may be detained under § 1225, or instead under

§ 1226. Therefore, because this case hinges almost totally on statutory construction, the Court

finds that exhaustion of administrative remedies is likely excused on that ground.

Further, as the Court discussed earlier, see supra Section I.A.3, the BIA has issued

decisions in recent months that appear to resolve the legal issues that Mr. Marroquin would raise

in his appeal to the BIA. In light of that fact, requiring Mr. Marroquin to exhaust his appeal to the

BIA prior to litigating his claims before this Court is futile—such action by this Court would

almost certainly result in the BIA persisting in its earlier rulings and applying those rulings to Mr.

Marroquin, all while he remains in detention without the bond hearing due him. Therefore, the

Court excuses exhaustion on the ground of futility as well.

Now that the Court has determined that: (1) Mr. Del Cid’s claims remain properly before

the Court, (2) § 1252(g) does not bar the Court’s consideration of Petitioners’ claims, and (3) it

would be inappropriate to require Mr. Marroquin to finalize his appeal before the BIA prior to

litigating his claims before this Court, the Court proceeds to address the merits of Petitioners’

claims.

Hl. Discussion

A. Legal Standard

As the Third Circuit has explained:

“Preliminary injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy, which should be granted

only in limited circumstances.” Ferring Pharms., Inc. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 765

F.3d 205, 210 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under the familiar

standard of proof, a party “seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that [he]

is likely to succeed on the merits, that [he] is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the

absence of preliminary injunctive relief, that the balance of equities tips in [his]

favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def.

Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). “Generally, the moving party must establish

23

the first two factors and only if these gateway factors are established does the

district court consider the remaining two factors.” Greater Phil. Chamber of Com.

v. City of Phil., 949 F.3d 116, 133 (3d Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted).

If the gateway factors are met, “[t]he court then determines in its sound discretion

if all four factors, taken together, balance in favor of granting the requested

preliminary relief.” /d. (internal quotation marks omitted).

SEC v. Chappell, 107 F.4th 114, 126 (3d Cir. 2024) (cleaned up).

Generally, a “‘primary purpose of a preliminary injunction is maintenance of the status quo

until a decision on the merits of a case is rendered.’” LVL Co., LLC v. Atiyeh, 469 F. Supp. 3d 390,

413 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (citing Acierno v. New Castle Cty., 40 F.3d 645, 647 (3d Cir. 1994)). Thus, a

“‘narty seeking a mandatory preliminary injunction that will alter the status quo bears a particularly

heavy burden in demonstrating its necessity.” Jd. at 414 (citing Acierno, 40 F.3d at 653)).

B. Petitioners Have Shown a Likelihood of Success on the Merits of Their Claim

That They are (or were) Detained Under § 1226(a) and Therefore Entitled

to a Bond Hearing

At the heart of Petitioners’ requests for relief is their assertion that they are “subject to 8

U.S.C. § 1226 detention rather than § 1225 detention.” (ECF No. 16 at 4). Because the Court finds

that Petitioners are correct on that issue, and because that holding resolves many of Petitioners’

other requests for relief, the Court first explains its finding that § 1226(a) governs: (1) Petitioners’

prior (in the case of Mr. Del Cid), (2) current (in the case of Mr. Marroquin), and (3) future (in the

case of Mr. Del Cid if he is re-detained under the same circumstances) detention.

When interpretating a statute, this Court’s “job is to interpret the words consistent with

their ‘ordinary meaning ... at the time Congress enacted the statute.’” Wis. Cir, Ltd. v. United

States, 585 U.S. 274, 277 (2018) (quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)). Indeed,

this Court’s “analysis begins with the plain language of the statute[,]” and where that language is

“plain, [a court] must enforce it according to its terms.” Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 118

(2009); see also United States v. Brow, 62 F 4th 114, 119 (3d Cir. 2023) (noting that a “court

24

considers the language of a statute in its natural and ordinary signification and if there is no

ambiguity or obscurity in its language, there will usually be no need to look elsewhere to determine

its intent’’). Further, statutory language “cannot be construed in a vacuum. It is a fundamental

canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a

view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” Roberts v. Sea-Land Services, Inc., 566 U.S.

93, 101 (2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

In considering whether § 1225 or § 1226 governs Petitioners’ detention, the Court is not

painting on a blank canvas. As this Court explained earlier, see supra Section I.A.2, the Supreme

Court has tethered § 1225 to “the Nation’s borders and ports of entry,” noting that aliens detained

pursuant to those provisions are typically detained during removal proceedings. Jennings, 583 U.S.

at 287—88.° And the Supreme Court has tethered § 1226 to aliens “inside the United States,” noting

that § 1226(a) permits the Attorney General to release aliens on bond during their removal

proceedings. Id. at 288-89; id at 303 (Ҥ 1226 applies to aliens already present in the United

States.”). In sum, “U.S. immigration law authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens

seeking admission into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2). It also authorizes the

Government to detain certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome of removal

proceedings under §§ 1226(a) and (c).” Jd. at 289.

This language from the Supreme Court leads this Court strongly in the direction of

concluding that Mr. Del Cid—who had been in this country for approximately four years when he

was arrested in Pennsylvania in 2025 and has SIJ Status—and Mr. Marroquin—who had been in

5 The portions of Jennings that the Court cites in this paragraph all come from the parts of Jennings that were joined

by a majority of the justices.

25

this country for over two years at the time he was arrested in Pennsylvania in 2025 and also has

SIJ Status—see supra Section IB, are subject to § 1226(a) rather than § 1225.

However, the Supreme Court’s language above is not unyieldingly absolute,° and two

points lead this Court to eschew any holding in this case that adopts a bright line rule for all of its

future cases presenting questions about the distinction between § 1225 and § 1226.

The first point is that Petitioners themselves recognize that there might be some cases that

“make this distinction [between which aliens are to be detained under § 1225 and which aliens are

to be detained under § 1226] blur[, but] Petitioners’ case is not one of them.” (ECF No. 16 at 28-

29). The second point is a provision within § 1225 itself. As the Supreme Court has explained, §

1225 contains an expedited removal procedure for any applicant who is: (1) “inadmissible because

he or she lacks a valid entry document;]” (2) “has not ‘been physically present in the United States

continuously for the 2-year period immediately prior to the date of the determination of

inadmissibility[;]’” and (3) “is among those whom the Secretary of Homeland Security has

designated for expedited removal.” DHS v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 108-109 (2020) (quoting

§§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(4), (iii)(D-CID). Simply put, because of the open legal questions in this area, and

because § 1225 contains a provision that permits expedited removal of individuals who have been

present in the United States for up to two years, this Court declines to adopt a bright line rule that

says § 1225 only applies to those at or immediately near the border and § 1226 applies to all other

aliens within the interior of the United States. Osorio-Martinez v. Att'y Gen. U.S., 893 F.3d 153,

173 (3d Cir. 2018) (“Although the INA allows the DHS to expeditiously remove certain aliens

6 This Court specifically emphasizes the Supreme Court’s statement that “U.S. immigration law authorizes the

Government to detain certain aliens seeking admission into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2). It also

authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings

under $§ 1226(a) and (c). Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289-90 (emphasis added) (noting that the Government had detained

Rodriguez, who was a lawful permanent resident of the United States, under § 1226). In short, the Supreme Court’s

language contains a measure of equivocation about the level of definition relative to the categories of individuals to

whom §§ 1225 and 1226 apply. This Court therefore includes a measure of equivocation in its holding as well.

26

apprehended up to two years after entering the United States and who were encountered anywhere

within United States territory, see 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), it apparently has not, until recently,

sought even standard removal, much less expedited removal, of SIJ designees while their

applicants for adjustment of status were pending[.]’).

While the Court does not adopt a bright line rule here, it need not do so in order to resolve

the case now before it, for the following three reasons.

First, once again, Jennings does stand for the general principle that § 1225 is tethered

closely to the border and § 1226 is tethered closely to the interior of the country. 583 U.S. 287—

89. .

Second, while the fact that § 1225(b)(1)’s expedited removal provision permits expedited

removal of individuals who have been here for up to two years does weigh against a bright-line

rule, that provision also suggests Congressional intent to tether § 1225 more closely to individuals

with weaker ties to the United States. After all, an individual who has been here for one month

clearly has weaker ties to this country than an individual who has been here for two years and one

month, and Congress permitted expedited removal of the former but not the latter.”

Finally, the first part of the title of § 1225 is “Inspection by immigration officers[.]”

Likewise, § 1225(a) is entitled “Inspection[.]” On the other hand, § 1226 is entitled “Apprehension

and detention of aliens[.]” All of this confirms the Court’s read of the two provisions—§ 1225 is

tethered more closely to the border and applies more readily to someone with a weak connection

7 The Court does recognize that § 1225 also contains a separate provision, in addition to § 1225(b)(1), that the Supreme

Court has described as a “catchall”——§ 1225(b)(2). Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287. While this provision means that § 1225

as a whole can and may sweep more broadly than § 1225(b)(1) by itself, the Court’s point is simply that § 1225

contains indicia that Congress intended the section to apply to aliens with less connection to the country than those

who have been here for a substantial period of time.

27

to the country, while § 1226 is tethered more closely to the interior of the country and applies more

readily to someone with a strong connection to the country.

How does all of that apply to Petitioners here? These principles strongly indicate, and in

fact lead the Court to firmly conclude, that Congress intended Mr. Del Cid and Mr. Marroquin,

who have both obtained SIJ Status and been present within the country for years, to be detained

under § 1226(a), not § 1225.

Indeed, both individuals have obtained SIJ Status. That status “bespeak[s] a substantial

legal relationship between them and the United States—a relationship far more significant than”

the relationship possessed between an initial entrant into this country. Osorio-Martinez, 893 F.3d

at 174.8 Further, Mr. Del Cid was here for over four years when Respondents detained him in July

2025, and Mr. Marroquin was here for over two years as of that time. See supra Section I.B. The

Court therefore readily infers that both Petitioners have begun making meaningful and substantial

connections to this country. And third, neither Petitioner has a criminal record, see supra Section

I.B, meaning that Petitioners have not violated either the public confidence placed in them’ or the

benefit conferred upon them via their SIJ Status. For all of these reasons, the Court holds that

Petitioners have shown a very strong likelihood of success on the merits of their claim that Mr.

Marroquin is currently detained pursuant to § 1226(a), not § 1225. Likewise, the Petitioners have

8 Although the Court does not rest its holding today on the canon of constitutional avoidance, it does note it here. That

canon provides that, when “‘a serious doubt’ is raised about the constitutionality of an Act of Congress, ‘it is a cardinal

principle that [the] Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the

question may be avoided.’” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 296 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)). While the

Court in no way holds that § 1225 would be unconstitutional as-applied to these Petitioners, it does have questions

about such an application fo those with SIJ Status in light of Osorio-Martinez, 893 F.3d 153. The Court therefore

simply notes that the canon of constitutional avoidance leads it even more firmly in the direction of finding that §

1225 does not apply to Mr, Del Cid and Mr. Marroquin given their particular facts and circumstances, but § 1226(a)

does.

° An individual may only receive SIJ Status after satisfying “a set of rigorous, congressionally defined eligibility

criteria,” and receiving approval from “USCIS and the consent of the Secretary of Homeland Security[.]” Osorio-

Martinez, 893 F.3d at 163.

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shown a very strong likelihood of success on the merits of their claim that, so long as Mr. Del Cid

is re-detained while he possesses SIJ Status and no criminal record, he may only be detained

pursuant to § 1226(a), not § 1225.

Critically, Federal Regulations “provide that aliens detained under § 1226(a) receive bond

hearings at the outset of detention.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 306 (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(1),

1236.1(d)(1)). Therefore, the Court will order Respondents to provide Mr. Marroquin with a bond

hearing consistent with § 1226(a) and all related provisions of law within seven (7) days of this

Opinion. Likewise, in the event Respondents elect to re-detain Mr. Del Cid in the future, and in

the event that he still has SIJ Status and no criminal record at that time, the Court will order

Respondents to provide Mr. Del Cid with a bond hearing consistent with § 1226(a) and all related

provisions of law within seven (7) days of such re-detention.

The Court finds that these conclusions address the first two items of injunctive relief that

Petitioners seek. See supra Section I.C. With respect to their three remaining requests, the Court

notes that “the due process afforded aliens stems from those statutory rights granted by Congress

and the principle that minimum due process rights attach to statutory rights.” Osorio-Martinez,

893 F.3d at 172 (cleaned up). In light of the law surrounding SJ Status, see supra Section I.A, the

Court holds that granting Mr. Marroquin a bond hearing within seven (7) days (and ordering that

Mr. Del Cid is subject to § 1226(a) and thus entitled to a bond hearing if re-detained in the future

while still possessing SIJ Status and no criminal record) adequately takes stock of Petitioners’

rights under the Due Process Clause at this time. Cortez-Amador v. Att’y Gen. , 66 F.4th 429, 433

n.12 (3d Cir. 2023) (“Osorio-Martinez ... did not hold that SIJS recipients are exempt from

removal due to inadmissibility, but only that Congress intended to provide SIJS recipients with an

opportunity to pursue adjustment of status.”). Such a bond hearing will enable them an opportunity

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to raise their claims regarding their pending applications for adjustment of status and the like. The

Court therefore finds that Petitioners’ other requests for relief are mooted given the Court’s holding

today, beyond the scope of the relief to which Petitioners are currently entitled, or both. See supra

Section I.A; Inlago Tocagon v. Moniz, No. 25-CV-12453, 2025 WL 2778023, at *5 (D. Mass.

Sept. 29, 2025) (finding that the appropriate remedy for a detained alien with SIJ Status was a

bond hearing under § 1226(a) within ten (10) days).

In short, the Court holds that Petitioners have shown a very strong likelihood of success on

the merits that § 1226(a) governs their current/future detention, not § 1225, given their unique

circumstances. The Court will therefore order Respondents to provide Mr. Marroquin an

appropriate bond hearing within seven (7) days. If Respondents re-detain Mr. Del Cid in the future,

and if his relevant circumstances remain the same at that time, they shall likewise provide him

with a bond hearing within (7) days of any such re-detention. The Court denies Petitioners’

requests for relief in all other respects at this time, finding that they have failed to show a likelihood

of success on the merits on those issues in light of the law above and the relief that the Court is

granting. Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 2017) (*[A] movant for

preliminary equitable relief must meet the threshold for the first two ‘most critical’ factors: it must

demonstrate that it can win on the merits ... and that it is more likely than not to suffer irreparable

harm in the absence of preliminary relief. Jf these gateway factors are met, a court then considers

the remaining two factors[.]’””) (emphasis added).

C. The Remaining Factors Support the Grant of a Preliminary Injunction

Finding That § 1226(a), Not § 1225 Applies to Petitioners and Requiring

Respondents to Afford Mr. Marroquin a Bond Hearing

Turning to the remaining preliminary injunction factors, there is precedent, in the

immigration context, for the principle that “unlawful detention is a sufficient irreparable injury.”

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Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976 994-95 (9th Cir. 2017); but see DSSA v. DDSHS, 108 F.4th

194, 204-05 (3d Cir. 2024) (Thus, when weighing preliminary injunctions, courts may presume

that suppressing speech or worship inflicts irreparable injury. But this presumption is the

exception, not the rule.’””). Here, the Court has no need to presume irreparable injury as it has found

that Petitioners are entitled to a bond hearing, and Mr. Marroquin is currently detained without

one, meaning that that aspect of his detention is unlawful.'° Further, detention without a bond

hearing undoubtedly deprives Petitioners of the opportunity to continue to advance their pending

applications for adjustment of status. See supra Section I.B. On these facts, the Court finds that

Petitioners have clearly shown a likelihood of irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief.

Turning to the third and fourth factors, it is squarely in the public interest to enable

individuals to partake of statutory and constitutional rights and meaningful judicial review where,

as here, it is consistent with the process prescribed by Congress.” Osorio-Martinez, 893 F.3d at

179. Further, because neither Mr. Marroquin nor Mr. Del Cid has a criminal history, the Court

finds that the public interest is not harmed by their receiving a bond hearing and potentially being

out of detention while any removal proceedings are continued as against them.

Therefore, the Court grants in part and denies in part Petitioners’ request for a preliminary

injunction.

Finally, the Court finds that the nominal bond of $1.00 that it previously required

Petitioners to post remains appropriate in light of all relevant legal principles. A.S.R. v. Trump, 782

F. Supp. 3d 224, 253 (W.D. Pa. 2025).

10 Likewise, Mr. Del Cid’s prior detention without a bond hearing, as well as any future detention while he still has

the same circumstances without a bond hearing, constitutes irreparable harm.

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IV. Conclusion

Having considered the entire record in this case and the relevant legal principles, the Court

holds that Petitioners are entitled to two pieces of injunctive relief. First, the Court finds that Mr.

Marroquin may not be detained pursuant to § 1225, but rather is detained pursuant to § 1226(a).

Likewise, in the event that Respondents elect to re-detain Mr. Del Cid in the future, and in the

event that he still has SIJ Status and no criminal record at that time, he may not be detained

pursuant to § 1225, but rather § 1226(a) alone. Second, the Court finds that Mr. Marroquin is

entitled to a bond hearing under § 1226(a) and all related legal principles within seven (7) days of

this Opinion. If Respondents re-detain Mr. Del Cid in the future, and if he still has SIJ Status and

no criminal record at that time, Respondents shall likewise provide him with a bond hearing under

§ 1226(a) and all related legal principles within seven (7) days of his re-detention. The Court finds

that Petitioners’ other claims are unavailing at this time.

An appropriate Order follows.

DATED: October 23, 2025 A aac PRP

U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

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