Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

WESTERN DIVISION

)

ANDREA JAYE MOSBY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

)

v. ) No. 2:23-cv-02009-SHM-tmp

)

REAVES LAW FIRM PLLC, )

)

Defendant. )

)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s September 4, 2025 Motion

for Award of Attorney’s Fees and Costs. (ECF No. 79.) Defendant

has not responded. For the reasons that follow, the Motion is

GRANTED.

I. Background

Both Plaintiff and Defendant vigorously litigated this

case. Plaintiff filed her Complaint on February 24, 2023,

alleging retaliatory termination in violation of Title VII, the

Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), and the Equal Pay Act

(“EPA”). (ECF No. 1.) Defendant filed an Answer denying

liability and raising affirmative defenses. (ECF No. 12.)

Defendant also filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s FLSA and

EPA claims. (ECF No. 11.) Plaintiff filed a response, and

Defendant filed a reply. (ECF Nos. 16-17.) The Court denied

Defendant’s motion. (ECF No. 18.)

Both parties served and answered interrogatories and

document requests. Each party took three depositions of the

main witnesses in the case. After an unsuccessful mediation,

Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 33.)

Plaintiff filed a response, and Defendant filed a reply. (ECF

Nos. 34, 36.) The Court entered an Order Denying Defendant’s

Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 42.)

Plaintiff filed one motion in limine. (ECF No. 44.)

Defendant filed five motions in limine. (ECF No. 45.) Responses

were filed by the parties. (ECF Nos. 46-47.)

Trial commenced on May 5, 2025, and concluded on May 7,

20205. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of Plaintiff on all

of her claims, awarding $258,269.27 in back pay, $516,538.54 in

compensatory damages, and $2.5 million in punitive damages.

(ECF No. 60.) Plaintiff filed a Motion for an Award of Front

Pay, Liquidated Damages, and Prejudgment Interest. (ECF No.

66.) Defendant filed a response, and Plaintiff filed a reply.

(ECF Nos. 73-74.) Defendant filed a Motion for Relief from

Judgment or Order. (ECF No. 72.) The Court entered an Order

granting Plaintiff’s Motion for an Award of Front Pay,

Liquidated Damages, and Prejudgment Interest and denying

Defendant’s Motion for Relief from Judgment or Order. (ECF No.

77.)

Plaintiff has now filed a Motion for Award of Attorney’s

Fees and Costs. (ECF No. 79.) The Motion includes a Memorandum

of Law, William B. Ryan’s Declaration, Janelle C. Osowski’s

Declaration, time and billing records, declarations from two

Memphis attorneys, and multiple exhibits establishing the rates

and total fees Defense counsel charged Defendant. (ECF. No.

79.) Plaintiff requests a total of $102,480.00 in fees for the

work performed by lead attorney Ryan and his partner Osowski.

(ECF No. 79 at 1.) That figure is based on an hourly rate of

$500 and 107.6 billed hours for Ryan and an hourly rate of $400

and 121.7 billed hours for Osowski. (ECF. Nos. 79-1 at 6, 79-2

at 4-10.) Plaintiff also requests costs in the amount of

$9,694.74. (ECF. No. 79 at 1.)

II. Legal Standard

A. Attorney’s Fees

The court may award reasonable attorney’s fees to a party

that prevails in a Title VII or FLSA action. See 42 U.S.C. §

2000e-5(k); 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).

A prevailing party is a party who “succeed[s] on any

significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the

benefit the part[y] sought in bringing suit.” Hensley v.

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983); (quoting Nadeau v.

Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278–79 (1st Cir. 1978)). Obtaining an

“enforceable judgment[] on the merits” is sufficient for a

party to be deemed a prevailing party. See Buckhannon Bd. &

Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dept. of Health & Human Res., 532

U.S. 598, 604 (2001).

To determine reasonable attorney’s fees, the court

calculates “the fee applicant’s lodestar, which is the proven

number of hours reasonably expended on the case by an attorney,

multiplied by [the] court-ascertained reasonable hourly rate.”

Hubbell v. FedEx SmartPost, Inc., 933 F.3d 558, 575 (6th Cir.

2019) (quoting Waldo v. Consumers Energy Co., 726 F.3d 802, 821

(6th Cir. 2013)). There is a “[a] strong presumption that the

lodestar figure—the product of reasonable hours times a

reasonable rate—represents a ‘reasonable’ fee.’” 1 Murphy v.

Smith, 583 U.S. 220, 226 (2018) (quoting Pennsylvania v.

Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546,

565 (1986)). The party seeking attorney’s fees bears the burden

1 A court may enhance or decrease the lodestar amount based on the

factors in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express in “rare” and

“exceptional” circumstances. Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559

U.S. 542, 543 (2010); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Exp., Inc., 488

F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974)). However, most of those factors

are already “subsumed in the lodestar calculation.” Perdue, 559 U.S.

at 546. A party seeking enhancement of the lodestar amount “has the

burden of identifying a factor that the lodestar does not adequately

take into account and proving with specificity that an enhanced fee

is justified.” Id.

to substantiate “the hours worked and the rates sought.”2

See Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v. Husted, 831 F.3d 686,

702 (6th Cir. 2016).

1. Reasonable Hours

To determine the number of reasonable hours for the

lodestar calculation, “the standard is whether a reasonable

attorney would have believed the work to be reasonably expended

in pursuit of success at the point in time when the work was

performed.” Wooldridge v. Marlene Indus. Corp., 898 F.2d 1169,

1177 (6th Cir. 1990) (abrogated on other grounds by Buckhannon,

532 U.S. 598). The court excludes hours from the lodestar

calculation that were “excessive, redundant, or otherwise

unnecessary.” See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434; Freed v. Thomas,

137 F. 4th 552, 561 (6th Cir. 2025) (“The district court should

exclude from [its] initial fee calculation hours that were not

reasonably expended”) (citation omitted). The court “may

‘identify specific hours that should be eliminated . . . or it

may rely on its ‘overall sense of a suit’ and ‘use estimates’

to calculate an attorney’s time.” Freed, 137 F. 4th at 561

2 “In this district, the Local Rules require parties to submit an

affidavit or declaration of counsel detailing the number of hours

spent on each aspect of the case and an affidavit or declaration

from another attorney in the community, who is not otherwise

involved in the case, setting out the prevailing rate in the

community for similar services.” Mid-America Apartment Cmty.’s v.

Philipson, No. 2:23-cv-02186-SHL-cgc, 2024 WL 4654452, at *3 (W.D.

Tenn. Nov. 1, 2024) (quoting Local Rule 54.1(b)(1)-(2)).

(citations omitted). “Hours that are not properly billed to

one’s client also are not properly billed to one’s adversary

pursuant to statutory authority.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434

(emphasis in original).

Documentation of hours must be sufficiently detailed to

allow the court “to determine with a high degree of certainty

that [the] hours were actually and reasonably expended in the

prosecution of the litigation.” Richard v. Caliber Home Loans,

Inc., 832 F. App'x 940, 947 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Imwalle v.

Reliance Med. Prods., Inc., 515 F.3d 351, 553 (6th Cir. 2008)).

To be sufficiently detailed, counsel “is not required to record

in great detail how each minute of his time was expended [b]ut

at least counsel should identify the general subject matter of

his time expenditures.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437 n.12; Imwalle,

515 F.3d at 553. If the fee applicant presents an inadequate

documentation of hours, the court “may reduce the award

accordingly.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433; Imwalle, 515 F.3d at

552. Rather than conducting a line-by-line audit of inadequate

billing entries to determine which to eliminate, the court may

apply an “across the board” percentage reduction in the overall

fee. Howe v. City of Akron, 705 F. App’x 376, 382-83. (6th Cir.

2017).

2. Reasonable Rate

To determine the “reasonable hourly rate” component of the

lodestar calculation, the court assesses the “prevailing market

rate in the relevant community.” See Waldo, 726 F.3d at 821

(quoting Adcock-Ladd v. Sec. of Treasury, 227 F.3d 343, 350

(2000)) (emphasis omitted). “The prevailing market rate is

‘that rate which lawyers of comparable skill and experience can

reasonably expect to command within the venue of the court of

record.’” Id. (quoting Adcock-Ladd, 227 F.3d at 350)).

The court “has broad discretion in determining a

reasonable hourly rate for an attorney.” Husted, 831 F.3d at

715. It is “permitted to ‘rely on a party’s submissions, awards

in analogous cases, state bar association guidelines, and its

own knowledge and experience in handling similar fee

requests.’” Waldo, 726 F.3d at 821-22 ((quoting Van Horn v.

Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 436 F. App’x 469, 499 (6th

Cir. 2011)).

B. Costs

Rule 54(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

provides that “[u]nless a federal statute, these rules, or a

court order provides otherwise, costs—other than attorney's

fees—should be allowed to the prevailing party.” FRCP 54(d)(1).

Recoverable costs pursuant to Rule 54(d)(1) are limited to the

costs itemized in 28 U.S.C. §1920. Those costs include fees of

the clerk and marshal, fees for printed or electronically

recorded transcripts necessarily obtained for use in the case,

and compensation of court appointed experts, among others. 28

U.S.C. § 1920.

The FLSA and Title VII also permit the recovery of costs.

The FLSA provides that “[t]he court . . . shall, in addition to

any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a

reasonable attorney’s fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs

of the action. 29 U.S.C. § 216 (emphasis added). Title VII

provides that, “[i]n any action or proceeding under this

subchapter the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing

party, . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee (including expert fees)

as part of the costs . . .” 42 U.S.C. §2000-e-5(k). “The award

of statutory costs is a matter for the district court, in its

best judgment as to what was reasonable and necessary . . .”

Sigley v. Kuhn, 205 F.3d 1341, 2000 WL 145187, at *8 (6th Cir.

2000).

III. Analysis

A. Attorney’s Fees

Plaintiff seeks the lodestar amount of $102,480. (ECF No.

79 at 1.) That figure is based on an hourly rate of $500 and

107.6 billed hours for Ryan and an hourly rate of $400 and

121.7 billed hours for Osowski. (ECF No. 79-2 at 4-10.)

Plaintiff does not seek an upward adjustment of the lodestar.

(ECF No. 79-1 at 9.) Plaintiff also seeks costs in the amount

of $9,694.74 for “the filing fee, court reporter expenses,

process servers, mediation, and expert witness reports.” (ECF

No. 79-1 at 11.)

Defendant has not responded to Plaintiff’s Motion. Thus,

“the Court need only determine that the requested award is

reasonable and sufficiently supported by documentation provided

by Plaintiff.” Jefferson v. Gen. Motors, No. 2:20-cv-02576-JPM-

tmp, 2025 WL 2403511, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 19, 2025).

The Court has reviewed the time and billing records

provided by Plaintiff’s counsel and the information Plaintiff

has submitted addressing the reasonableness of counsel’s hourly

rates. The Court finds that both the amount of time spent and

counsel’s hourly rates are reasonable. “The Court finds no

reason for a downward adjustment of the lodestar figure,

especially given that Defendant has not objected to the amount

sought.” Peterson v. West TN Expediting, Inc., No. 1:18-cv-

01164-STA-jay, 2020 WL 3490076, at *2 (W. D. Tenn. June 26,

2020).

1. Prevailing Party

Plaintiff argues that it is “undisputed” that she is the

prevailing party “in light of the jury’s verdict in Plaintiff’s

favor.” (ECF No. 79-1 at 4.)

A party need not succeed on all of its claims to be the

prevailing party, but Plaintiff did so. See Hensley, 461 U.S.

at 433; Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604. Plaintiff succeeded on her

Title VII, FLSA, and EPA claims and obtained an enforceable

judgment against Defendant. Plaintiff is the prevailing party

entitled to recover reasonable fees and costs.

2. Reasonable Hours

Plaintiff represents that, “it was necessary for Plaintiff

to vigorously prosecute and press her claims to trial” and

that, consequently, “the time spent by Plaintiff’s counsel [is]

reasonable and necessarily incurred in this case.” (ECF No. 79-

1 at 7-8.) Plaintiff’s Motion is supported by time and billing

records setting out the number of hours spent by each attorney

on each aspect of the case. (ECF No. 79-2 at 4-10.) The time

was recorded contemporaneously in increments of .10 per hour.

(ECF No. 79-2 at 3.) Plaintiff’s Motion is also supported the

Declarations of Plaintiff’s counsel, Ryan and Osowski. (ECF

Nos. 79-2, 79-3.).

In his Declaration, Ryan states that he and Osowski “have

exercised billing judgment at every step of the way and have

only billed for actual legal work performed.” (ECF No. 79-2 at

3.) Ryan also states that he “believe[s] that all the legal

work performed was necessary to achieve a fully successful

outcome in this case.” (ECF No. 79-2 at 3.)

Adequacy of Documentation of Hours

Vagueness

Some of the time entries in the time and billing records

fail to identify the subject matter of the task performed. For

example, the time records contain an entry on June 13, 2023 for

“zoom meeting with client.” 3 (ECF No. 79-2 at 4.)

However, “explicitly detailed descriptions are not

required” for a time entry to be deemed sufficiently detailed

for the purpose of assessing the reasonableness of hours spent.

Imwalle, 515 F.3d at 554. In determining whether a time entry

is sufficiently detailed, the Court reads the entry “in the

context of the billing statement as a whole and in conjunction

with the timeline of the litigation.”4 Id. (finding time

entries such as “conference with,” “research,” “review file,”

and “review documents,” sufficiently descriptive when read in

context of whole billing statement and litigation timeline);

see also Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Bannum, Inc., 102 F. 4th

3 Additional examples of entries that do not specify the general

subject matter of the task performed include “Zoom meeting with

client” on January 17, 2023, “Zoom meeting with client” on May 23,

2023, “multiple emails to/from client” on July 5, 2023, and

“multiple emails to/from client” on August 22, 2023, among others.

(ECF No. 72-1 at 4-5.)

4 Concerns about client confidentiality are implicated in determining

how specific task descriptions need to be. See McCombs v. Meijer,

No. C-1-99-358, 2002 WL 34461863 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 22, 2002), aff’d

395 F.3d 346 (6th Cir. 2005) (“There is no doubt that counsel could

have been more specific, however a line must be drawn which serves

the purpose of documenting what was done on the one hand and

preserves the confidences of the client on the other.”)

358, 363-64 (6th Cir. 2024) (finding time entry “[p]repare and

email correspondence to [] counsel” sufficiently detailed in

context of other time entries and case deadlines).

Here, the Court can determine from the timeline of the

litigation the subject matter of the few vague entries in the

time and billing records. For example, the June 13, 2022 “zoom

meeting with client” occurred during the week that Plaintiff’s

counsel drafted and filed a response to Defendant’s Motion to

Dismiss. The Court can reasonably conclude that the meeting

addressed counsel’s response to the Motion to Dismiss. See G.S.

v. Lee, No. 2:21-cv-02552-SHL-atc, 2022 WL 20512929, at *7

(W.D. Tenn. Sept. 30, 2022)(“‘research’ and ‘research claim’

entries, when read within [] context, refer to drafting the

Complaint”). The June 13 entry is sufficiently descriptive to

allow the Court to determine whether the time spent was

actually and reasonably spent.

Block Billing

Some of the time entries in the time and billing records

cover multiple tasks instead of itemizing, a billing practice

known as “block billing.” See Miller v. Caudill, 936 F. 3d 442,

452 (6th Cir. 2019) (Block billing “groups together multiple

tasks without specifying how much time each task took.”) For

example, the time records contain an entry on July 18, 2022 for

2.2 hours with the task description “client meeting regarding

termination from Reaves Law Firm; draft and file EEOC charge.”

(ECF No. 79-2 at 4.) It is not clear how much time Plaintiff’s

counsel spent meeting with Plaintiff, drafting the EEOC charge,

or filing the EEOC charge.

In this Circuit, “[b]lock billing is not per se improper.”

Miller v. Davis, 267 F. Supp. 3d 961, 997 (E.D. Ky. 2017),

aff'd sub nom. Miller, 936 F.3d 442 (quoting in part Husted,

831 F.3d at 705 n.7). That is, “[w]hile the practice is

generally discouraged, block billing by itself does not require

a court to reduce a fee award.” Oakley v. City of Memphis, No.

06-2276, 2012 WL 2682755, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. June 14, 2012),

report and recommendation adopted, No. 06-2276, 2012 WL 2681822

(W.D. Tenn. July 6, 2012), aff'd 566 F. App'x 425 (6th Cir.

2014)). The issue is whether “the description of the work

performed is adequate.” Husted, 831 F.3d at 705 n.7 (quoting

Smith v. Serv. Master Corp., 592 F. App’x 363, 371 (6th Cir.

2014)).

An adequate description in an otherwise block billed time

entry allows courts to “discern the type of work that was

done,” a prerequisite for determining that the work was

necessarily done and that the hours spent on it were

reasonable. See Renneker v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:10-cv-

386, 2011 WL 6950510, at *8 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 8, 2011) (declining

to reduce fees for block billed time entry “Further R&R review,

contact client, begin Objections” because “the Court can

discern the type of work that was done and that such work was

necessary to the litigation”); see also Cummings Inc. v. BP

Prods. N. Am., Inc., Nos. 3:06–0890, 3:07–0834, 2010 WL 796825,

at *6 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 3, 2010) (declining to reduce fees for

block billing because the court “was able to clearly ascertain

what tasks were performed”); Fair Hous. Advocates Assoc. Inc.

v. Terrace Plaza Apartments, No. 2:03–CV–563, 2007 WL 445477,

at *5 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 6, 2007) (declining to reduce fees for

block billing because the entries did “no[t] significantly

limit the Court's ability to determine the reasonableness of

the time expended”).

The block entries in counsel’s billing records adequately

describe the tasks performed either alone or in context.

Baumann, 102 F. 4th at 364 (declining to reduce fees for block

billing because time entry “prepare and email correspondence to

[] counsel,” in context, “adequately describe[s] the work being

done”).

For example, from the July 18, 2022 time entry “client

meeting regarding termination from Reaves Law Firm; draft and

file EEOC charge[,]” it is clear that, over 2.2 billable hours,

Ryan met with Plaintiff to discuss the termination at the heart

of the EEOC charge and then drafted and filed the EEOC charge.

The Court is able to discern the type of work that was done and

evaluate the reasonableness of the hours spent on these related

tasks, even if it is unable to determine exactly how the 2.2

hours were allocated among the tasks. See United States ex.

rel. Scott v. Humana, No. 3:18-CV-00061-GNS-CHL, 2025 WL

2744602, at *30 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 30, 2025) (“Many of the block

billed entries involve interconnected tasks such that . . .

grouping them together doesn’t deprive the undersigned of the

ability to review them for reasonableness.”)

Courts may reduce fees where block-billed time, although

adequately described, includes non-compensable tasks. See

Miller, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 996–97. Those time entries are

problematic because they “render it impossible for the Court to

determine the exact amount of non-compensable time included in

the requested hours.” Id. at 997. Non-compensable tasks are

“[p]urely clerical or secretarial tasks” that “do[] not require

legal knowledge.” Bannum, 102 F.4th at 366 (quoting Missouri v.

Jenkins, 491 U.S. 247, 288 n.10 (1989)). Examples of purely

clerical tasks include receiving and filing correspondence,

sending and receiving faxes, organizing documents, serving

papers, and obtaining transcripts. Bannum, 102 F. 4th at 366.

Some of the block-billed entries in counsel’s time and

billing records include filing motions and pleadings.5 Some

district courts in this Circuit have held filing motions to be

purely clerical and non-compensable. See Miller, 267 F. Supp.

3d at 996-97 (“Clerical work involves tasks that do not require

legal knowledge, such as filing motions . . .”); Benoist v.

Titan Med. Mfg., LLC, No. 2:19-cv-02704-SHM, 2021 WL 4477084,

at * 3 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 9, 2021) (“Clerical tasks include . .

. filing motions.”).

However, the Sixth Circuit has recently held that the act

of filing motions on the Electronic Court Filing System (ECF)

is not purely clerical. Bannum, 102 F. 4th at 366-67 (“Because

electronic filing requires legal knowledge, and because the

court permits only attorneys to serve as registered users of

the ECF system and attorneys are liable for any electronic

filings done using their login credentials, electronic filing

through the [Electronic Court Filing System] cannot be

considered purely clerical.”); see also Goza v. Memphis Light,

Gas & Water Div., No. 2:17-cv-2873-JPM-dkv, 2019 WL 5855705, at

*4 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 8, 2019), report and recommendation

5 Some examples include “client meeting regarding termination from

Reaves Law Firm; draft and file EEOC charge” on July 18, 2022;

“edits to complaint; finalize exhibits; file complaint, civil cover

sheet, summons” on February 24, 2023; “review service return;

finalize and file; review Doc. 10” on April 19, 2023; and “finalize

and file resp to MTD” on June 19, 2023. (ECF No. 79-2 at 4-5.)

adopted, 2019 WL 5847849 (W.D. Tenn. Nov. 7, 2019) (“Most of

the entries [defendant] objects to as purely clerical contain

filing as a task. The Local Rules establish that rather than

purely clerical tasks, the attorneys were performing legal work

when they drafted, edited, and then filed their documents per

the Local Rules.”) Thus, a reduction in fees for block-billed

time is not warranted here.

Plaintiff’s documentation of hours is sufficiently

detailed to allow the Court to review the reasonableness of the

hours spent.

Reasonableness of Hours

“When determining whether hours claimed by a party were

reasonably expended, ‘the standard is whether a reasonable

attorney would have believed the work to be reasonably expended

in pursuit of success at the point in time when the work was

performed.’” Oakley, 2012 WL 2682755, at *5 (quoting

Wooldridge, 898 F.2d at 1177). Hours that are “excessive,

redundant, or otherwise unnecessary” are not reasonably spent.

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 430.

Plaintiff’s counsel billed for a total of 229.3 hours

spent on this case. (ECF No. 79-2 at 9.) In his Declaration,

lead counsel William B. Ryan asserts that he “believe[s] that

all of the legal work performed was necessary to achieve a

fully successful outcome in this case” and that he has

“exercised billing judgment at every step of the way.” (ECF No.

79-2 at 3.) In her Declaration, Memphis attorney Maureen T.

Holland states that “the billing and time by both attorneys is

very reasonable based upon the time and effort it took to

successfully litigate the case.” (ECF No. 79-4 at 4.)

After a thorough review of the time and billing records,

the Court finds that the hours Plaintiff’s counsel spent on

this case are reasonable.

Time Billed Not Excessive

Plaintiff’s counsel has not billed an excessive amount of

time for the case as a whole or for any particular aspect of

the case.

The total amount of time billed is not excessive given

Defendant’s “vigorous opposition to [Plaintiff’s claims] at

nearly every phase of the litigation[,]” requiring extensive

motion practice and taking the case to trial. Husted, 831 F.3d

at 702; see Mid-America, 2024 WL 4654452, at *4 (total of 665.1

hours not excessive where defendant “mostly has himself to

blame for any increased time [plaintiff’s] attorneys and staff

had to spend on the matter”); Cummings, 2010 WL 796825, at **4,

6 (total of 4,568 hours high but not unreasonable “because this

was a three-year litigation that ‘had it all,’ including

burdensome and time-consuming discovery issues, complex

procedural issues, motion practice, two mediation sessions, a

lengthy trial and considerable post-trial briefing”).

“[T]here is nothing suspicious or concerning about the

total number of hours Plaintiff’s attorneys spent on this case

. . .” Heath v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. 3:09-cv-0138, 2011 WL

4005409, at *10 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 8, 2011) (total of 272.45

hours by two attorneys on an ERISA action not excessive

“particularly in light of its legal and factual complexity”).

Plaintiff’s counsel did not bill excessive hours for any

aspect of the litigation, including motions and briefing,

discovery, or trial preparation. For example, Plaintiff’s

counsel spent approximately nine (9) hours total preparing a

response to the Motion to Dismiss.6 That amount of time for

this necessary task is not excessive or unreasonable. See

6 The Court arrived at this figure by adding the time billed in the

following entries: “review doc. 11, motion to dismiss” for .5 hours

on May 8, 2023; “review motion to partially dismiss claims filed by

defendant; phone call with client” for .5 hours on May 9, 2023;

“draft motion and proposed order re: enlargement of time” for .3

hours on May 22, 2023; “Zoom meeting with client” for .5 hours on

May 23, 2023; “zoom mtg w/ client re: response” for .5 hours on May

23, 2023; “finalize and file motion for ext of time re: mtd; send

proposed order to judge” for .3 hours on May 24, 2023; “review

doc.15 – order granting motion” for .2 hours on May 24, 2023; “draft

resp to mtd” for 1.3 hours on June 7, 2023; “edit and draft response

to mtd” for .8 hours on June 8, 2023; “Zoom meeting with client” for

.5 hours on June 13, 2023; “zoom mtg w/ client” for .5 hours on June

13, 2023; “research re: flsa mgr excemption; continue drafting

response to mtd” for 1 hr on June 13, 2023; “revise mtd response”

for .4 hours on June 16, 2023; “review and edit response to motion

to dismiss” for 1.2 hours on June 19, 2023; “finalize and file resp

to MTD” for .3 hours on June 19, 2023. (ECF No. 79-2 at 4-5.)

Bannum, 102 F. 4th at 365 (twelve (12) hours for one attorney

to prepare a nearly thirty-page contempt motion was reasonable

and the court had “moreover, previously held far greater hours

spent drafting and editing filings to be reasonable”); Howe v.

City of Akron, No. 5:06-cv-2779, 2016 WL 916701, at *10 (N.D.

Ohio Mar. 10, 2016), aff'd 705 F. App'x 376 (6th Cir. 2017)

(133.85 hours for two attorneys to review and draft a response

to a motion to alter or amend judgment excessive).

Plaintiff’s counsel appears to have billed only 3.6

hours for preparing the complaint, above and beyond the work

done to prepare to file the underlying EEOC charge.7 See

Husted, 831 F.3d at 707 (300 hours for six attorneys to draft

and edit complaint in a case presenting numerous complex

federal and procedural issues not excessive); Ohio Right to

Life Soc., Inc. v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, No. 2:08-cv-492, 2013

WL 5728255, at *19 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 22, 2013), report and

recommendation adopted, 2014 WL 234677 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 22,

2014), aff’d 590 F. App’x. 597 (6th Cir. 2014) (118.25 hours

7 The Court arrived at this figure by adding the time billed in the

following entries: “meeting with client; draft complaint” for 1.5

hours on February 23, 2023; “review eeoc charge; review and edit

complaint; draft summons and civil cover sheet” for 1 hr on February

24, 2023; “edit and finalize complaint” for .3 hours on February 24,

2023; “edits to complaint; finalize exhibits; file complaint, civil

cover sheet, summons” for .3 hours on February 24, 2023; and “draft

and file amended complaint and summons; review doc. 8” for .5 hours

on February 24, 2023. (ECF No. 79-2 at 4.)

researching, drafting, and filing seventeen-page complaint – 1

page of which was the case caption and 2 pages of which were

block quotes - excessive).

“[T]here is no indication that plaintiff’s attorney[s]

inflated hours for any specific entry.” Renneker, 2011 WL

6950510, at *8. The vast majority of counsel’s time entries are

for less than 1.5 hours, and many of those entries are for far

less time and are proportionate to the work described. The

small handful of entries that exceed two hours are for

depositions, trial preparation, and trial – time reasonably and

necessarily spent.

Time Billed Not Redundant

Although multiple attorney litigation comes with the

“danger of duplication” of efforts, “[m]ultiple-lawyer

litigation is common and not inherently unreasonable.” Coulter

v. State of Tenn., 805 F.2d 146, 152 (6th Cir. 1986); see

Husted, 831 F.3d at 705; Gratz v. Bollinger, 353 F.Supp.2d 929,

942 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (“[T]here is nothing inherently

unreasonable about making an award for time spent by two or

more lawyers engaged in the same representation . . . ”)

(citation omitted). The issue is “whether the case was

overstaffed, or if the hours claimed were duplicative or

wasteful” such that the hours were not reasonably spent. See

Freed, 137 F.4th at 561; see also Raymond James & Assoc.’s,

Inc. v. 50 N. Front St. TN, LLC, No. 18 cv-2104-JTF-tmp, 2022

WL 3337275, at * 7 (W.D. Tenn. Feb. 8, 2022) report and

recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 3480902 (W.D. Tenn. May 16,

2023).

Nothing here suggests that the case was overstaffed.

Raymond James, 2022 WL 3337275, at * 7 (“[B]eyond multiple

attorneys working this case, there is no indication that

[plaintiff] overstaffed this litigation . . .”).

Although in many instances both of Plaintiff’s attorneys

billed for attending the same meetings and proceedings and

working on the same motions, there is no indication that those

hours were redundant or unnecessary.

It was not needlessly duplicative for both of Plaintiff’s

attorneys to attend meetings with the client, mediation, pre-

trial conferences, and trial, as shown in the time and billing

records.8 Husted, 831 F.3d at 704-05 (not duplicative for

multiple attorneys representing plaintiff to attend telephonic

conferences, proceedings, and hearings).

It was not redundant or unreasonable for both of

Plaintiff’s attorneys to work on the same tasks “when reviewing

8 For example, Ryan billed .5 hours for “Zoom meeting with client” on

January 17, 2023, and Osowski billed .5 hours for “zoom mtg w/

client” on the same day. (ECF No. 79-2 at 4.)

and drafting significant documents, such as the Complaint . .

., analyzing Defendant[’s] responses to [dispositive] motions

and preparing replies, [and] preparing witnesses and the

presentation of evidence for [trial].” G.S., 2022 WL 20512929,

at *8.

After reviewing the time and billing records of

Plaintiff’s counsel, Plaintiff’s memorandum of law, lead

counsel Ryan’s declaration, and Memphis attorney Holland’s

declaration, the Court finds that the hours Plaintiff’s counsel

spent on the case were not excessive, redundant, or otherwise

unnecessary. Plaintiff has met her burden of establishing the

reasonableness of the hours spent on the case. No reduction of

hours is warranted. The court adopts 229.3 hours as the proven

number of hours reasonably spent.

3. Reasonable Rate

The rates charged by Plaintiff’s counsel were $500 per

hour for Ryan, who has been licensed for twenty-six (26) years,

and $400 per hour for Osowski, who has been licensed for

thirteen (13) years. (ECF Nos. 79-2 at 1, 3; 79-3 at 1.)

Plaintiff represents that “the hourly rates sought by

Plaintiff’s counsel are reasonable and supported by competent

evidence.” (ECF No. 79-1 at 6.) Plaintiff represents that Ryan

and Osowski “are seasoned and experienced attorneys with nearly

39 years of combined experience, who specialize in handling

employment litigation matters in federal court.” (ECF No. 79-1

at 6.)

Plaintiff’s Motion is supported by Declarations from

Maureen T. Holland and J. Russ Bryant, employment law attorneys

in the community. (ECF Nos. 79-3, 79-4.) The Court finds

Holland’s Declaration especially persuasive.

In her Declaration, Holland states that a $500 hourly rate

for Ryan and a $400 hourly rate for Osowski are “reasonable and

in line with what other attorneys of their experience and

training would charge and bill.” (ECF No. 79-4 at 4.) Holland

has been licensed to practice in Tennessee for thirty-three

(33) years, and her own hourly rate is $450-500. (ECF No. 79-4

at 1, 5.) Holland bases her opinion on her own “experience and

training” and her “familiar[ity] with hourly rates charge by

attorneys with similar experience in Memphis.” (ECF No. 79-4 at

4.) Holland states that she is “aware of other plaintiff

attorneys who have equal or higher hourly rates.” (ECF No. 79-4

at 4.) She has “read Tennessee federal court orders granting

awards of similar ($475 in 2020) or higher ($500 in 2022)

hourly fees for plaintiff employment law work.” (ECF No. 79-4

at 4-5.)

Based on Plaintiff’s submissions, the Court’s familiarity

with the hourly rates in its jurisdiction and its knowledge and

experience in handling many similar fee requests, and the fact

that Defendant has not contested the hourly rates charged, the

Court concludes that Plaintiff has met her burden of

establishing the reasonableness of the hourly rates sought.

Mid-America, 2024 WL 4654452, at *4; see also Heath, 2011 WL

4005409, at *9 (“Because these rates are supported by counsel’s

own claims and competently verified by two members of the

[local] legal community who find them to be reasonable in light

of the case’s nature and the experience of Plaintiff’s

attorneys . . . the Court considers them to be reasonable.”)

No reduction in hourly rates is warranted. The court

adopts $500 per hour for lead attorney Ryan and $400 for

Osowski as the reasonable rate for each.

4. Calculation of Reasonable Attorney’s Fees

The Court applies a $500 reasonable hourly rate to Ryan’s

107.6 hours billed and a $400 reasonable hourly rate to

Osowski’s 121.7 hours billed. The Court awards the lodestar

amount of $102,480.00 in reasonable attorney’s fees.

B. Costs

Plaintiff seeks $9,694.74 in costs for “the filing fee,

court reporter expenses, process servers, mediation, and expert

witness reports.” (ECF No. 79-1 at 11.) Plaintiff’s counsel has

submitted an itemized list of costs. (ECF No. 79-2 at 10.)

Many of the costs Plaintiff seeks are recoverable pursuant

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) as defined at 28

U.S.C. § 1920. Plaintiff’s fees paid to the clerk for filing

and serving the complaint are recoverable as “fees of the clerk

and marshal.” 28 U.S.C. § 1920. Plaintiff’s costs for

deposition and trial transcripts are recoverable as “fees for

printed or electronically recorded transcripts necessarily

obtained for use in the case.” 28 U.S.C. § 1920.

Plaintiff also seeks $800 for the report of expert

economist, Ralph Scott, addressing the pre-judgment interest

calculation. (ECF No. 79-2 at 8, 10.) Scott was not court-

appointed, so Plaintiff is not permitted to recover under Rule

54(d)(1). However, Title VII expressly provides for the

recovery of expert fees as part of a reasonable attorney’s fee.

42 U.S.C. §2000-e-5(k) (“[T]he court, in its discretion, may

allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee

(including expert fees) as part of the costs . . .”).

Plaintiff seeks $2,340 for mediation expenses. (ECF No.

79-2 at 10.) “[A]s part of an attorney's fees award pursuant to

federal fee-shifting statutes, district courts may award ‘those

incidental and necessary expenses incurred in furnishing

effective and competent representation.’” Echols v. Express

Auto, Inc., 857 F. App’x. 224, 231 (2021) (quoting Waldo, 726

F.3d at 827). The Court finds that the costs incurred for

mediation were reasonable and necessary to provide Plaintiff

effective and competent representation. See Waldo, 726 F.3d at

827 (finding mediation costs reasonable and necessary).

Exercising its discretion, the Court concludes that

Plaintiff should be awarded her requested costs.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED.

Plaintiff is awarded $102,480.00 in attorney’s fees and

$9,694.74 in costs.

SO ORDERED this 23rd day of October, 2025.

/s/ Samuel H. Mays Jr. Saays, Jr.

SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE