The opinion
Filed 10/23/25 P. v. Brown CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A171881
v.
ANDRE VINCENT BROWN, (San Francisco County Super. Ct.
No. 22013019)
Defendant and Appellant.
A jury found defendant Andre Vincent Brown guilty of robbery, assault
with a semiautomatic firearm, and other offenses and found he caused great
bodily injury in committing the robbery and assault. Defendant’s only claim
on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying his request to represent
himself under Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta).
We conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
determination that defendant was incompetent to represent himself.
Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDRUAL BACKGROUND
On October 29, 2022, defendant was arrested in this criminal matter,
and the next day, the trial court found probable cause to detain him.1 On
1 Because the facts of the offenses are not relevant to defendant’s
appeal, we do not recount them here. The parties are aware of the evidence
1
November 2, 2022, the trial court appointed the San Francisco Public
Defender’s Office to represent defendant. A deputy public defender
represented defendant at the preliminary hearing in January 2023, after
which defendant was held to answer.
Charges
On January 24, 2023, the San Francisco County District Attorney filed
an eight-count information charging defendant with attempted murder of
Miguel B., a security guard for Safeway (Pen. Code,2 §§ 664, 187, subd. (a);
count 1), second degree robbery of Miguel B. (§ 211; count 2), assault with a
semi-automatic firearm of Miguel B. (§ 245, subd. (b); count 3), possession of
a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd.(a)(1); count 4), carrying an unregistered
loaded firearm (§ 25850, subd. (a); count 5), carrying an unregistered
concealed firearm (§ 25400, subd. (a)(2); count 6), carrying an unregistered
concealed firearm in a vehicle (§ 25400, subd. (a)(3); count 7) and
misdemeanor resisting arrest (§ 148, subd. (a)(1); count 8).
The district attorney alleged defendant used (§ 12022.5, subd.(a)) and
intentionally discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)) causing great bodily
injury (§§ 12022.53, subd. (d), 12022.7, subd. (a)) in the commission of counts
1 through 3 and defendant committed all the offenses while on bail (§
12022.1, subd. (b)). Six circumstances in aggravation were alleged, and it
was further alleged that defendant had two prior convictions for offenses that
were serious felonies (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)) and strikes under the Three Strikes
Law (§§ 667, subds. (d) and (e), 1170.12, subds. (b) and (c)).
presented at trial, and in his appeal, defendant does not challenge the
sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions.
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
Defendant’s First Faretta Motion is Granted
At arraignment on February 9, 2023, defendant requested to represent
himself (Faretta motion), completing a form advisement and waiver of right
to counsel. The trial court, Honorable Loretta Giorgi, granted the Faretta
motion and appointed Catherine Klimek as defendant’s investigator.
At a status hearing on March 1, the trial court (Honorable Rochelle
East) appointed David Harrison as advisory conflict counsel and scheduled
another status hearing for March 16. At the March 16 status hearing,
defendant refused to come to court.3 At a scheduled hearing on April 11,
defendant again refused to come to court. Judge East ordered defendant to
appear at the next court hearing.
Defendant Asks for an Attorney
A little over two months after asking to represent himself, defendant
changed his mind. At a hearing on April 19, 2023, defendant told the court
he was not provided discovery. Investigator Klimek, however, said she had
provided defendant initial discovery, the preliminary hearing transcript and
many pages of medical records, and defendant “had so many records that
[she] provided him with a large accordion folder.” The court (Judge Giorgi)
expressed concern that, despite “[r]epeated efforts to assist [defendant] to
prepare for trial,” “he is not doing so or certainly not processing what is being
provided to him sufficiently to represent himself.” Addressing defendant, the
3 Previously, defendant had refused to come to court on four separate
court dates in December 2022 and January 2023. Judge East ordered a
mental health evaluation under section 4011.6. (Under § 4011.6, subd. (a), if
it appears to a judge that a person in jail “may have a mental health
disorder,” the court is authorized to have the prisoner “taken to a facility for
72-hour treatment and evaluation pursuant to Section 5150 of the Welfare
and Institutions Code.”) The results of such evaluation, however, do not
appear to be part of the appellate record.
3
court stated that it was “becoming more and more of a concern to this Court
that you are either intentionally delaying things so that you don’t go out [to
trial], even though you say you want your speedy trial, or you are not able to
keep yourself all the documentation and the evidence that’s being provided
. . . such that you are able to prepare yourself.”
Defendant asked for a lawyer. The court confirmed defendant “no
longer want[ed] to represent [him]self” and granted his request for counsel.
The court relieved advisory counsel Harrison and investigator Klimek.
The next day, April 20, 2023, defendant refused to come to court, and
the trial court (Judge East) ordered that he appear at the next court hearing.
On April 21, the trial court appointed attorney Alexandria Carl to represent
defendant.
Defense Counsel Expresses Doubt About Defendant’s Competence
On June 27, 2023, a little over two months after her appointment,
attorney Carl declared a doubt as to defendant’s competence to stand trial
pursuant to section 1368, and the trial court suspended the criminal
proceedings.
In January 2024, Carl asked to be relieved as defendant’s counsel
because she was closing her private criminal defense practice. The trial court
relieved Carl as defendant’s counsel and continued the case for appointment
of counsel. In March 2024, Katherine Isa was appointed to represent
defendant.
4
Court-Appointed Psychiatrist Opines Defendant Has a Mental Disorder and
He is Competent to Stand Trial
Meanwhile, Dr. Jeffrey Gould interviewed defendant in October 2023
and prepared a written evaluation in January 2024.4 Dr. Gould found
defendant “was cooperative with the interview process and spoke in a clear
and coherent manner” and opined that defendant was currently competent to
stand trial.
Dr. Gould concluded defendant did have a mental disorder, and “it was
possible that [his] behavior represented signs of him suffering from a
psychotic disorder” or “ongoing . . . delusional disorder.” But, based on his
interview, the doctor opined defendant’s lack of cooperation with his attorney
was “most likely consistent with dysfunctional interpersonal functioning or
one of the personality disorders.”
Dr. Gould summarized defendant’s jail behavioral health services
(BHS) records from 2023. He wrote the following. In January 2023, BHS
progress notes reported defendant had a history of delusions of parasitosis;
he had been admitted to the San Francisco General Hospital psychiatry ward
for 12 days in 2004; defendant stated his public defender, Safeway, and BHS
were conspiring against him; and he was given diagnoses of delusion
disorder, somatic type, and opioid use disorder. In March 2023, defendant
“had some thought derailment and odd content,” stating he could “predict
storms” and “can feel ‘other worldly energy,’ ” and he was given diagnoses of
unspecified schizophrenia spectrum and other psychotic disorder and
polysubstance dependence. In April, defendant “endorsed auditory and
visual hallucinations” and “persecutory delusions.” In May, however, BHS
4 Initially, another psychologist was appointed to examine defendant in
June 2023, but after many continuances, the trial court relieved that
psychologist and appointed Dr. Gould to evaluate defendant.
5
noted defendant had no behavioral issues and no impairments in daily
functioning, and in July, it was noted that he had not presented with any
sign of major mental illness.
Criminal Proceedings Are Reinstated
On March 28, 2024, the parties submitted on Dr. Gould’s evaluation,
and the trial court (Honorable Charles Crompton) found defendant competent
to stand trial and reinstated criminal proceedings.
Defendant Makes a Second Faretta Motion
On May 28, 2024, two months after the criminal proceedings were
reinstated, defendant again asked to represent himself. The trial court
(Honorable Christine Van Aken) explained that if defendant wanted to
represent himself, a psychologist or psychiatrist would be appointed to
evaluate whether he was competent to do so.5 Defendant stated he did not
“have any mental health history” and denied he had ever “been to a mental
health facility at all.” He then described his understanding of certain prior
proceedings that was inconsistent with the court record, and he reiterated his
desire to represent himself.
The court determined it did not “know whether Mr. Brown is competent
to represent himself,” based on its “concerns about [defendant’s] doubts about
the transcript; [¶] And about the hearings; [¶] And the fact that his
recollection of our proceedings that have happened so far really don’t match
at all what the Court’s records show.”
5 Noting that a doubt previously had been raised about defendant’s
competence, the trial court explained to defendant, “[W]here there’s a
question about—where someone does have a history of mental health
concerns, this court is required to do a separate inquiry and to figure out . . .
are you competent to represent yourself,” which is a different issue from
whether a person is competent to stand trial.
6
Psychologist David Berke was appointed to evaluate whether defendant
was fit to represent himself.
Court-Appointed Psychologist Opines Defendant Is Not Competent to
Represent Himself in Trial
Dr. Berke interviewed defendant in June 2024 and prepared a written
evaluation the same month. He wrote that the court had asked him to
“determine whether Mr. Brown suffers from a severe mental illness to the
point where he cannot carry out the basic tasks needed to present his own
defense without the help of counsel.” Dr. Berke concluded defendant “is not
competent to represent himself in trial.”
Dr. Berke reviewed defendant’s jail medical-psychiatric records and Dr.
Gould’s January 2024 competency evaluation, and he spoke with defendant’s
current defense attorney and two previous attorneys. Dr. Berke summarized
defendant’s jail records, writing that defendant had a history of inpatient
psychiatric hospitalization, he “was 5150’d in October 2022,” and recently had
“Psychiatric Emergency Service visits.” Defendant “experienced delusional
thinking,” and he “perceives his oppositional behavior as being a reflection of
his intellectual and/or spiritual superiority. ‘I know it all, I know more than
you.’ ” The defense attorneys who had worked with defendant reported that
defendant was “extremely difficult to work with due to his oppositional
behavior, his delusional thinking, his paranoia, and his grandiosity.”
During his interview with Dr. Berke, defendant “appeared to be
grandiose regarding his ability to represent himself in court, indicating that
his judgment is impaired.” Noting defendant “was extremely talkative,
almost manic” as well as grandiose, Dr. Berke opined that defendant “may
suffer from a mood disorder, possibly bipolar disorder.” Regarding “his
current mental state of mind,” Dr. Berke wrote, defendant’s “grandiosity,
paranoia, and delusional thinking appear to be impairing his judgment.”
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Defendant’s Second Faretta Motion is Denied
On June 28, 2024, Dr. Berke’s report was received by the court
(Honorable Eric Fleming), and defendant’s request to represent himself was
denied.
The Case Goes to Trial and Defendant Is Convicted and Sentenced
A jury trial began in September 2024. The jury found defendant guilty
of counts 2 through 8 and found all enhancement allegations true. The jury
could not reach a verdict on count 1 (attempted murder), and the trial court
declared a mistrial on that count.
The trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of 30 years to life in
prison.
DISCUSSION
A. Relevant Legal Principles and Standard of Review
The Sixth Amendment right to a defense necessarily includes the “right
to self-representation.” (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 819.) “In Indiana v.
Edwards (2008) 554 U.S. 164 (Edwards), however, the United States
Supreme Court held that states may, but need not, deny self-representation
to defendants who, although competent to stand trial, lack the mental health
or capacity to represent themselves at trial—persons the court referred to as
‘gray-area defendants.’ ” (People v. Johnson (2012) 53 Cal.4th 519, 523
(Johnson).)
In Edwards, the Supreme Court observed that mental illness “can vary
over time” and “interfere[] with an individual’s functioning at different times
in different ways,” such that a person may be competent to stand trial, “yet at
the same time [that person] may be unable to carry out the basic tasks
needed to present his [or her] own defense without the help of counsel.”
(Edwards, supra, 554 U.S. at pp. 175–176.) The Court held, “[T]he
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Constitution permits States to insist upon representation by counsel for those
competent enough to stand trial . . . but who still suffer from severe mental
illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings
by themselves.” (Id. at p. 178.)
“Although asked to adopt ‘a more specific standard,’ the high court [in
Edwards] declined to do so,” and the California Supreme Court has likewise
chosen not to adopt a more specific standard. (Johnson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at
p. 530.) Thus, “the standard that trial courts considering exercising their
discretion to deny self-representation should apply is simply whether the
defendant suffers from a severe mental illness to the point where he or she
cannot carry out the basic tasks needed to present the defense without the
help of counsel.” (Ibid.)
When a trial court “doubts the defendant’s mental competence for self-
representation, it may order a psychological or psychiatric examination to
inquire into that question[, which is different from the question whether the
defendant is competent to stand trial]. To minimize the risk of improperly
denying self-representation to a competent defendant, ‘trial courts should be
cautious about making an incompetence finding without benefit of an expert
evaluation, though the judge’s own observations of the defendant’s in-court
behavior will also provide key support for an incompetence finding and
should be expressly placed on the record.’ ” (Johnson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at
pp. 530–531.)
In reviewing the denial of a Faretta motion, “we must defer largely to
the trial court’s discretion.” (Johnson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 531.) “The trial
court’s determination regarding a defendant’s competence [to represent
himself] must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence.” (Ibid.)
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B. Analysis
Defendant contends there was no substantial evidence that he suffered
from a severe mental disorder that rendered him incompetent to represent
himself at trial. We are not persuaded.
Johnson is illustrative. There, our high court found no error in the
trial court’s revocation of defendant Johnson’s self-representation status,
although Johnson was found competent to stand trial. (Johnson, supra, 53
Cal.4th at pp. 524–525.) The record supported “ ‘the trial court’s conclusion
that defendant, although competent to stand trial, was not competent to
conduct trial proceedings by himself,’ ” where, among other things, “ ‘[a]
psychologist had testified at the trial-competency hearing that there was “a
very strong possibility” that defendant had some type of delusional thought
disorder coupled with conspiracy paranoia,’ ” and the trial court “ ‘reasonably
concluded that defendant lacked the mental capacity to conduct his defense
without the assistance of counsel. . . . The trial judge showed great patience
in permitting defendant an opportunity to represent himself but chose to
deny further self-representation when it became clear that defendant was
accomplishing nothing and might, in the court’s opinion, be deprived of a fair
trial if allowed to continue his self-representation.’ ” (Id. at p. 532.)
In the present case, there was similar evidence that defendant had a
delusion disorder coupled with paranoia. Dr. Gould noted that defendant
believed his public defender, Safeway, and the jail mental health services
were all conspiring against him, and defendant had a diagnosis of delusional
disorder. In 2023, defendant had auditory and visual hallucinations and
persecutory delusions. During his interview in June 2024, Dr. Berke found
10
defendant to be grandiose, paranoid, and suffering from delusional thinking,
all of which “appeared to be impairing his judgment.”6
Defendant argues the record lacks substantial evidence supporting the
denial of his second Faretta motion because Dr. Berke “did not opine as to
whether . . . [defendant had] a severe mental illness.” However, Dr. Berke
wrote that he understood his task was to “determine whether Mr. Brown
suffers from a severe mental illness to the point where he cannot carry out the
basic tasks needed to present his own defense without the help of counsel,”
and he concluded defendant was not fit to represent himself under that
standard. (Italics added.) Dr. Berke’s written evaluation provided
substantial evidence that defendant was incompetent to represent himself.
(See People v. Gardner (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 945, 959–960 [doctor’s
evaluation concluding the “defendant was incompetent to represent himself
at trial” provided substantial evidence to uphold the trial court’s denial of a
Faretta motion].)
To the extent defendant’s position is that the record does not contain
substantial evidence that he suffers from “severe mental illness” as the
phrase is used in Edwards and Johnson, we disagree. The record contains
many references to diagnoses of delusion disorder, unspecified schizophrenia
spectrum and other psychotic disorder, and a history of hallucinations and
persecutory delusions. Defendant relies on jail reports that he showed no
behavioral issues in May 2023 and no signs of major mental illness in July
2023, but these observations do not negate the evidence supporting a
6 In Johnson, it was also noted that the defendant “ ‘conducted himself
in a bizarre and disruptive manner’ ” while he was representing himself.
(Johnson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 532.) Here, although the record does not
show bizarre behavior, defendant did often refuse to come to court both when
he had an attorney and when he was representing himself.
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determination that he had ongoing psychotic and/or delusional disorders.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that mental illness
“var[ies] over time” and “interferes with an individual’s functioning at
different times in different ways.” (Edwards, supra, 554 U.S. at p. 175.) For
this very reason, states may “insist upon representation by counsel for those
competent enough to stand trial . . . but who still suffer from severe mental
illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings
by themselves.” (Id. at p. 178.) That defendant at certain times lacked overt
symptoms of mental illness does not mean he necessarily was competent to
represent himself through the course of the criminal proceedings.
Finally, we reject defendant’s suggestion that Dr. Berke’s evaluation
does not provide substantial evidence because he mentioned that defendant’s
proposed defense “lacked plausibility.” As the Attorney General responds,
this was not the sole reason Dr. Berke found defendant incompetent to
represent himself. “Rather Dr. Berke repeatedly listed the mental infirmities
of [defendant] that impaired his competency to assist his attorneys.” Dr.
Berke wrote it was not clear that defendant “fully understood the charges
against him” and that defendant “appeared to have a distorted belief
regarding his perceived ability to articulate his defense in a court of law.” Dr.
Berke did not merely believe defendant would present an implausible
defense; he concluded defendant was incompetent to represent himself
because of his mental disorders, including “grandiosity, paranoia, and
delusional thinking.”
In short, we find substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
determination that defendant was not competent to represent himself.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed
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_________________________
Miller, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
Stewart, P. J.
_________________________
Richman, J.
A171881, People v. Brown
13