Com. v. Hartsfield, D.

J-S31041-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

:

DAMIEN HARTSFIELD :

:

Appellant : No. 1628 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 28, 2024

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at

No(s): CP-51-CR-0001345-2022

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED OCTOBER 22, 2025

Appellant Damien Hartsfield appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed following a non-jury trial in which he was convicted of theft by

deception, forgery, identity theft, perjury, false swearing, conspiracy to

commit theft by deception, conspiracy to commit forgery, and conspiracy to

commit identity theft.1 Appellant claims that the motions court erred in

allowing his former attorney to testify and that the trial court erred by

admitting an exhibit without proper authentication. After review, we affirm.

The trial court set forth the factual history of the case as follows:

On December 18, 2020, Appellant received a notification via email

from his attorney, Daniel Linn, Esq. [(Former Counsel)], that

settlement funds, from a separate civil case, in the amount of

$10,000 were received and placed into a client trust account.

[Former Counsel] informed Appellant that the funds could not be

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1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3922(a)(1), 4101(a)(2), 4120(a), 4902(a), 4903(a)(1), and

903(a), respectively.

J-S31041-25

distributed without a court order releasing child support

arrearages. Appellant owed approximately $17,000 in arears.

On December 23, 2020, Appellant contacted Laeah Brown

(hereinafter “Complainant”) and requested to be taken off child

support so that he could use his passport. Complainant refused

to release child support arrears owed by Appellant at that time.

The same day, December 23, 2020, Appellant contacted [Former

Counsel’s] office and requested to have the settlement funds

placed under his current wife’s name. [Former Counsel’s]

employee, Nancy Cellini, informed Appellant that the funds could

not be placed under another person’s name without a court order.

On December 29, 2020, Appellant called [Former Counsel] and

requested that a letter be sent on behalf of Complainant, the

mother of Appellant’s children and to whom the child support

payments were owed, asking for a release from child support

arrears. [Former Counsel] refused to send a letter and provided

the contact information for Paula Musi[, Esq.], an attorney in the

Child Support Unit of the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office,

who could assist in obtaining a court order to release the child

support arrears.

On January 12, 2021, Appellant contacted [Former Counsel]

because he was in receipt of an allegedly notarized letter signed

by Complainant which released the child support arrears.

Appellant then sent [Former Counsel] an email containing a copy

of the notarized release letter from Complainant and a copy of

[Complainant’s] driver[’s] license. [Former Counsel] forwarded

the notarized letter and license to Paula Musi via email and asked

if Appellant’s funds could be released. Appellant contacted

[Former Counsel] a second time on January 12, 2021 and

requested that the notarized letter be faxed to “child support.” On

January 13, 2021, [Former Counsel] faxed the notarized letter to

the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office and again asked if

Appellant’s settlement funds could be disbursed. Later the same

day, January 13, 2021, [Former Counsel] received an order

executed by the Honorable Margaret Murphy in the Court of

Common Pleas, Philadelphia County, Domestic Relations Division

[(Family Court)] which vacated Appellant’s non-disbursement

order. [Former Counsel] contacted Appellant and arranged the

release of the Appellant’s settlement funds.

Following the release of the child support arrearages, Complainant

received a confirmation letter from Philadelphia Family Court in

January 2021. Complainant did not know why she received the

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letter and called Appellant for clarification. Appellant responded

that he only called child support and requested to be taken off.

Complainant then contacted the Child Support Unit at the

Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office and was provided a copy of

the letter which released the child support arrearages.

Complainant did not recognize the letter and did not authorize any

third party to execute the document on her behalf. Additionally,

Complainant noticed that her name was spelled incorrectly and

she did not recognize the telephone number listed. Complainant

called the number and identified the owner of the number as

someone who was not a friend or family member. Complainant

then contacted [Former Counsel] regarding the release letter

which she believed to be forged. [Former Counsel] contacted the

Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office via email to inform them

that there were questions raised regarding the authenticity of the

letter releasing Appellant from [child support] arrearages.

[Former Counsel] also contacted Appellant and asked if the letter

was fraudulent. Appellant denied that any fraudulent activity

occurred but did not deny that he sent the letter.

On March 10th, 2021, Appellant and Complainant attended a

contempt hearing in Philadelphia [Family Court] before the

Honorable Joel Johnson regarding the improperly vacated court

order for child support and forged notarized release letter. The

hearing was conducted over a RingCentral conference call. During

the contempt hearing, Appellant denied providing or seeing the

forged notarized release letter sent to [Former Counsel].

Appellant denied taking a vacation or traveling to Cancun, Mexico

after January 13, 2021. On February 26, 2021 Appellant’s

passport was stamped for Quintana Roo, Mexico. Additionally,

Appellant stated that the settlement money was in his bank

account and that $500.00 was sent to his children each month

totaling about $3,000.00. Complainant denied receiving any

payment for her children aside from a toy purchased by Appellant

for a value of less than $3,000.00.

On February 8, 2022, Appellant was apprehended by police at [a

gate] in the Philadelphia International Airport.

Trial Ct. Op., 12/18/24, at 1-4 (citations omitted and some formatting

altered).

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On March 21, 2023, the Commonwealth filed a motion in limine seeking

to compel Former Counsel to testify at Appellant’s trial. A hearing regarding

the motion was held on July 24, 2023 before the Honorable Anthony Kyriakakis

(motions court). Ultimately, after Former Counsel testified at the hearing, the

motions court granted the Commonwealth’s motion to compel.

On January 23, 2024, Appellant, having waived his right to a jury trial,

proceeded to a waiver trial before the Honorable Tamika N. Washington (trial

court). Thereafter, the trial court found him guilty of the above-stated

charges. Appellant was sentenced on May 28, 2024 to three to six years’

incarceration for theft by deception, three to six years’ incarceration for

forgery, and three years of probation for identity theft.2 The trial court

imposed the sentences for theft by deception and forgery consecutive to each

other for an aggerate sentence of six to twelve years’ incarceration followed

by three years of probation.

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. Both Appellant and the trial

court complied with Rule 1925.3

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2 The trial court sentenced Appellant to no further penalty for conspiracy to

commit theft by deception, perjury, false swearing, conspiracy to commit

forgery, and conspiracy to commit identity theft.

3 On June 6, 2024, the trial court issued an order directing Appellant to file a

Pa.R.A.P 1925(b) statement within twenty-one days of the entry of the order.

Trial counsel motioned to withdraw as counsel on June 11, 2024 stating that

he was only retained for trial and that Appellant could not retain his services

for appeal, but wished to have counsel appointed. The trial court granted trial

counsel’s motion on June 26, 2024, and ordered the appointment of appellate

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

1. Did the motions court err in granting the Commonwealth’s

motion in limine via written order dated July 24, 2023 to

compel the testimony of [Former Counsel]?

2. Did the trial court err in admitting, over objection, the non-

disbursement order designated as Exhibit “C-3”?

Appellant Brief at 6 (some formatting altered).

Attorney-Client Privilege and the Crime-Fraud Exception

Appellant’s first claim is that the motions court erred in granting the

Commonwealth’s motion in limine, in which it sought to compel the testimony

of Former Counsel. See Appellant’s Brief at 9-15. Appellant argues that the

motions court erred by compelling Former Counsel to testify pursuant to the

crime-fraud exception of the attorney-client privilege. See id. at 10-11.

Specifically, Appellant argues that the order compelling Former Counsel to

testify was not restricted in scope. Id. Appellant concludes that, because the

order compelling Former Counsel to testify was not limited in scope, Former

Counsel was allowed to testify “to all communications between [Appellant]

and himself” and that “[t]his wholesale waiver contradicts the attorney-client

privilege and Pennsylvania law and rises to the level of reversible error.” Id.

at 15.

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counsel for Appellant’s direct appeal. Appellate counsel entered his

appearance on August 20, 2024. On September 8, 2024, appellate counsel

filed a motion for the extension of time to file a Rule 1925(b) statement nunc

pro tunc. After the trial court granted an extension, Appellant filed a timely

Rule 1925(b) statement nunc pro tunc.

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“Whether the attorney-client privilege . . . protects a communication

from disclosure is a question of law.” In re Thirty-Third Statewide

Investigating Grand Jury, 86 A.3d 204, 215 (Pa. 2014) (citations omitted).

Since this issue presents a question of law, our standard of review is de novo,

and our scope of review is plenary. See id.

The attorney-client privilege in criminal matters is codified and states

the following:

In a criminal proceeding counsel shall not be competent or

permitted to testify to confidential communications made to him

by his client, nor shall the client be compelled to disclose the

same, unless in either case this privilege is waived upon the trial

by the client.

42 Pa.C.S. § 5916.

However, “a lawyer’s fidelity to the client does not extend to aiding and

abetting a client in criminal activities, . . . nor can the client have a legitimate

expectation of such confidences.” Thirty-Third Statewide Investigating

Grand Jury, 86 A.3d at 218 (citation and quotation marks omitted). The

attorney client privilege “does not protect communications made for the

purpose or in the course of the commission of proposed crime or fraud.” In

re Investigating Grand Jury of Philadelphia County, 593 A.2d 402, 406

(Pa. 1991). The rationale behind this lack of protection is well established:

No court can permit it to be said that the contriving of a fraud can

form part of the professional occupation of an attorney or solicitor.

In order [for the attorney-client privilege to] apply there must be

both professional confidence and professional employment, but if

the client has a criminal object in view in his communications with

his solicitor one of these elements must necessarily be absent.

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The client must either conspire with his solicitor or deceive him.

If his criminal object is avowed, the client does not consult his

adviser professionally, because it cannot be the solicitor’s

business to further any criminal object. If the client does not avow

his object he reposes no confidence, for the state of facts, which

is the foundation of the supposed confidence, does not exist. The

solicitor’s advice is obtained by a fraud. Such communications

were not made to the attorney in his professional capacity, as they

were such as he could not receive in such capacity, and therefore

were not privileged.

Nadler v. Warner Co., 184 A. 3, 5 (Pa. 1936) (citations and quotation marks

omitted).

Further, “[w]hen the advice of counsel is sought in aid of the commission

of crime or fraud, the communications are not ‘confidential’ within the

meaning of the statute, and may be elicited from the client or the attorney on

the witness stand.” Id. Ultimately, “[a] client who consults an attorney for

advice that will serve him in the commission of a fraud will have no help from

the law [and] must let the truth be told.” Id. (citations omitted).

When seeking to disclose that which may be privileged, “the party

seeking disclosure has the burden of establishing a prima facie case that the

attorney was used to promote an intended or continuing fraudulent or criminal

activity.” Brennan v. Brennan, 422 A.2d 510, 515 (Pa. Super. 1980)

(citations omitted).

Here, the trial court addressed Appellant’s claim as follows:

[Former Counsel] provided uncontroverted testimony that he

suspected that [] Appellant involved him in a fraudulent scheme.

[Former Counsel] unknowingly assisted Appellant in sending a

fraudulent letter to the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office and

Philadelphia [Family Court] in order to have a non-disbursement

order vacated. [Former Counsel] learned of potential fraud from

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Complainant and contacted Appellant to see if the letter releasing

the ar[r]ears was fraudulently obtained. [Former Counsel] then

contacted Paula Musi in the Child Support Unit of the Philadelphia

District Attorney’s Office due to suspected fraud. [Former

Counsel’s] testimony demonstrates that attorney-client privilege

does not apply because the correspondence with Appellant

involved a criminal act. [Former Counsel’s] discussions with

Appellant fall under the crime fraud exception.

Trial Ct. Op. at 10 (citations omitted).

After review, we agree with the trial court that Appellant’s

communications with Former Counsel were not covered by attorney-client

privilege. At the hearing on the Commonwealth’s motion to compel his

testimony, Former Counsel testified that he represented Appellant in a civil

matter in which he negotiated a $10,000 settlement in Appellant’s favor. N.T.

Mot. Hr’g, 7/24/23, at 9. Former Counsel stated that he could not disburse

the funds to Appellant due to a non-disbursement order related to Appellant’s

child support arrearages. Id. Former Counsel stated that he explained the

effect of the non-disbursement order to Appellant. Id. at 9-10. Former

Counsel also testified that in December of 2020, Appellant contacted him and

stated that he had a letter from the mother of his children releasing him from

the arrearages. Id. at 11-12. Former Counsel told Appellant to submit the

letter to the Child Support Unit of the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office as

Former Counsel could not release any funds to Appellant until he received

authorization and a court order allowing him to do so. See id. at 13. Former

Counsel testified that Appellant later asked him to send the letter and Former

Counsel advised Appellant to forward the letter himself but Former Counsel

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also agreed to send a courtesy copy. Id. Appellant emailed the letter to

Former Counsel, who sent it to the proper contact at the Child Support Unit to

obtain an order allowing Former Counsel to disburse the settlement funds.

See id. at 14. Thereafter, Former Counsel received an order allowing him to

disburse the funds to Appellant. Id.

Former Counsel explained that he was then contacted by Complainant.

Id. at 15. After speaking to Complainant, Former Counsel called Appellant to

discuss Complainant’s contention that she did not authorize the release of the

arrearages. Id. at 15-16. Appellant denied any wrongdoing. Id. at 16.

Former Counsel contacted the Child Support Unit to advise them about the

discrepancy regarding the letter. Id. at 16-17.

Based upon the above testimony, we conclude that the Commonwealth

satisfied its burden of establishing a prima facie case that Former Counsel was

used to promote an intended fraudulent or criminal activity. See Brennan,

422 A.2d at 515. Since Appellant utilized Former Counsel to further fraudulent

or criminal activity, “the communications are not ‘confidential’ within the

meaning of the statute, and may be elicited from the client or the attorney on

the witness stand.” See Nadler, 184 A. at 5; see also Investigating Grand

Jury of Philadelphia County, 593 A.2d at 406; Thirty-Third Statewide

Investigating Grand Jury, 86 A.3d at 218. Accordingly, the motions court

did not err in granting the Commonwealth’s motion to compel Former

Counsel’s testimony. See Thirty-Third Statewide Investigating Grand

Jury, 86 A.3d at 215.

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As to Appellant’s argument that the order compelling Former Counsel to

testify was required to be limited in scope, Appellant failed to make this

argument in the motions or trial court. At the motions hearing, Appellant

argued that the evidence presented was insufficient to show that he sent the

letter to Former Counsel and that Former Counsel’s action of notifying the

Child Support Unit about the discrepancy of the letter was improper. See N.T.

Mot. Hr’g, 7/24/23, at 35-39. Appellant did not file a response to the

Commonwealth’s motion to compel. See id. at 41. Further, at trial, Appellant

never raised an objection regarding Former Counsel’s testimony going beyond

the scope of the crime-fraud exception. See N.T., 1/24/24, at 9-45. Since

this argument was never raised in the trial court, it is waived for our review.

See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (stating that “[i]ssues not raised in the trial court are

waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal”); see also

Commonwealth v. Murray, 83 A.3d 137, 158-59 (Pa. 2013) (holding that

the defendant waived his claim regarding attorney-client privilege by failing

to raise it in the trial court and stating “that preservation of the specific

argument in support of the ground for reversal is required for appellate

review” (citation omitted)). For these reasons, Appellant is not entitled to

relief.

Authentication of the Non-Disbursement Order

Appellant’s next claim is that the trial court erred by admitting the non-

disbursement order without proper authentication. See Appellant’s Brief at

15-20. Specifically, Appellant argues that “[w]hile the non-disbursement

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order was issued by the Administrative Judge of Family Court, the

[Commonwealth] attempted to admit a copy through the [assistant] district

attorney’s testimony.” Id. at 15-16. Appellant claims that the assistant

district attorney who authenticated the document was not qualified to do so

and that “the appropriate individual to authenticate such a document would

be the clerk or prothonotary.” Id. at 18. Appellant argues that a custodian

of records was required to testify before admitting the order and, specifically,

the custodian of records for Family Court and not an assistant district attorney.

See id. at 19. Finally, Appellant contends that the admission of the

disbursement letter was not harmless error as “it as a key piece of evidence

to demonstrate why [Appellant] engaged in the alleged forgery.” Id. at 19-

20.

Our standard of review for evidentiary issues is as follows:

We review a challenge to the trial court’s evidentiary rulings for

an abuse of discretion. . . . The admission of evidence is

committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and a trial

court’s ruling regarding the admission of evidence will not be

disturbed on appeal unless that ruling reflects manifest

unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such

lack of support to be clearly erroneous. Where the evidentiary

question involves a discretionary ruling, our scope of review is

plenary. Further, we will affirm a trial court’s evidentiary ruling if

the result is correct on any ground, without regard to the grounds

on which the trial court relied.

Commonwealth v. Williamson, 330 A.3d 407, 414 (Pa. Super. 2025)

(citations omitted and some formatting changed), appeal denied, --- A.3d --,

79 MAL 2025, 2025 WL 2217650 (Pa. filed Aug. 5, 2025).

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Generally, authentication of evidence requires a low burden of proof.

See Commonwealth v. Jackson, 283 A.3d 814, 818 (Pa. Super. 2022).

“Unless stipulated, to satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying

an item of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to

support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.” Pa.R.E.

901(a).

Public records “may be self-authenticating as provided in Pa.R.E. 902”

or “may be authenticated in the same manner as other writings.” Pa.R.E. 901,

cmt. Under Rule 901, a public record may be authenticated by evidence

showing that “a document was recorded or filed in a public office as authorized

by law” or “a purported public record or statement is from the office where

items of this kind are kept.” Pa.R.E. 901(b)(7). Under Rule 902, certified

copies of public records that were recorded or filed in a public office are self-

authenticating “if the copy is certified as correct by . . . the custodian or

another person authorized to make the certification or . . . a certificate that

complies with Rule 902(1), (2), or (3), a statute or a rule prescribed by the

Supreme Court.” Pa.R.E. 902(4) (some formatting altered).

Here, the trial court concluded that the non-disbursement order was

admissible pursuant to Pa.R.E. 803(6)(d). See Trial Ct. Op. at 11-13.

However, Rule 803 sets forth the exceptions to the rule against hearsay and

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does not deal with the authentication of documents.4 See Pa.R.E. 803.

Accordingly, the trial court’s rationale is erroneous. However, we are not

bound by the trial court’s rationale if the admission is supported on other

grounds. See Williamson, 330 A.3d at 414.

Here, our review of the record demonstrates that the non-disbursement

order was properly authenticated under Rule 901. At trial, the Commonwealth

did not claim that the order was a certified copy. See N.T., 1/23/24, at 51.

The Commonwealth called Assistant District Attorney Joan Esmonde, Esq. to

authenticate the non-disbursement order. Id. at 46-50. ADA Esmonde

identified the non-disbursement order as “our form, non-disbursement order,

. . . that we send to counsel directing them not to distribute any money to the

defendant in [a] child support case” and identified the specific document as

the order related to Appellant’s child support case. Id. at 49-50. ADA

Esmonde testified that her unit at the district attorney’s office, as part of a

court-approved administrative enforcement mechanism, generates non-

disbursement orders, keeps record of the orders, and dockets the orders in

the Family Court record. Id. at 53-55. ADA Esmonde testified that she was

the person that wrote the non-disbursement order in Appellant’s case. Id. at

54. Based upon this testimony, the non-disbursement order was properly

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4 We note that Appellant did not preserve a challenge to the admission of the

non-disbursement order based upon hearsay. See N.T., 1/23/24, at 50

(objecting and stating “I don’t think that this testimony is appropriate to

authenticate the court document”); N.T., 1/24/24, at 5-7 (explaining that

“while [the order] may be a business record, that’s not my argument”).

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authenticated under Rule 901(b)(7) as the Commonwealth introduced

sufficient evidence to show that the order was “recorded or filed in a public

office as authorized by law” and that the order was “from the office where

items of this kind are kept.”5 See Pa.R.E. 901(b)(7). Since the non-

disbursement order was properly authenticated under Rule 901, we affirm the

trial court’s ruling on that basis.6 See Williamson, 330 A.3d at 414. Since

the non-disbursement order was properly authenticated, no relief is due.

Accordingly, we affirm.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Date: 10/22/2025

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5 The test under Rule 901(b)(7) is disjunctive and, therefore, the

Commonwealth was only required to prove one of these two elements to

authenticate the order. See Pa.R.E. 901(b)(7).

6 To the extent Appellant relies on Commonwealth v. Manivannan, 186

A.3d 472 (Pa. Super. 2018), to argue that a record custodian from family court

was required to authenticate the order, we note that Manivannan dealt with

the requirements of self-authenticating evidence under Pa.R.E. 902. See

Manivannan, 186 A.3d at 480-81. Rule 902 is not the only way to

authenticate a public record as, like here, public records may also be

authenticated under Rule 901. See Pa.R.E. 901, cmt. (stating that, in addition

to being self-authenticating under Rule 902, public records may be

authenticated under Rule 901).

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