Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOSEPH J. LYNCH, JOSEPH B. : CIVIL ACTION

LYNCH :

:

v. : NO. 25-3442

:

HAVERFORD TOWNSHIP, CHIEF :

JOHN VIOLA, LIEUTENANT :

LAWRENCE TODD, SERGEANT :

ROBERT MCCREIGHT, CODE :

DIRECTOR JOSEPH CELIA, :

TOWNSHIP MANAGER DAVID :

BURMAN, DELAWARE COUNTY :

DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, :

DELAWARE COUNTY MOBILE :

CRISIS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT :

(MCLE), JOHN DOES 1-2 :

MEMORANDUM

KEARNEY, J. October 20, 2025

A Haverford Township man did not like how his local police protected his neighborhood

and how the township paid its police chief in Spring 2023. He complained on May 12, 2023 to the

Delaware County District Attorney’s Office. A township mental health crisis response team and

other township personnel including police officers visited the home he shares with his parent

homeowners including within hours of his May 12, 2023 complaints to a detective in the County’s

District Attorney’s Office. The township officials returned a few times over the next few weeks.

Township officials took pictures of alleged code violations at the property. The officials then cited

his property owner father for violating the township code by storing landscaping materials. A judge

found the property owner father did not violate the township code after two hearings, including a

hearing where the judge and police removed the property owner’s son from the courtroom. The

father and son waited almost two years and then pro se sued the township, township police

officials, Delaware County District Attorney’s office, township officials, and unidentified mental

health professionals claiming they violated their constitutional rights and under several

Pennsylvania law theories.

The township and state actors moved to dismiss. The father and son chose to not timely

contest the dismissal arguments. We nevertheless studied the allegations. We dismiss the federal

claims with differing treatment moving forward. We dismiss some claims with prejudice (and no

leave to amend) including those facially time barred by Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of

limitations. We dismiss other timely federal claims as uncontested without prejudice for the father

and son to timely plead a First Amendment retaliation claim against each individual state actor.

We decline to today exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims absent a federal

question without prejudice to the father and son timely seeking remedies in state court for these

state law claims.

I. Alleged pro se facts.

Joseph J. Lynch did not like how his hometown Haverford Township protected his

community and paid its police chief in May 2023.1 Joseph J. Lynch, living with his father property

owner Joseph B. Lynch, reported suspected municipal corruption to the Criminal Investigative

Department of the Delaware County District Attorney’s Office on May 12, 2023.2

Police and mental health professionals visit the Lynch home on May 12, 2023.

Haverford police officers along with mental health professionals visited the Lynches’ home

on May 12, 2023 following Son Lynch’s report to the Delaware County District Attorney’s

Office.3 Son Lynch attempted to identify the people visiting the Lynch home on May 12, 2023 but

an unidentified person at the District Attorney’s Office would not provide the names and told Son

Lynch his complaints would be “thrown in the trash” and he would be “labeled” as mentally ill if

he pursued the matter.4

Mental health professionals and the Code Director visit the Lynches’ property in June 2023.

Mental health professionals then visited the Lynch home in June and July 2023.5 Father

Lynch objected to the visits on June 12, 2023.6 Son Lynch followed the mental health professionals

down the street and told them future visits would be grounds for charges against them.7

Township Code Director Joseph Celia visited the Lynch property on June 19 or 20, 2023

and accused Son Lynch of illegally building an access trail and an illegal retaining wall on the

trail.8 Son Lynch countered his conduct is entirely legal and a state–protected activity.9 Code

Director Celia accused Son Lynch of illegally having materials delivered onto a grass strip outside

the Lynch home.10 Son Lynch responded his conduct is legal.11 Son Lynch asked Code Director

Celia to stop harassing him and accused the Haverford Police Department of retaliation for his

May 12 corruption report by sending Code Director Celia to the property. 12 Code Director Celia

refused to leave and asked to enter the home to inspect the property.13 Son Lynch denied Code

Director Celia access telling him he needed a warrant and should never return to the property

without a legal basis and to stop harassing his family.14 Code Director Celia entered the side of the

property.15 Son Lynch directed Code Director Celia to leave the property.16 Code Director Celia

began photographing the property.17 Code Director Celia then used these photographs to issue a

code violation on June 20, 2023.18 The June 20,. 2023 violation identified Father Lynch and his

wife as the owners of the property.19

Township Police Lieutenant Lawrence Todd photographed the Lynch property on June 27,

2023.20 Lieutenant Todd sent these photographs to Code Director Celia who later visited the Lynch

property the same day.21 Son Lynch again directed Code Director Celia to get off his parents’

property.22 Code Director Celia asked Son Lynch to get his father.23 Son Lynch directed Code

Director Celia to leave.24 Father Lynch then came outside.25 Code Director Celia said he did not

care about the family’s project and complimented them on the property.26 Code Director Celia

nevertheless issued a code violation.27

Visits to Father Lynch’s property in July 2023.

Township Police Sergeant Robert McCreight knocked on the front door of the Lynches’

property on July 2, 2023 to address outstanding code violations and directed Father Lynch to

“move the materials.”28 Father Lynch told Sergeant McCreight he would be go to court to resolve

these concerns.29 Township Manager David Burman visited the Lynches property the next day and

then drafted a code violation threatening ninety days’ jail time for landscaping issues.30 Code

Director Celia returned two days later.31 Son Lynch again told Code Director Celia to leave the

property but Code Director Celia stayed and looked for Father Lynch.32 Code Director Celia told

Father Lynch everything was fine with the project and Township Manager Burman forced him to

come onto the property and look at the ongoing activity.33 Code Director Celia nevertheless posted

a code violation on the front door of the property.34

Father Lynch defeats the code violations in court after police remove Son Lynch.

The Township proceeded to a hearing on the code violation on August 23, 2023 before

Judge Duerr.35 Code Director Celia offered photographs to support the code violation.36 Father

Lynch told Judge Duerr the township retaliated because of Son Lynch’s May 12, 2023 corruption

report.37 Code Director Celia admitted the police sent him to the Lynches’ property.38

The parties proceeded to a second day of hearings over two months later on October 31,

2023 before Judge Duerr.39 Code Director Celia presented the photographs as evidence shown at

the earlier hearing.40 Son Lynch, claiming to be authorized on behalf of his father, swore the code

violations are evidence of retaliation for his May 12, 2023 report of corruption to the Delaware

County District Attorney’s Office.41 Son Lynch argued his landscaping activities are state–

protected activities.42 Son Lynch swore Code Director Celia and Lieutenant Todd illegally

obtained the evidence.43 Judge Duerr found the Lynches not guilty of the code violations.44

Judge Duerr became concerned with the conduct of Son Lynch at some unpleaded point

during this hearing.45 Judge Duerr found Son Lynch to be talking too fast.46 Judge Duerr asked

Father Lynch to ask Son Lynch to leave the courtroom.47 Son Lynch apparently did not do so.48

Township Police Officer Fuller removed Son Lynch from the courtroom by grabbing his right

forearm and punched Son Lynch in the back within ten feet of Judge Duerr.49 Son Lynch then left

the courtroom.50

Son Lynch reports Judge Duerr to the judicial conduct board.

About a year later in an unrelated matter Judge Duerr described her behavior at the October

31, 2023 hearing to Son Lynch as “witness tampering,” “producing a false statement,” and “being

pressured by Haverford Police.”51 Son Lynch reported Judge Duerr’s admissions to the

Pennsylvania Judicial Conduct Board.52

II. Analysis

Father and Son Lynch sued Haverford Township, Police Chief John Viola, Lieutenant

Lawrence Todd, Sergeant Robert McCreight, Code Director Joseph Celia, Township Manager

David Burman, the Delaware County District Attorney’s Office, Delaware County Mobile Crisis

for Law Enforcement and two unidentified mental health professionals on July 2, 2025 alleging

civil rights violations and under Pennsylvania law.53 Father and Son Lynch have not yet served

their Complaint upon the District Attorney’s Office or the Mobile Crisis Unit. They also claim to

have served someone as “John Doe” but do not identify them and we have no basis to find proper

service requiring we today strike their proof of service upon unidentified persons.54

Father and Son Lynch allege First Amendment retaliation based on Son Lynch’s protected

speech on May 12, 2023 through issuing code violations, threatening him with false arrest,

obstructing a criminal complaint, and presenting illegally obtained evidence at the hearings before

Judge Duerr where they defeated the charges with no sanction.55 The Lynches claim Code Director

Celia, Lieutenant Todd, and unidentified mental health professionals unlawfully entered Father

Lynch’s property on May 12, June 19-20, June 27, and July 5, 2023 without probable cause or

consent and Sergeant McCreight seized landscaping material on July 2, 2023 in violation of the

Fourth Amendment.56 They claim Township Manager Burman, Code Director Celia, and

Lieutenant Todd violated their procedural due process rights by issuing code violations and

presenting false evidence without fair notice and opportunity to respond even though the Lynches

attended and defeated the code violations.57 They further allege Township Manager Burman, Chief

Viola, Code Director Celia, Lieutenant Todd, and Sergeant McCreight conspired to deprive them

of their First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights motivated by animus against Son Lynch

as a whistleblower.58 They further seek to impose municipal liability upon Haverford Township

without pleading a policy or custom by the Township.59 The Lynches also bring claims under

Pennsylvania law for trespass, malicious prosecution, defamation and intentional infliction of

emotional distress.60

Son Lynch claims he is incurring $1,000 per week of medical bills for therapy, $150,000

in reputational harm due to property development loan denials, and $750,000 in lost contracts for

property developments.61 He seeks damages of almost $2 million.62 Father Lynch alleges severe

emotional distress causing him to lose fifteen pounds and losing $150,000 per year in wages.63

Father Lynch estimates damages of $2,335,000 based on ongoing health issues, loss of enjoyment

of his property, and reduced work capacity.64

Haverford Township, Police Chief Viola, Lieutenant Todd, Sergeant McCreight, Code

Director Celia, and Township Manager Burman move to dismiss arguing: (1) Father Lynch has

not stated a claim; (2) the official capacity claims against the individual defendants are duplicative

of the claims against Haverford Township; (3) the First Amendment retaliation claim is time-

barred and otherwise insufficiently pleaded; (4) the Fourth Amendment claim fails to allege an

unlawful search or seizure; (5) the Fourteenth Amendment due process claim is partially time-

barred and otherwise fails to allege a cognizable deprivation or inadequate process; (6) the civil

rights conspiracy claim does not apply to the facts as alleged; (7) the Complaint does not plead

facts sufficient to state a claim for municipal liability; and (8) the state law claims are barred in

part by the statute of limitations.65 Police Chief John Viola, Lieutenant Lawrence Todd, Sergeant

Robert McCreight, Code Director Joseph Celia, and Township Manager David Burman further

contend they are entitled to qualified immunity.66

We are directed by our Court of Appeals to be “mindful of our obligation to liberally

construe a pro se litigant’s pleadings . . . .”67 We are to “remain flexible” and “apply the relevant

legal principle even when the complaint has failed to name it.”68 But “pro se litigants still must

allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim” and “cannot flout procedural rules—

they must abide by the same rules that apply to all other litigants.”69

But we also require pro se parties to participate in their cases. Our Court through Local

Rule 7.1(c) provides “[w]hen a party has failed to timely respond to a motion to dismiss within 14

days, the Court is authorized to grant the motion as uncontested.”70 Haverford Township, Police

Chief John Viola, Lieutenant Lawrence Todd, Sergeant Robert McCreight, Code Director Joseph

Celia, and Township Manager David Burman moved to dismiss on September 15, 2025.71 Father

and Son Lynch chose not to respond.

We grant Haverford Township, Police Chief John Viola, Lieutenant Lawrence Todd,

Sergeant Robert McCreight, Code Director Joseph Celia, and Township Manager David Burman’s

Motion as uncontested. We dismiss the Lynches’ official capacity, Fourth Amendment, and

Fourteenth Amendment claims with prejudice as they cannot state a claim as matter of law. We

dismiss the Lynches’ First Amendment retaliation claim in part with prejudice and in part without

prejudice. We dismiss the Lynches’ civil rights conspiracy, municipal liability, and state law

claims without prejudice to timely amend or we will close the case.

A. We dismiss official capacity claims against individual state actors with

prejudice.

Father and Son Lynch bring claims against Chief Viola, Lieutenant Todd, Sergeant

McCreight, Code Director Celia, and Township Manager Burman in both their individual and

official capacities. Chief Viola, Lieutenant Todd, Sergeant McCreight, Code Director Celia, and

Township Manager Burman argue the official capacity claims must be dismissed.72

Claims against county or municipal officials in their official capacity under section 1983

are treated as claims against the entity itself.73 Official capacity claim against Code Director Celia

and Township Manager Burman are claims against Haverford Township. These claims are

duplicative.

The official capacity claims against Chief Viola, Lieutenant Todd, and Sergeant McCreight

are likewise treated as claims against the Haverford Police Department. But the Haverford Police

Department is a mere sub-unit of the municipality and may not itself be sued as a “person” acting

under color of state law.74

We dismiss all official capacity claims against the individual state actors with prejudice.

To sue a municipal employee in his individual capacity, the Lynches must plead the existence of

personal involvement.75 “Personal involvement can be shown through allegations of personal

direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence. Allegations of participation or actual

knowledge and acquiescence, however, must be made with appropriate particularity.”76 In this

context, our Court of Appeals has held “a civil rights complaint is adequate where it states the

conduct, time, place, and persons responsible.”77

B. We dismiss the unreasonable search and seizure claims under the Fourth

Amendment with prejudice.

Father and Son Lynch claim Code Director Celia, Lieutenant Todd, and Sergeant

McCreight violated their Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure when

they “conducted warrantless searches of 501 Mill Road or 505 Mill Road on May 12, June 19–20,

June 27, and July 5, 2023, without probable cause or consent, and Defendant McCreight seized

landscaping activities on July 2, 2023.”78 Code Director Celia, Lieutenant Todd, and Sergeant

McCreight argue conduct alleged before July 2, 2023 is plainly barred by the statute of limitations

and the Lynches fail to allege facts to support an actual search or seizure.79 They argue the alleged

presence on the Lynch property and reference to “seizing landscaping activities” do not establish

a Fourth Amendment violation.80

Federal claims brought under section 1983 are governed by Pennsylvania’s two-year

statute of limitations for personal injury actions.81 “[A] cause of action accrues at the time of the

last event necessary to complete the tort, usually at the time the plaintiff suffers an injury.”82 We

agree the alleged searches on May 12, June 19 and 20, and June 27, 2023 are time-barred by

Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations. But the property visits after July 2, 2023 are not

time-barred.

The Lynches allege an unconstitutional seizure occurred when Sergeant McCreight

“knocked on the front door of 501 Mill Road” on July 2, 2023, Father Lynch answered, Sergeant

McCreight “berated” him for “outstanding code violations” by stating “[m]ove the materials now,”

and Father Lynch replied it “is [his] property” and he “will be going to court to resolve this.”83

The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”84 The “basic purpose of this

Amendment . . . is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions

by governmental officials.”85 A Fourth Amendment seizure occurs “when there is some

meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in [her or his] property.’”86

Meaningful interference “includes the exercise of ‘dominion and control’ over or destruction of

property.”87 But police may “‘knock and talk’ with people in a residence, and doing so is not a

seizure under the Fourth Amendment.88 “In order to effectuate a seizure, there must be something

more than ‘inoffensive contact between a member of the public and the police. . . . ’”89

The Lynches do not allege any conduct beyond Sergeant McCreight’s knock on the front

door and the brief exchange between Sergeant McCreight and Father Lynch. They do not allege

physical entry, restraint, or any exercise of dominion or control over the property. Sergeant

McCreight’s “brief presence on the [Lynches’] property and short conversation with [Father

Lynch] did not approach the meaningful possessory interference contemplated by the Fourth

Amendment.”90

The Lynches also claim an unconstitutional search occurred when Code Director Celia

“trespassed onto 501 Mill Road via the Earlington Road stairs” on July 5, 2023, “began walking

around the property,” “called for” Father Lynch, Father Lynch “came to the front yard,” and Code

Director Celia “walked to the front door of 501 Mill Road, and posted the violation on the front

door, including a threat of arrest.”91 A Fourth Amendment search occurs “either when the

Government violates an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy or when the Government

obtains information by physically intruding on persons, houses, papers, or effects.”92 “Trespass

alone does not qualify [as a search], but there must [also] be . . . an attempt to find something or

to obtain information.”93 “The Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable searches [and t]he

reasonableness of a search depends on the totality of the circumstances, including the nature and

purpose of the search and the extent to which the search intrudes upon reasonable privacy

expectations.”94

The Lynches have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area immediately surrounding

their home including their front door.95 But they do not allege Code Director Celia entered or

attempted to enter the house, or engaged in conduct beyond entering the property, calling for Father

Lynch (the property owner), and posting the violation on the front door. They do not plausibly

allege Code Director Celia attempted to obtain information or conduct a search within the meaning

of the Fourth Amendment.96 He appeared to post the violation notice and the interaction ended

once the posting was complete.97

We dismiss the Lynches’ Fourth Amendment claims with prejudice.

C. We dismiss Father and Son Lynch’s Fourteenth Amendment due process

claim with prejudice.

The Lynches claim Township Manager Burman, Code Director Celia, and Lieutenant Todd

deprived them of procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment “by collaborating and

issuing baseless code violations from June 19 to July 5, 2023,” “presenting illegally obtained

evidence at the August 23, 2023 hearing,” and “undermining Plaintiffs’ property rights without

fair notice or opportunity to respond.”98 Township Manager Burman, Code Director Celia, and

Lieutenant Todd again argue conduct before July 2, 2023 is barred by the statute of limitations.99

They also argue this claim fails because the Township issued alleged code violations to Father

Lynch (not Son Lynch) and he received notice and a full opportunity to challenge the violations

through the Township’s established procedures.100 We agree the alleged violations before July 2,

2025 are time-barred by Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations.101

To state a procedural due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Lynches

must allege (1) a deprivation of an individual interest encompassed within the Fourteenth

Amendment’s protection of life, liberty, or property; and (2) the procedures made available to them

did not provide due process.102 “At the core of procedural due process jurisprudence is the right to

advance notice of significant deprivations of liberty or property and to a meaningful opportunity

to be heard.”103

The Lynches admit those protections existed. Father Lynch received formal notice of the

alleged code violations, participated in two hearings, and Judge Duerr found him not guilty.104

Those proceedings afforded him notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard—the very

process the Constitution requires. The Lynches identify no protected interest actually deprived and

no procedural deficiency amounting to a constitutional violation. Their allegations cannot support

a Fourteenth Amendment claim.

We dismiss the procedural due process claim with prejudice.

D. We dismiss with prejudice Son Lynch’s First Amendment retaliation claim

barred by the statute of limitations but grant leave to amend the claim based

on conduct on or after July 2, 2023.

Son Lynch asserts a First Amendment retaliation claim based on conduct both before and

after July 2, 2023.105 The Pennsylvania two-year statute of limitations applying to a civil rights

claim requires we only consider claims for conduct within two years of filing this case on July 2,

2025.

Son Lynch alleges all “Defendants” retaliated against him for his “protected speech on

May 12, 2023” by “dispatching [the Delaware County Mobile Crisis for Law Enforcement],”

“threatening him with false arrest, issuing false code violations,” “obstructing his criminal

complaint,” and “presenting illegally obtained evidence.”106 The alleged protected speech is Son

Lynch’s report of suspected municipal corruption to the Delaware County District Attorney’s

Office on May 12, 2023.107 The alleged retaliatory dispatches of the County mental health crisis

response unit occurred on May 12 and June 12, 2023.108 The alleged threats of false arrest occurred

on May 12 and July 5, 2023.109 The alleged issuance of false code violations occurred on June 27

and July 5, 2023.110 The alleged obstruction of Son Lynch’s criminal complaint occurred between

May 13 and June 12, 2023.111 The alleged presentation of illegally obtained evidence occurred on

August 23 and October 31, 2023.112 Haverford Township, Police Chief John Viola, Lieutenant

Lawrence Todd, Sergeant Robert McCreight, Code Director Joseph Celia, and Township Manager

David Burman argue the First Amendment retaliation claim is time-barred and otherwise

insufficiently pleaded because the Lynches do not identify the alleged protected speech with

sufficient specificity.113

We agree with the state actors as to the untimely nature of several claims. But we grant

Son Lynch leave to amend to properly plead First Amendment claims for alleged retaliation on or

after July 2, 2023. He must now allege (1) he engaged in “constitutionally protected conduct”; (2)

a state actor “engaged in retaliatory action sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from

exercising his constitutional rights”; and (3) a “causal link between the constitutionally protected

conduct and retaliatory action.”114

“In the First Amendment retaliation context, individual discrete acts ‘g[ive] rise to a cause

of action at the time [they] occur[ ].’”115 The Lynches filed their Complaint on July 2, 2025.116

Any alleged retaliatory acts before July 2, 2023 are time-barred. Son Lynch’s First Amendment

retaliation claim to the extent it rests on all mental health crisis response unit dispatches, the May

12, 2023 threat of false arrest, the June 27, 2023 issuance of false code violations, and obstruction

of his criminal complaint is untimely.117 We dismiss these bases with prejudice.

The only timely claims for Son Lynch’s First Amendment retaliation claim are based on

the July 5, 2023 threat of false arrest and issuance of false code violations, and the presentation of

illegally obtained evidence on August 23 and October 31, 2023. We dismiss these claims without

prejudice to timely amend with a good faith pleading of the facts

E. Son Lynch does not plead a claim for conspiracy.

Son Lynch alleges a civil rights conspiracy under section 1985(3).118 He alleges Chief

Viola, Lieutenant Todd, Sergeant McCreight, Code Director Celia, and Township Manager

Burman “conspired to deprive Father and Son Lynch of their First, Fourth, and Fourteenth

Amendment rights, motivated by animus against [Son] Lynch as a whistleblower, a protected class

under § 1985(3).”119 Chief Viola, Lieutenant Todd, Sergeant McCreight, Code Director Celia, and

Township Manager Burman argue section 1985(3) does not apply.120

A viable claim under section 1985(3) requires: “(1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of

depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the

laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; and (3) an act in furtherance of

the conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is injured in his person or property or deprived of any right

or privilege of a citizen of the United States.”121 But a civil rights conspiracy claim cannot survive

without an underlying federal constitutional violation.122

Son Lynch does not plead a standalone constitutional violation under federal civil rights

law as shown in detail above. We dismiss his conspiracy claim under section 1985(3) without

prejudice to timely amend if he can plead a constitutional claim.

F. Son Lynch does not plead a claim for municipal liability.

Son Lynch asserts a municipal liability claim under section 1983 against Haverford

Township.123 He alleges the Township “maintained a custom or policy of retaliating against

whistleblowers, as evidenced by the coordinated actions of Defendants Burman, Celia, Todd, and

McCreight, approved by final policymaker Burman.”124

A municipality may be held liable under federal civil rights law only when its official

policy or customs caused the alleged constitutional violation.125 Son Lynch must “specify exactly”

the underlying custom or policy.126 He must “point to an official proclamation, policy, or edict by

a decisionmaker possessing the final authority to establish municipal policy on the relevant

subject.”127 A municipal policy under section 1983 is a “statement, ordinance, regulation, or

decision officially adopted and promulgated by” the Township’s officers.128 A custom enacted by

the Township may also lead to liability if it is “so widespread as to have the force of law.”129 “Proof

of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose liability under Monell

unless proof of the incident includes proof that it was caused by an existing, unconstitutional

municipal policy.”130 “Without an underlying constitutional violation, there can be no Monell

claim.”131

Son Lynch does not plead a standalone constitutional violation under federal civil rights

law. We dismiss his municipal liability claim without prejudice to timely amend.

G. We decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.

Father and Son Lynch also plead trespass, malicious prosecution, defamation, and

intentional emotional distress state law claims over which we may exercise our supplemental

jurisdiction.132 We can hear state claims filed within the statute of limitations where we have

original jurisdiction over federal claims arising out of a common nucleus of operative fact.133 The

federal and state claims must arise from the same case or controversy.134 We may decline to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims if we have dismissed all claims over which we have

original jurisdiction.135

We decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Lynches’ remaining state claims

absent a federal question. We dismiss the Lynches’ state law claims as we decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over them.

III. Conclusion

Son Lynch claims his local police and township officials retaliated against him and his

father by citing the father’s property for code violations shortly after Son Lynch complained about

police protection in his neighborhood and the police chief’s salary on May 12, 2023. The Lynches

defeated these charges at a full hearing. Father and Son Lynch waited until July 2, 2025 to sue the

police, township officials, and unnamed mental health professionals for violating a variety of

constitutional rights and under Pennsylvania law. The state actors moved to dismiss. Father and

Son Lynch chose to not timely oppose the requested relief. We dismiss the Complaint but with

different steps moving forward.

We dismiss with prejudice (i.e. no leave to amend) the time-barred claims as well as all

official capacity claims against Chief Viola, Lieutenant Todd, Sergeant McCreight, Code Director

Celia, and Township Manager Burman; the unreasonable search and seizure claims under the

Fourth Amendment; the Fourteenth Amendment due process claims; and all First Amendment

retaliation claims based on alleged retaliatory acts before July 2, 2023.

We grant the Lynches leave to file an amended Complaint by November 21, 2025

consistent with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 11 to plead a timely First Amendment

retaliation claim arising from specific conduct attributable a state actor in his individual capacity

on or after July 2, 2023 if they can show a temporal connection between the alleged retaliation and

Son Lynch’s allegedly protected conduct, a civil rights conspiracy claim under the First

Amendment, a municipal liability claim based on the retaliation claim, and state law claims not

otherwise barred by the statute of limitations.

1 ECF 1 at 4–5, 28.

2 Id. at 4, 7. We refer to Joseph B. Lynch as “Father Lynch” and Joseph J. Lynch as “Son Lynch”

for ease of reference.

The Lynches timely and separately sued Haverford Township officials at No. 25-2382 relating to

conduct immediately following the May 12, 2023 encounter as the police department. We dismiss

this companion case today as well with leave to amend to bring cognizable claims by November

21, 2025. We will then consider consolidating the remaining timely-pleaded claims into one

lawsuit given the substantial similarity in the facts alleged by the Lynches against many of the

same parties in both cases. For example, Son Lynch judicially admits in No. 25-2382 he

complained to Haverford Township police on May 12, 2023 and a detective physically removed

him from the police station. Those allegations are not pleaded in this case so we do not address

them here. But we take judicial notice of these earlier facts to offer context for the May 12, 2023

events. They pleaded the same conduct as to the Delaware County District Attorney in both cases

but just separate out the different retaliations.

3 Id. at 6–8.

4 Id. at 8–9.

5 Id. at 9.

6 Id.

7 Id.

8 Id. at 10–11.

9 Id.

10 Id. at 11.

11 Id.

12 Id.

13 Id.

14 Id. at 11–12.

15 Id. at 12.

16 Id.

17 Id.

18 Id.

19 Id. at 10.

20 Id. at 12.

21 Id.

22 Id.

23 Id.

24 Id. at 12–13.

25 Id. at 13.

26 Id.

27 Id.

28 Id.

29 Id.

30 Id. at 14.

31 Id.

32 Id. at 14–15.

33 Id. at 15.

34 Id.

35 Id. at 16.

36 Id.

37 Id.

38 Id.

39 Id. at 17.

40 Id.

41 Id.

42 Id.

43 Id. at 18.

44 Id.

45 Id. at 19.

46 Id.

47 Id.

48 Id.

49 Id. at 20.

50 Id.

51 Id. at 25–26.

52 Id. at 27.

53 Id. at 3–4. Congress through section 1983 provides a remedy for a violation of constitutional

rights but it is not a source of substantive rights; it is a vehicle to vindicate federal rights “elsewhere

conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1989). Section 1983 provides, in relevant

part: “Every person who, under color of any statute . . . of any State . . ., subjects, or causes to be

subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be

liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress

. . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a civil rights claim, Father and Son Lynch must allege (1) a person

acting under color of state law committed the complained-of conduct; and (2) the conduct deprived

him of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

Schneyder v. Smith, 653 F.3d 313, 319 (3d Cir. 2011).

54 ECF 7. See, e.g., Love v. Does, No. 17-1036, 2020 WL 5760447, at *14 (D.N.J. Sept. 28, 2020),

aff'd sub nom. Love v. Does 1-9, No. 17-01036, 2021 WL 2134940 (D.N.J. May 26, 2021)

(“Fictitious John Doe Defendants cannot be served without a name, or sufficiently identifying

information, and address. . .”).

55 ECF 1 at 6–17, 32–33.

56 Id. at 6–15, 33.

57 Id. at 9–17, 33.

58 Id. at 34.

59 Id.

60 Id. at 34–35.

61 Id. at 32.

62 Id.

63 Id.

64 Id.

65 ECF 10. Haverford Township, Police Chief John Viola, Lieutenant Lawrence Todd, Sergeant

Robert McCreight, Code Director Joseph Celia, and Township Manager David Burman move to

dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6).

A complaint must state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The

purpose of Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the sufficiency of a complaint under the plausibility pleading

standard. Zanetich v. Wal-Mart Stores East, Inc., 123 F.4th 128, 138 (3d Cir. 2024). A plaintiff

must include “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.’” Huertas v. Bayer US LLC, 120 F.4th 1169, 1174 (3d Cir. 2024) (quoting Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Kalu v. Spaulding, 113 F.4th 311, 325 (3d Cir. 2024) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 678). “‘Plausibly’ does not mean ‘probably,’ but ‘it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a

defendant has acted unlawfully.’” Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 605

U.S. 280, 291 (2025) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). A pleading offering “labels and

conclusions,” “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” or “tenders ‘naked

assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement’” is insufficient. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678

(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 557 (2007)).

Our Court of Appeals requires us to apply a three-step analysis to a 12(b)(6) motion: (1) we “tak[e]

note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim”; (2) we “identify allegations that …

‘are not entitled to the assumption of truth’ because those allegations ‘are no more than

conclusion[s]’”; and, (3) “‘[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations,’ we ‘assume their

veracity’ … in addition to assuming the veracity of ‘all reasonable inferences that can be drawn

from’ those allegations … and, construing the allegations and reasonable inferences ‘in the light

most favorable to the [plaintiff]’…, we determine whether they ‘plausibly give rise to an

entitlement to relief.’” Oakwood Lab’ys LLC v. Thanoo, 999 F.3d 892, 904 (3d Cir. 2021) (internal

citations omitted).

66 ECF 10 at 17–18.

67 Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Higgs v. Att’y Gen., 655 F.3d 333,

339 (3d Cir. 2011)) (cleaned up).

68 Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704

F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2013)).

69 Id. (quoting Mala, 704 F.3d at 245).

70 Ewideh v. Keystone Advanced Remodeling, LLC, No. 23-3032, 2024 WL 5668922, at *1 n.1

(E.D. Pa. Jan. 25, 2024) (quoting King v. Luppold, No. 18-3420, 2023 WL 4671346, at *2 (E.D.

Pa. July 20, 2023)); see also Fleming v. United States VA Med. Ctrs., 348 Fed. App’x. 737, 738

(3d. Cir. 2009) (affirming the district court’s grant of a defendant’s motion to dismiss under Rule

7.1(c) as “within its authority” when the plaintiff failed to respond for approximately four weeks);

Abdulhay v. Abdulhayoglu, No. 22-2066, 2022 WL 6768194, at *3 n.3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 11, 2022)

(“It is within a district court's discretion to grant a motion to dismiss as unopposed pursuant to

Local Civil Rule 7.1(c)”).

71 See ECF 10.

72 Id. at 10.

73 See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66 (1985) (“Official-capacity suits . . . ‘generally

represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an

agent.’”) (quoting Monell v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n. 55 (1978)).

74 See Bush v. Pennsylvania, No. 23-2216, 2023 WL 5339612, at * 2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 2023)

(citing Bonenburger v. Plymouth Twp., 132 F.3d 20, 25 (3d Cir. 1997)); Draper v. Darby Twp.

Police Dep’t, 777 F. Supp. 2d 850, 856 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (citing Martin v. Red Lion Police Dep’t,

146 F. App’x 558, 562 n.3 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting the police department is not a “person” under

section 1983 “because it lacks an identity separate from the municipality of which it is a part.”)).

75 See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).

76 Id.

77 Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005).

78 ECF 1 at 33.

79 ECF 10 at 16.

80 Id.

81 Lloyd v. Ocean Twp. Couns., 857 F. App’x 61, 64 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Dique v. N.J. State

Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010)) (“A section 1983 claim is characterized as a personal-

injury claim and thus is governed by the applicable state’s statute of limitations for personal-injury

claims.”); see also 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5524.

82 Millan v. Municipality of Harrison, No. 24-2882, 2025 WL 2375263, at *1 (3d Cir. Aug. 15,

2025) (quoting Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009)).

83 ECF 1 at 13.

84 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

85 Camara v. Mun. Ct. of City & Cnty. of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).

86 Stone v. Martin, 720 F. App’x 132, 134 (3d Cir. 2017) (internal quotations omitted).

87 Alburg v. Jones, 784 F. Supp. 3d 775, 787 (E.D. Pa. 2025) (quoting Stone, 720 F. App’x at 134–

35).

88 Haberle v. Troxell, 885 F.3d 170, 176 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d

497, 519 (3d Cir. 2003)).

89 Id. (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 555 (1980)); see also id. (“There must

be, for instance, ‘the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer,

some physical touching of the person of the citizen, . . . the use of language or tone of voice

indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled,’ or some other

communication that would convey to a reasonable person that compliance was not optional.”)

(quoting Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554). Telling Father Lynch to “move the materials” during a

brief conversation at the door does not amount to a show of authority or coercion causing a

reasonable person to believe he could not end the encounter.

90 Stone, 720 F. App’x at 135.

91 ECF 1 at 13–14.

92 Edwards v. Banpfield, No. 22-2062, 2023 WL 2815963, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 6, 2023), appeal

dismissed, No. 23-3137, 2024 WL 2814503 (3d Cir. Apr. 5, 2024) (quoting Stone 720 F. App’x at

135).

93 Id. (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 408 n.5 (2012)).

94 Grady v. North Carolina, 575 U.S. 306, 310 (2015).

95 See Edwards, 2023 WL 2815963, at *3 (citing Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S, 1, 6–7 (2013)).

96 The Lynches underscore this point. Code Director Celia told Father Lynch he “didn’t have a

problem with [the] project” and “Dave made [him] do it,” referring to posting the violation. ECF

1 at 15. Code Director Celia then “posted the violation . . . before leaving.” Id.

97 See Jones, 565 U.S. at 408 n.5; Stone v. Martin, No. 15-1632, 2016 WL 7404607, at *5 (M.D.

Pa. Dec. 22, 2016), aff'd, 720 F. App’x 132 (3d Cir. 2017).

98 ECF 1 at 33.

99 ECF 10 at 11.

100 Id. at 11–12.

101 See supra nn.82–83.

102 AstraZeneca Pharm. LP v. Sec’y United States Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 137 F.4th

116, 125 (3d Cir. 2025) (quoting Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 233-34 (3d Cir. 2006)).

103 eXp Realty, LLC v. Borough of Glenolden, No. 23-4287, 2024 WL 1806429, at *11 (E.D. Pa.

Apr. 25, 2024) (quoting Abbot v. Latshaw, 164 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 1998)).

104 ECF 1 at 14–18, 31.

105 Id. at 32–33.

106 Id.

107 Id. at 4.

108 Id. at 4, 6, 9.

109 Id. at 7–8, 15.

110 Id. at 13, 15.

111 Id. at 15–16.

112 Id. at 16–17. Father and Son Lynch also refer to an August 15, 2023 hearing. See id. at 17, 28.

We assume this refers to the same proceeding held on August 23, 2023.

113 ECF 10 at 17.

114 Baloga v. Pittston Area Sch. Dist., 927 F.3d 742, 752 (3d Cir. 2019) (cleaned up) (footnote

omitted).

115 Millan, 2025 WL 2375263, at *1 (quoting O'Connor v. City of Newark, 440 F.3d 125, 128–29

(3d Cir. 2006)).

116 ECF 1 at 36.

117 See supra nn.82–83.

118 Only Son Lynch is identified as the alleged target of the civil rights conspiracy. See ECF 1 at

34. To the extent Father Lynch seeks to assert a conspiracy claim under § 1985(3), we dismiss it

with prejudice because the Complaint alleges no conspiracy directed at him.

119 Id. The Lynches name “Vernacchio” as another participant in the alleged conspiracy. See id.

Vernacchio is not named as a defendant in the case caption so we disregard this as an error.

120 ECF 10 at 12–13.

121 Davis v. Wigen, 82 F.4th 204, 214 (3d Cir. 2023) (quoting United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners

v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 828–29 (1983)).

122 Dondero v. Lower Milford Twp., 431 F. Supp. 3d 590, 606 (E.D. Pa. 2019), aff'd, 5 F.4th 355

(3d Cir. 2021); see also Rink v. Ne. Educ. Intermediate Unit 19, 717 F. App’x 126, 141 (3d Cir.

2017) (“There can be no civil conspiracy to commit an unlawful act under § 1983 where the

plaintiff has not proven a deprivation of a constitutional or federal statutory right or privilege.”).

123 The alleged unconstitutional retaliatory conduct is asserted only against Son Lynch as a

whistleblower. To the extent Father Lynch seeks to assert a municipal liability claim, we dismiss

it with prejudice because the Complaint does not allege a Township policy or custom directed at

him.

124 ECF 1 at 34.

125 Monell, 436 U.S. at 694–95.

126 Bush, 2023 WL 5339612, at *2 (citing McTernan v. City of York, PA, 564 F.3d 636, 658 (3d Cir.

2009).

127 Forrest v. Parry, 930 F.3d 93, 105-06 (3d Cir. 2019).

128 Monell, 436 U.S. at 690.

129Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997).

130 Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823–24 (1985).

131 City of Phila. v. Hempstead Props., LLC, No. 23-2434, 2024 WL 1620792, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Apr.

15, 2024) (citing Knellinger v. York Street Prop. Dev., LP, 57 F. Supp. 3d 462, 471 (E.D. Pa. 2014)).

132 ECF 1 at 34-35; 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

133 De Asencio v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 342 F.3d 301, 307–08 (3d Cir. 2003).

134 Krell v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. (In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practice Litig. Agent

Actions), 148 F.3d 283, 303 (3d Cir. 1998).

135 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).