Dcpp v. M.M., A.C., III, and L.C., in the Matter of the Guardianship of F.A.C., A.M.C., L.M., and L.M.

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NOS. A-2680-23

A-2681-23

NEW JERSEY DIVISION

OF CHILD PROTECTION

AND PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

M.M. and A.C., III,

Defendants-Appellants,

and

L.C.,

Defendant.

____________________________

IN THE MATTER OF THE

GUARDIANSHIP OF F.A.C.,

A.M.C., L.M., and L.M., minors.

____________________________

Submitted September 23, 2025 – Decided October 21, 2025

Before Judges Gilson, Perez Friscia, and Vinci.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,

Chancery Division, Family Part, Camden County,

Docket No. FG-04-0018-24.

Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for

appellant M.M. (Catherine Wilkes, Assistant Deputy

Public Defender, of counsel and on the briefs).

Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for

appellant A.C., III (Daniel A. DiLella, Designated

Counsel, on the briefs).

Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for

respondent (Sookie Bae-Park, Assistant Attorney

General, of counsel; Alicia Y. Bergman, Deputy

Attorney General, on the brief).

Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, Law Guardian,

attorney for minor F.A.C. (Meredith Alexis Pollock,

Deputy Public Defender, of counsel; Noel C. Devlin,

Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on

the brief).

Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, Law Guardian,

attorney for minors A.M.C., L.M., and L.M. (Meredith

Alexis Pollock, Deputy Public Defender, of counsel;

Todd Wilson, Designated Counsel, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

M.M. (Myra) and A.C., III (Arthur) appeal from an April 17, 2024

judgment terminating their parental rights to four children.1 The judgment gave

1

We use initials and fictitious names to protect the privacy interests and

confidentiality of the record. See R. 1:38-3(d)(12).

A-2680-23

2

guardianship of the children to the Division of Child Protection and Permanency

(the Division) with the plan that the children be adopted. Myra focuses her

arguments on two of the children, contending that the Division failed to prove

three of the prongs of the child's best-interests test necessary for the termination

of her parental rights. See N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). Arthur challenges the

judgment as to one of the children, asserting that the Division failed to prove

each of the four prongs of the child's best-interests test. Having reviewed the

record in light of the parties' contentions, we affirm because the trial court's

findings of facts are supported by substantial credible evidence and it correctly

applied the well-established law.

I.

We summarize the facts from the record, including the evidence presented

at a two-day guardianship trial.

Myra is the mother of six children: N.V.M. (Noah), born in November

2005; I.A.C. (Iris), born in November 2008; F.A.C. (Fay), born in January 2011;

A.M.C. (Adam), born in June 2013; L.L.M. (Logan), born in April 2020; and

L.I.M. (Luna), born in June 2021. Noah and Iris are both over the age of

eighteen and were not part of the judgment.

A-2680-23

3

Arthur is the father of Iris, Fay, and Adam. Arthur also had a child with

another woman, but that child tragically died in December 2023.

Fay was originally part of the judgment but in March 2025, Fay's

permanency plan changed when her resource parent decided not to proceed with

the adoption. The Division then moved to remand this matter concerning Fay,

which we granted. On remand, the trial court vacated the judgment as to Fay.

Accordingly, this appeal now involves challenges to the termination of

parental rights concerning Adam, Logan, and Luna. Myra focuses her

arguments on Logan and Luna. The biological father of Logan and Luna

surrendered his parental rights, and he is not appealing the judgment. Arthur is

appealing the judgment as it concerns Adam, but not as to Logan and Luna, who

are not his biological children.

The Division has a long history of involvement with Myra, Arthur , and

their children. Since 2009, the Division has received referrals and investigated

allegations of neglect, domestic violence, and physical abuse of the children .

Myra has mental health and substance abuse issues. A psychologist

diagnosed her as exhibiting "borderline intelligent functioning" and suffering

from "persistent depression disorder." Arthur has struggled with substance

abuse disorders and has been incarcerated for various criminal convictions.

A-2680-23

4

Both Myra and Arthur have been substantiated for physical abuse of the children

in the form of corporal punishment.

In May 2017, following a referral concerning physical abuse of Myra's

oldest child, the Division obtained custody of Noah, Iris, Fay, and Adam. In

2018, Arthur refused services from the Division and shortly after was sentenced

to probation for distribution of illegal substances. The Division provided

services to Myra, and she regained custody of the children in May and June of

2019. The Division, however, maintained care and supervision of the children.

In 2020, Arthur was convicted of several new drug offenses and was found to

have violated his probation, resulting again in his incarceration.

In December 2021, the Division again removed the children from Myra's

care after she was arrested for physically assaulting Noah. That same month,

the family court granted the Division custody of Iris, Fay, Adam, Logan, and

Luna. The Division was also granted care and supervision of Noah, and he

returned to living with his paternal grandmother.

Since December 2021, Logan and Luna have been in the care of Y.G.

(Yara). Adam has various behavioral challenges, and he has been diagnosed

with oppositional defiant disorder and attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder.

He has received care in several treatment homes and, since January 2023, he has

A-2680-23

5

been living with M.F. (Mable), a non-family caregiver. While Noah has been

with Mable, there have been significant improvements in his behavioral

conditions.

Following the children's removal in December 2021, the Division spent

several years providing various services to Myra and Arthur. During that time,

both Myra and Arthur underwent several evaluations, including psychological

evaluations. Myra was given psychiatric and psychotherapy consultation, which

included cognitive and behavioral therapy, parenting skills, and anger

management. She was allowed to visit the children, but during those visits she

exhibited poor parenting skills, resulting in unsafe conditions. Due to Myra's

inability to maintain control of the children, her visits eventually had to be

conducted virtually. After Arthur was released from prison in December 2021,

he entered an intensive outpatient drug treatment program, and the Division

provided him with additional services, including parenting classes and housing

assistance.

By mid-2023, however, the Division believed that neither Myra nor

Arthur had developed the skills to allow them to parent any of their children.

Consequently, the Division filed for guardianship in October 2023.

A-2680-23

6

A guardianship trial was conducted on April 2 and 3, 2024. The Division

presented testimony from Jacquline Cassidy, a Division adoption case worker,

Dr. Melanie A. Freedman, Ph.D., an expert witness, and three resource

caregivers: Mable, Yara, and Susan (who had cared for Iris). The Division also

submitted numerous exhibits into evidence. Myra was present at trial and

testified on her own behalf. Arthur did not appear at trial, nor did he call any

witnesses or submit any evidence.

Dr. Freedman was qualified as an expert in clinical and forensic

psychology. Her testimony included summarizing the psychological and

bonding evaluation she had conducted. Dr. Freedman explained that Myra had

made little progress in developing the skills to parent the children during the

more than two-year period she was provided with services. She also testified to

her conversation with Myra regarding reunification, and Myra agreed she

needed in-home help to take care of the children. Dr. Freedman noted that Myra

had no real plan of reunification because she had not taken steps to obtain

outside help.

Dr. Freedman diagnosed Myra with borderline intellectual functioning

and explained that it affected her ability to learn from experience and implement

solutions that would enable her to care for her children. She explained that Myra

A-2680-23

7

was unable to appreciate when she placed the children in harmful situations. Dr.

Freedman also diagnosed Myra with persistent depressive disorder and

explained that disorder affected her ability to address the children's needs

because she would often simply shut down emotionally. Based on those

diagnoses, the doctor expressed concerns regarding Myra's ability to parent her

children, most of whom had emotional or behavioral issues.

Concerning Arthur, Dr. Freedman summarized various evaluations which

Arthur had undergone. She explained that during one of her evaluations, Arthur

had acknowledged his substance abuse problems and that following completion

of an Intensive Supervision Program he "spiraled out of control." Dr. Freedman

diagnosed Arthur with multiple substance abuse disorders and a bereavement

condition. Dr. Freedman also explained that Arthur, like Myra, did not have a

reunification plan. She opined that it would be harmful for Adam to reunite with

Arthur because Arthur had made little progress in finding stable housing and

employment and addressing his anger control problems.

Summarizing her overall conclusions, Dr. Freedman opined that neither

Myra nor Arthur could safely parent their children despite the various services

they had received. She also testified that they had little prospect of gaining the

skills needed to be adequate parents at any time in the foreseeable future.

A-2680-23

8

Dr. Freedman then described the bonding evaluation she conducted

between Arthur and Adam. She noted that in "no way was he patient, loving, or

caring to his son," and he used threatening language, which was "troubling."

From this encounter, Dr. Freedman concluded "the risk of engaging in [the]

types of behaviors that led to these removals is still very much present," and his

actions show "[he] is not as committed or interested in a parenting role."

Concerning Logan and Luna, Dr. Freedman found that they had positive

but weak bonds with Myra. Dr. Freedman explained that neither Logan nor

Luna saw Myra as their primary caregiver. Dr. Freedman also explained that

Adam had a neutral and "weakened" bond with Myra.

In comparison, Dr. Freedman stated that the bonding evaluation between

Logan, Luna, and Yara showed that the children had a positive and strong

attachment to Yara. Dr. Freedman noted that Logan exhibited certain behavioral

issues and Yara was effectively dealing with those issues by giving the children

consistent support. Dr. Freedman opined that Logan's and Luna's best chance

of finding permanency was to remain in the care of Yara. Regarding Adam, Dr.

Freedman found that he seemed "relaxed and engaged" with Mable, which was

in stark contrast with how he seemed with Arthur, whom Adam feared.

A-2680-23

9

Overall, Dr. Freedman testified that she supported terminating Myra's and

Arthur's parental rights to all the children. She explained that the children's best

chance for positive and permanent homes was adoption by their respective

resource caregivers.

Cassidy testified about the Division's involvement with the family. She

detailed the history of the referrals and investigations the Division had

conducted. She also summarized her observation of the children in their

respective placements.

In their testimony, Yara and Mable explained the care they had given to

Adam, Logan, and Luna. Both Yara and Mable explained how they had worked

to address the children's behavioral issues and had worked to provide emotional

stability. Mable and Yara also testified that the Division worker discussed the

differences between adoption and Kinship Legal Guardianship (KLG),

they understood the differences, and they preferred adoption over KLG.

On April 17, 2022, the trial court entered a judgment terminating Myra's

and Arthur's parental rights to the children and granting guardianship to the

Division. That same day, Judge Francine I. Axelrad, who was the trial judge,

rendered a thorough oral decision, making detailed findings of facts and

conclusions of law.

A-2680-23

10

Judge Axelrad found that the Division had proven by clear and convincing

evidence the four prongs of the child's best-interests test. In making that finding,

the judge credited the testimony of both Dr. Freedman and Cassidy.

Addressing the first and second prongs, Judge Axelrad found that both

Myra and Arthur had neglected their children by withholding parental attention

and care and failing to remedy those deficiencies in the more than two years that

the children were removed from their custody. The judge found that Myra's

mental health contributed to her "significant" and "serious" parenting

deficiencies and her inability to learn from services.

Concerning Arthur, the judge found that his incarceration and housing

issues impacted both prongs one and two and those problems were compounded

by his substance abuse issues. The judge also relied on Arthur's adverse

interactions with his son during his supervised visits. The judge concluded that

neither parent was able nor willing to provide a safe and stable home for any of

the children now or in the future.

Turning to prong three, the judge found that the Division had made

substantial and reasonable efforts to provide "every service possible" to each

parent. Thus, the judge found that the Division satisfied the first part of prong

three.

A-2680-23

11

Evaluating the second part of prong three, the court credited the expert

testimony of Dr. Freedman that it was in the children's best interests to have safe

and secure permanent homes with the resource caregivers who had taken care of

those children for years. In making that finding, the court noted that stability

was critical for the children.

Regarding the resource caregivers, Judge Axelrad found that they each

understood the difference between adoption and KLG and expressed an

informed decision to adopt. Acknowledging that KLG and adoption were to be

treated equally in terms of permanency plans, Judge Axelrad found that adoption

was in the children's best interests based on all the testimony and evidence

presented at trial.

Judge Axelrad rejected Myra's position that she should be reunited with

Logan and Luna. In that regard, the judge relied on the expert testimony of Dr.

Freedman and noted that Myra's demeanor at trial supported Dr. Freedman's

opinion that she would shut down and not be able to address the children's needs.

Concerning prong four, Judge Axelrad found that termination of Myra's

and Arthur's parental rights will not do more harm than good. Relying on th e

unrebutted testimony of Dr. Freedman, the judge found that there was no

evidence that the children would suffer significant harm from termination of

A-2680-23

12

their ties with Myra and Arthur. The judge also found that the children's need

for permanency and stability was "best served" by adoption by their respective

resource caregivers.

Myra and Arthur each filed separate appeals from the judgment. Those

appeals were then consolidated.

II.

Myra challenges the judgment by contending that (1) she had not

endangered Logan's or Luna's health or development; (2) there was no clear and

convincing evidence that the Division made reasonable efforts to reunite her

with Logan and Luna; (3) there was no clear and convincing evidence that the

trial court did not consider alternatives to the termination of her parental rights;

and (4) the trial court erred in concluding that the termination of her parental

rights will not do more harm than good, particularly because that conclusion was

not based on an individual evaluation of each child.

In his appeal, Arthur challenges the trial judge's findings concerning each

of the four prongs of the child's best-interests test. He argues that his troubles

with addiction, housing instability, and incarceration did not establish harm

under prongs one and two. Like Myra, Arthur also argues that the trial judge

did not follow the law regarding an evaluation of alternatives to the termination

A-2680-23

13

of his parental rights. Finally, he asserts that he should have been given more

time to "heal" his relationship with Adam and, therefore, it was an error for the

trial judge to find that termination of his parental rights will not do more harm

than good.

The record and law do not support Myra's or Arthur's challenges to the

judgment. Instead, we affirm the judgment because Judge Axelrad's findings

concerning the four prongs are supported by substantial credible evidence .

Judge Axelrad also correctly applied her findings to the well-established law.

A. Our Standard of Review.

An appellate court's review of a trial court's decision to terminate parental

rights is limited. N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. C.J.R., 452 N.J.

Super. 454, 468 (App. Div. 2017) (citing N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v.

M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 278-79 (2007)). An appellate court will not reverse the

trial court's "termination decision 'when there is substantial credible evidence in

the record to support the court's findings.'" Ibid. (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth &

Fam. Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008)). So, "[o]nly when the trial court's

conclusions are so 'clearly mistaken' or 'wide of the mark' should an appellate

court intervene and make its own findings to ensure that there is not a denial of

justice." E.P., 196 N.J. at 104 (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v.

A-2680-23

14

G.L., 191 N.J. 596, 605 (2007)). No deference is given to the trial court's

interpretations of the law, which are reviewed de novo. D.W. v. R.W., 212 N.J.

232, 245-46 (2012) (citing Balsamides v. Protameen Chems., Inc., 160 N.J. 352,

372 (1999)).

B. The Four Prongs for Termination of Parental Rights.

To terminate parental rights, the Division must prove by clear and

convincing evidence each element of the "best interests of the child" test,

codified by N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). M.M., 189 N.J. at 280. That test is

comprised of the following four prongs:

(1) The child's safety, health, or development has been

or will continue to be endangered by the parental

relationship;

(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the

harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to

provide a safe and stable home for the child and the

delay of permanent placement will add to the harm;

(3) The [D]ivision has made reasonable efforts to

provide services to help the parent correct the

circumstances which led to the child's placement

outside the home and the court has considered

alternatives to termination of parental rights; and

(4) Termination of parental rights will not do more

harm than good.

[N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a).]

A-2680-23

15

These prongs "are not discrete and separate," but rather "relate to and overlap

with one another to provide a comprehensive standard that identifies a child's

best interests." In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 348 (1999).

Effective July 2021, various sections of statutes concerning child

protective services were amended. See L. 2021, c. 154. Those amendments

included a change to prong two of the best-interests test. The Legislature

removed the following sentence: "Such harm may include evidence that

separating the child from his resource family parents would cause serious and

enduring emotional or psychological harm to the child." L. 2021, c. 154, § 9

(codified at N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(2)). Accordingly, any harm a child might

suffer by removing him or her from the resource parent should no longer be

considered by a court under prong two. Nevertheless, a court may still consider

the child's bond with the resource parent, including harm resulting from the

destruction of that bond, under prong four of the best-interests test. N.J. Div. of

Child Prot. & Permanency v. D.C.A., 256 N.J. 4, 26 (2023) (explaining that in

amending N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(2) in 2021, the Legislature "acted to preclude

trial courts from considering harm resulting from the termination of a child's

relationship with resource parents when they assess parental fitness under the

A-2680-23

16

second prong, but not to generally bar such evidence from any aspect of the trial

court's inquiry").

1. Prongs One and Two.

Judge Axelrad's findings regarding prongs one and two are amply

supported by substantial credible evidence. The record establishes that both

Myra and Arthur endangered the safety and development of their children. The

children's removal in December 2021 was based on Myra's physical abuse of

Noah while Arthur was in prison. Judge Axelrad's finding that Myra caused

harm to Adam, Logan, and Luna was based on her inability to obtain the stability

needed to be an adequate parent. Dr. Freedman's unrebutted testimony

established that Myra suffered from mental health issues that prevented her from

being an effective parent to any child. The doctor's testimony, coupled with the

testimony by Cassidy, demonstrates that Myra was given years of services, but

she was unable to obtain the stability needed to parent any child, much less two

children, one of whom has specific needs.

Arthur argues that his incarceration, drug addiction, and lack of housing

does not satisfy the harm requirement under prongs one and two. Judge Axelrad,

however, did not find that it was his incarceration, addiction, or lack of housing

that caused harm. Instead, she correctly found that his inability and

A-2680-23

17

unwillingness to correct his addiction and find stable housing established that

he could not provide a safe and stable home for Adam, or any other child. See

N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. L.M., 430 N.J. Super. 428, 444 (App. Div.

2013) (explaining that prong one can be met based on ongoing irresponsible

behavior of a drug-addicted parent and the failure to take advantages of services

offered by the Division).

We also reject Arthur's assertion that the Division should have provided

additional time to allow him to address his problems and try to "heal" his

relationship with Adam. It has long been recognized that permanency of a child

is favored over protracted efforts of reunification, particularly when those

efforts have gone on for years and there is no showing of a likelihood of the

parent achieving stability. See, e.g., N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs v. C.S.,

367 N.J. Super. 76, 111 (App. Div. 2004).

2. Prong Three.

Prong three requires the Division to have made "reasonable efforts to

provide services to help the parent correct the circumstances which led to the

child's placement outside the home" and to have "considered alternatives to the

termination of parental rights." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(3). Reasonable efforts

depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam.

A-2680-23

18

Servs. v. R.G., 217 N.J. 527, 557 (2014) (citing In re Guardianship of D.M.H.,

161 N.J. 365, 387 (1999)).

Myra argues that the Division focused on providing reunification with an

approach of "all the children or none of the children." She contends that the

Division should have made efforts to provide her with services to reunite her

with the two youngest children, Logan and Luna.

The services provided to Myra were designed to assist her to address her

parenting deficiencies as to any of the children. The record amply demonstrates

that Myra was provided with multiple services over several years, which

included parenting skill classes, counseling, therapy, and regular visitation with

the children. The evidence also demonstrates that Myra could not adequately

address her mental health issues and her own instability. Further, Dr. Freedman

credibly testified that Myra never presented a reasonable plan for reunification

for the two youngest children. Indeed, although Myra testified she had a

reunification plan, due to her own instability, she was unable to follow through

to provide a safe and stable home environment.

Arthur argues that he should have been given more time. As we have

already summarized, he was given years to try to show he could overcome his

addictions, his involvement in criminal activity, and his inability to find stable

A-2680-23

19

housing. He never showed the ability to overcome those problems. That point

was reflected in his failure to appear at trial and to present any testimony

concerning a viable reunification plan with Adam.

As to the second part of prong three, whether the court has considered

alternatives to the termination of parental rights, Judge Axelrad's findings were

also amply supported by substantial credible evidence. The judge found that

reunification with Myra or Arthur was not in the best interests of any of the

children. Moreover, Mable and Yara credibly testified that they had been

informed of KLG, but they wished to adopt the children.

Arthur cites the Title 30 Amendments (2021) to support his argument that

KLG is the best outcome for the children. But these amendments did not elevate

KLG over adoption. Rather, they place both permanency option on equal

footing. Courts are not required to impose KLG when the resource parent has

decided on adoption and when adoption is in the child's best interests. See L.

2021, c. 154, § 4 (removing the requirement that the court find by clear and

convincing evidence that adoption is "neither feasible nor likely," N.J.S.A.

3B:12A-6(d)(3), but preserving the requirement that they prove "[KLG] is in the

child's best interest," N.J.S.A. 3B:12A-6(d)(4)); see also N.J. Div. of Child Prot.

& Permanency v. M.M., 459 N.J. Super. 246, 275 (App. Div. 2019) (explaining

A-2680-23

20

that when a resource parent "unequivocally, unambiguously, and

unconditionally" wants to adopt "irrespective of [KLG]" and "termination of

parental rights and adoption is clearly in the child's best interests, the final

judgment to that effect should be reaffirmed").

3. Prong Four.

Prong four requires the court to determine that "[t]ermination of parental

rights will not do more harm than good." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(4). This prong

does not require a showing that no harm will come to the children "as a result of

the severing of biological ties." K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 355. Instead, the issue is

"whether a child's interests will best be served by completely terminating the

child's relationship with that parent." E.P., 196 N.J. at 108. "The crux . . . is the

child's need for a permanent and stable home, along with a defined parent-child

relationship." N.J. Div. of Youth and Fam. Servs. v. H.R., 431 N.J. Super. 212,

226 (App. Div. 2013). Prong four may be satisfied by "testimony of a 'well

qualified expert who has had full opportunity to make a comprehensive,

objective, and informed evaluation' of the child's relationship with both the

natural parents and the foster parents." M.M., 189 N.J. at 281 (quoting In re

Guardianship of J.C., 129 N.J. 1, 19 (1992)).

A-2680-23

21

Judge Axelrad relied on all the testimony, including the unrebutted

testimony of Dr. Freedman, in finding that termination of Myra's and Arthur's

parental rights will not do more harm than good. Judge Axelrad appropriately

considered that while Logan and Luna had positive but weak bonds with Myra ,

they had strong bonds with Yara and that she was the most stable and consistent

caregiver over the last three years.

Myra's arguments that her bonds with Logan and Luna were affected by

the virtual visits that she had with them is not persuasive. The record

demonstrates that Myra was inconsistent with her visits with the children, and

she also ignores that when she did have visits there was substantial credible

evidence that she lacked the parenting skills to manage the children.

Arthur argues that he had a strong bond with Adam, but he acknowledged

that he needed more time to heal his relationship. The evidence at trial, however,

demonstrated that Arthur's bond with Adam was weak and Adam had a fear of

his biological father.

Arthur also argues that prong four cannot be met because he had

employment during the litigation. The evidence at trial, however, showed that

Arthur's employment was not consistent and he was unemployed during the trial.

A-2680-23

22

Just as importantly, Arthur does not adequately address Dr. Freedman's

testimony that Arthur could not safely parent Adam, who has specific needs.

III.

A review of all the evidence presented at trial establishes that Judge

Axelrad's findings on each of the four prongs were amply supported by the

record. See N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 448 (2012).

Moreover, Judge Axelrad correctly summarized the law and correctly applied

her factual findings to the law. See N.J. Div. of Child Prot. and Permanency v.

P.O., 456 N.J. Super. 399, 407 (App. Div. 2018). We, therefore, affirm the

judgment as to both Myra and Arthur.

Affirmed.

A-2680-23

23