People of Michigan v. Jaquone Quorteze Leach

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, UNPUBLISHED

October 20, 2025

Plaintiff-Appellee, 8:44 AM

v No. 369350

Wayne Circuit Court

JAQUONE QUORTEZE LEACH, LC No. 23-000610-01-FC

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: LETICA, P.J., and RICK and BAZZI, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial convictions of second-degree murder,

MCL 750.317; assault with intent to commit murder (AWIM), MCL 750.83; first-degree home

invasion, MCL 750.110a(2); and three counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of

a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b(1). Defendant was sentenced to 35 to 60 years’

imprisonment for the second-degree murder conviction, 20 to 40 years’ imprisonment for the

AWIM conviction, 10 to 20 years’ imprisonment for the first-degree home invasion conviction,

and two years’ imprisonment for each of his felony-firearm convictions. The sentences for felony-

firearm were ordered to be served concurrent with each other, but consecutive to defendant’s other

sentences. We affirm.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This case arises from the death of the victim, Eric Marcus Coleman, on January 26, 2020.

Coleman’s cousin, Ronnell Wilson, testified that he and Coleman were returning to Wilson’s house

on Prairie Street in Detroit when they were attacked by a group of men in black ski masks. It was

approximately 10:00 p.m. at the time and Wilson had just walked into his kitchen when he saw

“about two [men] behind [Coleman]” from the backyard of the house. Wilson testified at trial that

there were more than just two men attempting to attack Coleman, but he “couldn’t see the rest of

them because they was [sic] coming from my back yard.” Coleman attempted to fight off his

attackers, but was overwhelmed. Wilson testified that the men told Coleman, “Don’t move[,]”

and that one of them stated, “Just shoot the m**********r.”

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Wilson stated that when he saw Coleman was in trouble, he ran up a flight of stairs, yelling

for his roommate, Curtis Lee, to call the police. One of the masked men entered the house and

chased Wilson up the stairs. When Wilson and his attacker were about halfway up the staircase,

he heard gunshots ring out and froze in place. Wilson testified that he then turned around and

grabbed a gun that was on the ground between him and his attacker. Wilson believed the man

must have dropped the gun, because the attacker turned around and ran back down the stairs.

Wilson then broke the glass out of an upstairs window and fired at the attackers. The men fled

down an alleyway near the house and Wilson heard a car driving away. Wilson went downstairs

and saw that Coleman had been shot and killed. He dragged Coleman’s body into the house and

locked the door before calling the police.

Officer Brandon Ely responded to a call for backup at the scene. He stated that when he

arrived, a man wearing “all black clothing or dark-colored clothing, gloves, and a ski mask” was

“hung up on the fence” in the backyard behind the house. Officer Ely observed that the man had

been shot. The man, who was later identified as Pierre Perkins, was taken to Sinai-Grace Hospital

for treatment. Officer Ely and a partner left the Prairie Street address and went to Sinai-Grace

Hospital. While they were on the way, they received some information that another gunshot victim

had also arrived at the hospital. The second gunshot victim was identified as defendant.

As part of the investigation, Officer Ely reviewed hospital surveillance footage and

determined that defendant had been dropped off at the hospital in what he believed was a tan or

gold Chevrolet Equinox. When he ran the license plate number, it indicated that it matched a Ford

Taurus, suggesting that the license plate was stolen. While he was at the hospital, he detained

Perkins as a possible suspect in the shooting.

Carrington Sheridan, a Detroit Police forensic technician, testified that he and a partner

processed the scene at the Prairie Street house. He testified that he observed fired shell casings

and a fired bullet in the driveway and more shell casings in the backyard. Also discovered in the

backyard were “additional fired shell casings, a live round, and an extended ammunition magazine,

a firearm, suspected blood, and . . . an alley with another firearm.” Sheridan testified that further

down the alley, investigators found a single Nike tennis shoe.

Detroit Police Sergeant Jeb Rutledge testified that he was instructed to go to Sinai-Grace

hospital in response to the shooting. Sergeant Rutledge arrived at the hospital at around 1:00 a.m.

He testified that he spoke with hospital security and determined that defendant had been dropped

off at the hospital in a silver Chevrolet Equinox. Andrew Moore, a security officer at the hospital,

testified at trial that a silver Chevrolet Equinox pulled up to the emergency department entrance

on the night in question. Three men were in the car, and one of them told Moore that their friend

had been shot. Two of the men pulled the third man—later identified as defendant—out of the

backseat and placed him on the ground. Moore testified that he took down the car’s license plate

information, and that while he was standing near the car, he noticed what appeared to be ski masks

and a semiautomatic firearm in the backseat of the car.

Sergeant Rutledge asked hospital security if they had any property belonging to defendant.

Security stated that they had taken some clothing off of defendant when he arrived at the hospital.

Sergeant Rutledge asked for the clothing, and a security guard took the items out of a locked room

and handed them over. The items were contained in a blue plastic bag and included a Nike tennis

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shoe, a face mask, and identification cards belonging to defendant. Sergeant Rutledge seized the

clothing and took it to Detroit Police headquarters. Sergeant Rutledge testified that, when he

brought the bag of clothing back to headquarters, he was unsure whether defendant had yet been

arrested in relation to the shooting.

Defendant was initially charged with first-degree murder, MCL 750.316(1)(a); felony

murder, MCL 750.316(1)(b); AWIM, MCL 750.83; two counts of armed robbery, MCL 750.529;

six counts of felony-firearm, MCL 750.227b(1); and first-degree home invasion,

MCL 750.110a(2). At defendant’s preliminary examination, the prosecutor indicated that he

would only proceed with six of the twelve charges. Defendant was thus charged with first-degree

murder, MCL 750.316(1)(a); AWIM, MCL 750.83; first-degree home invasion,

MCL 750.110a(2); and three counts of felony-firearm, MCL 750.227b(1).

Before trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence, quash the information, and

dismiss the case. Four days later, he filed an amended motion, raising the same claims and

requesting the same relief. Defendant argued that the police violated his right against unlawful

searches and seizures by seizing the bag of his clothing at the hospital prior to his arrest. Defendant

reasoned that the illegally obtained evidence “served as the primary element the prosecution

offered to establish identification of [defendant] as a perpetrator of the crime’s charges [sic]” and

that without it, the prosecution would not have been able to establish probable cause. Defendant

also reasoned that the “inevitable discovery” rule did not justify the seizure and that the police

could and should have obtained a warrant for his clothing. Defendant further argued that his arrest

was illegal and not based on probable cause.

At a hearing on the motion, Sergeant Rutledge testified that he spoke with Perkins and

defendant in the hospital. Defendant said that he had been shot in the vicinity of Prairie Street.

After speaking to defendant, Sergeant Rutledge obtained the bag of defendant’s clothing from

security. Notably, Sergeant Rutledge initially testified that security gave the property to him, but

proceeded to testify that he is unsure who gave him the property. Sergeant Rutledge believed he

had the legal right to take the property because, at the time, he believe that defendant was the

victim of a crime. He later testified on cross-examination that he believed the property to be

abandoned. He explained that, based on more than 24 years of law enforcement experience,

hospitals in Detroit often destroyed bloody and contaminated clothing. However, he admitted that

he did not receive any information that the clothing was going to be destroyed from hospital

personnel on the date of the incident.

Sergeant Todd Eby testified that he was with Sergeant Rutledge at the hospital on the night

defendant was brought in for treatment. While he was at the hospital, Sergeant Eby received

information from detectives who were processing the evidence at the Prairie Street house,

indicating that Perkins was a suspect and that defendant may also be a suspect, as he was somehow

connected to Perkins. Sergeant Eby testified that Sergeant Rutledge went back to the Detroit Police

headquarters, where he determined, based on law enforcement databases, that there was an

associational connection between Perkins and defendant. Sergeant Eby then advised officers to

place defendant under arrest. Sergeant Eby testified that when defendant’s property was taken, he

had not yet been placed under arrest. He additionally stated that he was not with Sergeant Rutledge

when Rutledge took possession of the property.

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On cross-examination, Sergeant Eby testified that he had more than 13 years of experience

executing search warrants for firearms, blood, and clothes. Sergeant Eby also testified that the

security guard had indicated that the clothing, which was saturated in blood, would be destroyed

if defendant died in the hospital. He explained that in even in nonfatal shootings, the victim’s

property is often so saturated with blood that it becomes a biohazard risk, meaning the hospital

would dispose of it. Sergeant Eby further stated that, in his experience, it was common in hospital

settings for officers to search and seize property without obtaining a search warrant.

The trial court ultimately denied defendant’s motion. The trial court reasoned that either

“exigent circumstances or inevitable discovery” justified the warrantless seizure of defendant’s

clothing. The court continued:

[W]hile there was some testimony from both officers saying that they know the

hospital’s policy is when there are bloody clothes it’s a biohazard, that those clothes

are disposed of by the hospital and they’re not necessarily given back, but their

policy is to dispose of a biohazard with the rest of the blood and other things that

they dispose of at the hospital, and that they knew that these things would be

destroyed by the hospital and disposed of.

So there could be an argument for exigent circumstances in that they don’t

know necessarily when the hospital is going to dispose of these things.

But they are certainly biohazards. They were told that they were bloody

clothes that are usually deemed a biohazard from their experience on the job, and

both of them had quite a few years of experience on the job.

However, the court ultimately found the inevitable discovery rule to be the more compelling

justification for the seizure, stating:

Sgt. Eby testified that he, based on all the information he was getting from

the scene; from the statements taken from the person that survived, Mr. Wilson;

based on reviewing the video at the hospital; talking to Security Guard Moore, who

told him that the defendant had a mask on him when he came in, and then showed

him the mask—but he was told by Officer Moore that the defendant had a mask in

his property, and that there was a gun in the back seat of the car where the defendant

got out of when he was brought to the hospital. They came to get him on the gurney,

and he saw the gun in the back seat where the defendant came out of.

All of these things have to be taken into account. And the fact that the 911

call came in at 11:32 or 11:30 something, and about 15 minutes later the defendant’s

dropped off at the hospital, the closest hospital to the scene of the shooting, and,

you know, he’s a black male with a mask.

And mind you, this is before COVID. This is in January of 2020. This is

not when everybody’s being seen with masks after March, April of 2020 . . . . So

this is not a usual circumstance to see someone, you know, walking down the street

or showing up at the hospital with a black mask in January of 2020.

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And so, you know, that—all of these things tied in together led Sgt. Eby to

reach a probable cause decision in placing the defendant under arrest.

And then once he’s placed under arrest, all of his possessions have to be

inventoried, and he is now in the custody of the Detroit Police Department. And

his clothing would have been inventoried and taken into custody by the police

department anyway upon his arrest.

The trial court thereafter entered three separate orders denying defendant’s motion to suppress,

motion to quash, and motion to dismiss.

Defendant’s trial began on November 13, 2023. At trial, Michigan State Police Sergeant

Dean Molnar was qualified as an expert in firearms and tool marks analysis. Sergeant Molnar

received and tested four semiautomatic firearms, 11 spent cartridge cases, and one fired bullet in

relation to the shooting. He testified that the fired bullet had been removed from Coleman’s head

during his autopsy. He explained that the bullet was classified as a .38/9-millimeter, meaning that

“the English classification for the .38 caliber bullet, the metric is .9 mm.” Sergeant Molnar

determined that the bullet could not have been fired by two of the four guns related to the

shooting—a Smith & Wesson handgun, or a Glock handgun. He further determined that his testing

returned “inconclusive” results as to whether the bullet could have been fired by either of the two

remaining handguns—a Springfield Armory handgun, or a Ruger handgun.

Jennifer Jones, a Michigan State Police forensic scientist, was qualified as an expert in

forensic biology and DNA analysis. She testified that she received samples from various items

found at the scene of the crime for DNA testing. Her tests concluded that it was “4.3 septillion

times more likely” that DNA found on the Smith & Wesson handgun originated from defendant.

Defendant’s DNA was not found on any of the other items tested, including the Ruger and

Springfield Armory handguns, several ski masks, and a debit card.

The prosecution rested following Jones’s testimony. Defendant elected not to testify.

Defense counsel then moved for a directed verdict, arguing that insufficient evidence had been

presented to tie defendant to the case. The trial court denied the motion on the record.

Defendant then called Dr. Theodore Kessis to the stand. Dr. Kessis was qualified as an

expert in Forensic DNA analysis, PCR analysis, and PCR analysis of short tandem repeats.1 Dr.

Kessis testified that the DNA analysis of the items taken from the crime scene was accurate and

reliable. The defense rested following Dr. Kessis’s testimony.

The following day, the jury deliberated and found defendant guilty of second-degree

murder, MCL 750.317; AWIM, MCL 750.83; first-degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(2); and

1

PCR stands for “polymerase chain reaction,” and PCR analysis is a molecular biology technique

used to amplify specific DNA sequences, making many copies of a DNA segment from a small

initial sample. MedlinePlus, PCR Tests <https://medlineplus.gov/lab-tests/pcr-tests> (accessed

August 21, 2025). Dr. Kessis explained that “STR analysis” involves testing DNA for unique,

repeated DNA sequences.

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three counts felony-firearm, MCL 750.227b(1). In December 2023, defendant was sentenced as

earlier described. This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

A. WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE

Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the evidence,

quash the information, and dismiss the case. He maintains that the police violated his Fourth

Amendment right to be free of illegal searches and seizures by taking the bag of his clothing from

the hospital without a warrant. He further contends that none of the exceptions to the warrant

requirement apply, including the inevitable discovery rule. We agree that the search and seizure

in this matter was not justified by an exception to the warrant requirement, but find that the error

was ultimately harmless.

This Court reviews de novo a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence. People

v Mazzie, 326 Mich App 279, 288-289; 926 NW2d 359 (2018) (quotation marks and citations

omitted). This Court likewise reviews de novo whether a Fourth Amendment violation occurred,

as well as whether an exclusionary rule applies to the matter at hand. People v Mahdi, 317 Mich

App 446, 457; 894 NW2d 732 (2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The trial court’s

factual findings are reviewed for clear error. Mazzie, 326 Mich App at 288. “A finding of fact is

clearly erroneous if, after a review of the entire record, an appellate court is left with a definite and

firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Mahdi, 317 Mich App at 457.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and

effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no

Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,

and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be

seized. [US Const, Am IV.]

Analogously, the Michigan Constitution provides that “[t]he person, houses, papers and

possessions of every person shall be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures.” Const 1963,

art 1, section 11. Generally, “a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment occurs when the

government intrudes on an individual’s reasonable, or justifiable, expectation of privacy.” People

v Antwine, 293 Mich App 192, 195; 809 NW2d 439 (2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

“Searches or seizures conducted without a warrant are per se unreasonable, subject to several well-

delineated exceptions.” People v Moorman, 331 Mich App 481, 485; 952 NW2d 597 (2020).

Accordingly, for a search to comply with the Fourth Amendment, “the police must show either

that they had a warrant or that their conduct fell within one of the narrow, specific exceptions to

the warrant requirement.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). The exceptions to the

warrant requirement include “exigent circumstance[s], searches incident to a lawful arrest, stop

and frisk, consent, and plain view.” People v Chowdhury, 285 Mich App 509, 516; 775 NW2d

845 (2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Relevant to this appeal is a separate exception:

the “inevitable discovery” rule, which states that “evidence should not be suppressed [i]f the

prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or

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inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means[.]” People v Hyde, 285 Mich App 428,

439; 775 NW2d 833 (2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration in original). If none

of these exceptions apply, the contested evidence “must be excluded from trial.” Chowdhury, 285

Mich App at 516 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

“When a defendant moves to suppress evidence as having been illegally obtained, it is the

prosecutor’s burden to show that the search and seizure were justified by a recognized exception

to the warrant requirement.” People v Jordan, 187 Mich App 582, 589; 468 NW2d 294 (1991).

In Jordan, the defendant attempted to rob the victim at gunpoint, but the victim gained the upper

hand and shot the defendant first. Id. at 584. The defendant was taken to the hospital by an

accomplice and was in surgery when police arrived. Id. An officer requested the defendant’s

clothing, and hospital staff turned it over. Id. The officer opened the bag to look at the defendant’s

clothing. Id. He admitted that he did not have a search warrant at the time. Id. at 584-585. Before

trial, the defendant moved to suppress the clothing as the product of an illegal search and seizure,

but the trial court denied the motion. Id.

On appeal, this Court concluded that the trial court clearly erred in denying the motion to

suppress. Id. at 592. This Court stated that the warrantless seizure of the clothing did not fall into

any of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. Id. at 590. This Court further explained:

[W]e find no evidence that defendant intended to abandon his clothing and

therefore conclude that the hospital possessed the clothing as a bailee. Thus, the

hospital personnel enjoyed joint access to and control over the clothing, but their

duty was to safeguard the clothing, and they were required to exercise ordinary and

reasonable care in performing that duty. The hospital personnel did not enjoy

mutual use of the clothing; had they had mutual use, they would have been entitled

to consent to the seizure without a warrant. Furthermore, the facts do not suggest

that the clothing might have been lost or destroyed before a warrant could have

been obtained by the police. The defendant was in surgery when the seizure

occurred and remained hospitalized for several weeks thereafter. [Id. at 592.]

However, this Court ultimately concluded that the admission of the clothing into evidence was

harmless error. Id. at 593. This Court reasoned that, based on the overwhelming evidence of the

defendant’s guilt, including the victim’s identification of defendant, the outcome of the case likely

would not have changed had the evidence been suppressed. Id. at 593-594.

As was the case in Jordan, Sergeant Rutledge’s decision to seize defendant’s clothing

without his consent and without a search warrant in this matter violated defendant’s Fourth

Amendment rights. The issue then becomes whether an exception to the warrant requirement

justified the search. Id. at 590. Here, the trial court considered exigent circumstances and the

inevitable discovery rule as potentially applicable exceptions to the warrant requirement.

Regarding exigent circumstances, this Court has explained:

The exigent-circumstance exception is applicable where the police have

probable cause to believe that an immediate search will produce specific evidence

of a crime and that an immediate search without a warrant is necessary in order to

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(1) protect the officers or others, (2) prevent the loss or destruction of evidence, or

(3) prevent the escape of an accused. [Id. at 587.]

The trial court considered the second category, in which a warrantless search and seizure is

required to “prevent the loss or destruction of evidence.” Id. Sergeant Rutledge testified at trial

that he did not have a warrant for the bag of clothing, but believed that if he did not obtain it, there

was a chance that potential evidence could be “gone forever.” He likewise testified at the hearing

on defendant’s motion to quash, suppress, and dismiss that he did not have a warrant or defendant’s

permission to seize the bag of clothing, but believed it was in imminent danger of being destroyed

because hospitals typically destroy bloody clothing. He agreed, however, that hospital staff did

not tell him that the bag of clothing was scheduled to be destroyed. On this record, there is no

evidence that the bag of clothing would have been destroyed before the police could have obtained

a search warrant. The exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement therefore does

not apply.

The trial court’s rationale for denying the motion to suppress, quash, and dismiss also

focused on the inevitable discovery rule. The inevitable discovery rule was adopted by the United

States Supreme Court in Nix v Williams, 467 US 431; 104 S Ct 2501; 81 L Ed 2d 377 (1984).

There, the Nix Court explained that extending the exclusionary rule to cover evidence illegally

obtained by police was necessary “to deter police from violations of constitutional and statutory

protections notwithstanding the high social cost of letting obviously guilty persons go

unpunished.” Id. at 432. The Nix Court thus reasoned that, “[i]f the prosecution can establish by

a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been

discovered by lawful means . . . then the deterrence rationale has so little basis that the evidence

should be received.” Id.

Three concerns arise when considering the inevitable discovery rule: “(1) whether the legal

means are truly independent, (2) whether both the use of the legal means and the discovery by that

means are truly inevitable, (3) and whether the application of the inevitable discovery doctrine

provides an incentive for police misconduct or significantly weakens Fourth Amendment

protections.” Hyde, 285 Mich App at 440. The key point, according to this Court’s ruling in Hyde,

is whether the police were in the process of obtaining a warrant when the seizure occurred. Id.

at 445. This Court reasoned that evidence should be excluded if the police made no effort to obtain

a search warrant before the seizure occurred, even though probable cause existed to obtain a

warrant and the evidence could have been seized under a warrant. Id. As this Court explained:

If evidence were admitted notwithstanding the officers’ unexcused failure

to obtain a warrant, simply because probable cause existed, then there would never

be any reason for officers to seek a warrant. To apply the inevitable discovery

doctrine whenever the police could have obtained a warrant but chose not to would

in effect eliminate the warrant requirement. [Id. at 444 (citation omitted).]

Thus, the inevitable discovery rule cannot be applied if no evidence exists to show that the police

were attempting to lawfully seize a defendant’s property by obtaining a search warrant, and had

the necessary probable cause to do so. Id. at 444-445.

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Here, even if Sergeant Rutledge had probable cause to obtain a warrant for the bag of

clothing, the record does not indicate that he was in the process of obtaining a warrant when he

seized the bag and the items inside. See Mahdi, 317 Mich App at 470 (finding that the inevitable

discovery rule did not apply to a warrantless search and seizure where the police were not in the

process of obtaining a warrant when the seizure occurred). Additionally, the seizure in this

instance runs afoul of the third prong of the inevitable discovery analysis. Applying the doctrine

here would almost certainly “provide[] an incentive for police misconduct or significantly

weaken[] Fourth Amendment protections,” Hyde, 285 Mich App at 440, by allowing police to

seize property without a warrant in any instance where probable cause can be established. As this

Court reasoned in Hyde, “[t]o allow a warrantless search merely because probable cause exists

would allow the inevitable discovery doctrine to act as a warrant exception that engulfs the warrant

requirement.” Id. at 445. Accordingly, the inevitable discovery rule does not apply to the

warrantless seizure of the bag of clothing. The evidence therefore should have been excluded at

trial.

However, under Jordan, we must still consider whether the admission of the evidence at

trial constituted harmless error. Jordan, 187 Mich App at 593. “A constitutional error is harmless

if [it is] clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty

absent the error.” Hyde, 285 Mich App at 447 (quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration in

original). In Jordan, this Court explained:

A two-tiered analysis is used in determining whether an error concerning

the erroneous admission of evidence is harmless. First, it must be determined

whether the error is so offensive to the maintenance of a sound judicial system that

it can never be regarded as harmless and, second, whether the error was harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt so that not even one juror, or, in the event of a bench

trial, the judge, would have voted to acquit the defendant but for the error. People

v Robinson, 386 Mich 551, 563; 194 NW2d 709 (1972). The first criterion is

intended to deter prosecutorial and police misconduct, while the second is intended

to safeguard the decisional process. People v Furman, 158 Mich App 302, 317;

404 NW2d 246 (1987). An error may be intolerably offensive to the maintenance

of a sound judicial system if it was deliberately injected into the proceedings by the

prosecution, if it deprived the defendant of a fundamental element of the adversarial

process, or if it is of a particularly inflammatory or persuasive kind. Id., at [] 318;

404 NW2d 246. [Jordan, 187 Mich App at 593.]

Based on the aggregate evidence that defendant was present on Prairie Street during the

shooting and participated in the killing of Coleman, defendant would not have been acquitted had

the evidence at issue been suppressed. Evidence was presented that defendant arrived at the

hospital in either a gold or silver Chevrolet Equinox that was later connected to the crime, in close

temporal proximity to Perkins, who also arrived at the hospital on the same night after suffering a

gunshot wound. Moore, the hospital security guard, testified that two men pulled defendant out

of the Equinox, and that one of them said defendant had been shot. Moore further testified that he

saw a handgun in the backseat of the Equinox and a ski mask on another seat inside the Equinox.

He also asserted that defendant had a ski mask on his person when he was brought into the hospital.

Defendant’s DNA was also found on a Smith & Wesson handgun that was discovered at the scene

of the crime. Here, as was the case in Jordan, “it cannot be said that the error was deliberately

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injected into the trial by the prosecutor, but rather occurred as a result of the court’s pretrial ruling

that the evidence was admissible.” Jordan, 187 Mich App at 594. Further, there is no evidence

that the error in this matter was knowing or purposeful. Id. at 593-594. Accordingly, the trial

court’s error in admitting the evidence at issue was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Reversal

is therefore not required.

B. DEFENDANT’S STANDARD 4 BRIEF2

1. BRADY VIOLATION

Defendant argues that the prosecution’s failure to call Curtis Lee as a witness at trial

violated Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83; 83 S Ct 1194; 10 L Ed 2d 215 (1963), because it prevented

the defense from cross-examining Lee. Defendant claims that Lee had information regarding an

anonymous letter containing evidence that defendant was a victim of the shooting on Prairie Street.

We disagree.

Defendant failed to preserve this issue by moving in the trial court for a new trial or for

relief from judgment on Brady grounds. People v Burger, 331 Mich App 504, 516; 953 NW2d

424 (2020). Unpreserved issues are reviewed for plain error affecting substantial rights. People v

Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). “To avoid forfeiture under the plain error

rule, three requirements must be met: 1) error must have occurred, 2) the error was plain, i.e., clear

or obvious, 3) and the plain error affected substantial rights.” Id. “The third requirement generally

requires a showing of prejudice, i.e., that the error affected the outcome of the lower court

proceedings.” Id.

“ ‘[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request

violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of

the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.’ ” People v Chenault, 495 Mich 142, 149; 845

NW2d 731 (2014), quoting Brady, 373 US at 87. To establish a Brady violation, defendant must

show that “(1) the prosecution has suppressed evidence; (2) that is favorable to the accused; and

(3) that is material.” Chenault, 495 Mich at 149 (quotation marks omitted).

Defendant claims that the prosecution suppressed Lee’s testimony regarding the contents

of an anonymous letter. Lee was named in the prosecution’s proposed witness list, but was never

called to testify. He was therefore never cross-examined by the defense. Defendant does not claim

that the prosecution prevented him from speaking with Lee, nor does he substantiate the argument

that the failure to call a res gestae witness constituted a Brady violation in this instance. Generally,

2

Defendant’s Standard 4 brief does not contain a statement of the issues presented as required by

the Michigan Court Rules. See MCR 7.212(C)(5). This failure could constitute abandonment of

the issues. See People v Brown, 239 Mich App 735, 748; 610 NW2d 234 (2000). However, parties

who represent themselves are generally entitled to more lenity in construing their pleadings than

lawyers. See Estelle v Gamble, 429 US 97, 106-108; 97 S Ct 285; 50 L Ed 2d 251 (1976). We

will address defendant’s arguments accordingly.

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Brady does not obligate the government to locate res gestae witnesses; rather, it only encompasses

the government’s duty to disclose exculpatory information in its possession. See People v

Gadomski, 232 Mich App 24, 36; 592 NW2d 75 (1998) (stating that, under MCL 767.40a, the

prosecution must “provide notice of known witnesses and reasonable assistance to locate witnesses

on a defendant’s request”). Additionally, the anonymous letter that defendant claims was

suppressed was not produced at any point during the proceedings below. There is no mention of

the letter in the record. The only mention of it is in the Standard 4 brief. Ultimately, defendant

cannot establish a Brady violation based on the failure to call Lee at trial, because the failure to

call a res gestae witness does not itself constitute a suppression of evidence. See Chenault, 495

Mich at 149 (stating that for a Brady claim to succeed, the defendant must prove that the

prosecution suppressed evidence). Further, without evidence that the prosecution possessed the

letter in the first instance, defendant cannot establish that the prosecution suppressed said evidence.

See id. Defendant’s Brady claim lacks merit.

2. DOUBLE JEOPARDY

Defendant next argues that he was deprived of his double jeopardy protections when the

trial court dismissed the charges against him and refiled them the same day. He additionally

contends that the refiling of the charges against him violated the doctrines of collateral estoppel

and res judicata. This argument misconstrues the record.

“To preserve appellate review of a double jeopardy violation, a defendant must object at

the trial court level.” People v Ackah-Essien, 311 Mich App 13, 30; 874 NW2d 172 (2015).

Defendant did not object to the reinstatement of the charges against him on double jeopardy

grounds, via collateral estoppel or res judicata. Thus, the issue is unpreserved, and our review is

for plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. Carines, 460 Mich at 763.

“The Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States Constitution and the Michigan

Constitution prohibit a person from twice being placed in jeopardy for the same offense.” People

v Barber, 332 Mich App 707, 713; 958 NW2d 288 (2020). See also US Const, Am V; Const 1963,

art 1, § 15. The prohibition against double jeopardy provides three protections: “(1) it protects

against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) it protects against a second

prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3) it protects against multiple punishments

for the same offense.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). However, an accused is not

placed in jeopardy the moment charges are filed. Instead, our Supreme Court has made it clear

that “[a]n accused is placed in jeopardy as soon as a jury is selected and sworn.” People v Dawson,

431 Mich 234, 251; 427 NW2d 886 (1988); see also Ackah-Essien, 311 Mich App at 32.

Here, defendant alleges that the trial court dismissed the charges against him on

February 27, 2023, and refiled them the same day. This is not an accurate recitation of the facts.

Defendant was arraigned on January 10, 2023 in the district court. A preliminary hearing was held

on February 7, 2023, at which time the prosecutor moved for bindover on the offenses contained

in Counts 1, 3, 6, 8, 11 and 12. It would appear from the record that the felony information initially

filed in the circuit court was signed by the prosecutor on January 9, 2023. It erroneously contained

charges of which defendant had not been bound over. Therefore, on March 3, 2023, the

prosecution filed an amended felony information which reflected what transpired at the conclusion

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of the preliminary examination. At the March 3, 2023 hearing, defense counsel acknowledged

that the prosecution dismissed six of defendant’s 12 charges.3

In any event, no jury was selected and sworn in this matter until the start of trial on

November 13, 2023. Double jeopardy could not have attached in February 2023, when the felony

information was amended. Dawson, 431 Mich at 251. Since the trial court did not infringe upon

defendant’s double jeopardy protections, defendant cannot establish that plain error occurred in

this case. Carines, 460 Mich at 763. His argument thus lacks merit.

As noted, defendant also argues that refiling the charges against him violated the doctrines

of collateral estoppel and res judicata. For the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply to a criminal

prosecution, there must be a prior litigation. People v Brown, 279 Mich App 116, 126; 755 NW2d

664 (2008). “Collateral estoppel bars relitigation of an issue in a subsequent, different litigation

between the same parties where the prior proceeding culminated in a valid, final judgment and the

issue was both actually litigated and necessarily determined.” Id. Since there was no prior

litigation, collateral estoppel is inapplicable here and defendant cannot establish otherwise. The

prosecutor’s office filed the amended information before trial. No final judgment had been entered

at that point in the proceedings. Accordingly, the doctrine of collateral estoppel does not apply

under the circumstances presented.

The doctrine of res judicata likewise does not apply here. Res judicata “bars a subsequent

action when (1) the prior action was decided on the merits, (2) both actions involve the same parties

or their privies, and (3) the matter in the second case was, or could have been resolved in the first.”

Adair v State, 470 Mich 105, 121; 680 NW2d 386 (2004). Here, defendant’s argument fails on

the first element. Trial had not started when the charges in this matter were dismissed and refiled.

Consequently, no prior action had yet been “decided on the merits[.]” Id. Defendant is not entitled

to relief on these grounds.

3. JUROR CONFUSION

Defendant also argues that testimony from Sergeant Molnar regarding a Glock handgun

caused jury confusion. We conclude that the issue has been abandoned on appeal.

At trial, Sergeant Molnar testified that the Glock was included in ballistics testing with the

firearms recovered in relation to this case. During his testimony, a juror submitted a question

asking, “In your Conclusions, were there any casings or bullets that you concluded were from the

Glock gun?” Sergeant Molnar responded that none of the casings or bullets matched the Glock

3

This Court requested that defense counsel submit the transcripts from defendant’s January 10,

2023 arraignment, and January 24, 2023 pre-exam hearing, in the hopes that doing so would

provide a fuller picture of the timeline of events that defendant describes in his Standard 4 brief.

On August 5, 2025, this Court received a stipulation from the parties indicating that they had

agreed that supplying the Court with these transcripts was unnecessary to the determination of the

issues. Upon close review of the record, charges were not filed, dismissed, and then refiled.

Rather, an amended information was filed to reduce the number of offenses that defendant was

charged with, consistent with the outcome of the preliminary examination.

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handgun. Following Sergeant Molnar’s testimony, the prosecutor explained that the information

regarding the Glock handgun should have been redacted from the ballistics report. The prosecutor

stated that the Glock had defendant’s DNA on it, but was not suspected to be one of the guns used

in the shooting on Prairie Street. The prosecutor then stated that the DNA report from Jennifer

Jones would be altered to exclude information regarding the Glock. The trial court clarified as

follows:

The Court: It doesn’t have anything to do with this?

[The Prosecution]: No.

The Court: Okay.

[Defense Counsel]: Correct.

The Court: Oh, so it should have been redacted, and he shouldn’t have been

talking about the Glock?

[The Prosecution]: Yes.

The Court: Because I was a little confused hearing about the Glock.

Defendant contends that “juror confusion can cause prejudice taking attention away from

key points of merit of defense [sic].” Defendant presents no further legal support for this argument.

An appellant may not merely “announce a position or assert an error and then leave it up to the

Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims, or unravel and elaborate for him his

arguments, and then search for authority either to sustain or reject his position.” People v

Kevorkian, 248 Mich App 373, 389; 639 NW2d 291 (2001). Accordingly, defendant has

abandoned his argument.

4. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

Finally, defendant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call a ballistic

expert to testify at trial. We disagree.

To preserve a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must either move for

a new trial or for a Ginther4 hearing in the trial court. See People v Lopez, 305 Mich App 686,

693; 854 NW2d 205 (2014). A defendant can also preserve such issues “by filing in this Court a

motion for remand to the trial court for a Ginther hearing.” People v Abcumby-Blair, 335 Mich

App 210, 227; 966 NW2d 437 (2020), lv den 508 Mich 945 (2021). Defendant has not moved for

a new trial or a Ginther hearing in this Court or the trial court; thus, our review is limited to errors

apparent on the record. People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 253; 749 NW2d 272 (2008).

4

People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).

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A defendant who seeks to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must show

“that (1) counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) but for

counsel’s deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have

been different.” People v Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich 38, 51; 826 NW2d 136 (2012). Counsel is

presumed to be effective and defendant bears the burden of proving otherwise. People v Isrow,

339 Mich App 522, 531; 984 NW2d 528 (2021). Defendant likewise bears the burden to establish

the factual predicate for the claim. People v Hoag, 460 Mich 1, 6; 594 NW2d 57 (1999).

The decision to retain an expert witness is a matter of trial strategy. People v Payne, 285

Mich App 181, 190; 774 NW2d 714 (2009). Here, defendant states that an expert could have

addressed what he considered “discrepancies” in the testimony of forensic technician Margaret

Lovallo, indicating that the shooting of Coleman did not occur inside the house on Prairie Street.

According to the Standard 4 brief, the testimony at issue allegedly comes from the preliminary

examination of “codefendants,” although defendant does not identify those codefendants or direct

us to any information about the case to which he refers. Defendant likewise has not provided this

Court with a copy of the preliminary examination transcript, nor does he explain what the

discrepancies at issue are, or what a ballistics expert could have specifically proven. We thus find

that defendant has failed to establish the factual predicate for this portion of his claim. Hoag, 460

Mich at 1.

Defendant also states that an expert could have been called to rebut the testimony offered

by Sergeant Molnar. Sergeant Molnar testified that the Smith & Wesson handgun found at the

scene could not have fired the bullet that killed Coleman. Later, DNA expert witness Jennifer

Jones testified that defendant’s DNA was on the Smith & Wesson handgun. Thus, the

prosecution’s own expert witnesses implied that defendant could not be conclusively linked to the

gun or the bullet used to kill Coleman. Nevertheless, the jury still elected to convict defendant of

second-degree murder. Defendant does not elaborate as to what a ballistics expert would have

testified to, and perhaps more importantly, offers no proof that an expert would have testified

favorably if called by defense counsel. Again, defendant fails to establish the factual predicate for

his claim. Id.

Even if we were to conclude that defense counsel’s performance was constitutionally

deficient, defendant cannot establish that he was prejudiced by her failure to call a ballistics expert.

Regarding the failure to call an expert to testify to discrepancies in the evidence, we note that at

trial, Wilson testified that he was chased in the house by a man with a gun, and that he grabbed the

gun when the man dropped it. However, at no point did Wilson testify that anyone opened fire

while inside the house, except when he fired a gun through the upstairs window, which multiple

witnesses agreed had been broken out. This corroborates Lovallo’s alleged testimony that there

were no signs of a gunfight in the house. There is no indication that the outcome of the case would

have been different had defense counsel called an expert to rebut this alleged testimony.

Additionally, regarding the claim that an expert witness should have been called to rebut

Sergeant Molnar’s testimony, it bears repeating that the jury still convicted defendant of second-

degree murder even though the prosecution’s expert witness suggested that the firearm containing

defendant’s DNA could not have fired the bullet that killed Coleman. There is no evidence that

additional testimony from a competing defense expert would have changed the outcome of this

case. Accordingly, defendant’s claim must fail.

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Affirmed.

/s/ Anica Letica

/s/ Michelle M. Rick

/s/ Mariam S. Bazzi

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