defaulted defendant deemed to admit well-pleaded allegations, but “not held to admit facts that are not well-pleaded or to admit conclusions of law”
How later courts described this case
- defaulted defendant deemed to admit well-pleaded allegations, but “not held to admit facts that are not well-pleaded or to admit conclusions of law”
- “[A] successful plaintiff in a trademark infringement case is entitled to recover enhanced statutory damages even where its actual damages are nominal or non-existent.”
- statutory damages are “specially appropriate in default judgment cases due to infringer nondisclosure”
- “The two methods by which damages are usually calculated under [35 U.S.C.] § 284 are assessment of actual damages (the profits the patentee lost due to the infringement) or, if actual damages cannot be ascertained, determination of a reasonable royalty.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 24-24008-CIV-MARTINEZ-SANCHEZ
PURPLE INNOVATION, LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
THE INDIVIDUALS, CORPORATIONS, LIMITED
LIABILITY COMPANIES, PARTNERSHIPS, AND
UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS IDENTIFIED
ON SCHEDULE “A”,
Defendants.
_______________________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION FOR ENTRY OF FINAL DEFAULT JUDGMENT
This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Entry of Final Default Judgment Against
Defendants, ECF No. 51, filed by the Plaintiff, PURPLE INNOVATION, LLC (“Plaintiff” or
“PURPLE INNOVATION”).1 A clerk’s default was entered against those Defendants2 listed in
the Schedule “A” attached thereto (the “Remaining Defendants”). ECF Nos. 43 (Clerk’s Entry of
Default), 51-8 at 19-25 (Schedule “A”). Despite having been served with process, see ECF No.
30, the Remaining Defendants failed to appear, answer, or otherwise respond to Plaintiff’s
1 The Honorable Jose E. Martinez, United States District Judge, referred the Plaintiff’s motion to
the undersigned for a report and recommendation. ECF No. 52.
2 A clerk’s default was also entered as to Defendants Nos. 23, 33 to 35, 37, 38, 40, 50, 51 to 54,
60, 98, 110, and 129, listed in Schedule “A” to the Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Final Default
Judgment. See ECF Nos. 42, 43, 51. However, since Plaintiff’s filing of this motion, the Plaintiff
has filed a notice of voluntary dismissal as to these listed Defendants. See ECF Nos. 53, 54, 56,
57, 58. Plaintiff thus no longer seeks a default judgment against the sixteen defendants listed
above nor against the other Defendants that Plaintiff has voluntarily dismissed from this action.
See ECF No. 51 at 1 n.1. A modified Schedule A listing the Remaining Defendants that are the
subject of both the Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment and this Report and Recommendation
is attached to this Report.
complaint. Plaintiff now seeks entry of final default judgment against the Remaining Defendants.
ECF No. 51. Having carefully considered Plaintiff’s Motion, the record in this case, the applicable
law, and being otherwise fully advised, the undersigned RESPECTFULLY RECOMMENDS
that Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Final Default Judgment Against Defendants, ECF No. 51, be
GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND3
Plaintiff commenced this action against the Remaining Defendants, alleging claims for
trademark infringement and counterfeiting under § 32 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (Count
I); and design patent infringement under the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 271 (Count II). ECF No. 1.
Plaintiff is the registered owner of federally registered trademarks for PURPLE
INNOVATION Products: U.S. Trademark Registration Nos. 5,416,146; 5,224,883; 5,224,901;
5,659,866; 5,661,556; 6,546,748; 6,816,315; 6,971,732; 6,971,733; 6,971,734; and 6,975,208 (the
“PURPLE INNOVATION Trademarks”). ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 1, 14, 50; see also ECF No. 1-1
(Certificates of Registration for the PURPLE INNOVATION Trademarks). The PURPLE
INNOVATION Trademarks are used in connection with the design, marketing, and distribution of
PURPLE INNOVATIONS’ mattresses, pillows, and other products. See ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 15-20;
ECF No. 12-1 at ¶¶ 6-7, 31 (Declaration of James Larson). Plaintiff owns all rights in the PURPLE
INNOVATION Trademarks pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b). ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 1, 14, 18; ECF No.
12-1 at ¶ 5.
Plaintiff is also the registered owner of several design patents: U.S. Patent Nos. US
D991,706 S; D990,930 S; D959,176 S; D951,670 S; D917,926 S; D909,790 S; and D909,092 S
3 The following facts are admitted as a result of the Remaining Defendants’ default. See, e.g.,
Amguard Ins. Co. v. Super Winn Nail Spa, Inc., No. 23-61304, 2024 WL 996444, at *1 (S.D. Fla.
Mar. 5, 2024); Section II infra.
(collectively, the “PURPLE INNOVATION Patents”). ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 2, 14, 21; ECF No. 1-2
(PURPLE INNOVATION patents). Plaintiff maintains “right, title, and interest in and to the
PURPLE INNOVATION Patents,” and its products often “embody at least a portion of the designs
depicted in the PURPLE INNOVATION Patents.” ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 21-22; ECF No. 12-1 at ¶ 5.
Plaintiff has not licensed or authorized any of the Remaining Defendants to use the
PURPLE INNOVATION Trademarks or the PURPLE INNOVATION Patents, and none of the
Remaining Defendants are authorized retailers of genuine PURPLE INNOVATION products.
ECF No. 1 at ¶ 31; see also id. at ¶ 45.
The complaint establishes that the Remaining Defendants are advertising, marketing,
offering to sell, and/or selling unauthorized, counterfeit, and noncompliant products (the
“Counterfeit Products”) by using marks that are identical or substantially identical to the PURPLE
INNOVATION Trademarks and by embodying designs depicted in the PURPLE INNOVATION
Patents. ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 3, 46, 48-49; see also id. at ¶¶ 32-33. The Counterfeit Products are made
to appear to be genuine PURPLE INNOVATION Products but are inferior and unauthorized
imitations of the PURPLE INNOVATION Products. ECF No. 1 at ¶ 5; see also id. at ¶¶ 20, 28,
32-33. Furthermore, the Remaining Defendants have “sold, offered to sell, marketed, distributed,
and advertised, and are still selling, offering to sell, marketing, distributing, and advertising
products in connection with the PURPLE INNOVATION Trademarks without Plaintiff’s
permission,” and “have been making, using, selling, offering for sale, and/or importing into the
United States for subsequent sale or use, without authority, Counterfeit Products that infringe
directly and/or indirectly the PURPLE INNOVATION Patents.” Id. at ¶¶ 49, 55; see also id. at
¶ 56. Plaintiff asserts that the Remaining Defendants’ unlawful infringing activities caused and
will continue to cause irreparable harm to Plaintiff’s reputation and goodwill “from the loss of its
exclusivity of its intellectual property rights, as well as through consumer confusion, dilution, and
tarnishment of its valuable trademark.” Id. at ¶¶ 8, 46, 53, 58; see also id. at ¶ 52.
Plaintiff seeks entry of final default judgment against the Remaining Defendants and
requests that the Court (1) permanently enjoin the Remaining Defendants from continuing to
infringe on Plaintiff’s intellectual property rights, that is, the PURPLE INNOVATION
Trademarks and the PURPLE INNOVATION Patents; and (2) award Plaintiff damages. See ECF
No. 51 at 2, 11-22.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
“When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead
or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the
party’s default.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a); Mitchell v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 294 F.3d
1309, 1316 (11th Cir. 2002). The effect of a clerk’s default is that all the plaintiff’s well-pleaded
allegations are deemed admitted. See, e.g., Giovanno v. Fabec, 804 F.3d 1361, 1366 (11th Cir.
2015); see also Nishimatsu Constr. Co., Ltd. v. Houston Nat’l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir.
1975) (defaulted defendant deemed to admit well-pleaded allegations, but “not held to admit facts
that are not well-pleaded or to admit conclusions of law”).
Only well-pleaded allegations are admitted because “entry of default judgment is only
warranted when there is a sufficient basis in the pleadings for the judgment entered, with the
standard for ‘a sufficient basis’ for the judgment being akin to that necessary to survive a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” Singleton v. Dean, 611 F. App’x 671, 671 (11th Cir. 2015)
(“The complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief
that is plausible on its face, which is met when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”);
Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Found., 789 F.3d 1239, 1244-45 (11th Cir. 2015). Therefore, before
entering a default judgment, a court must ensure that the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint
state a substantive cause of action and provide a sufficient basis for the particular relief sought.
Tyco Fire & Sec., LLC v. Alcocer, 218 F. App’x 860, 863 (11th Cir. 2007); see also, e.g., Luxottica
Group S.p.A. v. Individual, P’ship or Unincorporated Ass’n, No. 17-CV-61471, 2017 WL
6949260, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 3, 2017) (“Because the defendant is not held to admit facts that are
not well pleaded or to admit conclusions of law, the Court must first determine whether there is a
sufficient basis in the pleading for the judgment to be entered.”). If the admitted facts are sufficient
to establish liability, then the court must ascertain the appropriate amount of damages. Nishimatsu
Constr. Co., 515 F.2d at 1206.
Here, Plaintiff stated in its motion that there are no allegations of joint and several liability
against the Remaining Defendants. See ECF No. 51 at 8. The Remaining Defendants have not
appeared and have defaulted. Therefore, there is no possibility of inconsistent liability between
the Remaining Defendants, and a final default judgment against the Remaining Defendants may
be entered.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Count I: Trademark Infringement and Counterfeiting Pursuant to § 32 of the
Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. § 1114)
Section 32 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114, provides liability for trademark
infringement if, without the consent of the registrant, a defendant uses “in commerce any
reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark” which is “likely to
cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.” 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1). To prevail on this
claim, Plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) it had prior rights to the mark at issue; and (2) Defendants
adopted a mark or name that was the same or confusingly similar to Plaintiff’s trademark such that
consumers were likely to confuse the two. Frehling Enters., Inc. v. Int’l Select Grp., Inc., 192
F.3d 1330, 1335 (11th Cir. 1999); see also Planetary Motion, Inc. v. Techsplosion, Inc., 261 F.3d
1188, 1193 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. v. Longhorn Steaks, Inc.,
106 F.3d 355, 360 (11th Cir. 1997)).
To establish its claim, Plaintiff alleged that it is the registered owner of the PURPLE
INNOVATION Trademarks and the official source of PURPLE INNOVATION Products, see
ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 1, 50, that the Remaining Defendants have no license or authorization to use the
PURPLE INNOVATION Trademarks, see id. at ¶¶ 31, 49, that the Remaining Defendants are
using marks that are “identical or substantially identical to the PURPLE INNOVATION
Trademarks,” id. at ¶ 3, that the Remaining Defendants are “willfully infringing and intentionally
using counterfeits of the PURPLE INNOVATION Trademarks,” id. at ¶ 50, and that the
Remaining Defendants “have sold, offered to sell, marketed, distributed, and advertised, and are
still selling, offering to sell, marketing, distributing, and advertising products in connection with
the PURPLE INNOVATION Trademarks without Plaintiff’s permission,” id. at ¶ 49. According
to the complaint, the Remaining Defendants’ activities are “likely to cause and [are] causing
confusion, mistake, and deception as to the origin and quality of the counterfeit goods among the
general public” and damages to Plaintiff. Id. at ¶¶ 50, 52; see also id. at ¶¶ 28-29. Therefore,
Plaintiff properly established the necessary elements to state a claim for trademark infringement
and counterfeiting under § 32 of the Lanham Act and is entitled to default judgment on this claim.
B. Count II: Design Patent Infringement Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 271
Under the Patent Act, “whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any
patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented
invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). A
design patent infringement action requires Plaintiff to demonstrate that “‘during the term of a
patent for a design, without license of the owner[,]’ a defendant ‘(1) applies the patented design,
or any colorable imitation thereof, to any article of manufacture for the purpose of sale, or (2) sells
or exposes for sale any article of manufacture to which such design or colorable imitation has been
applied.” XYZ Corp. v. Individuals, P’ships, and Unincorporated Ass’ns Identified on Sched. “A,”
668 F. Supp. 3d 1268, 1273 (S.D. Fla. 2023) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 289). “Determining whether a
design patent is infringed is a two-step process. First, when appropriate, the design patent’s claims
are construed. Second, the patented design is compared to the accused device.” Pride Fam.
Brands, Inc. v. Carl’s Patio, Inc., 992 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1223-24 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (footnote
omitted). “The ‘ordinary observer’ test is the sole test for determining whether a design patent has
been infringed.” XYZ Corp., 668 F. Supp. 3d at 1274 (quoting Columbia Sportswear N. Am., Inc.
v. Seirus Innovative Accessories, Inc., 942 F.3d 1119, 1129 (Fed. Cir. 2019)). Under this test, “if,
in the eye of an ordinary observer, giving such attention as a purchaser usually gives, two designs
are substantially the same, if the resemblance is such as to deceive such an observer, inducing him
to purchase one supposing it to be the other, the first one patented is infringed by the other.”
Gorham Mfg. Co. v. White, 81 U.S. 511, 528 (1871); see also, e.g., XYZ Corp., 668 F. Supp. 3d at
1274. “Minor differences between a patented design and an accused article’s design cannot, and
shall not, prevent a finding of infringement.” Crocs, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 598 F.3d 1294,
1303 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Reebok Int’l Ltd., 998 F.2d 985, 991
(Fed. Cir. 1993)).
Here, Plaintiff has established that it is the registered owner of the PURPLE
INNOVATION Patents. ECF No. 1-2. The PURPLE INNOVATION Patents “were duly and
legally issued by the United States Patent and Trademark Office” and are “valid, subsisting, and
in full force and effect.” ECF No. 1 at ¶ 2; see ECF No. 1-2. Additionally, the PURPLE
INNOVATION Patents contain illustrated images depicting the patented designs, ECF No. 1-2,
and the Court need not construe claims language here in light of the patents’ illustrations. See,
e.g., Crocs, Inc., 598 F.3d at 1302-03; Believe Pursue LLC v. Individuals, Corps., Ltd. Liab. Cos.,
P’ships, & Unincorporated Ass’ns Identified on Schedule “A”, No. 25-CV-20162, 2025 WL
2427675, at *8 (S.D. Fla. July 29, 2025). Moreover, the Plaintiff has adequately alleged that the
Remaining Defendants applied the Plaintiff’s patented designs to articles of manufacture for the
purposes of sale. Indeed, the Remaining Defendants “are and have been making, using, selling,
offering for sale, and/or importing into the United States for subsequent sale or use . . . Counterfeit
Products that infringe directly and/or indirectly with PURPLE INNOVATION Patents.” Id. at
¶ 55; see also id. at ¶ 3 (“Defendants are improperly advertising, marketing and/or selling
unauthorized and noncompliant products . . . that embody the design(s) depicted in the PURPLE
INNOVATION Patents.”); id. at ¶ 32 (“Defendants deceive unknowing consumers by using the
. . . PURPLE INNOVATION Patents without authorization . . . as embodied by the Counterfeit
Products themselves.”). Plaintiff also provided images of the PURPLE INNOVATION Patents
and Defendants’ Counterfeit Products as evidence of the Remaining Defendants’ infringement of
the PURPLE INNOVATION Patents under the ordinary observer test. See id. at ¶¶ 55-58;
compare ECF No. 1-2, with ECF Nos. 51-2 to 51-6 (screenshots of Counterfeit Products from each
of Remaining Defendants’ Seller IDs).
Given the circumstances present in this case, Plaintiff has properly established the
necessary elements to state a claim for design patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271 and is
entitled to final default judgment on this claim.
Here, Plaintiff sufficiently alleged facts to establish the elements of both of its claims, and
the factual allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint have been additionally substantiated by sworn
declarations and other evidence establishing the Remaining Defendants’ liability on both claims,
see ECF Nos. 51-1 to 51-6. Under the circumstances presented, entry of default judgment in favor
of Plaintiff and against the Remaining Defendants pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55
is appropriate.
C. RELIEF
Plaintiff, in its motion, ECF No. 51 at 2, 11-23, requests equitable relief, statutory damages,
and lost profits. The undersigned first addresses Plaintiff’s request for injunctive and other
equitable relief, and then addresses the monetary damages for each claim individually.
A. Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief
Pursuant to the Lanham Act, a district court is authorized to issue an injunction “according
to the principles of equity and upon such terms as the court may deem reasonable,” to prevent
violations of trademark law. See 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a). Indeed, “[i]njunctive relief is the remedy
of choice for trademark and unfair competition cases, since there is no adequate remedy at law for
the injury caused by a defendant’s continuing infringement.” Burger King Corp. v. Agad, 911 F.
Supp. 1499, 1509-10 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (citing Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Sandlin, 846 F.2d
1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 1988)). Similarly, the Patent Act provides that a district court “may grant
injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured
by patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable.” 35 U.S.C. § 283; see Atmos Nation, LLC
v. Pana Depot, Inc., No. 14-CIV-62620, 2015 WL 11198010, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 8, 2015)
(granting default judgment and a permanent injunction for patent infringement claim, among
others). Indeed, a plaintiff has little other recourse where defendants fail to respond or appear in
a case. See Atmos Nation, LLC, 2015 WL 11198010, at *2.
Permanent injunctive relief is appropriate where a plaintiff demonstrates that (1) it has
suffered irreparable injury; (2) there is no adequate remedy at law; (3) the balance of hardship
favors an equitable remedy; and (4) an issuance of an injunction is in the public’s interest. eBay,
Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 392-93 (2006).
In trademark cases, “a sufficiently strong showing of likelihood of confusion . . . may by
itself constitute a showing of a substantial threat of irreparable harm.” McDonald’s Corp. v.
Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 1998); see also Levi Strauss & Co. v. Sunrise Int’l
Trading Inc., 51 F.3d 982, 986 (11th Cir. 1995) (“There is no doubt that the continued sale of
thousands of pairs of counterfeit jeans would damage LS & CO’s business reputation and decrease
its legitimate sales.”). Further, “[i]n order for an injury to be irreparable, it cannot be undone
through monetary remedies.” Alpha Signs & Designs v. Individuals, No. 24-cv-20096, 2024 WL
3543724, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 3, 2024) (quoting VAS Aero Servs., LLC v. Arroyo, 860 F. Supp. 2d
1349, 1362 (S.D. Fla. 2012)), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 3543702 (S.D. Fla.
May 24, 2024).
Plaintiff’s complaint demonstrates that the Remaining Defendants are improperly
infringing on the PURPLE INNOVATION Trademarks and Patents by using them to advertise,
promote, and sell goods by using marks that are identical or substantially identical to the PURPLE
INNOVATION Trademarks and by embodying designs depicted in the PURPLE INNOVATION
Patents, and these infringing activities are deceiving consumers and causing consumers to confuse
and mistake the Remaining Defendants’ counterfeit products with Plaintiff’s genuine products that
use the PURPLE INNOVATION Trademarks or embody the designs depicted in the PURPLE
INNOVATION Patents. ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 3, 45-46, 48-49, 50, 52, 58; see also id. at ¶¶ 28-29, 32-
33. The Remaining Defendants’ infringing actions have caused Plaintiff irreparable injury,
including to Plaintiff’s good will and reputation, and will continue to do so if the Remaining
Defendants are not permanently enjoined. Id. at ¶¶ 8, 53, 58.
Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law so long as Remaining Defendants continue to use
the PURPLE INNOVATION Trademarks and PURPLE INNOVATION Patents in connection
with their Internet-based e-commerce stores under the Seller IDs because Plaintiff will have no
control over the quality of what appears to be its products in the marketplace and will be unable to
exclude the Remaining Defendants from using its intellectual property. See, e.g., XYZ Corp., 668
F. Supp. 3d at 1276. An award of monetary damages alone will not cure the injury to Plaintiff’s
reputation and goodwill that will result if Remaining Defendants’ counterfeiting and infringing
actions are allowed to continue. Plaintiff has a significant interest in enforcing its Trademark and
Patent rights and expends significant resources promoting its Trademarks and genuine products
and protecting and enforcing its rights. See id. at ¶¶ 17, 20. Enjoining Remaining Defendants is
critical to prevent hardship to Plaintiff from loss of sales and injury to Plaintiff’s reputation and
goodwill. By contrast, the Remaining Defendants face no hardship if they are prohibited from the
continued infringement of PURPLE INNOVATION Trademarks and PURPLE INNOVATION
Patents, which are unlawful acts.
Finally, the public interest supports the issuance of a permanent injunction against the
Remaining Defendants to prevent consumers from being misled by the Remaining Defendants’
products. Chanel, Inc. v. Sea Hero, 234 F. Supp. 3d 1255, 1262 (S.D. Fla. 2016); see Nike, Inc. v.
Leslie, No. 85-960 Civ-T-15, 1985 WL 5251, at *1 (M.D. Fla. June 24, 1985) (“[A]n injunction to
enjoin infringing behavior serves the public interest in protecting consumers from such
behavior.”). The Remaining Defendants have created an Internet-based infringement scheme in
which they are profiting from the deliberate misappropriation of PURPLE INNOVATION
Trademarks and PURPLE INNOVATION Patents. Unless the Remaining Defendants are
enjoined, they will be free to continue infringing on Plaintiff’s PURPLE INNOVATION
Trademarks and PURPLE INNOVATION Patents.
Having established all four elements necessary for injunctive relief, Plaintiff is entitled to
a permanent injunction.
Plaintiff additionally requests that the Court order that all listings and associated images of
goods that infringe on the PURPLE INNOVATION Trademarks and PURPLE INNOVATION
Patents be permanently removed from the Remaining Defendants’ online marketplace stores. See
ECF No. 51 at 2, 14-15. The Court’s broad equity powers allow it to fashion such relief to stop
the Remaining Defendants’ infringing activities, see, e.g., Believe Pursue LLC, 2025 WL 2427675,
at *10, and such relief is appropriate and recommended in this case.
B. Damages for Trademark Infringement and Counterfeiting
Because the admitted facts are sufficient to establish liability, the Court must ascertain the
appropriate amount of damages. Nishimatsu Constr. Co., 515 F.2d at 1206. In a case involving
the use of counterfeit marks in connection with a sale, offering for sale, or distribution of products,
15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) provides that a plaintiff may elect an award of statutory damages at any time
before final judgment is rendered in the sum of not less than $1,000.00 nor more than $200,000.00
per counterfeit mark per type of good or service. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c)(1). In addition, if the Court
finds that the Remaining Defendants’ counterfeiting actions were willful, it may impose damages
above the maximum limit, up to $2,000,000.00 per mark per type of good or service. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1117(c)(2). Here, Plaintiff has elected statutory damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) as to
Count I of its complaint.
Statutory damages under the Lanham Act are “particularly appropriate in the default
judgment context” because it is difficult to ascertain the defendants’ profits and because the
defendants have not participated in the litigation. See CreeLED, Inc. v. Individuals, Bus. Entities
& Unincorporated Ass’ns Identified on Schedule “A”, No. 22-CV-23683-JEM/Becerra, 2023 WL
6130593, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 11, 2023) (citing Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Benefitfortiffany.com, No.
16-60829-Civ-Lenard/Goodman, 2016 WL 8679081, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 3, 2016)); see also
PetMed Express, Inc. v. MedPets.Com, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1220 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (statutory
damages are “specially appropriate in default judgment cases due to infringer nondisclosure”).
The Court has wide discretion to determine the amount of statutory damages awarded. See PetMed
Express, 336 F. Supp. 2d at 1219 (citing Cable/Home Commc’n Corp. v. Network Prod., Inc., 902
F.2d 839, 853 (11th Cir. 1990)). An award of statutory damages is appropriate despite a plaintiff’s
inability to prove actual damages caused by a defendant’s infringement. Under Armour, Inc. v.
51nfljersey.com, No. 13-62809-civ, 2014 WL 1652044, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 23, 2014) (citing
Ford Motor Co. v. Cross, 441 F. Supp. 2d 837, 852 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (“[A] successful plaintiff
in a trademark infringement case is entitled to recover enhanced statutory damages even where its
actual damages are nominal or non-existent.”)); Playboy Enters. Inc. v. Universal Tel-A-Talk, Inc.,
No. CIV.A. 96-6961, 1998 WL 767440, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 3, 1998) (awarding statutory damages
where plaintiff failed to prove actual damages or profits). An award of statutory damages pursuant
to 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) is “intended not just for compensation for losses, but also to deter wrongful
conduct.” See CreeLED, 2023 WL 6130593, at *4 (citing PetMed Express, 336 F. Supp. 2d at
1220-21)).
Here, the allegations in the complaint, which are taken as true, establish that the Remaining
Defendants intentionally used counterfeits of the PURPLE INNOVATION Trademarks for the
purpose of deriving benefit from Plaintiff’s reputation and goodwill. See ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 45, 50-
51; see also id. at ¶¶ 28-30, 32-33, 48-49, 53. As such, the Lanham Act permits the Court to award
up to $2,000,000.00 per infringing mark on each type of good as statutory damages to ensure that
the Remaining Defendants do not continue their intentional and willful counterfeiting actions. See
15 U.S.C. § 1117(c)(2).
Each of the Remaining Defendants sold, promoted, distributed, advertised, and/or offered
for sale products bearing marks that were counterfeits of the PURPLE INNOVATION
Trademarks. See, e.g., ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 3, 10, 45, 48-50. Based on the above considerations,
Plaintiff suggests that the Court award statutory damages of $200,000.00 against each of the
Remaining Defendants, each of whom sold at least one type of good bearing counterfeits of the
PURPLE INNOVATION Trademarks. See ECF No. 51 at 22. Such an award should be sufficient
to deter the Remaining Defendants and others from continuing to counterfeit or otherwise infringe
upon PURPLE INNOVATION Trademarks, compensate Plaintiff, and punish the Remaining
Defendants, all stated goals of 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c). See, e.g., Purple Innovation, LLC v.
Individuals, No. 24-25034-CIV, 2025 WL 1754677, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 25, 2025). The Court
finds that this award of statutory damages—$200,000.00 per Remaining Defendant—falls within
the permissible statutory range under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) and is just. The undersigned accordingly
recommends an award of $200,000 against each of the Remaining Defendants on Count 1.
C. Damages for Design Patent Infringement
On its patent design infringement claim, Plaintiff “seeks $250 for the infringement of each
Design Patent” pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 289 “[t]o the extent that the [Remaining] Defendants’
known total profits were less than $250 in connection with the sale of products that infringe on the
Design Patents.” ECF No. 51 at 16. With respect to 14 of the Remaining Defendants, Plaintiff
also seeks “lost profits” to the “extent that th[ose] [Remaining] Defendants’ total profits exceeded
$250.” Id.; see also ECF No. 51-7.
More specifically, Plaintiff contends that it seeks to recover such lost profits pursuant to
35 U.S.C. § 284, see ECF No. 51 at 16, which provides for compensatory damages based on a
patentee’s lost sales and profits and which also allows for the trebling of those damages. See 35
U.S.C. § 284 (“Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant damages adequate
to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made
of the invention by the infringer” and “may increase the damages up to three times the amount
found or assessed.”); Believe Pursue LLC, 2025 WL 2427675, at *6-7; see also, e.g., Trell v.
Marlee Elecs. Corp., 912 F.2d 1443, 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“The two methods by which damages
are usually calculated under [35 U.S.C.] § 284 are assessment of actual damages (the profits the
patentee lost due to the infringement) or, if actual damages cannot be ascertained, determination
of a reasonable royalty.”). Plaintiff, however, provides no argument or evidence whatsoever about
any lost sales or lost profits that it suffered. Instead, Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment
actually seeks the profits made by the infringing Remaining Defendants. See ECF No. 51 at 17-
20. That, however, is not a remedy available under 35 U.S.C. § 284, but is instead a remedy
provided by 35 U.S.C. § 289.4 See Believe Pursue LLC, 2025 WL 2427675, at *11 (“Recovery of
an infringer’s total profits, rather than a patentee’s own lost sales, falls squarely within the scope
of § 289, not § 284.”); id. at *5-7. Indeed, § 289 provides that “[w]hoever during the term of a
4 It appears that Plaintiff has “conflate[d] the distinct remedies provided under 35 U.S.C. §§ 284
and 289.” Believe Pursue LLC, 2025 WL 2427675, at *11. The remedies that Plaintiff requests—
the profits made by the Remaining Defendants—are available under § 289.
patent for a design, without license of the owner, (1) applies the patented design, or any colorable
imitation thereof, to any article of manufacture for the purpose of sale, or (2) sells or exposes for
sale any article of manufacture to which such design or colorable imitation has been applied shall
be liable to the owner to the extent of his total profit, but not less than $250.” 35 U.S.C. § 289
(emphasis added). Significantly, Plaintiff calculates the loss profits that it seeks expressly using
the methodology for determining an award under § 289. See ECF No. 51 at 17. Because it is
impermissible “for Plaintiff to recover both infringer’s profits under § 289 and additional
compensatory damages under § 284 for the same act of infringement,” Believe Pursue LLC, 2025
WL 2427675, at *12, and because Plaintiff calculates the damages that it requests pursuant to
§ 289 based on the Remaining Defendants’ profits, Plaintiff’s damages on its design patent claim
are evaluated under § 289.
Determining an award under § 289 involves two steps: “First, identify the ‘article of
manufacture’ to which the infringed design has been applied. Second, calculate the infringer’s
total profit made on that article of manufacture.” Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple, Inc., 580 U.S. 53,
60 (2016). The plaintiff has the initial burden to show the article of manufacture and the
defendant’s total profit on that article. Blue Spring Partners, LLC v. Individuals, Corps., Ltd. Liab.
Cos., P’ships, and Unincorporated Ass’ns Identified on Sched. “A”, No. 1:24-CV-24197-PCH,
2025 WL 1042127, at *9 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 10, 2025). The burden then shifts to the defendant to
produce evidence of any deductions from the total profit identified by the plaintiff (or to show the
article of manufacture, if it believes it to be different). Id.
When calculating an infringer’s profits in similar contexts, courts have held that any
uncertainty is to be resolved against the infringer. See, e.g., Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg.
Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 US. 203, 206-07 (1942) (“The burden is the infringer’s to prove that
his infringement had no cash value in sales made by him. If he does not do so, the profits made
on sales of goods bearing the infringing mark properly belong to the owner of the mark.”). “[I]n
the context of default judgments, courts in this District evaluate lost profits under Gross Merchant
Value (‘GMV’), which is the sales price of infringing goods multiplied by the number of goods
sold.” Believe Pursue LLC, 2025 WL 2427675, at *6 (collecting cases). Where a defendant fails
to produce supporting documents “to characterize revenue, courts in this District have entered a
profits award for the entire revenue amount excluding any costs to be deducted from the
defendant’s gross profit.” Id. (collecting cases).
Here, Plaintiff purports to calculate its lost profits damages as follows:
If the Third Party Provider provided information about gross profits for a specific
infringing product (i.e., the “Gross Merchant Value”), Plaintiff relied on that
information. If the Third Party Provider did not provide such information, Plaintiff
relied on the reported entire revenue amount for the [Remaining] Defendant.
ECF No. 51 at 19 n.3. In support of its calculation, Plaintiff merely submitted a chart indicating
the total amount of lost profits it seeks from each seller. See ECF No. 51-7; ECF No. 51-1 at ¶ 2
n.3. Plaintiff, however, “provides no underlying information or documentation to corroborate
th[ose] figure[s]—no sales records, transaction histories, invoices, or account summaries.
Nowhere in the record does Plaintiff provide any evidence or breakdown of the number of goods
sold or how Plaintiff calculated” its lost profits. Believe Pursue LLC, 2025 WL 2427675, at *12.
Plaintiff has thus failed to satisfy its burden to produce evidence of the lost profits it seeks from
14 of the Remaining Defendants, and even in the default judgment context, “[w]ithout supporting
evidence, the Court cannot verify the accuracy of Plaintiff’s claimed damages.” Id. Plaintiff’s
bare assertion within its motion for default judgment is insufficient to satisfy its burden. Id.
Accordingly, because the Plaintiff has established the Remaining Defendants’ liability on
Plaintiff’s design patent infringement claim, but Plaintiff has not yet presented adequate evidence
to support its request for damages under 35 U.S.C. § 289, the undersigned respectfully
RECOMMENDS that the Court REQUIRE Plaintiff to present evidence of the lost profits that it
seeks for each infringing product for which it seeks damages under § 289 against each of the
Remaining Defendants.
D. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned RESPECTFULLY RECOMMENDS that
Plaintiff’s Motion for Final Default Judgment Against Defendants, ECF No. 51, be GRANTED
with respect to the Remaining Defendants as set forth above, that final default judgment be entered
in favor of Plaintiff and against the Remaining Defendants, that a permanent injunction be issued
against the Remaining Defendants, that Plaintiff be awarded statutory damages of $200,000
against each of the Remaining Defendants pursuant to the Lanham Act, and that Plaintiff be
required to present additional evidence of the profits that it seeks from each Remaining Defendant
within fourteen (14) days of the Court’s Order requiring such evidence.
Pursuant to Local Magistrate Rule 4(b), the Court finds good cause to EXPEDITE the
period to serve and file written objections to this Report and Recommendation. Accordingly, the
parties shall have until September 25, 2025, to serve and file written objections, if any, to this
Report and Recommendation with the Honorable Jose E. Martinez, United States District Judge.
Failure to file timely objections will bar a de novo determination by the District Judge of any issue
addressed in the Report and Recommendation, will constitute a waiver of a party’s “right to
challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal
conclusions,” and will only allow appellate review of the district court order “for plain error if
necessary in the interests of justice.” 11th Cir. R. 3-1; 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474
U.S. 140 (1985); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989); see also Harrigan v.
Metro-Dade Police Dep’t Station #4, 977 F.3d 1185, 1191-92 (11th Cir. 2020).
RESPECTFULLY RECOMMENDED in Chambers in Miami, Florida, this 19th day of
September 2025.
al :
EDUARDO I. SANCHEZ
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
ce: Hon. Jose E. Martinez
Counsel of Record
19
SCHEDULE A
DOE No. | Defendant Seller Defendant Online Marketplace
1 Airspace https://us.shein.com/store/home?store_code=6078 116
083
Always Be My Gul Store | https://www.aliexpress.com/store/1 103050324
Autobliss Store https://www.aliexpress.com/store/1103266471
16 Enjoying* Life Store littpls://www.aliexplress.com/store/1101460664
17 HUTTON LIVE Store □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□ 102963729
| 18 IBPS Shop Store
| 19 JUNMUMUKE]JI https://www.aliexpress.com/store/1 103185219
Manufacturer Store
20 KAWASIMAYA □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□ 103210325
Professional Sale Store
21 Maimeirui Homeware https://www.aliexpress.com/store/1] 103315068
Store
DOE No.
UY6Q
https://www.amazon.com/sp?seller=A 16LUVBOC86
X4L
https://www.temu.com/aiqin-m-
634418212847771 html
https://www.temu.com/-home-m-
634418211489725 html
https://www.temu.com/-m-634418211009567.html
Awesome Selection - https://www.temu.com/awesome-selection-
Youqingshu ougingshu-m-5986259853168.html
31 ban yarun https://www.temu.com/ban--m-
634418213974176.html?go00ds_id=60109960217801
S&sticky_type=1&_x_sessn_id=ulr3nt420q&refer_p
age name=goods&refer_page 1d=10032_ 172588068
1941 qze98won9r&refer page sn=10032
32 Beautiful Blue House https://www.temu.com/beautiful--m-
634418217297075 html
women women-1mn-61 17219438339. html
43 CieloHome https://www.temu.com/cielohome-m-
DOE No. | Defendant Seller Defendant Online Marketplace
49 Dongxiu https://www.temu.com/dongxiu-m-
634418216498082.html
55 Enjoy your wonderful life | https://www.temu.com/up-stone-m-
634418212163196.html
fenghui commerce https://www.temu.com/-commerce-m-
634418216968949 html
61 Ginger Dec https://www.temu.com/ginger-dec-m-
5654252915134.html
63 GTAO https://www.temu.com/gtao-m-
634418215669157. html
64 GTDAMAI https://www.temu.com)/gtdamai-m-
634418215673050.html
| GYANG https:/Awww.temu.com/-m-6344 18214634867. html
H Enjoy life https://www.temu.con/h-enjoy-life-m-
634418214923782.html
634418218140552. html
https://www.temu.com/hupo-kb-m-
634418216600415.html
634418213196323 html
”
634418216666192.html
78 jrukun https://www.temu.cony/jiukun-m-
ry 634418214753295.html
KPAN
4346568268839. html
84 Le Puppino Pet local https://www.temu.com/le-puppino-pet-local-m-
634418215275914. html
Bee nesta
634418213531294 html
634418212619316.html
634418217050520.html
>
634418215468308 html
634418213736070.html
634418212225006.html
634418213738488. html
Products 634418210890397. html
635517727290097 html
97 Office Craft Shop https://www.temu.cony office--m-
634418213127157. html
99 pengs https://www.temu.cony/pengg-m-
634418215185387. html
100 Pin An Dian https://www.temu.com/pin-an--m-
oo 634418215523382.html
102 QDU0Q https://www.temu.com/qduoq-in-
4663785375090. html
103 renquandianpu https://www.temu.com/renquandianpu-in-
634418214519251.html
104 ROU SHOP https://www.temu.com/rou-shop-m-
oe 634418211506458 html
634418212493328 html
634418217390724. html
634418215367213.html
634418212933638 html
634418211784895. html
Defendant Online Marketplace
https://www.temu.com/wtn-shop-m-
634418216630482. html
https://www.temu.com/x--m-634418216845952.html
https://www.temu.com/xflwto-m-
634418216140782 html
121 xguoguo https://www.temu.com/xguoguo-m-
634418213236918. html
122 xianqishop https://www.temu.com/xianqishop-m-
634418217646365.html
125 yangeuangmeigui https://www.temu.com/yangeuanginelgul-mn-
634418212171885.html?goods_1d=60109962025801
9&sticky_type=1&_x_sessn_id=ul3nt420q&refer_p
age name=goods&refer_ page 1d=10032_ 172588050
1512_pistxbyihc&refer_page_sn=10032
126 yezishangdian □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□
6344182132661 13.html
132 ZHAO
634418216717439. html
134 ZHONG HUISHAN https://www.temu.com/-huishan-in-
634418217046521.html
https://www.wish.com/merchant/616d292590f8c7def
f09129e
DOE No. Defendant Seller Defendant Online Marketplace
139 mytlp https://www.wish.com/merchant/550a36408e8def0b2
a652677
140 nvjiaoezimei https://www.wish.com/merchant/5ae13469a71fbf120
bc2f877
141 SHOPSTORYFRANCE https://www.wish.com/merchant/5a955057a6bf7a195
938b11c
142 SKY-00 https://www.wish.com/merchant/641bf6e8ace9aac64
855e789
143 wuhaiyuelian https://www.wish.com/merchant/5e7b0e64d14fc41c3
0244b82
144 wuyishan513 https://www.wish.com/merchant/641473e363cf403c6
b16555f
145 xingtai https://www.wish.com/merchant/5d4269b270327a45
c1c40774
146 xionghongji8542 https://www.wish.com/merchant/6174f1c73618ae52b
05858a8
147 xuchengyan5620 https://www.wish.com/merchant/617508b09c5e62c6f
2a441c7