Osceola

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

TODD KEVIN OSCEOLA and

JESSICA OSCEOLA,

Plaintiffs,

v. Case No.: 2:24-cv-1131-SPC-DNF

THOMAS FORSYTH, PEDRO

RAMOS, and U.S. DEPARTMENT

OF THE INTERIOR NATIONAL

PARK SERVICE,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is Defendants Thomas Forsyth, Pedro Ramos, and the

United States National Park Service’s Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 24). Plaintiffs

Todd Kevin Osceola and Jessica Osceola responded (Doc. 35). For the below

reasons, the Court grants the motion.

This appears to be an action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents

of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) and its progeny involving a

land dispute.1 The amended complaint’s sloppiness makes it difficult to discern

1 The Court “accept[s] the allegations in the complaint as true and constru[es] them in the

light most favorable to” Plaintiffs. Belanger v. Salvation Army, 556 F.3d 1153, 1155 (11th

Cir. 2009). That said, “legal conclusions without adequate factual support are entitled to no

assumption of truth[.]” Dusek v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 832 F.3d 1243, 1246 (11th Cir.

2016) (cleaned up).

exactly what this case entails.2 As best the Court can discern, Plaintiffs are

members of the Seminole Indian Tribe and owners of a parcel of land located

on the Big Cypress National Preserve. Defendants are the United States

Department of the Interior National Park Service (a federal agency) (“National

Park Service”), Thomas Forsyth (a superintendent of the National Park

Service and current superintendent of Big Cypress National Preserve) and

Pedro Ramos (a former Superintendent of Big Cypress National Preserve who

oversees the four National Park Service units) (collectively, “Defendants”).

Although Forsyth and Ramos appear to be federal agents, Plaintiffs allege they

acted “under color of federal and state law” (Doc. 21 ¶ 9 (emphasis added))

without any clarification.

For years, Plaintiffs wrote letters and issued phone calls criticizing

Defendants. No other context for these criticisms is alleged. Then, on a date

not specified, Plaintiffs “were informed that their land was to be confiscated by

authorities.” (Id. ¶ 25). Who provided this information to Plaintiffs is a

mystery. Plaintiffs also “were ordered to vacate the property by officials from

the relevant authorities.” (Id. ¶ 26). Who gave this order and who the

“relevant authorities” are is also a mystery. Ramos and Forsyth harassed

2 Notably, Plaintiffs are represented by counsel.

Plaintiffs, including threatening to seize their property, demolish Plaintiffs’

residence and trailer, and bill Plaintiffs for the cost of the demolition.

The amended complaint includes a variety of other information, the

relevance of which is entirely unclear. For instance, it mentions that: a septic

tank was installed on the property before Plaintiffs occupied it; Plaintiffs never

damaged the property or any native trees; the National Park Service facilitated

installation of utility services on the property and consented to electrical use;

the property is located on high land; the property includes a pre-existing

foundation installed by the Brown family (whoever that is); and Plaintiff Todd

Kevin Osceola is working to rehabilitate the Kale House and establish a

Florida Seminole Native American Museum. (Id. ¶¶ 39–53). It also includes

several paragraphs reciting various legal authorities and offering legal

conclusions. (Id. ¶¶ 54–62). For good measure, Plaintiffs allege Defendants

violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause “by not

engaging in the same harassment and taking of property to non-Indian

Americans” (id. ¶ 62), but they do not actually assert a Fourteenth Amendment

claim.3

Turning to the individual claims—which are just as confusing (if not

more so). In count I, Plaintiffs bring a claim under the Fifth Amendment

3 Never mind that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the states, and Defendants appear

to be a federal agency and agents.

Takings Clause. It says Defendant’s (singular) actions constituted a seizure of

Plaintiffs’ property without just compensation. (Id. ¶ 64). That’s it. It does

not say which Defendant or what actions violated the Fifth Amendment. And,

conspicuously, Plaintiffs never allege anyone ever actually seized their

property. They allege some unknown authority ordered them to vacate their

property. But who gave this order and whether Plaintiffs ever actually vacated

the land is unknown. Indeed, the only actions by any Defendant that Plaintiffs

identify is Forsyth’s and Ramos’ purported harassment. For all the Court

knows, Plaintiffs reside on their property to this day.

Moving to count II, the Court cannot make heads or tails of it. It is titled

“DECLARATORY ACTION – VIOLATION OF PUBLIC LAW FLORIDA

STATUTE 285.07.”4 But Plaintiffs never indicate what declaration they are

seeking. Instead, the amended complaint states the National Park Service

“erroneously obstructed the Plaintiff’s [sic] access to and use of his [sic]

property located at the Indian Village.” (Id. ¶ 69). There are multiple problems

here.

To begin, what conduct obstructed Plaintiffs’ access to their property?

The Court has no clue because Plaintiffs have not alleged any. What’s more,

4 This section explains that the statute’s purpose “is to protect the Seminole Indians of Florida

against undue and unnecessary hardships during these difficult years of transition from their

ancestral culture to the culture of the white person’s civilization and to aid said Indians to

obtain economic independence as a tribe and as individuals.” Fla. Stat. § 285.07.

Plaintiffs do not allege facts suggesting an ongoing dispute such that

declaratory relief is appropriate. See Strickland v. Alexander, 772 F.3d 876,

883 (11th Cir. 2014) (“Where the plaintiff seeks declaratory or injunctive relief,

as opposed to damages for injuries already suffered . . . the injury-in-fact

requirement insists that a plaintiff allege facts from which it appears there is

a substantial likelihood that he will suffer injury in the future.” (citation

omitted)). So the Court dismisses count II without prejudice.

Count III, titled “DECLARATORY ACTION – VIOLATION OF PUBLIC

LAW 93-440”5 is worse. In it, Plaintiffs simply give a history of the law and

their property and then assert the statute “was designed to protect the

property interests of the plaintiffs, and its violations have caused the

Plaintiff[s] damages.” (Doc. 21 ¶ 71–74). Plaintiffs do not bother explaining

which Defendants violated this statute or how it was violated. And, like the

last claim, it does not appear there is an ongoing controversy for the Court to

resolve, as opposed to a claim for a prior injury. So Plaintiffs have not shown

declaratory relief is appropriate. The Court dismisses this claim without

prejudice as well.6

5 This law, codified at 16 U.S.C. § 698j, provides that “members of the Miccosukee Tribe of

Indians of Florida and members of the Seminole Tribe of Florida shall be permitted, subject

to reasonable regulations established by the Secretary, to continue their usual and customary

use and occupancy of Federal or federally acquired lands and waters within the preserve[.]”

6 Defendants broadly argue that neither Fla. Stat. § 285.07 nor 16 U.S.C. § 698j provide a

private cause of action. (Doc. 24 at 14). But that is all they say on the topic. They provide

In count IV, Plaintiffs allege a violation of their Fourth Amendment

rights. This claim is perplexing for multiple reasons. First, they allege

“Defendants” (presumably all three) were acting under color of state law. (Doc.

21 ¶ 76). This is difficult to comprehend given the National Park Service is a

federal agency, and Forsyth and Ramos work for this federal agency. Even

more peculiar is Plaintiffs’ allegation that Forsyth and Ramos “unlawfully

deprived Plaintiffs of their property without due process of law” and that

“Defendant” (singular and unknown which one) “made an unreasonable search

and seizure of Plaintiff’s property in violation of the Fourth Amendment.” (Id.

¶ 78). Again, a multitude of problems here.

The Court starts with the obvious problem: the Fourth Amendment does

not contain a due-process clause. So Plaintiffs’ assertion that Defendant(s)

violated the Fourth Amendment by taking their property without due process

is confusing. And, as discussed throughout, Plaintiffs never allege any

purported seizure by any Defendant. What’s more, at no point do Plaintiffs

allege any facts suggesting this is a Fourth Amendment case. As best the

Court has been able to surmise to this point, this case is about someone (no one

knows who) taking Plaintiffs’ property through eminent domain. There is no

indication Plaintiffs’ property was seized pursuant to some federal (or state,

no citation to authority or any other analysis. That said, Plaintiffs offer nothing to the

contrary. The parties must rectify this shortcoming next time around.

apparently) police power. Cf. Almond v. Randolph Cnty., Ala., No. 3:19-CV-

175-RAH, 2020 WL 3052223, at *11 (M.D. Ala. June 8, 2020) (collecting cases

and distinguishing seizures under the Fourth Amendment and the Fifth

Amendment’s takings clause); see also Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 537–

39 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (distinguishing takings under the Fourth

and Fifth Amendments). So count IV is dismissed without prejudice.

In count V, Plaintiffs bring a First Amendment retaliation claim against

all three Defendants. The claim allocates several paragraphs to describing the

First Amendment and the rights it provides. It otherwise broadly asserts that

Defendants violated Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights “by targeting them and

harassing them and illegally seizing their land prohibiting plaintiffs from and

making exercising their constitutional rights to free speech and expression and

retaliating against them.” (Doc. 21 ¶¶ 80–94). Several problems here, too.

The first problem is—as already explained—Plaintiffs allege no facts

suggesting Defendants seized their land. Nor do Plaintiffs indicate they

engaged in protected speech, a necessary element for a retaliation claim. See

O’Boyle v. Sweetapple, 187 F. Supp. 3d 1365, 1370 (S.D. Fla. 2016) (outlining

the elements for a First Amendment retaliation claim). What’s more, the Court

is confused as to how Defendants' purported seizure of Plaintiffs’ land

prohibited them from exercising their First Amendment rights. Needless to

say, this claim fails and is dismissed without prejudice.

Above all else, Plaintiffs’ amended complaint is undoubtedly a shotgun

pleading. See Behr v. Uthmeier, No. 25-80915-CIV, 2025 WL 2552616, at *1

(S.D. Fla. Sept. 5, 2025) (“Shotgun pleadings are cumbersome, confusing

complaints that do not comply with these pleading requirements.” (citation

omitted)). The amended complaint adopts the allegations of all preceding

counts; is replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts; and asserts

multiple claims against multiple defendants without specifying which applies

to which. See Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1322

(11th Cir. 2015). “Courts in the Eleventh Circuit have little tolerance for

shotgun pleadings.” Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th

Cir. 2018). And the Court has no tolerance for Plaintiffs’ inept pleading.

Plaintiffs must do much better than what they provided in the amended

complaint.

One more point. Defendants raise a sovereign immunity defense for each

count. But Plaintiffs’ attempts to rebut it are scant. They simply argue,

without citation to any authority, that “Plaintiffs have sued individual officers

for constitutional violations, which are not shielded by sovereign immunity[.]”

(Doc. 35 at 14). And they claim the two statutory claims “specifically recognize

and protect the rights of Seminole Tribe members to occupy and use land in

the Preserve.” (Id.). This does nothing to rebut Defendants’ sovereign

immunity defense. “A plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the

government has waived sovereign immunity at the motion to dismiss stage.”

Rebuild Fla., LLC v. United States Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., No. 6:21-CV-

771-WWB-LHP, 2022 WL 22890214, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 21, 2022) (citation

omitted). So Plaintiffs’ briefing also must improve if they want to salvage their

claims.’

Accordingly, it is now

ORDERED:

1. Defendants’ Motion to dismiss (Doc. 24) is GRANTED.

2. Plaintiffs’ amended complaint (Doc. 21) is DISMISSED without

prejudice.

3. On or before October 31, 2025, Plaintiffs may file a second amended

complaint. Failure to do so will cause the Court to dismiss this

case without further notice.

DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on October 17, 2025.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies: All Parties of Record

7 The Court has not addressed each of Defendants’ arguments for dismissal. But once the

Court has a better idea of Plaintiffs’ claims, it will be better situated to do so.