People of Michigan v. Michael Manuel Jackson-Bolanos

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, UNPUBLISHED

October 17, 2025

Plaintiff-Appellant, 9:52 AM

v No. 372263

Wayne Circuit Court

MICHAEL MANUEL JACKSON-BOLANOS, LC No. 24-000535-01-FC

Defendant-Appellee.

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v No. 372604

Wayne Circuit Court

MICHAEL MANUEL JACKSON-BOLANOS, LC No. 24-000535-01-FC

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: FEENEY, P.J., and BORRELLO and BAZZI, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant was charged with first-degree premeditated murder, MCL 750.316(1)(a), felony

murder, MCL 750.316(1)(b), first-degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(2), and lying to a peace

officer, MCL 750.479c(1)(b) and (2)(c). Following trial, the jury acquitted defendant of

premeditated murder and found defendant guilty of lying to a peace officer. In acquitting

defendant of first-degree murder, the jury also declined to find defendant guilty of the lesser-

included offense of second-degree murder, on which the jury had also been instructed. The jury

declared that it was deadlocked and unable to reach a verdict on the felony-murder and first-degree

home invasion counts. The trial court declared a mistrial on those charges.

The trial court sentenced defendant as a fourth-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to

18 months to 15 years’ imprisonment. On the same day, the trial court granted defendant’s motion

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to dismiss the counts for felony murder and first-degree home invasion with prejudice on double-

jeopardy grounds, ruling that the prosecution could not retry those counts.

In Docket No. 372263, the prosecutor appeals as of right from the trial court’s order

granting defendant’s motion to dismiss the charges of felony murder and first-degree home

invasion. In Docket No. 372604, defendant appeals as of right from his judgment of sentence.1

The appeals have been consolidated.2 For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the trial

court’s order dismissing the felony-murder and first-degree home invasion charges, affirm

defendant’s conviction, and remand for the limited purpose of modifying and amending the

presentence investigation report consistent with this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises out of the death of Samantha Woll. Woll attended a wedding in Sterling

Heights, Michigan on the evening of October 20, 2023. There was evidence suggesting that she

likely returned from the wedding to her home in Detroit, Michigan, at about 12:30 a.m. Evidence

collected from Woll’s cell phone indicated that she did not use her phone after approximately 1:35

a.m. Cell phone location evidence was consistent with Woll’s phone being continuously in her

residence from approximately 12:30 a.m. to 4:29 a.m. Woll’s home security system showed that

Woll’s front door was opened at 12:31 a.m. on October 21, 2023, and motion in the living room

was detected a minute later. The system detected that the back door was opened at 12:35 a.m. and

closed at 12:38 a.m. At 1:01 a.m., the system recorded that the front door was still open. The

system detected motion in the living room area at 4:20 a.m., and the system went into “idle” mode

at 4:22 a.m. There was testimony that this meant that the motion in the living room would have

stopped no later than 4:22 a.m.

Woll’s body was discovered on the sidewalk outside her home by neighbors early on the

morning of October 21, at approximately 6:20 a.m.; she was already deceased. There was a trail

of blood on the sidewalk from Woll’s home to the spot where her body was found, and the body

was “covered in blood.” The medical examiner determined that Woll died as a result of multiple

sharp-force injuries to her neck, face, head, and upper back, and the medical examiner concluded

that Woll’s death was a homicide.

During the investigation of the crime scene, police found a vehicle in a nearby parking lot

with tires that appeared to have been cut with a knife. Surveillance video from an elementary

school recorded during the early morning hours of October 21 captured an individual walking

toward Woll’s home and toward the parking lot where the vehicle with slashed tires had been

1

This Court granted defendant’s motion to expedite his appeal in Docket No. 372604. People v

Jackson-Bolanos, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered May 14, 2025 (Docket No.

372604).

2

People v Jackson-Bolanos, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered September 25,

2024 (Docket Nos. 372263 and 372604).

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discovered. The surveillance video showed the individual opening a vehicle door, going into the

vehicle, and carrying some kind of bag.

Using a combination of cell phone tower location data and various closed-circuit video

surveillance cameras located throughout the metropolitan Detroit area, the police were able to

determine that beginning at approximately 12:35 a.m. on October 21, defendant travelled from an

apartment where he lived with his girlfriend to the area of Woll’s residence, where he remained

from about 3:50 to 4:20 a.m., and back to defendant’s girlfriend’s apartment by about 4:54 a.m.

Defendant was arrested and interviewed by Detective Patrick Lane and Sergeant Steven

Ford. Near the beginning of the interview, Detective Lane told defendant that he was being

questioned about some cars that had been broken into in downtown Detroit. Defendant initially

denied committing any such acts. However, during his trial testimony, defendant admitted that he

lied in that regard during his police interview. Defendant also admitted during his trial testimony

that he was walking around that night and that he was checking car door handles and going into

unlocked cars. Defendant testified that while he was out, he came across the victim lying outside,

put his hand on her neck, and found that she was dead. Defendant decided not to call the police

because he did not want to explain that he had been breaking into cars in the area. He denied

killing Woll.

II. DOCKET NO. 372263

In Docket No. 372263, the prosecution appeals the trial court’s ruling dismissing the

felony-murder and first-degree home invasion charges with prejudice on double-jeopardy grounds.

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“A double-jeopardy challenge presents a question of constitutional law that this Court

reviews de novo.” People v Ream, 481 Mich 223, 226; 750 NW2d 536 (2008).

B. ANALYSIS

The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, applicable to the states through the

Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits “any person” from being “subject for the same offence to be

twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” US Const, Ams V and XIV; Benton v Maryland, 395 US

784, 787; 89 S Ct 2056; 23 L Ed 2d 707 (1969). The analogous provision of the Michigan

Constitution similarly provides that “[n]o person shall be subject for the same offense to be twice

put in jeopardy.” Const 1963, art 1, § 15. The Michigan Supreme Court has held that the Double-

Jeopardy Clause of Michigan’s Constitution was adopted with the intent that it “would be

construed consistently with Michigan precedent and the Fifth Amendment,” People v Nutt, 469

Mich 565, 591; 677 NW2d 1 (2004), and that the meaning of Michigan’s Double Jeopardy Clause

has been accurately conveyed by interpretations of the Fifth Amendment. Ream, 481 Mich at 227

n 1. “[S]tate courts are bound by United States Supreme Court decisions construing federal law,

including the Constitution.” People v Lewis, 501 Mich 1, 7; 903 NW2d 816 (2017) (quotation

marks and citation omitted).

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The “the underlying premise” of the principle of double jeopardy is “that a defendant

should not be twice tried or punished for the same offense.” United States v Wilson, 420 US 332,

339; 95 S Ct 1013; 43 L Ed 2d 232 (1975). The Double Jeopardy Clause thus provides three

general protections:

It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal.

It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction. And

it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense. [Id. at 343 (quotation

marks and citation omitted).]3

Additionally, there is an “issue-preclusion component” of the Double Jeopardy Clause.

Bravo-Fernandez v United States, 580 US 5, 7; 137 S Ct 352; 196 L Ed 2d 242 (2016). “In criminal

prosecutions, as in civil litigation, the issue-preclusion principle means that ‘when an issue of

ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be

litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.’ ” Id. at 7-8, quoting Ashe v Swenson,

397 US 436, 443; 90 S Ct 1189; 25 L Ed 2d 469 (1970). The “doctrine of issue preclusion

ordinarily bars relitigation of an issue of fact or law raised and necessarily resolved by a prior

judgment.” Id. at 10.

More specifically, “the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes the Government from

relitigating any issue that was necessarily decided by a jury’s acquittal in a prior trial.” Yeager v

United States, 557 US 110, 119; 129 S Ct 2360; 174 L Ed 2d 78 (2009). “[W]hen an issue of

ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment of acquittal, it cannot again

be litigated in a second trial for a separate offense.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).

“ ’[A] verdict of acquittal [in our justice system] is final,’ the last word on a criminal charge, and

therefore operates as ‘a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.’ ” Bravo-Fernandez,

580 US at 9, quoting Green v United States, 355 US 184, 188; 78 S Ct 221; 2 L Ed 2d 199 (1957)

(alterations in original). If a trial involves multiple counts and “a jury returns inconsistent verdicts,

convicting on one count and acquitting on another count, where both counts turn on the very same

issue of ultimate fact[,]” the United States Supreme Court has held that “both verdicts stand.”

Bravo-Fernandez, 580 US at 8. “The Government is barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause from

challenging the acquittal, . . . but because the verdicts are rationally irreconcilable, the acquittal

gains no preclusive effect . . . .” Id.

However, in Yeager, the United States Supreme Court addressed the question “whether an

apparent inconsistency between a jury’s verdict of acquittal on some counts and its failure to return

a verdict on other counts affects the preclusive force of the acquittals under the Double Jeopardy

Clause of the Fifth Amendment” and held “that it does not.” Yeager, 557 US at 112. The Court

explained that “for double jeopardy purposes, the jury’s inability to reach a verdict on [some]

3

See also Nutt, 469 Mich at 574 (“The United States and Michigan Constitutions protect a person

from being twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense. . . . The prohibition against double

jeopardy provides three related protections: (1) it protects against a second prosecution for the

same offense after acquittal; (2) it protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after

conviction; and (3) it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense.”).

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counts [is] a nonevent and the acquittals on [other] counts are entitled to the same effect as [any

other] acquittal.” Id. at 120. Reasoning that a “hung count is not a relevant part of the record of

[the] prior proceeding” because “a jury speaks only through its verdict” and “its failure to reach a

verdict” therefore “cannot—by negative implication—yield a piece of information that helps put

together the trial puzzle,” the Court held that the “consideration of hung counts has no place in the

issue-preclusion analysis” regarding the acquitted counts and plays “no part in assessing the legal

consequences of a unanimous verdict that the jurors did return.” Id. at 121-122 (alteration in

original; quotation marks and citation omitted).

In Yeager, the defendant was tried by a jury on charges involving allegations of securities

fraud, wire fraud, and insider trading. Id. at 113-114. The jury acquitted the defendant of the fraud

counts but became deadlocked on the remaining insider trading counts, which resulted in a mistrial

on the hung counts. Id. at 114-115.

While acknowledging the general rule that a defendant may be retried on hung counts

without offending the Double Jeopardy Clause, the Yeager Court explained that when there were

simultaneous verdicts of acquittal issued by the same jury, the question became “whether the

interest in preserving the finality of the jury’s judgment on the fraud counts, including the jury’s

finding that petitioner did not possess insider information, bar[red] a retrial on the insider trading

counts.” Id. at 118-119. Because “the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes the Government from

relitigating any issue that was necessarily decided by a jury’s acquittal in a prior trial,” the analysis

therefore required determining what issues were necessarily decided by the jury. Id. at 119-123.

The Court explained:

To decipher what a jury has necessarily decided, . . . courts should examine the

record of a prior proceeding, taking into account the pleadings, evidence, charge,

and other relevant matter, and conclude whether a rational jury could have

grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to

foreclose from consideration. . . . [T]he inquiry must be set in a practical frame and

viewed with an eye to all the circumstances of the proceedings.” [Id. at 119-120

(quotation marks and citations omitted).]

The Yeager Court concluded:

To identify what a jury necessarily determined at trial, courts should scrutinize a

jury’s decisions, not its failures to decide. A jury’s verdict of acquittal represents

the community’s collective judgment regarding all the evidence and arguments

presented to it. Even if the verdict is based upon an egregiously erroneous

foundation, its finality is unassailable. Thus, if the possession of insider

information was a critical issue of ultimate fact in all of the charges against

petitioner, a jury verdict that necessarily decided that issue in his favor protects

him from prosecution for any charge for which that is an essential element. [Id. at

122-123 (quotation marks and citations omitted; emphasis added).]

The Yeager Court thus concluded that the acquittals on the fraud counts were entitled to

the same preclusive effect as an acquittal in a trial involving a single charged offense, id. at 120,

and that “acquittals can preclude retrial on counts on which the same jury hangs,” id. at 125

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(emphasis added). Hence, the lower court was permitted on remand to determine under the proper

framework whether the jury had necessarily decided the issue regarding the defendant’s possession

of insider information. Id. at 125-126.

In the present case, as the prosecution concedes, this Court is bound by Yeager and we

must therefore apply the Yeager analytical framework to determine whether retrial on the hung

counts of felony murder and first-degree home invasion is barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.

We first consider the felony-murder charge. As our Supreme Court has explained:

Murder is a common-law offense, defined as the unlawful killing of one

human being by another with malice aforethought. The elements of second-degree

murder are: (1) a death, (2) caused by an act of the defendant, (3) with malice, and

(4) without justification or excuse.

Malice is defined as the intent to kill, the intent to cause great bodily harm,

or the intent to do an act in wanton and wilful disregard of the likelihood that the

natural tendency of such behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm. The

malice element for depraved heart murder is general mens rea. [People v Goecke,

457 Mich 442, 463-464; 579 NW2d 868 (1998) (citations omitted).]

Furthermore:

The elements of felony murder are: (1) the killing of a human

being, (2) with the intent to kill, to do great bodily harm, or to create

a very high risk of death or great bodily harm with knowledge that

death or great bodily harm was the probable result [i.e., malice], (3)

while committing, attempting to commit, or assisting in the

commission of any of the felonies specifically enumerated . . . .

The facts and circumstances of the killing may give rise to an inference of

malice. A jury may infer malice from evidence that the defendant intentionally set

in motion a force likely to cause death or great bodily harm. Malice may also be

inferred from the use of a deadly weapon. [People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 759;

597 NW2d 130 (1999) (citations omitted; alteration in original).]

Here, as the prosecution acknowledges on appeal, the jury acquitted defendant of second-

degree murder and therefore necessarily found that defendant did not commit murder with malice,

which is also a necessary element of establishing felony murder.4 Id.; Goecke, 457 Mich at 463-

464; Yeager, 557 US at 119-120. See also People v Reichard, 505 Mich 81, 87; 949 NW2d 64

(2020) (stating that the felony-murder statute “operates only to elevate a second-degree murder to

first-degree murder if it was committed in the commission of one of the enumerated felonies”).

Therefore, the prosecution is prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clause from retrying defendant

4

The prosecution contends that Yeager was wrongly decided but acknowledges that this Court is

bound by Yeager with respect to the application of the Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause.

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on the felony-murder charge. Yeager, 557 US at 112, 119, 122-123. The trial court’s ruling thus

was not erroneous.

Next, we turn to the first-degree home invasion charge. The prosecution argues on appeal

that even under Yeager, retrial on the first-degree home invasion charge is not barred by the Double

Jeopardy Clause. As we have already explained, resolving a question such as this requires us to

begin by determining what the jury “necessarily decided” in its acquittal verdict through

“examin[ing] the record of [the] prior proceeding, taking into account the pleadings, evidence,

charge, and other relevant matter” to reach a conclusion “whether a rational jury could have

grounded its verdict upon an issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from

consideration.” Yeager, 557 US at 119-120 (quotation marks and citation omitted). “[T]he inquiry

must be set in a practical frame and viewed with an eye to all the circumstances of the

proceedings.” Id. at 120 (quotation marks and citation omitted). If an essential element of first-

degree home invasion also was a “critical issue of ultimate fact” that was necessarily decided in

defendant’s favor by the jury, then defendant may not be retried for first-degree home invasion.

Id. at 123.

The offense of first-degree home invasion is defined in MCL 750.110a(2), which provides

as follows:

(2) A person who breaks and enters a dwelling with intent to commit a

felony, larceny, or assault in the dwelling, a person who enters a dwelling without

permission with intent to commit a felony, larceny, or assault in the dwelling, or a

person who breaks and enters a dwelling or enters a dwelling without permission

and, at any time while he or she is entering, present in, or exiting the dwelling,

commits a felony, larceny, or assault is guilty of home invasion in the first degree

if at any time while the person is entering, present in, or exiting the dwelling either

of the following circumstances exists:

(a) The person is armed with a dangerous weapon.

(b) Another person is lawfully present in the dwelling.

During closing argument, the prosecuting attorney explained the prosecution’s theory of

how the relevant crimes were committed during the early morning hours of October 21:

Now, I can’t tell you what exactly happened inside of Samantha Woll’s

apartment, inside her home on October 21st of 2023. I can’t tell you exactly what

happened, but you don’t need to know exactly what happened to know that she was

murdered and to know that the defendant is the murderer.

And although I can’t tell you exactly what happened, it’s not hard to

imagine it either. She gets back from that wedding that night. She gets settled in.

She falls asleep, doesn’t realize that that door was left open.

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And meanwhile, we have this creeper in the night prowling around her

neighborhood, looking for every opportunity to find -- to take things that weren’t

his to take, to go into spaces that weren’t his to be in.

And at some point, as he’s methodically searching each and every single car

in that area, based on his own admissions, he sees that door open and decides to go

inside.

And imagine the horror of Samantha Woll’s last moments on this earth. She

wakes up to this masked man inside her home in the middle of the night, and

something happened. Something happened. He decided to subdue her with an

outburst of violence, and he got the heck out of there.

And she, as the blood starts flowing, stumbles around, probably confused,

probably in shock, and in the last second, in a desperate cry for help, stumbles

outside toward her neighbor’s door, where she collapses and dies there on the

ground. It’s not hard to imagine that scenario at all.

Now, this is a case about coincidences. It’s a case about common sense.

And when you use that common sense, and you look at the coincidences in this

case, there’s simply too many coincidences, too many coincidences to suggest that

anyone other than the defendant killed her.

* * *

What makes sense is that he went in there, he didn’t expect to find her,

something happened, and she paid with that for her life [sic].

* * *

. . . Common sense tells us that it takes a matter of seconds to inflict eight

stab wounds, a matter of seconds.

Moreover, the prosecutor stated that the first-degree home invasion offense was “assaulting

Samantha Woll inside of her home after entering that home without permission” and that the

charge was “based on the idea that he did not have permission to enter the home and he entered

that home, Samantha Woll was there, and he assaulted her inside that home.” The prosecutor

further argued in closing rebuttal argument:

The timeline is that the only time that motion is detected in her home after

her phone stops being used, the defendant’s right there. And then as he’s leaving,

he’s got her blood on him.

That timeline is intact. It is a commonsense timeline to convict him.

* * *

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And then, you know, when we talk about the defendant and this idea that

his intent, in going through that front door, was to take something -- again, the

defense continues to circle back on nothing was taken, nothing was taken, so

therefore this wasn’t a home invasion, this wasn’t a attempted larceny.

Once what happened inside that home happened, he had every reason not to

take something. You think he’s going to want to get caught with a murder victim’s

laptop, or a murder victim’s wallet, or a murder victim’s phone?

He had every reason to get out of there quickly, which is exactly what all of

the evidence suggests that he did.

During final jury instructions, the trial court instructed the jury in relevant part as follows:

Now, it is my duty to instruct you on the law, and you must take the law as

I give to you. If a lawyer said something different about the law, follow what I say.

* * *

In Count 1, the defendant is charged with the crime of First-Degree Felony

Murder. To prove this charge, the prosecutor must prove each of the following

elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

First, that the defendant caused the death of Samantha Heather Woll, that

is, that Samantha Heather Woll died as a result of stab wounds.

Second, that the defendant had one of these three states of mind: Either he

intended to kill, or he intended to do great bodily harm to Samantha Woll, or he

knowingly created a very high risk of death or great bodily harm knowing that such

harm would be the likely result of his actions.

Third, that when he did the act that caused the death of Samantha Heather

Woll, the defendant was committing or attempting to commit the crime of Larceny

and/or Home Invasion - First Degree.

For the crime of Larceny, the prosecutor must prove each of the following

elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

First, that the defendant took someone else’s property.

Second, that the property was taken without consent.

Third, that there was some movement of the property. It does not matter

whether the defendant actually kept the property, or whether the property was taken

off the premises.

Fourth, that at the time the property was taken, the defendant intended to

permanently deprive the owner of the property.

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For the crime of Home Invasion - First Degree, the prosecutor must prove

each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

First, that the defendant entered a dwelling without permission. It does not

matter whether the defendant got his entire body inside. If the defendant put any

part of his body into the dwelling without permission, that is enough to count as an

entry.

Second, that when the defendant entered, was present in, or was leaving the

dwelling, he committed the offense of Assault and Battery.

To prove the charge of Assault and Battery, the prosecutor must prove each

of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

First, that the defendant committed a Battery on Samantha Heather Woll.

A Battery is a forceful, violent, or offensive touching of the person, or

something closely connected with the person of another.

The touching must have been intended by the defendant, that is, not

accidental, and it must have been against Samantha Heather Woll’s will. It does

not matter whether the touching caused an injury.

And second, that the defendant intended either to commit a Battery upon

Samantha Heather Woll or to make her reasonably fear an immediate Battery.

Third, that when the defendant entered, was present in, or was leaving the

dwelling, either of the following circumstances existed: Either (a) he was armed

with a dangerous weapon, and/or (b) another person was lawfully present in the

dwelling.

Attempting to commit a crime requires the prosecutor to prove the following

elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

First, that the defendant intended to commit the crime of Larceny or Home

Invasion - First Degree, which are defined above.

Second, that the defendant took some actions toward committing the alleged

crime, but failed to complete the crime.

It is not enough to prove that the defendant made preparations for

committing the crime. Things like planning the crime or arranging how it will be

committed are just preparations. They do not qualify as an attempt.

In order to qualify as an attempt, the action must go beyond mere

preparation to the point where the crime would have been completed if it had not

been interrupted by outside circumstances.

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To qualify as an attempt, an act must clearly and directly be related to the

crime that the defendant is charged with attempting and not some other objective.

* * *

In Count 3, the defendant is charged with the crime of Home Invasion in

the First Degree.[]

I already read the elements of that crime during the Felony Murder

elements, so I’m not going to re-read those again, but you can refer to this page if

you want to go over those when you’re discussing that charge. [Emphasis added.]

Admittedly, there are multiple ways in which the crime of first-degree home invasion may

potentially be committed. Our Supreme Court has explained:

The alternative elements of first-degree home invasion can be broken down

as follows:

Element One: The defendant either:

1. breaks and enters a dwelling or

2. enters a dwelling without permission.

Element Two: The defendant either:

1. intends when entering to commit a felony, larceny, or assault in

the dwelling or

2. at any time while entering, present in, or exiting the dwelling

commits a felony, larceny, or assault.

Element Three: While the defendant is entering, present in, or exiting the

dwelling, either:

1. the defendant is armed with a dangerous weapon or

2. another person is lawfully present in the dwelling. [People v Wilder, 485

Mich 35, 43; 780 NW2d 265 (2010).]

In recognizing the existence of these various alternatives, our Supreme Court cautioned

that appellate courts should focus the appellate inquiry on the elements that were actually “at issue”

in the case and not on hypothetical means by which a home invasion may be committed. See id.

at 44 (addressing whether third-degree home invasion was a necessarily included lesser offense of

first-degree home invasion).

In this case, it is clear from the charging language in the amended information, as well as

the prosecutor’s closing argument and the final jury instructions that the jury was presented with

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a single theory for how defendant was alleged to have committed this offense, which was that

defendant entered the dwelling without permission, committed an assault and battery against the

victim that resulted in her death, while either the victim was lawfully present and/or defendant was

armed with a dangerous weapon. The first-degree home invasion charge was not predicated on

allegations relating to a larceny or any other felony. It is also clear that the stabbing constituted

both the assault and the murder. The prosecutor’s theory was that defendant stabbed the victim in

her home and left, after which, the victim died. The prosecutor’s argument did not present the idea

of an assault that was separate from the murder. Therefore, on this record, the jury necessarily

decided that defendant did not commit the assault or the murder, and the Double Jeopardy Clause

thus prohibits the prosecution from retrying defendant on the first-degree home invasion charge

because under all of the facts and circumstances, the critical issue before the jury was whether

defendant was the person who committed the assault and murder; the jury clearly resolved this

issue in defendant’s favor. Yeager, 557 US at 119-120, 122-123. In light of the prosecution’s

theory, a rational jury could not have grounded its verdict of acquittal for second-degree murder

on a finding other than that defendant did not attack or assault the victim. Id. at 120.

We do not foreclose the possibility that defendant could have been charged with first-

degree home invasion in such a manner that retrial on a hung count would not have been barred

under the Double Jeopardy Clause by the jury’s acquittal for second-degree murder. However, the

prosecution has not provided any citation to the record to support, nor does it appear to seriously

argue, that the jury was presented with any theory of first-degree home invasion other than the

theory relying on the commission of an assault.5 Even if the trial evidence could have supported

alternate theories, the prosecution does not claim to have actually presented those alternatives to

the jury. A jury is bound to follow the law as given to it by the trial court in its instructions. See

MCL 768.29 (“The court shall instruct the jury as to the law applicable to the case . . .”). As quoted

above, the jury was instructed that an assault was a necessary element of the first-degree home

invasion charge. The prosecution has not provided this Court with any legal authority for the

proposition that the Double Jeopardy Clause as interpreted in Yeager may be circumvented by

amending the information or otherwise changing the alleged theory of prosecution for the hung

count.

Permitting the prosecution to employ such a tactic would be contrary to the fundamental

purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause, as explained by the United States Supreme Court in Burks

v United States, 437 US 1, 11; 98 S Ct 2141; 57 L Ed 2d 1, 9-10 (1978):

The Double Jeopardy Clause forbids a second trial for the purpose of

affording the prosecution another opportunity to supply evidence which it failed to

muster in the first proceeding. This is central to the objective of the prohibition

against successive trials. The Clause does not allow “the State . . . to make repeated

attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense,” since “[t]he constitutional

prohibition against ‘double jeopardy’ was designed to protect an individual from

5

On page 11 of the prosecution’s appellate brief, the prosecution concedes that the assault-

predicated theory was the sole theory of prosecution for first-degree home invasion actually

presented to the jury.

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being subjected to the hazards of trial and possible conviction more than once for

an alleged offense.” [Citations omitted; ellipsis and alteration in original.]

Accordingly, the prosecution is prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clause from retrying

defendant on the first-degree home invasion charge, and the trial court’s ruling thus was not

erroneous. Yeager, 557 US at 112, 119, 122-123.

III. DOCKET NO. 372604

A. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

In Docket No. 372604, defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to allow the

jury to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of lying to a peace officer, contrary to MCL

750.479c, and that his federal and state constitutional due-process rights were thereby violated.

An appellate challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is reviewed de novo. People v Ericksen,

288 Mich App 192, 195; 793 NW2d 120 (2010).

“[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a defendant in a criminal

case against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to

constitute the crime with which he is charged.” Jackson v Virginia, 443 US 307, 315; 99 S Ct

2781; 61 L Ed 2d 560 (1979) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Michigan’s Constitution

provides similar due-process protection. People v Prude, 513 Mich 377, 384; 15 NW3d 249 (2024)

(“[A] conviction that is not supported by sufficient evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt violates due process and cannot stand.”) (citing US Const, Ams V and XIV; Const 1963, art

1, § 17; Jackson, 443 US 307; People v Hampton, 407 Mich 354, 366; 285 NW2d 284 (1979)

(opinion by COLEMAN, C.J.)).

“In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court analyzes the

evidence presented in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether any rational

trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the crime charged were proven beyond

a reasonable doubt.” People v Lundy, 467 Mich 254, 257; 650 NW2d 332 (2002). Circumstantial

evidence and reasonable inferences derived from the evidence can provide satisfactory proof of

the elements of the crime. People v Jackson, 292 Mich App 583, 587; 808 NW2d 541 (2011). It

is for the jury to weigh the evidence and address the credibility of the witnesses; therefore, any

conflicts in the evidence must be resolved in the prosecution’s favor. Id. at 587-588.

“This standard of review is deferential to the fact-finder that weighed the evidence to

determine the criminal defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,” but the “reviewing court

only defers to a jury on questions of fact; it does not defer on questions of law.” Prude, 513 Mich

at 385. “Questions of law that are not within the province of the jury include the proper scope of

a penal statute . . . .” Id.

In this case, the amended information charged defendant in Count 4 with violating MCL

750.479c(2) as follows:

[Defendant] after being informed by Patrick Lane and/or Steven Ford of the

Detroit Police Department that the officer was conducting a criminal investigation,

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did knowingly and willfully make a statement or statements to the officer(s) that he

knew was false or misleading regarding the following material fact or facts relating

to the investigation that he committed larcenies or attempted larcenies from motor

vehicles on October 21, 2023, and the officer was conducting a criminal

investigation for Larceny from a Motor Vehicle ; contrary to MCL 750.479c(2)(c).

MCL 750.479c provides in relevant part as follows:

(1) Except as provided in this section, a person who is informed by a peace

officer that he or she is conducting a criminal investigation shall not do any of the

following:

(a) By any trick, scheme, or device, knowingly and willfully conceal from

the peace officer any material fact relating to the criminal investigation.

(b) Knowingly and willfully make any statement to the peace officer that

the person knows is false or misleading regarding a material fact in that criminal

investigation.

(c) Knowingly and willfully issue or otherwise provide any writing or

document to the peace officer that the person knows is false or misleading regarding

a material fact in that criminal investigation.

(2) A person who violates this section is guilty of a crime as follows:

* * *

(c) If the crime being investigated is a felony punishable by imprisonment

for 4 years or more, the person is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by

imprisonment for not more than 2 years or a fine of not more than $5,000.00, or

both.

We have previously explained:

[T]his statute “prohibits knowingly and willfully making a statement regarding a

material fact ‘that the person knows is false or misleading.’ ” People v Williams,

318 Mich App 232, 239; 899 NW2d 53 (2016). For purposes of this statute, mislead

means “1. to lead or guide in the wrong direction. 2. to lead into error of conduct,

thought, or judgment; lead astray.” Id. at 240 (quotation marks and citation

omitted). Additionally, false statements are misleading as well because “[a]n

affirmatively false statement—a bald-faced lie—may turn an investigator’s

attention away from the true perpetrator or the source of valuable evidence.” Id.

[People v Simon, 339 Mich App 568, 581; 984 NW2d 800 (2021) (second alteration

in original).]

“The plain language of the statute conveys the Legislature’s intent to hold fully responsible

for accuracy and candor those who provide information to peace officers in the course of a criminal

investigation.” People v Williams, 318 Mich App 232, 241; 899 NW2d 53 (2016).

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Here, defendant argues on appeal that his conviction for lying to a police officer must be

overturned because “there was no investigation into larcenies from a motor vehicle, nor was Mr.

Jackson-Bolanos ever informed of such an investigation.” Thus, defendant contends the statute

requires a peace officer to indicate the specific crime that is being investigated because only false

or misleading statements regarding “that criminal investigation” come within the purview of the

statute. Defendant maintains that he was brought in for questioning under the “false” premise that

he was being questioned about certain glasses he sold to a pawn shop and was never informed that

the police were investigating larcenies from vehicles while the officers actually were investigating

defendant for murder.

This Court has stated that one of the elements that the statute requires the prosecution to

prove is that “the peace officer was conducting a criminal investigation and advised [the defendant]

to that effect.” People v Klages, 339 Mich App 610, 624; 984 NW2d 822 (2021). However,

defendant’s appellate argument willfully ignores the fact that the interview video shows that

Detective Lane expressly informed defendant that he was in custody and was being questioned

about a series of vehicle break-ins. We conclude that this was legally sufficient to satisfy the

requirements of the statute, and defendant thus has not demonstrated that the evidence was

insufficient to justify a rational trier of fact in finding that each element of this offense had been

proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Lundy, 467 Mich at 257; Prude, 513 Mich at 385. We therefore

affirm defendant’s conviction.

B. THE PSIR

Defendant also argues that the trial court erred by not removing information related to

Woll’s death from the Presentence Investigation Report (PSIR) because defendant was acquitted

by the jury of premediated and second-degree murder and facts involving that acquitted conduct

were not relevant to the crime of which defendant was actually convicted, which was lying to a

police officer regarding a criminal investigation of larcenies from vehicles. Defendant seeks to

have his PSIR corrected for accuracy, and he expressly states on appeal that he is not seeking

resentencing.

A trial court’s response to a defendant’s challenge to the accuracy of a PSIR is reviewed

for an abuse of discretion. People v Maben, 313 Mich App 545, 552; 884 NW2d 314 (2015). “A

trial court abuses its discretion when it selects an outcome outside the range of reasonable and

principled outcomes.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).

A court, when sentencing the defendant who has been convicted of some offenses and

acquitted of others, may not rely on acquitted conduct to impose sentence because to do so violates

the defendant’s right to due process. People v Beck, 504 Mich 605, 609, 613-615, 629; 939 NW2d

213 (2019). However, this Court explained in People v Stokes, 333 Mich App 304, 311-312; 963

NW2d 643 (2020), that a trial court may review a PSIR that contains information regarding

acquitted conduct without violating Beck, so long as the court does not rely on the acquitted

conduct when sentencing the defendant.

Nonetheless, this Court recently recognized that information regarding acquitted conduct

that is contained in the PSIR still may have serious effects for a defendant throughout a term of

imprisonment, including effects on matters such as security classification and parole. People v

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Knepper, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket No. 363191); slip op at 9. Thus,

although this Court in Knepper concluded that information about crimes of which the defendant

was acquitted did not necessarily need to be redacted from the PSIR so long as the trial court did

not rely on that challenged information at sentencing, we nevertheless held that the defendant was

entitled to have the PSIR modified to clarify the nature of the jury’s acquittals. Id. at ___; slip op

at 8-9. We explained:

This Court has ruled that when a trial court “fail[s] to adequately resolve [a

defendant]’s challenges” to a PSIR, remand is appropriate “for proper consideration

of his challenges.” Maben, 313 Mich App at 555. During defendant’s sentencing

hearing, defense counsel objected to the facts set forth in the “Agent Description of

the Offense” that were derived entirely from the police report because many of

those facts were inconsistent with the jury’s verdict of acquittal on three counts.

Counsel proposed adding the following language to the agent’s description:

“Defendant denies physically assaulting the victim and specifically denies

strangling or sexually assaulting the victim, and the jury verdict supports the

Defendant’s position.” The trial court agreed to include the reference to

defendant’s denials, but it declined to include a reference to the acquittals.

Although we agree with the trial court that defense counsel’s proposed language

may have overstated what the jury determined, we conclude that the jury’s verdict

of acquittal on three of the four counts, including the charge of strangulation, must

be stated in the agent’s description. We reach this conclusion because, absent

recognition that defendant was acquitted of crimes based on conduct recited in the

PSIR, the agent’s description would constitute inaccurate information. Therefore,

we remand the case for the limited purpose of modifying the PSIR to ensure that

the agent’s description clearly reflects defendant’s acquittal on three of the four

charges that flowed from the police report. [Id. at ___; slip op at 9 (alterations in

original).]

Here, after reviewing the PSIR, it is not clear to us that defendant’s lying to a police officer

conviction was premised on his false statements about breaking into cars, as we have described

earlier in this opinion. The description of the offense seems to suggest that he was convicted for

lying about the murder of which he was acquitted. Pursuant to Knepper, we remand this matter

for the limited purpose of allowing the trial court to address defendant’s concerns about the

accuracy of his PSIR under the proper framework as set forth in our opinion in Knepper.

In Docket No. 372263, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal with prejudice of the charges

of felony murder and first-degree home invasion. In Docket No. 372604, we affirm defendant’s

conviction, but we remand for the limited purpose of amending the PSIR consistent with this

opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.

/s/ Kathleen A. Feeney

/s/ Stephen L. Borrello

/s/ Mariam S. Bazzi

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