ALVAREZ

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

KING ALVAREZ, :

Plaintiff, :

:

v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-CV-4941

:

COMMONWEALTH OF :

PENNSYLVANIA, :

Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM

Pappert, J. October 16, 2025

Pro se plaintiff King Alvarez asserts against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 et seq.

He alleges he was denied reasonable accommodations during civil proceedings before

the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas and seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

For the following reasons, the Court will grant Alvarez leave to proceed in forma

pauperis and dismiss his complaint.

I1

Alvarez states that he suffers from “extreme depression, anxiety, and Complex-

PTSD” as a result of the “torment” he suffered at multiple residential treatment

facilities over the course of a decade. (Compl. at 2-4.) After the City of Philadelphia

terminated Alvarez’s “life-sustaining housing subsidy” in September 2022, his mental

health deteriorated further, causing him to experience a “serious decline” in his “mental

1 The factual allegations set forth in this Memorandum are taken from Alvarez’s

complaint. (Dkt. No. 1.) The Court adopts the sequential pagination assigned to the

complaint by the CM/ECF docketing system.

and physical abilities.”2 (Id. at 4, 7.) For example, Alvarez suffers from memory loss,

vision loss, and a “decreased inability to focus or enjoy hobbies.” (Id. at 7.)

Alvarez claims the judge in his state court case “repeatedly . . . denied [his] civil

case [as] frivolous.” (Id.) Alvarez was told that “all the court can do is offer [him] a

stenographer.” (Id.) Although he used the stenographer, it was “still [] not good

enough for the court to hear [his] legitimate case.” (Id. at 6.) Alvarez states that he

was denied as an “ADA accommodation” his request to “submit a judicial complaint” to

the Judicial Conduct Board of Pennsylvania. (Id.) Based on these allegations, Alvarez

asserts claims under Title II of the ADA. He seeks money damages and for the Court to

compel the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to provide him an attorney. (Id. at 7.)

II

The Court grants Alvarez leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Accordingly, 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) requires the Court to dismiss the complaint if it fails to state a

claim. Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed

by the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6), see Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999),

which requires the Court to determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

2 Alvarez also states that he lost his housing subsidy because a nonprofit director

lied during a meeting, causing his “fair housing rights” continue to be violated. (Compl. at

4.) Alvarez previously filed two cases asserting Fair Housing Act claims in connection with

the discontinuation of his housing subsidy. See Alvarez v. City of Philadelphia, No. 24-

3127; Alvarez v. HUD, No. 22-3631. Both cases were dismissed. See Alvarez v. City of

Philadelphia, No. 24-3127, 2024 WL 3606347, at *4 (E.D. Pa. July 31, 2024); Alvarez v.

HUD, No. 22-3631, 2022 WL 17252193, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 28, 2022). Although the Court

understands this case to assert claims under Title II of the ADA only, to the extent that

Alvarez attempts to reassert any FHA claims in connection with his housing subsidy, the

claims are dismissed.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations omitted). At this early stage of

the litigation, the Court will accept the facts alleged in the pro se complaint as true,

draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, and ask only whether the

complaint contains facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Shorter v. United

States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021), abrogation on other grounds recognized by

Fisher v. Hollingsworth, 115 F.4th 197 (3d Cir. 2024). Conclusory allegations do not

suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Because Alvarez is proceeding pro se, the Court

construes his allegations liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing

Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir. 2013)).

III

Alvarez claims that the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas has not provided

him with reasonable accommodations for his disabilities, in violation of the ADA.3 Title

II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of

such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the

services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by

any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. This provision provides a cause of action for

disabled individuals claiming that they were denied access to state courts because of

their disabilities. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533-34 (2004) (recognizing that Title

II of the ADA validly abrogates state sovereign immunity).

To state a plausible claim under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must allege that

3 The Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas is an arm of the Commonwealth

of Pennsylvania. See Callahan v. City of Philadelphia, 207 F.3d 668, 674 (3d Cir. 2000); see

also Andrews v. Hens-Greco, 641 F. App’x 176, 180 (3d Cir. 2016) (stating that “the

Pennsylvania state courts . . . are entities of the state of Pennsylvania”); Geness v. Cox, 902

F.3d 344, 362 (3d Cir. 2018) (permitting Title II ADA claims against the Commonwealth).

“(1) he is a qualified individual; (2) with a disability; (3) who was excluded from

participation in or denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public

entity, or was subjected to discrimination by any such entity; (4) by reason of his

disability.” Geness, 902 F.3d at 361 (quoting Haberle v. Troxell, 885 F.3d 170, 178-79

(3d Cir. 2018)). Because Alvarez seeks compensatory damages, he must also plead that

he suffered intentional discrimination under a deliberate indifference standard. See

Haberle, 885 F.3d at 181 (citations omitted). A plaintiff may meet that standard in two

ways: “first, by alleging facts suggesting that the existing policies caused a failure to

adequately respond to a pattern of past occurrences of injuries like the plaintiff’s, or,

second, by alleging facts indicating that he could prove that the risk of cognizable harm

was so great and so obvious that the risk and the failure to respond will alone support

finding deliberate indifference.” Id. (cleaned up). To allege plausibly that he is a

“qualified individual with a disability,” Alvarez must provide facts to show that he has

a “disability,” which is defined as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially

limits one or more major life activities of such individual . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A).

“[M]ajor life activities include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself, performing

manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending,

speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and

working.” Id. at § 12101(2)(A).

Title II of the ADA includes within its prohibition against discrimination the

failure to make “reasonable accommodations.”4 See Haberle, 885 F.3d at 180. When

4 Although Title II’s definition of “qualified individual with a disability” uses the

term “reasonable modification” as opposed to “reasonable accommodation,” as used in Title

I of the ADA, courts treat the two phrases synonymously. See Berardelli v. Allied Servs.

determining whether an accommodation is reasonable, courts consider “‘whether it

alters the essential nature of the program or imposes an undue burden or hardship in

light of the overall program.’” Doe 1 v. Perkiomen Valley Sch. Dist., 585 F. Supp. 3d

668, 694-95 (E.D. Pa. 2022) (quoting Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 337 (3d Cir.

1995)). “A public entity need not make ‘fundamental’ or ‘substantial’ alterations to

accommodate a disabled individual.” Id. at 695 (citing Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S.

287, 300 (1985)).

The Court understands Alvarez to assert failure to accommodate claims under

Title II of the ADA. He specifically alleges that he suffers from extreme depression,

anxiety, and Complex-PTSD and that, as a result, he struggles with memory and vision

loss and a decreased ability to focus or enjoy hobbies. Assuming that these allegations

are sufficiently specific to address the first two prongs of his ADA claim, Alvarez’s

allegations are too vague to plausibly allege that the Philadelphia Court of Common

Pleas denied him a service or program by reason of his disability or denied him a

reasonable accommodation for such service or program. Alvarez alleges that, for nearly

three years, he has been “denied reasonable accommodations and access to the Court of

Common Pleas.”5 (Compl. at 6.) Alvarez does not elaborate on the specific

Inst. of Rehab. Med., 900 F.3d 104, 117 (3d Cir. 2018); see also Haberle, 885 F.3d at 181

n.11.

5 Alvarez provides no specific dates for when he was allegedly denied reasonable

accommodations. If Alvarez chooses to file an amended complaint, he should be mindful

that claims asserted under Title II of the ADA are subject to a two-year statute of

limitations. See Disabled in Action of Pa. v. Se. Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 539 F.3d 199,

208 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[W]e hold that the statute of limitations applicable to claims under

Title II of the ADA . . . is the statute of limitations for personal injury actions in the state in

which the trial court sits”); see also 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5524. “The general rule is

that the statute of limitations begins to run as soon as a right to institute and maintain suit

arises.” Haugh v. Allstate Ins. Co., 322 F.3d 227, 231 (3d Cir. 2003).

accommodations he has requested and been denied regarding access to the court. He

alleges instead that he is unable to represent himself in court due to his disabilities and

that he needs an attorney to assist with his state case. (Id. at 5.) Alvarez also alleges

that his state case was “repeatedly denied” as “frivolous” and that, despite his use of a

court stenographer, his “legitimate case” was still not heard. (Id. at 6.) Alvarez also

states that his request to file a judicial complaint, purportedly as a reasonable

accommodation, was denied.

Alvarez’s allegations fail to state a plausible claim to relief. He has not alleged

with sufficient specificity the services or programs he was denied, what

accommodations he requested to access those services or programs, which of those

accommodations were afforded to him and which were denied, and how he was injured

by any denials. To the extent Alvarez contends that the Commonwealth has failed to

accommodate his disabilities by not appointing him an attorney, such a claim lacks

merit because there is no right to an attorney under Title II of the ADA. See Douris v.

New Jersey, 500 F. App’x 98, 100 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of

ADA claims where the plaintiff alleged that “the New Jersey courts failed to provide

him with legal counsel” because “there is no requirement under the ADA that courts

provide legal counsel for a person with disabilities”); Pinson v. Equifax Credit Info.

Servs., Inc., 316 F. App’x 744, 749 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding “no support” for plaintiff’s

assertion that the ADA requires the court to appoint counsel). Moreover, Alvarez has

not alleged any facts which could allow the Court to conclude that the Commonwealth’s

alleged denial of accommodations for his disabilities amounted to intentional

discrimination under a standard of deliberate indifference. See Fowler v. UPMC

Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[A] complaint must do more than

allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief. A complaint has to ‘show’ such an

entitlement with its facts.”); McDonald-Witherspoon v. City of Phila., No. 17-1914, 2017

WL 3675408, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 25, 2017) (dismissing ADA Title II claim because

complaint did not contain any facts showing that plaintiff was discriminated against

because of his disability).

IV

For the foregoing reasons, Alvarez’s Complaint will be dismissed without

prejudice. Alvarez will be granted leave to file an amended complaint to clearly set out

the factual bases of any ADA claim he seeks to present against the Commonwealth. An

Order with additional instructions for amendment follows.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Gerald J. Pappert

GERALD J. PAPPERT, J.