Rubio

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

EASTERN DIVISION

CLAUDIA ELIZABETH SERAFIN )

TRISTAN, CLAUDIA ALEJANDRA )

SAUCEDO SERAFIN, and MIGUEL )

ALEJANDRO SAUCEDO SERAFIN, )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 4:25 CV 255 JMB

)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF )

STATE, MARCO RUBIO, PAM BONDI, )

and THOMAS C. ALBUS,1 )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM and ORDER

Now pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 8). For the reasons

set forth below, the Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part without prejudice.

I. Background

In a Complaint filed on February 28, 2025, Plaintiffs seek a declaration that they are United

States citizens pursuant to federal immigration law (Doc. 1).2 Plaintiff Claudia Elizabeth Serafin

Tristan (hereinafter Claudia Elizabeth) and her two children, Plaintiffs Claudia Alejandra Saucedo

Serafin (hereinafter Claudia Alejandra) and Miguel Alejandro Saucedo Serafin (hereinafter Miguel

1 On August 1, 2025, Thomas C. Albus was sworn in as the interim United States Attorney for the Eastern District of

Missouri. Mr. Albus is hereby SUBSTITUTED for Sayler A. Fleming pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

25(d).

2 The Complaint states that it was drafted by Steven P. Timmons, Claudia Elizabeth’s brother-in-law, with Plaintiffs’

permission. Mr. Timmons does not purport to be an attorney and instead identifies himself as a probation officer with

a master’s degree in criminology. Each of Plaintiffs have signed the pleadings in this case, thereby acknowledging

their obligations pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. Defendant points out that some of Plaintiffs’ citations

to case authorities are erroneous and not do refer to existing cases, e.g. “Lazo v. Blinken, No. 7:21-cv-00313, 2022

WL 1316223 (S.D. Tex. May 3, 2022)” does not exist (Doc. 11, p. 11), nor does “Flores-Torres v. DHS, 548 F.3d 1,

6 (1st Cir. 2008)” (Doc. 11, p. 7). Plaintiffs are warned that failure to provide citations to actual case authority in

support of propositions of law or fact are a violation of Rule 11 and may result in sanctions.

Alejandro), allege that their United States citizenship derives from Esteban Oliva Serafin, a United

States citizen and Claudia Elizabeth’s father. Claudia Elizabeth claims that she was denied

citizenship, most recently in January, 2025, in an arbitrary and capricious manner and in violation

of § 301 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1401. The Complaint does

not allege that Claudia Alejandra and Miguel Alejandro likewise applied for citizenship and were

denied; however, they assert that they have a derivative claim of citizenship based on Claudia

Elizabeth’s (anticipated) successful claim of citizenship. Plaintiffs claim an entitlement to relief

in this Court pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a) and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C.

§§ 551, et seq. Defendants seek dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to

state a claim.

Attached to the Complaint are copies of a variety of documents purporting to show Esteban

Oliva Serafin’s presence in the United States, in addition to Plaintiffs’ family history, births, and

relationships, some of which are written in Spanish. As set forth in the attachments to the

Complaint, Plaintiffs were all born in Mexico and are all citizens of Mexico (Docs. 1-28, 1-32, 1-

33, and 1-34). While Plaintiffs do not attach Claudia Elizabeth’s recent application for a United

States passport, Plaintiffs have attached a December 13, 2024 letter from the Consulate General of

the United States of America in Monterrey, Mexico indicating that her March 27, 2024 application

was rejected, and a passport cannot issue, because she failed to show that her father was physically

present in the United States prior to her birth and for a period of at least 10 years (Doc. 1-26).

The Complaint does not state that Claudia Elizabeth filed any other claims of citizenship

other than the March, 2024 application (Doc. 1, p. 9). Attached to Defendants’ memorandum,

however, are documents demonstrating that Claudia Elizabeth applied for a United States passport

prior to 2024.3 As to the first application,4 she was directed to provide more evidence in support

of her application on October 22, 2014; the application was subsequently denied on February 10,

2015 (Doc. 9-1, pp. 3-4). As to a second September 11, 2018 application, she was again directed

to provide more evidence and the application was ultimately denied on May 2, 2019 (Id. pp. 5-9).

And, as indicated above, her third 2024 application likewise was denied. Neither of the later

denials referenced Claudia Elizabeth’s prior applications.

II. Standard

Defendants seek dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6).

Rule 12(b)(1) provides for dismissal based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Such motions

can present a “facial” and/or a “factual” attack on the Court’s jurisdiction. Where a defendant

asserts a facial challenge to this Court’s jurisdiction, one that relies on the averments made in a

complaint, the arguments are analyzed under the same standard as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

Branson Label, Inc. v. City of Branson, Mo., 793 F.3d 910, 914 (8th Cir. 2015). However, in a

factual attack, where a defendant “challenges the veracity of the facts underpinning subject matter

jurisdiction,” the Court “considers matter outside the pleadings, and the non-moving party does

not have the benefit of 12(b)(6) safeguards.” Davis v. Anthony, Inc., 886 F.3d 674, 679 (8th Cir.

2018) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Defendants make a factual attack on this Court’s

subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, material outside of the pleadings, namely Claudia

Elizabeth’s prior applications for a United States passport and denials of the same, shall be

3 In an attached certification, Larry W. Talbott, a Deputy Director with the Office of Information Management and

Liaison within the Visa Office of the Bureau of Consular Affairs, United States Department of State, avers that the

documents attached to the memorandum represent copies maintained by the Department of State related to Plaintiffs’

attempts to seek citizenship and/or a visa to enter the United States. This Court takes judicial notice of these

administrative files because they are integral to Plaintiffs’ claims and their authenticity is not questioned. See Dittmer

Properties, L.P. v. F.D.I.C., 708 F.3d 1011, 1021 (8th Cir. 2013).

4 The date on the application is unreadable (Doc. 9-1, p. 1).

considered by the Court along with the fact that neither Claudia Alejandra nor Miguel Alejandro

have applied for a United States passport or certificate of citizenship.

The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is to test the

legal sufficiency of the complaint. To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), “a

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim for relief “must include sufficient factual

information to provide the ‘grounds’ on which the claim rests, and to raise a right to relief above

a speculative level.” Schaaf v. Residential Funding Corp., 517 F.3d 544, 549 (8th Cir. 2008)

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 & n.3). This obligation requires a plaintiff to plead “more

than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not

do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

On a Rule 12(b)(6) (and a facial Rule 12(b)(1)) motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true

all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint, even if it appears that “actual proof of

those facts is improbable,” and reviews the complaint to determine whether its allegations show

that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. at 555-56; Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 8(a)(2). However, the

principle that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint does not

apply to legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause

of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”).

III. Discussion

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Title 301 of the

Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA) defines those persons who are United States

citizens at birth. 8 U.S.C. § 1401; Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 582 U.S. 47 (2017). The statute

provides, in part, that a person who is born outside of the territorial limits of the United States, but

who has one United States citizen parent who was physically present in the United States for a

specified number of years, is a citizen at birth. Id. § 1401(g).5 Such a person may seek a United

States passport from a passport agency if they are residing in the United States, or an embassy or

consulate if residing outside of the United States. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 301.1. A person who is

denied the rights or privileges of a national may seek a “judgment declaring him to be a national

of the United States” under certain circumstances. 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a).6 An action under that

section must be: (1) by a person denied a right or privilege; (2) filed against “the head of such

department or independent agency” that denied a right or privilege as a national; (2) filed “only

within five years after the final administrative denial of such right or privilege”; and, (3) must be

filed in the district court “in which such person resides or claims a residence.” Id.

5 In the Complaint, Plaintiff refers to §301(a)(7) of the INA. Due to renumbering of the statute, §301(a)(7) now is

renumbered to § 301(g). See Immigration and Nationality Act, Amendment, Repeals, Pub. L. No. 95-432, 92 Stat.

1046 (1978). At the time of Claudia Elizabeth’s birth, the residency requirement for her citizen father was 10 years,

5 years of which must have been after the age of 14. See Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1986, Pub.

L. No. 99-653, 100 Stat. 3655 (changing the 10 year residency requirement to 5 years).

6 In full:

If any person who is within the United States claims a right or privilege as a national of the United

States and is denied such right or privilege by any department or independent agency, or official

thereof, upon the ground that he is not a national of the United States, such person may institute an

action under the provisions of section 2201 of title 28 against the head of such department or

independent agency for a judgment declaring him to be a national of the United States, except that

no such action may be instituted in any case if the issue of such person's status as a national of the

United States (1) arose by reason of, or in connection with any removal proceeding under the

provisions of this chapter or any other act, or (2) is in issue in any such removal proceeding. An

action under this subsection may be instituted only within five years after the final administrative

denial of such right or privilege and shall be filed in the district court of the United States for the

district in which such person resides or claims a residence, and jurisdiction over such officials in

such cases is conferred upon those courts.

8 U.S.C. § 1503(a).

As to all claims, Defendants first argue that the United States Department of State, Pam

Bondi, and Thomas C. Albus should be dismissed as improper defendants and that Plaintiffs cannot

assert a claim pursuant to the APA.

Plaintiffs7 acknowledge that the only proper party-defendant in this action is Marco Rubio,

the Secretary of State. Id. (“If any person who is within the United States claims a right or privilege

as a national of the United States and is denied such right or privilege by any department or

independent agency, or official thereof, upon the ground that he is not a national of the United

States, such person may institute an action under the provisions of section 2201 of Title 28 against

the head of such department or independent agency for a judgment declaring him to be a national

of the United States, . . . .”).8 Accordingly, the remaining Defendants, the United States

Department of State, Pam Bondi, and Thomas C. Albus, are DISMISSED without prejudice.

The APA permits judicial review of an agency’s actions “for which there is no other

adequate remedy in a court.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. The APA permits a court to compel agency action

and/or put aside agency action that is deemed, in part, arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of

discretion. 5 U.S.C. § 706. Importantly, review under the APA may not be possible when there

is another specific statute that grants an adequate remedy. See Central Platte Natural Resources

Dist. v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, 643 F.3d 1142, 1148-1149 (8th Cir. 2011) (“Congress did not

mean for the APA’s review procedures to duplicate existing review mechanisms.”). In this case,

7 Plaintiffs first take issue with Defendants’ reference to Claudia Elizabeth as “mom” in their motion and briefs.

Plaintiffs find that the moniker does not reflect the seriousness of their claims and may represent a form of bias. The

Court does not ascribe a negative connotation or intent to Defendants’ informal reference to Claudia Elizabeth and

finds that Defendants are sufficiently aware of the gravity of Plaintiffs’ claims.

8 Title 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) provides, in relevant part, for declaratory judgments:

In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, . . . any court of the United States, upon the

filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested

party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.

§ 1503(a) grants Plaintiffs an adequate remedy, the ability to file suit in district court to

acknowledge citizenship. Under § 1503(a), this Court would make a de novo determination of

whether Plaintiffs are United States citizens. See Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 256 (1980).

And, while § 1503(a) does not require an evaluation of the agency’s determination, see Richards

v. Sec’y of State, 752 F.2d 1413, 1417 (9th Cir. 1985), it provides an adequate remedy that would

foreclose APA review.

In any event, Plaintiffs state that their reference to the APA is “contextual” and does not

set forth a separate claim (Doc. 11, p. 7) (“Plaintiffs clarify that they are not raising the APA as an

independent cause of action . . . . No separate claim or request for relief has been made under it.”).

Accordingly, to the extent that Plaintiffs may be asserting an APA claim, it is DISMISSED

without prejudice.

A. Claudia Elizabeth’s claim (Count I)

Defendant next argues that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Claudia

Elizabeth’s claims because they are time-barred. Putting aside the argument that the time limit

found in § 1503(a) is jurisdictional in nature, the five-year limitations period contained in the

statute begins to run from the “first final administrative denial” of a claim of citizenship. See

Gonzalez v. Limon, 926 F.3d 186, 189 (5th Cir. 2019); Whitehead v. Haig, 794 F.2d 115, 119 (3rd

Cir. 1986); Chin Chuck Ming v. Dulles, 225 F.2d 849, 853 (9th Cir. 1955). This clock may be

reset, however, if subsequent applications are qualitatively different; and, some courts have found

that providing additional and new evidence can render an application different and can lead to a

new five-year limitations period. See, e.g., Arthur-Price v. Blinken, 2022 WL 1004415 (N.D. Ill.

2022); but see Henry v. Quarantillo, 684 F.Supp.2d 298, 307-308 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (“But there is

no precedent to suggest that when a second ‘final administrative denial’ is based on the

presentation of new evidence, it is somehow qualitatively different than previous denials and thus

begins anew the statute of limitations.”).

As noted above, Claudia Elizabeth applied for a United States passport in October, 2014

and was directed on October 22, 2014 to provide more information.9 On February 10, 2015,

Claudia Elizabeth’s first application was denied for failure to establish the physical presence of

her father in the United States for at least 10 years prior to her birth (Doc. 9-1, p. 4). There is no

discussion in the briefs whether Claudia Elizabeth administratively appealed or otherwise

challenged that decision.10 As such, the decision on her first application became final on or about

February 10, 2015 and the § 1503(a) clock would appear to run on that date. In addition, it does

not appear that Claudia Elizabeth’s subsequent applications were “qualitatively different” than her

first application: they all appear to be on the same form and while additional evidence may have

been presented in subsequent applications, such evidence did not change the nature of her assertion

that she is entitled to citizenship based on §301(g). Plaintiffs filed suit on February 28, 2025, more

than five years thereafter. Accordingly, Defendant argues that Claudia Elizabeth’s claim is time-

barred.

In most cases, a statute of limitations defense is an affirmative defense that a Defendant

must plead and prove, Jessie v. Potter, 516 F.3d 709, 713 n.2 (8th Cir 2008), and that is subject to

equitable considerations. Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate of Lake Traverse Reservation v. United States

Corps of Engineers, 888 F.3d 906, 917 (8th Cir. 2018) (“Equitable tolling allows for an extension

of the prescribed limitations period when the plaintiff, despite all due diligence, is unable to obtain

9 In her response, Plaintiffs state that the application was made in 2015 without any citation to a record or pleading

(Doc. 11, p. 3).

10 Defendants have made no argument that this Court lacks jurisdiction because Plaintiffs may have failed to exhaust

their administrative remedies. See Flores v. Hartnett, 2022 WL 101978, *2-3 (5th Cir. 2022); Poole v. USCIS

Pittsburgh Field Office, 2024 WL 3439777 (3rd Cir. 2024).

vital information bearing on the existence of his [or her] claim.” (quotation marks and citation

omitted)). Nonetheless, a complaint may be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) “if the complaint

itself establishes that the claim is time-barred.” Richardson v. Omaha School Disrict, 957 F.3d

869, 873 (8th Cir. 2020) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

Defendant argues, however, that the limitations period contained in § 1503(a) is

jurisdictional, meaning that this matter must be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of

jurisdiction if Plaintiffs filed suit outside of the limitations period, regardless of any equitable

considerations. Id.; see T.L. ex. Rel. Ingram v. United States, 443 F.3d 956, 959 (8th Cir. 2006)

(discussing whether the Federal Tort Claims Act’s limitations period is jurisdictional in nature),

abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Wong, 575 U.S. 402 (2015). When considering

whether a statute of limitations is merely an affirmative defense subject to equitable tolling or a

jurisdictional prerequisite to judicial review, this Court must look to congressional intent. United

States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347 (1997). In such cases,

The Government may therefore attempt to establish, through evidence

relating to a particular statute of limitations, that Congress opted to forbid equitable

tolling.

One way to meet that burden—and the way the Government pursues here—

is to show that Congress made the time bar at issue jurisdictional. When that is so,

a litigant’s failure to comply with the bar deprives a court of all authority to hear a

case. Hence, a court must enforce the limitation even if the other party has waived

any timeliness objection. And, more crucially here, a court must do so even if

equitable considerations would support extending the prescribed time period.

Given those harsh consequences, the Government must clear a high bar to

establish that a statute of limitations is jurisdictional. In recent years, we have

repeatedly held that procedural rules, including time bars, cabin a court’s power

only if Congress has clearly stated as much. That does not mean Congress must

incant magic words. But traditional tools of statutory construction must plainly

show that Congress imbued a procedural bar with jurisdictional consequences.

And in applying that clear statement rule, we have made plain that most

time bars are nonjurisdictional.

Wong, 575 U.S. at 408–09 (quotation marks and omitted); see also Boechler v. Commissioner,

596 U.S. 199, 203 (2022); Harrow v. Department of Defense, 601 U.S. 480, 483-485 (2024); Riley

v. Bondi 606 U.S. ___, 145 S.Ct. 2190, 2201 (2025) (“Because jurisdictional rules have a unique

capacity to disrupt the orderly adjudication of disputes, we are reluctant to label a rule

‘jurisdictional’ unless Congress has clearly signaled that the rule is meant to have that status.”).

Defendant seeks to shortcut this analysis of Congressional intent by relying on Gonzalez

v. Limon, 926 F.3d 186 (5th Cir. 2019), and Sanchez v. Rubio, 2025 WL 289229 (S.D. Tx. 2025),

which in turn relies on Gonzalez and Flores v. Pompeo, 936 F.3d 273 (5th Cir. 2019).11 Sanchez,

2025 WL 289229 at *5 (“Taken together, Gonzalez and Flores establish that the final clause in

Section 1503(a) applies to both the geographic and temporal components of that sentence, and that

it is jurisdictional.”). In Gonzalez, the plaintiff was issued a certificate of citizenship in 1984; but,

that certificate was cancelled in 2006 (because plaintiff was not the legitimate daughter of a United

States citizen) and plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider (asserting that she never received a

pretermination letter sent in 1991 and that, in any event, she was legitimated according to relevant

Mexican law). Id. 926 F.3d at 187. That motion was dismissed and plaintiff did not appeal. In

2014, the plaintiff filed a new motion for reconsideration asserting a new basis for reconsideration

(that her father legitimated her through a sworn statement of paternity). That motion was dismissed

11 In Flores, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Court stated that:

The parties disagree over whether the residence requirement in § 1503(a) is a jurisdictional or venue

provision. We conclude it is jurisdictional. A limitation or condition on the scope of a statute is

jurisdictional if Congress ‘clearly states’ that it is jurisdictional. Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S.

500, 515–16, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006). To discern whether a statutory condition is

jurisdictional, courts ‘look[ ] to the condition’s text, context, and relevant historical treatment.’ Reed

Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 166, 130 S.Ct. 1237, 176 L.Ed.2d 18 (2010) (citing Zipes

v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393–95, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982)).

Congress clearly stated that § 1503(a)’s residence requirement is jurisdictional by appending the

clause ‘jurisdiction over such officials in such cases is conferred upon those courts.’

Id., 936 F.3d at 276.

in 2014 and plaintiff’s appeals efforts were denied in 2016. She filed suit in 2017 related to the

2016 dismissal of her (second) motion to reconsider the cancellation of her certificate of citizenship

pursuant to § 1503(a).

The Fifth Circuit explicitly considered whether “there is jurisdiction over Gonzalez’s

claim” based on the accrual of her claim and exhaustion of administrative remedies. Id. 188. Its

holding, however, was narrower:

While the text is silent regarding duplicative denials, in defining a limitations

period, Congress expressed its interest in finality. Implicitly authorizing a series of

duplicative claims would frustrate that interest. Section 1503(a)’s reference to “the

final administrative denial” means the first final administrative denial.

Id., 926 F.3d at 190. The Gonzalez court relegated exhaustion to a footnote. Id. at 188 n.7

(“Additionally, a plaintiff must exhaust administrative remedies.”). As to the limitations period,

the Court briefly stated that the plaintiff’s action “must comply with further jurisdictional

requirements,” namely, the five year limitations period. Id. 188. Thus, the Gonzalez court was

more concerned with when a claim accrued, after the first final decision, versus whether the

limitations period established a jurisdictional bar.

After briefing in this matter, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals disavowed the holding in

Gonzalez related to the jurisdictional nature of the limitations clause in § 1503(a). In Villegas v.

Noem, 149 F.4th 554 (5th Cir. 2025), the Court held that “§1503(a)’s procedural time bar is

nonjursidictional, and Villegas’s suit was timely.” Id. at 559. Importantly, the Villegas court

found that Gonzalez, and by-and-by Flores, failed to conduct the analysis required by the Supreme

Court in determining whether § 1503(a)’s limitations period was jurisdictional, and instead merely

made such a pronouncement in dicta that is nonbinding and non-precedential. Villegas, 149 F.4th

at 563-564 and n.4. The Court then conducted a “clear statement test” to determine whether

Congress intended for the limitations period in § 1503(a) is jurisdictional. See Harrow, 601 U.S.

at 489. The Court found that the text of § 1503(a), and in particular the last sentence, did not

clearly establish a jurisdictional bar. Villegas, 149 F.4th at 565. The Court further found that a

supposed conditional waiver of sovereign immunity did not convert the limitations period in §

1503(a) to a jurisdictional bar nor did the proximity of the word “jurisdiction” in the sentence

containing the limitations clause. Id. 565-566 (citing Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner of Internal

Revenue, 596 U.S. 199, 204-206 (2022). In light of the dearth of binding authority from the Eighth

Circuit Court of Appeals, this Court finds the Villegas reasoning persuasive. There is no showing

that Congress intended § 1503(a) to create a jurisdictional bar as to the statute of limitations.

Neither the text of the statute, nor binding (or even persuasive) case authority, nor any other

authority that would touch upon Congressional intent and be relevant, demonstrates clearly that

Congress intended the limitations period in §1503(a) to be a jurisdictional. See, e.g., Riley, 145

S. Ct. at 2202 (“We start with the text of the statute. Section 1252(b)(1) provides that “[t]he

petition for review must be filed not later than 30 days after the date of the final order of removal.”

This language tells aliens what they must do if they want judicial review, but it provides no

directives to courts. It makes no reference to jurisdiction and lacks any language demarcat[ing] a

court’s power. (quotation marks and citation omitted; emphasis in original)); Patsy v. Board of

Regents of State of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 501-502 (1982) (“However, the initial question whether

exhaustion is required should be answered by reference to congressional intent; and a court should

not defer the exercise of jurisdiction under a federal statute unless it is consistent with that intent.”).

As such, the limitations period is merely a claims processing rule and Defendant is obligated to

affirmatively show that Plaintiffs failed to file within the limitations period.

Of course, Defendant rests on Rule 12(b)(1) and does not argue that Claudia Elizabeth

failed to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Because there is no argument, the Court will not

speculate or offer an opinion on whether Defendant has timely raised a statute of limitations

defense and whether Claudia Elizabeth’s claim may be entitled to any equitable tolling.

Accordingly, Count I cannot be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), at this time.

B. Claudia Alejandra’s and Miguel Alejandro’s claim

In Count II, Claudia Alejandra and Miguel Alejandro likewise claim that they are entitled

to a declaration that they are United States citizens based on Claudia Elizabeth’s (alleged)

citizenship and Esteban Oliva Serafin’s citizenship (Doc. 1, p. 10). Defendant argues that they

lack standing and that they fail to state a derivative or other claim of citizenship.

In any federal case, whether a party has Article III standing to sue is a threshold question

that must be answered. Iowa v. Wright, ___ F.4th ___, 2025 WL 2554549, * 6 (8th Cir. 2025).12

“For standing, a petitioner must show it suffered an injury in fact, fairly traceable to the challenged

action, and likely redressable by a favorable decision of the court.” Id. An injury in fact is “an

invasion of a legally protected interest that is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent,

not conjectural or hypothetical.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted); Lujan v. Defenders

of Wildlife, 504 U.S 555, 560 (1992). Plaintiffs bear the burden of showing that they have standing

to sue. Steger v. Franco, Inc., 228 F.3d 889, 892 (8th Cir. 2000). Neither Claudia Alejandra nor

Miguel Alejandro have set forth a justiciable controversy. There is no allegation that they sought

United States citizenship and that they were denied the privilege; thus, these Plaintiff have not

shown an injury in fact. See Nakka v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, 111

F.4th 995, 1011 n.18 (9th Cir. 2024) (stating that the possible revocation of an immigration status

is “too speculative” to confer standing.”); Sok v. Mayorkas, 691 F.Supp.3d 1276, 1279 (W.D. WA.

2023) (finding that a person who is neither the petitioner nor a beneficiary as to an immigration

12 Article III, section 2 of the United States Constitution limits the Court’s jurisdiction to “Cases” and “Controversies.”

petition, notwithstanding his relationship to the petitioner, has standing to sue). Nor is there any

allegation, to the extent that they are seeking injunctive relief, that there is a substantial risk that

they are likely to suffer a future, impending injury. In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 769 (8th

Cir. 2017). Indeed, “[a]llegations of possible future injury are not sufficient.” Clapper v. Amnesty

Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013).

Even if Claudia Alejandra or Miguel Alejandro could show Article III standing, they have

nonetheless failed to show statutory standing, either through § 1401(g), § 1503(a) or even the APA.

See Miller v. Redwood Toxicology Lab’y, Inc., 688 F.3d 928, 934 (8th Cir. 2012). That is, they

cannot state a claim pursuant to § 1401(g) because they have not plausibly alleged that they have

a United States citizen parent who currently meets the residency requirements. They cannot state

a § 1503(a) claim because it requires the denial of the citizenship privilege which has not been

alleged in this matter. Moreover, there is no showing of any agency action that could invoke the

APA.

To support the standing claim, Claudia Alejandra and Miguel Alejandro argue that

applying for citizenship would be futile in light of Claudia Elizabeth’s thrice denied applications,

that their claims are inextricably intertwined with hers such that they should be determined

together, and that equity requires the claims be considered together. Article III standing to sue can

be found even if a plaintiff fails “to take steps to satisfy a precondition if the attempt would have

been futile.” Pucket v. Hot Springs School Dist. No. 23-2, 526 F.3d 1151, 1162 (8th Cir. 2008);

Browne v. Reynolds, ___ F.4th ___, 2025 WL 2503148, *2 (8th Cir. 2025). Thus, in the context

of an equal protection claim alleging discrimination, “a nonapplicant can be the victim of unlawful

discrimination entitled to make-whole relief when an application would have been a useless act

serving only to confirm a discriminatee’s knowledge that the job he wanted was unavailable to

him.” International Broth. Of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 367 (1977). Typically,

futility is found when particular groups of plaintiffs are foreclosed from relief due to particular

polices or laws. See, e.g., Browne, 2025 WL 2503148, * 2 (involving a plaintiff who was

foreclosed from obtaining a handgun through operation of state law he claims is unconstitutional).

And, there is at least some showing that a person would have applied absent the barrier. See, e.g.,

Dalton v. JJSC Properties, LLC, 967 F.3d 909, 913 (8th Cir. 2020); Smith v. Golden China of Red

Wing, Inc., 987 F.3d 1205, 1209 (8th Cir. 2021) (“In the ADA context, plaintiffs need not engage

in the futile gesture of visiting a building containing known barriers that the owner has no intention

of remedying, but they must at least prove knowledge of the barriers and that they would visit the

building in the imminent future but for those barriers.” (quotation marks, citations, and editing

marks omitted; emphasis in the original)).13

The obvious problem with Plaintiffs’ arguments is that Claudia Alejandra and Miguel

Alejandro are not wholly foreclosed from applying for citizenship by operation of any law nor is

there any allegation in their complaint that they even intend to apply for citizenship but for a

barrier. As such, there is no showing of imminent injury, merely a conjectural one – that if Claudia

Elizabeth is ultimately denied citizenship their possible applications may also be denied.

Whitmore v Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, (1990) (“The complainant must allege an injury to himself

that is distinct and palpable, as opposed to merely abstract, and the alleged harm must be actual or

imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” (cleaned up)). The second obvious problem is that

even if they somehow do have Article III standing, they lack statutory standing as set forth above.

Plaintiffs have presented no case authority that would support the proposition that they are entitled

to bypass statutory and regulatory immigration schemes that contain limitations periods,

13 Plaintiffs appear to have randomly cited to Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission, 945

F.3d 206 (5th Cir. 2019), to support their futility argument. That case does not concern Article III standing.

exhaustion requirements, and physical presence requirements based on their desire to have a court

adjudicate their rights instead of the federal agencies tasked with making those determinations in

the first instance.14

Plaintiffs next rely on Hughes v. Ashcroft, 255 F.3d 752 (9th Cir. 2001), and claim that it

recognizes the “derivative claims of children tied to a parent’s naturalization” (Doc. 11, p. 5).15

Hughes, which concerned the removal proceedings of a convicted felon, did not concern a

“derivative” claim of citizenship – rather, the plaintiff claimed that he was a “national” of the

United States because of the length of his residence, his lack of allegiance to the country of his

birth, his allegiance to the United States, and that his birth country did not recognize him as a

citizen. Id. 255 F.3d at 756. None of those facts are alleged here and the removal statutes at issue

in Hughes are not relevant to these proceedings. In any event, Hughes stated, in dicta, that “[i]t

appears that, to qualify as a national, a noncitizen resident of the United States must have applied

for citizenship” which has not been alleged in this case. Id. at 756. Plaintiffs’ remaining arguments

are without merit – there is no case authority to support a finding that standing can be established

through equitable considerations of efficiency and economy. And to the extent that Plaintiffs may

allege citizenship through some other avenue, i.e. 8 U.S.C. § 1433 (permitting a parent to apply

for citizenship for their minor child), the Court will not guess at what those avenues may be without

allegations in a pleading stating as much.

14 Plaintiffs state that “[i]f the Court rules in [Claudia Elizabeth’s] favor, [Claudia Alejandra’s and Miguel Alejandro’s]

status follows automatically” (Doc. 15, p. 4). That is not accurate. They would presumably still be required to show

Claudia Elizabeth’s necessary residency in order to acquire citizenship via § 1401(g).

15 In their sur-reply, Plaintiff’s also rely on Flores-Villar v. United States, 564 U.S. 210 (2011) (mem.). That citation

refers to an affirmance by a divided court and contains no reasoning – the case certainly does not “recogniz[e]

derivative impact of parental citizenship claims under § 301” as set forth in Plaintiffs’ brief (Doc. 15, p. 4). Instead,

the Ninth Circuit case that was affirmed, United States v. Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2008), noted that a

child cannot assert the constitutional rights of a parent and § 1401(g) “provides no textual basis for imputing residency

of a grandparent.” Id. at 998-999.

Accordingly, Claudia Alejandra’s and Miguel Alejandro’s claims in Count II are

DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of standing.

C. Venue

Normally, the Court would address venue before getting the merits of the claims. However,

the manner in which Defendant makes this argument necessitated a different approach. In a

footnote, Defendant states that the Court need not address venue because of their jurisdictional

arguments (Doc. 9, p. 9 n.4). However, in light of the foregoing, venue should now be addressed.

Section 1503(a) provides that for a “person who is within the United States,” an action

“shall be filed in the district court of the United States for the district in which such person resides

or claims a residence . . . .”16 In their Complaint, Plaintiffs state that venue is appropriate in this

Court because “substantial parts of the events giving rise to this claim occurred in this jurisdiction

and [Plaintiffs] currently reside in St. Louis, Missouri with Claudia [Elizabeth’s] sister and brother-

in-law . . . .” (Doc. 1, p. 2). They further state that they are residing in St. Louis “in order to pursue

this present case in federal court.” Id. Defendant points out that Claudia Elizabeth’s most recent

passport application (2024) lists a mailing address in Piedras Negras, Mexico; she received mail

there recently in December 2024, three months before filing this lawsuit (Docs. 1-26 and 9-1, p.

10). Both Claudia Alejandra and Miguel Alejandro listed Piedras Negras, Mexico as their home

address and that they are students at a Mexican university in their 2017 and 2020, respectively,

visa applications (Doc. 9-1, pp. 23, 24, 30, and 31).

Certainly, Plaintiffs are “within the United States” and must file suit where they “reside”

or “claim a residence” – this is regardless of whether they complied with § 1503(b). Defendant

16 For a “person who is not within the United States,” the rules are more complicated with an alien ultimately capable

of filing suit as provided by § 1503(a) if they have been granted entry into the United States; or if denied entry, in “a

court of competent jurisdiction in habeas corpus and not otherwise.” 8 U.S.C. § 1503(b) – (c).

relies on Villafranca v. Pompeo, 486 F.Supp.3d 1078, (S.D. Tex. 2020), for the proposition that

“resides” in § 1503(a) equates to the definition of “residence” as set forth in the Immigration and

Nationality Act: “The term ‘residence’ means the place of general abode; the place of general

abode of a person means his principal, actual dwelling place in fact, without regard to intent.” 8

U.S.C. § 1101(a)(33). In addition, Villafranca defined “claims a residence” as a “location” “that

she claimed (asserted or stated) . . . is in fact her general place of abode – i.e. her principal, actual

dwelling place – and must have done so in a manner subject to possible contradiction.” Id. 486

F.Supp.3d at 1085. Defendant also urges this Court to consider factors such as whether Plaintiffs

own a home here and where they work, indicia that their residence in this district is not a “mere

physical presence.” Villafranca, 486 F.Supp.3d at 1085 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

Defendant’s arguments are undeveloped. Unlike in Villafranca, which is not controlling

authority, there is no evidence supporting or disclaiming residence. Id. 1086 (“The focus when

considering whether a plaintiff ‘claims a residence’ is the strength of the evidence showing that

the plaintiff has asserted that a location within the judicial district is her principal, actual dwelling

place.”). Claudia Elizabeth’s mailing address may just be that, a place where she receives mail;

and, Claudia Alejandra’s and Miguel Alejandro’s visa applications appear to be at least 5 years

old. Further, there is no suggestion that if Plaintiffs’ “primary residence” is in Mexico, they are

foreclosed from claiming a residence in the United States. Finally, there is no indication of where

venue would be appropriate if not in this District. Defendant’s reply brief makes no substantive

argument as to venue.

For their part, Plaintiffs rely on a non-existent case, Escobar v. INS,17 for the proposition

that “residence is defined by intent to remain, not legal status,” and on other cases that also do not

17 The citation listed is 935 F.2d 955 (8th Cir. 1991) which is in fact the citation to United States v. Lee, a different

and unrelated Eighth Circuit case.

exist or that do not stand for the propositions asserted (Doc. 11, p. 7). Given the lack of any real

or developed argument, this Court cannot find, on these briefs, that venue is improper. However,

Defendant is granted leave to refile and provide a more robust argument and/or evidence as to why

venue does not lie in this district. In any response, Plaintiffs shall be sure to cite to specific (actual)

case authority and evidence supporting their position on venue.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 8) is GRANTED in part

and DENIED in part without prejudice.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Count II of the Complaint along with Plaintiffs Claudia

Alejandra Saucedo Serafin and Miguel Alejandro Saucedo Serafin are DISMISSED without

prejudice for lack of standing;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ APA claim is DISMISSED without

prejudice;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Thomas C. Albus is hereby SUBSTITUTED for

Defendant Sayler A. Fleming;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants United States Department of State, Pam

Bondi, and Thomas C. Albus are DISMISSED without prejudice as improper defendants;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant is GRANTED leave to refile its motion to

dismiss for lack of venue;

Finally, the Court notes that mail sent to Claudia Elizabeth at “1200 McCausland, St. Louis,

MO 63117” was returned to the Court as undeliverable with no forwarding information (Doc. 16).

Local Rule 2.06(B) requires self-represented parties to inform the Court and opposing parties of

their current address. Under these circumstances, Claudia Elizabeth was required to “notify the

Court of the change of address within thirty (30) days” and that failure to do so means that the

Court may dismiss this lawsuit without further notice. However, because it is unclear whether the

Court’s mail was directed to Plaintiffs at 1200 McCausland Avenue (as opposed to Court), and

Defendant has not indicated that pleadings he has served have been returned as undeliverable, the

Court will not entertain dismissal at this time. Accordingly, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to

mail this Memorandum and Order to Plaintiffs at “1200 McCausland Avenue” and to the email

address contained in the docket. Plaintiffs are nonetheless DIRECTED to file a notice with the

Court setting forth their address, in full, and telephone number(s) within 10 days of the date of this

Memorandum and Order. Failure to do so may result in dismissal of this lawsuit.

Dated this 16" day of October, 2025

HENRY EDWARD AUTREY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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