State of Tennessee v. Joshua McKinley Hammonds

10/16/2025

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

Assigned on Briefs September 24, 2025

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. JOSHUA MCKINLEY HAMMONDS

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Washington County

No. 47276 Stacy L. Street, Judge

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No. E2024-01839-CCA-R3-CD

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A Washington County jury convicted the defendant, Joshua M. Hammonds, of first-degree

murder in perpetration of a felony, theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than

$60,000, and evading arrest with risk of death. After a sentencing hearing, the defendant

received a sentence of life in confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends the evidence

presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction for first-degree murder in

perpetration of a felony. Upon our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the

applicable law, we affirm the defendant’s conviction.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

J. ROSS DYER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JILL BARTEE AYERS and

MATTHEW J. WILSON, JJ., joined.

Gene G. Scott, Johnson City, Tennessee, for the appellant, Joshua McKinley Hammonds.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Park Huff, Assistant Attorney General;

Steve Finney, District Attorney General; and L. Scott Shults, Assistant District Attorney

General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

Facts and Procedural History

On December 7, 2020, between 3:30 p.m. and 4:00 p.m., Tony Wilder, an employee

of King’s Dairy Farm in Sullivan County, noticed that his Chevrolet GM Silverado pickup

truck, which he described “between silver and gold” in color, had been stolen while he was

at work. In response, Mr. Wilder filed a police report. At approximately 6:00 p.m., after

he had finished working, Mr. Wilder drove around the area attempting to track down his

missing vehicle. He was accompanied by Cayden Keys, a fellow employee.

At 7:15 p.m., Joseph Gaus, an employee of Barnhart Crane & Rigging, arrived at

work to park a Peterbilt tractor for the night. At the time, Mr. Gaus was assigned to drive

the yellow Peterbilt tractor 32-0-9 with a red fender. When he arrived, the gate was locked,

but he had received instructions to leave the gate unlocked for employees who were

arriving later that evening. Mr. Gaus parked the Peterbilt tractor and, as was customary for

drivers, left the keys in the ignition and a few personal items in the vehicle. Mr. Gaus then

proceeded into the office for approximately ten minutes to complete time sheets. When he

emerged, he noticed a silver Chevrolet pickup truck that he did not recognize. The

defendant, standing next to the truck, was attempting to transfer diesel fuel from one of

Barnhart’s tanks into the Chevrolet truck. Not knowing who the defendant was, but

believing he was a “regular employee,” Mr. Gaus did not confront the defendant and,

instead, made small talk. Mr. Gaus then got into his car and left the premises. In his

testimony, Mr. Gaus described the defendant’s demeanor during this interaction as “not

jittery or anxious.” He believed the defendant to be acting “perfectly normal.” After Mr.

Gaus left the Barnhart premises in his own vehicle, security camera footage showed the

Peterbilt tractor also exit Barnhart’s parking lot.

Elmer Fletcher, branch manager for Barnhart Crane & Rigging, estimated the fair

market value of the Peterbilt 32-0-9 to be between $15,000 and $30,000. Mr. Fletcher

testified that no one, other than Barnhart employees, had permission to drive the Peterbilt

tractor.

At 8:14 p.m., Captain John Light with the Washington County Sheriff’s Office

(WCSO) dispatched Deputy Sylvoski Bogus to the Appalachian Fairgrounds upon

receiving a report concerning a disturbance involving a yellow Peterbilt tractor with a

“Barnhart” logo attempting to ram a gate. By the time Deputy Bogus arrived, the Peterbilt

tractor was no longer present at the Fairgrounds. In response, Captain Light issued a “be

on the lookout” (BOLO) call for the Peterbilt tractor.

Between 8:30 p.m. and 9:00 p.m., Mr. Wilder and Mr. Keys, in their search for the

Chevrolet Silverado, drove to the Trailblazer Market. Mr. Keys described the Trailblazer

Market as a “hotspot for stolen goods.” While at the Trailblazer Market, Mr. Wilder and

Mr. Keys were approached by the defendant offering to sell them a Peterbilt tractor for

$15,000. Mr. Wilder motioned to Mr. Keys to photograph the vehicle because he “knew

something wasn’t right.” Mr. Wilder described the defendant’s behavior as “too fidgety,

too jumpy.” He was “acting like he was in a big hurry.” Mr. Keys testified that the

defendant appeared to be under the influence, because he was not making sense.

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Mr. Wilder was also suspicious of the offer because the truck was marked with

“Barnhart Crane Service,” and the defendant did not know how to properly operate the

vehicle. Mr. Wilder testified that the defendant was “stripping gears” and nearly hit several

fuel pumps and another vehicle as he exited the parking lot. Mr. Keys reported the incident

to 911. After the defendant left the Trailblazer Market, Mr. Wilder and Mr. Keys followed

him for approximately ten to fifteen minutes until the police arrived. During that time, Mr.

Wilder described the defendant’s driving as “dangerous” and “reckless.” Within half an

hour of his interaction with the defendant, Mr. Wilder received a call from Washington

County detectives that they had recovered his Chevrolet GM Silverado from Barnhart

Crane & Rigging.

At approximately 9:00 p.m., Captain Light received a report of a disturbance at the

Trailblazer Market. As Deputy Bogus was responding to the disturbance call at the

Trailblazer Market, he passed the defendant driving the stolen Peterbilt. Upon seeing the

defendant, Deputy Bogus activated his emergency blue lights and sirens in an attempt to

conduct a traffic stop. The defendant refused to stop and led Deputy Bogus on a high-

speed chase. According to Deputy Bogus, the defendant was traveling 75 miles per hour

in 40 mile-per-hour zones.

At 9:06 p.m., Captain Light instructed Deputy Bogus to discontinue the chase due

to concerns of danger to the public. Deputy Bogus testified that while he might have

continued the chase, he too had concerns about the number of drivers on the road given the

defendant’s erratic and high-speed driving. While on cross-examination Deputy Bogus

agreed that the defendant’s driving behavior could have been indicative of impairment, he

testified on direct examination that the defendant’s behavior was also consistent with

someone evading the police.

Trooper Gavin Ruff with the Tennessee Highway Patrol (THP) was one of the

officers who received the BOLO call concerning the stolen Peterbilt. As he drove down

Ft. Henry Drive in Sullivan County toward Washington County, he located a vehicle

matching the description of the Peterbilt pulled in an alleyway of Moody Sprinkler

Company. He described the tractor as “sitting still” facing down an alley with its engine

running and brake lights illuminated, giving him the impression that the driver’s foot was

on the brake. Trooper Ruff requested backup before approaching the vehicle because the

“BOLO had said [the driver] was driving extremely recklessly, incorrectly lanes of travel,

high speed in a very high-populated area.” Trooper Ruff assumed that if he attempted to

stop the Peterbilt alone, it would initiate a second, reckless chase.

Trooper Ruff pulled his patrol car to the side of Moody Sprinkler Company to radio

for backup. As he was doing so, the Peterbilt backed up, did a “several point turn” and

reversed down the alleyway. Trooper Ruff observed that the tractor was yellow, labeled

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“Barnhart” on the side, and that the driver was a white male. Trooper Ruff immediately

activated his blue lights and attempted to make contact with the vehicle in the alleyway.

Immediately, the defendant accelerated towards Trooper Ruff, veering to the left and

narrowly missing his patrol car. The defendant drove away on Ft. Henry Drive. Once

Trooper Ruff was able to turn around and exit the alleyway, he saw additional officers with

their “blue lights activate[d]” pursing the defendant.

Just after the defendant accelerated past Trooper Ruff, he was seen by Trooper

Richard Page also with the THP. Trooper Page observed the defendant driving without his

headlights on and “approached him.” In response, the defendant intentionally swerved the

Peterbilt into Trooper Page’s lane of traffic and forced him off the road. Trooper Page

made a U-turn, activated his blue lights, and began pursuing the defendant southbound on

Highway 36.

As the defendant led Trooper Page on a high-speed chase, the defendant alternated

between moving into oncoming, northbound traffic and hitting his brakes, forcing Trooper

Page to slow his pursuit. As the defendant and Trooper Page approached the intersection

with Highway 75, the defendant sped through a red light, forcing two vehicles to swerve

out of his path. When Trooper Page was able to make his way safely through the

intersection and draw closer to the Peterbilt, the defendant, again, crossed the median into

oncoming traffic. The defendant drove directly towards three oncoming vehicles. Two

vehicles were able to avoid the Peterbilt, but the defendant drove head on into the third

vehicle, killing the driver, Timmy Hensley. Trooper Page testified that at no point during

the high-speed chase did he see the defendant operate his headlights or his brake lights.

After the collision, Trooper Page conducted a preliminary investigation. In

searching the Peterbilt, he discovered a backpack belonging to Mr. Gaus. Inside the

backpack, Trooper Page found Mr. Gaus’ identification card, as well as a cut straw with

white residue.

The defendant made a statement at the scene that he “thought it wasn’t real.”

Trooper Page testified, “I guess you could say signs of impairment were there. But he was

just, you know, screaming ‘cause he was in pain.” The defendant was taken by ambulance

to the Johnson City Medical Center. Trooper T. K. Sallin with THP obtained a search

warrant for the defendant’s blood.

Philip Warren of the THP’s Critical Incident Response Team (CIRT) testified that

his primary duty was to assist other THP troopers with “crash investigations.” For this

case, he analyzed measurements collected at the scene and photographed the Peterbilt

tractor and the vehicle of the victim. Using the evidence collected, Mr. Warren recreated

an overhead view of the collision to depict the nature of the roadway, the alignment, the

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pavement markings, the vehicles involved, and their positioning at final rest. He testified

that after impact the Peterbilt rotated, landing on the driver’s side door and came to final

rest between the northbound lane and the roadway’s shoulder. The victim’s vehicle came

to rest perpendicular to the roadway. In addition, Mr. Warren noted that the victim’s

seatbelt had been stretched during the collision, indicating that he had been wearing it when

his vehicle had been struck.

Medical Examiner Dr. Emilie Cook conducted the autopsy on the victim. The

autopsy revealed that the victim sustained multiple abrasions, lacerations, contusions, and

large areas of blood pooling around his left eye. There was blood on his brain and in his

abdominal cavities. He had bilateral rib and hip fractures, as well as a liver laceration and

injury to his spleen. Dr. Cook concluded that the cause of death was multiple blunt force

injuries caused by being struck by another vehicle head-on. On cross-examination, Dr.

Cross agreed that she listed in her report the manner of death was “accident,” but clarified

on re-direct examination that “accident” as a manner of death is not a legal definition. She

testified that the classification of “accident” was used because the death was due to a motor

vehicle.

Michael Tilton, a special agent with the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (TBI)

testified as an expert in forensic science. He received a blood sample from the defendant

and determined that it contained no ethyl alcohol. The blood sample tested positive for

one nanogram per milliliter of hydromorphone, amphetamine at less than 0.05 micrograms

per milliliter, and methamphetamine at 0.31 micrograms per milliliter. Agent Tilton

testified that hydromorphone is known as Dilaudid, an opiate given by emergency services

or hospitals after severe injuries or before emergency surgeries. He described

methamphetamine and amphetamine as prescription medications commonly taken for

ADD, weight loss, or narcolepsy. Agent Tilton testified that while the amounts of

methamphetamines and amphetamines were above normal therapeutic levels, he was

unable to testify to whether those amounts would impair the defendant without knowledge

of the defendant’s personal usage history. On cross-examination, Agent Tilton agreed that

methamphetamine at the levels found in the defendant’s blood could have impaired a

person’s faculties either as a stimulant or as a depressant.

Mike Little, a criminal investigator with the First Judicial District, analyzed the

evidence of the defendant’s movements on December 7, 2020, and mapped them in

sequential order. The markers were placed at (1) 705 Warren Drive, (2) Barnhart Crane &

Rigging, (3) Appalachian Fairgrounds, (4) Trailblazer Market in Washington County, (5)

Moody Sprinkler Company in Sullivan County, and (6) the collision site in Washington

County. Mr. Little also testified as to the contents of inmate communications between the

defendant and his girlfriend through an inmate communication platform called “Chirps.”

Through Chirps, an inmate is given an assigned individualized tablet through which he can

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communicate with friends and family. The district attorney general’s office has access to

the “chirps” for investigative purposes. Mr. Little testified that on June 23, 2023, the

defendant communicated the following to his girlfriend,

DEFENDANT: So we looking at my papers, and they got me charged for

stealing the truck in Washington County, and I didn’t take it in

Washington, the truck was took in Sullivan ‘C.’” . . . So how can they

charge me here for the theft when it happened in Sullivan?

GIRLFRIEND: Cause you crossed over in Washington with it.”

DEFENDANT: But I had done crossed over in Washington once, and they

had me in Sulphur Springs trying to sell it. Then I went back into

Sullivan County, then back into Washington.”

GIRLFRIEND: They will have to drop that charge and shouldn’t be able to

charge you. But they are just trying to charge you with everything

they can.”

Mr. Little testified that the communication between the defendant and his girlfriend

seemed to follow the same sequence of the Peterbilt’s movements at specific points on the

night of the collision. Mr. Little coupled the defendant’s outline of his own movements

with those recreated on the map through his collection of evidence. On cross-examination,

Mr. Little agreed the defendant’s statement to his girlfriend was not an admission to the

theft of the Peterbilt.

The State rested, and the defendant elected not to offer proof. Based on the above

evidence, the jury convicted the defendant of first-degree murder in the perpetration of a

felony, theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, and evading

arrest with risk of death. After a sentencing hearing was held, the trial court sentenced the

defendant to an effective life sentence. This timely appeal followed.

Analysis

On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his

conviction for first-degree murder in perpetration of a felony. Specifically, the defendant

contends the evidence is not sufficient because the killing was not closely connected to the

theft of the Peterbilt tractor. The State asserts that there was sufficient evidence presented

at trial that a reasonable juror could find a sufficiently close connection between the killing

of Timmy Hensley and the theft. We agree.

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When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, the relevant question of the

reviewing court is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); see also Tenn.

R. App. P. 13(e) (“Findings of guilt in criminal actions whether by the trial court or jury

shall be set aside if the evidence is insufficient to support the findings by the trier of fact

of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”); State v. Evans, 838 S.W.2d 185, 190-92 (Tenn.

1992); State v. Anderson, 835 S.W.2d 600, 604 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). All questions

involving the credibility of witnesses, the weight and value to be given the evidence, and

all factual issues are resolved by the trier of fact. See State v. Pappas, 754 S.W.2d 620,

623 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). “A guilty verdict by the jury, approved by the trial judge,

accredits the testimony of the witnesses for the State and resolves all conflicts in favor of

the theory of the State.” State v. Grace, 493 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 1973). Our supreme

court has stated the rationale for this rule:

This well-settled rule rests on a sound foundation. The trial judge and the

jury see the witnesses face to face, hear their testimony and observe their

demeanor on the stand. Thus, the trial judge and jury are the primary

instrumentality of justice to determine the weight and credibility to be given

to the testimony of witnesses. In the trial forum alone is there human

atmosphere and the totality of the evidence cannot be reproduced with a

written record in this Court.

Bolin v. State, 405 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tenn. 1966) (citing Carroll v. State, 370 S.W.2d 523

(1963)). “A jury conviction removes the presumption of innocence with which a defendant

is initially cloaked and replaces it with one of guilt, so that on appeal a convicted defendant

has the burden of demonstrating that the evidence is insufficient.” State v. Tuggle, 639

S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982).

Guilt may be found beyond a reasonable doubt where there is direct evidence,

circumstantial evidence, or a combination of the two. State v. Matthews, 805 S.W.2d 776,

779 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990) (citing State v. Brown, 551 S.W.2d 329, 331 (Tenn. 1977);

Farmer v. State, 343 S.W.2d 895, 897 (Tenn. 1961)). The standard of review for

sufficiency of the evidence “is the same whether the conviction is based upon direct or

circumstantial evidence.” State v. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 370, 379 (Tenn. 2011) (quoting

State v. Hanson, 279 S.W.3d 265, 275 (Tenn. 2009). Moreover, the jury determines the

weight to be given to circumstantial evidence and the inferences to be drawn from this

evidence, and the extent to which the circumstances are consistent with guilt and

inconsistent with innocence are questions primarily for the jury. See id. at 379.

Circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to support a conviction. State v.

Richmond, 7 S.W.3d 90, 91 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999). This Court, when considering the

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sufficiency of the evidence, shall not reweigh the evidence or substitute its inferences for

those drawn by the trier of fact. Id. This Court will not exchange its “inferences for those

drawn by the trier of fact from circumstantial evidence.” State v. Matthews, 805 S.W.2d

776, 779 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990).

A first-degree murder is the “killing of another committed in the perpetration of or

attempt to perpetrate . . . [a] theft[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(2). “No culpable

mental state is required for conviction” of first-degree felony murder, “except the intent to

commit the enumerated” offense. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(b). “A person commits

theft of property if, with intent to deprive the owner of property, the person knowingly

obtains or exercises control over the property without the owner’s effective consent.”

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-103(a). “The felony murder rule applies when the killing is

‘done in pursuance of the unlawful act, and not collateral to it.’” State v. Thacker, 164

S.W.3d 208, 223 (Tenn. 2005) (quoting Farmer v. State, 296 S.W.2d 879, 883 (Tenn.

1956)). Nonetheless, “[t]he killing may precede, coincide with, or follow the felony and

still be considered as occurring ‘in the perpetration of’ the felony offense, so long as there

is a connection in time, place, and continuity of action.” Id. (internal quotation marks

omitted) (quoting State v. Buggs, 995 S.W.2d 102, 106 (Tenn. 1999)). The jury “may

reasonably infer from a defendant’s actions immediately after a killing that the defendant

had the intent to commit the felony prior to, or concurrent with, the killing.” Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted) (quoting Buggs, 995 S.W.2d at 106).

Our supreme court has held, “in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to

support a conviction of first-degree murder in the perpetration of a theft, a court must

determine whether the killing is closely connected to the initial taking of the property in

time, place, causation, and continuity of action.” State v. Pierce, 23 S.W.3d 289, 295

(Tenn. 2000). If, however, there “is a break in the chain of events between the felony and

the killing, the felony murder rule does not apply.” Id. at 295. An important factor “to

consider in determining whether there has been a break in the chain of events that would

preclude application of the felony murder rule is whether the felon has reached a place of

temporary safety.” Id.

The defendant’s central argument on appeal is that the killing of Mr. Hensley and

the theft of the Peterbilt tractor were not sufficiently connected to be considered in

“perpetration” of the latter. However, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State,

there was sufficient evidence from which a rational trier of fact could find that the killing

of Mr. Hensley was in perpetration of the theft of the Peterbilt truck and that there was

sufficiently close connection between the two in time, location, causation, and continuity

of action.

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The State introduced video footage that showed the defendant drive the Peterbilt

tractor off the Barnhart Crane & Rigging property between 7:30 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. After

that point in time, numerous witnesses testified to the reports of the defendant’s

disturbances and reckless driving at the Appalachian Fairgrounds and the Trailblazer

Market. Deputy Bogus described the defendant’s refusal to comply with the initial traffic

stop and the great risk to human life he took to evade arrest. Trooper Ruff testified that it

was less than a half hour after Captain Light issued the BOLO that he discovered the

defendant hiding in the alleyway with his engine running and brake lights illuminated.

Upon being discovered, Troopers Ruff and Page testified that the defendant led them on a

second high-speed chase that placed both their lives and other motorists’ lives in danger

until ultimately, the defendant drove head on into Mr. Hensley at approximately 9:36 p.m.

The State also introduced a map of the six locations between which the defendant traversed

in the stolen Peterbilt during the two-hour window he spent creating disturbances and

dangerously fleeing the police.

From our review of the record, we conclude that a reasonable juror could find the

time, location, causation, and continuity of action all satisfactorily connected to determine

that the defendant’s killing of Timmy Hensley was done in perpetration of the theft of the

Peterbilt tractor. Accordingly, the evidence is sufficient to support the defendant’s

conviction.

Moreover, the defendant’s application of our supreme court’s holding in State v.

Pierce, 23 S.W.3d 289 (Tenn. 2000), is flawed as the facts in Pierce are remarkably

divergent from the case at bar. In Pierce, the defendant’s friend stole a vehicle belonging

to her mother while the defendant and another person were present in the car. Id. at 291.

The three people fled the state where they remained for nearly three weeks. Id. at 291-92.

Twenty days and several states away from the theft, the trio were discovered by the police

and the defendant led the police on a high-speed chase. Id. While attempting to evade a

roadblock, the defendant hit a parked police car and killed a police officer. Id. In contrast,

here, the defendant’s theft and the killing of Mr. Hensley occurred two hours and only a

few miles apart.

In addition, the supreme court in Pierce, found that the chain of events between the

underlying theft and the killing had been broken because the defendant and his cohorts had

reached a “place of temporary safety.” Id. at 297. The supreme court rationalized that the

killing could not have been in perpetration of the theft because the defendant was “not

being actively and continuously pursued by police during this time, nor was he attempting

to hide from the police.” Id. This reasoning is inapplicable here where the defendant failed

to reach a place of temporary safety. In the case at bar, the evidence presented shows that

the police were continuously pursuing the defendant from early in the evening until the

moment of the collision. Furthermore, the defendant clearly attempted to hide from the

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police in the alleyway until he was discovered. Therefore, the defendant did not reach a

place of temporary safety, and the chain of events between the theft of the Peterbilt tractor

and the killing of Timmy Hensley was not broken. This argument is without merit.

Conclusion

Based on the authorities and reasoning, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

S/ J. ROSS DYER _

J. ROSS DYER, JUDGE

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