Shambreka Hall v. State of Indiana

FILED

Oct 16 2025, 10:02 am

CLERK

Indiana Supreme Court

Court of Appeals

and Tax Court

IN THE

Court of Appeals of Indiana

Shambreka Hall,

Appellant-Defendant

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

October 16, 2025

Court of Appeals Case No.

25A-CR-868

Appeal from the St. Joseph Superior Court

The Honorable Elizabeth C. Hurley, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

71D08-2307-F4-68

Opinion by Judge Bradford

Judge May concurs.

Judge Mathias dissents with opinion.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-868 | October 16, 2025 Page 1 of 25

Bradford, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] On September 22, 2022, Shambreka Hall was involved in a traffic collision with

Dale Womack. Womack died as a result of the injuries that he sustained in the

collision. An investigating officer observed signs of impairment in Hall

following the collision and her blood subsequently tested positive for THC and

THC metabolites. Hall was charged with, and convicted of, Level 4 felony

operating a vehicle with a Schedule I or II substance in the blood causing death.

Hall contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain her conviction. She

alternatively contends that Indiana Code section 9-30-5-5 is unconstitutionally

vague. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In September of 2022, Hall was employed delivering food through Door Dash

in South Bend. The afternoon of September 22, 2022, Hall received a delivery

request from a restaurant near 27th Street and Mishawaka Avenue. As Hall was

driving on 31st Street toward Mishawaka Avenue, Hall stopped at the stop sign

on 31st Street. Mishawaka Avenue had a speed limit of twenty miles per hour

and cross traffic was required to stop. While at the stop sign, Hall’s view was

partially obstructed.

[3] At the same time, Womack was leaving Dave’s Pub on Mishawaka Avenue.

Womack, who was not wearing a helmet, had pulled away from the pub on his

motorcycle and traveled approximately 270 feet, quickly accelerating to

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approximately thirty-seven to forty miles per hour. Womack’s motorcycle had

“after-market exhaust,” i.e., no mufflers, which would have caused the

motorcycle to be “very loud[,]” louder than a standard motorcycle. Tr. Vol. II

p. 116.

[4] In subsequently describing the events that led to the collision with Womack,

Hall testified as follows:

I came to a complete stop. So the light on 30[th] Street had

turned red. When it turned red two cars came by. When I seen

[sic] that light turn red and the two cars had came [sic] by, I

creeped out. And when I creeped out[,] I looked like four times.

I had my window down, and I looked and I didn’t see anything

so I went out and made a left turn. While I was making that left

turn I didn’t see him until I was out [in the intersection] then he

hit me.

Tr. Vol. II p. 176. Womack collided with the rear driver’s side door of Hall’s

vehicle and Womack was “launched” from his motorcycle and landed on the

pavement. Tr. Vol. II p. 111. Womack was pronounced dead at the scene.1

[5] After the fatal-crash team was activated, Hall was transported to South Bend

Memorial Hospital as part of the investigation. Mishawaka Police Officer

Corey Cronk was a member of St. Joseph County “FACT team”2 and had

1

Womack’s cause of death was subsequently determined to be “[m]ultiple blunt force injuries with the

primary one that led to his death was the skull fracture.” Tr. Vol. II p. 15. At the time of his death, Womack

had a blood alcohol concentration (“BAC”) of 0.152 “grams of alcohol per hundred milliliters of blood[.]”

Tr. Vol. II p. 122.

2

The acronym “FACT” stands for the fatal alcohol crash team. Tr. Vol. II p. 68.

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specialized training as a drug-recognition expert. Tr. Vol. II p. 36. Officer

Cronk responded to Memorial Hospital, where he encountered Hall. St. Joseph

County Police Sergeant Josh Siekman, who was also a member of “the FACT

team[,]” read Hall her Miranda3 rights and implied-consent notifications. Tr.

Vol. II p. 43. Hall agreed to speak with the officers, engage in a drug-

recognition evaluation, and submit to a blood draw. A Memorial Hospital

phlebotomist performed the blood draw, with Officer Cronk observing.

[6] Officer Cronk conducted a drug-recognition evaluation. Initially, Hall was

“was very cooperative. She was alert, conscious, oriented, and obviously

talking to” the investigating officers. Tr. Vol. II p. 43. Hall had no horizontal

gaze nystagmus in her left eye, likely due to some blindness in that eye. Officer

Cronk also administered a modified Romberg test, during which Hall exhibited

body tremors and eye-lid tremors. Hall had “a two[-]inch sway front to back.

She also estimated the passage of 30 seconds [at] 42 seconds,” which gave

Officer Cronk “indication that her internal clock at that point in time is slowed

down.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 44–45.

[7] Hall “was not able to stay in the starting position” for the walk-and-turn test.

Tr. Vol. II p. 45. Hall missed three heel-to-toes on her first set of nine steps.

On her second set, Hall’s “steps were very slow and very methodical. Much

slower than [Officer Cronk] would observe a normal person conduct these nine

3

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

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steps. The depth perception seemed off, and they were very slow, taking a

pause between each step.” Tr. Vol. II p. 46. During the one-leg stand test, Hall

became emotional. After Officer Cronk gave her the opportunity to regain her

composure, Hall

put her foot down twice. She counted 19 seconds when it was

actually 30. So, again, her clock at that point was slow. On her

second set when she balanced on her left foot, no clues were

observed at that time, and she counted 23 seconds in a 30 second

time.

Tr. Vol. II p. 46.

[8] Hall’s body temperature and pulse rates were normal, but her blood pressure

was high. Officers tested Hall’s pupil responses in three different light settings:

direct light, room light, and near darkness. Hall’s pupils were dilated and

outside the normal range in room-light and direct-light settings but were normal

in the near-and-total-darkness setting. Throughout the course of the

examination, Hall’s

mannerisms and her reflexes and her face and eye lids all went

down hill. She became very slow. She became very relaxed.

She became more droopy in her face, more droopy in her eye

lids. She was starting to go down hill more at that point in time

as you can tell by the clinical indicators and her nine step walk

and turn. She kind of went from an up to a down in a relatively

short period of time.

Tr. Vol. II p. 48.

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[9] Hall’s blood tested positive for THC, specifically testing positive for both delta 9

THC and delta 9 carboxy. Robert Ruhl, a forensic scientist with the Indiana

State Department of Toxicology, explained that

Delta 9 THC, that is the psychoactive compound that’s

marijuana essentially. If any impairment is present, it’s caused

by delta 9 THC. And then as your body breaks down THC, it

breaks it down into delta 9 carboxy, which is an inactive

metabolite. So the presence of carboxy in a sample just means

that at some point THC was consumed by the person.

Tr. Vol. II p. 144. Hall admitted that “she used to smoke marijuana … but

she’s since transitioned from smoking to eating edible gummies[.]” Tr. Vol. II

p. 52. She claimed, however, that the last time she had done so was about a

week before the collision. Hall initially made no complaint of head pain but,

toward the end of the hour-long examination, complained of neck pain. Hall

had not presented any indications of a concussion and was not, at any relevant

point, diagnosed with a concussion. Based upon the totality of his evaluation,

Officer Cronk believed that Hall was impaired at the time of the collision. Tr.

Vol. II p. 53.

[10] On July 25, 2023, the State charged Hall with Level 4 felony operating a vehicle

with a Schedule I or II substance in the blood causing death, Level 4 felony

operating a vehicle while intoxicated (“OWI”) causing death, and Level 5

felony reckless homicide. The case proceeded to trial and, following the

conclusion of the evidence, the trial court granted Hall’s motion for a directed

verdict on the reckless-homicide charge. The jury found Hall guilty of Level 4

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felony operating a vehicle with a Schedule I or II substance in the blood causing

death but not guilty of Level 4 felony OWI causing death. The trial court

subsequently sentenced Hall to a two-year term, which was to be served “as a

direct commitment to” community corrections. Tr. Vol. III p. 6.

Discussion and Decision

[11] Hall contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain her conviction for

Level 4 felony operating a vehicle with a Schedule I or II substance in the blood

causing death.

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a

conviction, appellate courts must consider only the probative

evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. It is

the fact-finder’s role, not that of appellate courts, to assess

witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether

it is sufficient to support a conviction. To preserve this structure,

when appellate courts are confronted with conflicting evidence,

they must consider it most favorably to the trial court’s ruling.

Appellate courts affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-

finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a

reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence

overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The

evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn

from it to support the verdict.

Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146–47 (Ind. 2007) (internal brackets, citations,

emphasis, and quotations omitted). Stated differently, in reviewing the

sufficiency of the evidence, “we consider only the evidence and reasonable

inferences most favorable to the convictions, neither reweighing evidence nor

reassessing witness credibility” and “affirm the judgment unless no reasonable

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factfinder could find the defendant guilty.” Griffith v. State, 59 N.E.3d 947, 958

(Ind. 2016).

[12] In order to prove that Hall had committed Level 4 felony operating a vehicle

with a Schedule I or II substance in the blood causing death, the State was

required to prove that Hall had caused Womack’s death “when operating a

vehicle … with a controlled substance listed in schedule I or II of IC 35-48-2 or

its metabolite in [her] blood.” Ind. Code § 9-30-5-5(a)(2). It is undisputed that

Hall and Womack were involved in a traffic collision which resulted in

Womack’s death. It is also undisputed that Hall had THC in her bloodstream

at the time of the collision and that THC qualifies as a schedule I drug. See Ind.

Code § 35-48-2-4(d) (listing marijuana and tetrahydrocannabinols, commonly

referred to as THC, as schedule I drugs).

[13] In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain her conviction, Hall

argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove that she had caused

Womack’s death, arguing that an intervening cause, i.e., Womack’s

intoxication and allegedly reckless driving, broke the chain of her criminal

responsibility.

An intervening cause is an independent force that breaks the

causal connection between a defendant’s actions and the victim’s

injuries. In order for an intervening cause to break the chain of

criminal responsibility, it must be so extraordinary that it would

be unfair to hold the defendant responsible for the actual result.

This court has explained causation in the context of criminal

liability:

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The concept of causation in criminal law is similar to that found

in tort law. Like in tort law, the criminal act must be both 1) the

actual cause (sometimes called the “cause-in-fact”); and 2) the

legal cause (sometimes called the “proximate cause”) of the

result. Cause-in-fact requires that “but for” the antecedent

conduct, the result would not have occurred. If there is more

than one cause which precipitates the result, the defendant’s

action is the cause-in-fact if it is a “substantial factor” in bringing

about that result.

Legal or proximate cause is a distinct concept, speaking not to

the physical relationship between the actor’s conduct and the

result, but instead embodying a value judgment as to the extent

of the physical consequences of an action for which the actor

should be held responsible. Thus, proximate cause questions are

often couched in terms of “foreseeability”; an actor is not held

responsible for consequences which are unforeseeable. In

Indiana, a result is deemed foreseeable if it is a “natural and

probable consequence” of the act of the defendant.

In cases where an action of the victim ... affects the chain of

causation, foreseeability is again a factor. Such an occurrence is

called an “intervening cause”, and it becomes a superseding

cause breaking the chain of causation if it was not foreseeable. If

an intervening and superseding cause aided in bringing about the

result, the defendant is not criminally liable.

Cannon v. State, 142 N.E.3d 1039, 1043 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (internal brackets,

citations, and quotations omitted).

[14] Based on the facts of this case, we cannot say that Womack’s decision to

operate his motorcycle while intoxicated or the alleged reckless manner of

operating his motorcycle (that being operating the motorcycle above the posted

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speed limit without wearing a helmet) was so extraordinary that it would be

unfair to hold the Hall responsible for the actual result, i.e., Womack’s death.

Id. There is no dispute that Hall was required to stop and yield to traffic at the

intersection where the collision occurred. There is also no dispute that, given

his direction of travel, Womack was not. The evidence indicates that Hall

failed to yield to oncoming traffic and pulled out into the line of traffic in front

of Womack, leading to his impact with the back half of her vehicle.

[15] We have previously noted that because motorists regularly exceed posted speed

limits and fail to wear safety equipment, such facts are not so extraordinary to

constitute an intervening cause that would affect criminal liability. See generally

id. at 1044–45 (providing that the victim’s failure to wear a seatbelt was

foreseeable and was not an intervening cause that would eliminate criminal

liability). Moreover, the exhaust system on Womack’s motorcycle had been

modified, making it louder than a normal motorcycle. Given the close

proximity of all of the relevant locations and Hall’s testimony that her window

had been open at the time of the collision, one could reasonably infer that Hall

should have heard Womack’s motorcycle prior to the collision, even if her sight

had been impaired by other parked vehicles. Hall’s argument regarding

causation was raised before and ultimately rejected by the jury. Her appellate

argument as to causation effectively amounts to a re-hash of her argument

below and invites us to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Griffith,

59 N.E.3d at 958.

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[16] Hall alternatively contends that Indiana Code section 9-30-5-5 is

unconstitutional. Hall concedes that she did not challenge the constitutionality

of the statute below. Failure to raise an issue before the trial court generally

results in waiver of appellate review. See Layman v. State, 42 N.E.3d 972, 975–

76 (Ind. 2015) (providing that constitutional issues may be waived if not raised

before the trial court). However, “[e]ven though the general rule is that failure

to challenge the constitutionality of a statute at trial results in waiver of review

on appeal, [appellate courts have] long exercised [their] discretion to address

the merits of a party’s constitutional claim notwithstanding waiver.” Plank v.

Cmty. Hosps. of Ind., Inc., 981 N.E.2d 49, 53 (Ind. 2013) (internal citations

omitted). “It is certainly the case that ‘appellate courts are not prohibited from

considering the constitutionality of a statute even though the issue otherwise

has been waived.’” Layman, 42 N.E.3d at 976 (quoting Plank, 981 N.E.2d at

53–54). Indeed “a reviewing court may exercise its discretion to review a

constitutional claim on its own accord.” Plank, 981 N.E.2d at 54. We exercise

our discretion to address Hall’s constitutional claim.

[17] When considering the constitutionality of a statute, we begin

with the presumption of constitutional validity, and therefore the

party challenging the statute labors under a heavy burden to

show that the statute is unconstitutional. All reasonable doubts

must be resolved in favor of the statute’s constitutionality. Under

basic principles of due process, a statute is void for vagueness if

its prohibitions are not clearly defined. A statute is not

unconstitutionally vague if persons of ordinary intelligence

would interpret it to adequately inform them of the proscribed

conduct. No statute need avoid all vagueness, and because

statutes are condemned to the use of words, there will always be

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uncertainties for we cannot expect mathematical certainty from

our language.

Bennett v. State, 801 N.E.2d 170, 173–74 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (internal brackets,

citations, and quotations omitted).

[18] Hall claims that because Indiana Code section 9-30-5-5 contains a blanket

prohibition against driving with a schedule I or II drug in a person’s blood and

does not require an additional showing of impairment, the statute is

unconstitutional as it “is not rationally designed to [prevent dangerous

behavior] when it punishes behavior that is not dangerous at all.” Appellant’s

Br. p. 12. However, as Hall concedes, we have previously rejected similar

constitutional challenges to Indiana Code section 9-30-5-5. See id. at 173–77; see

also Shepler v. State, 758 N.E.2d 966, 969–72 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (rejecting a

constitutional challenge to Indiana Code section 9-30-5-1, which provides that

it is a Class C misdemeanor to operate a vehicle with a schedule I or II

controlled substance, or its metabolite, in one’s blood), trans. denied. In Bennett,

we concluded that

a flat ban on driving with any proscribed controlled substance in

the body, whether or not capable of causing impairment, is

permissible. It is permissible because, unlike alcohol, there is no

acceptable level of drug use that can be quantified so as to

distinguish between users who can drive unimpaired and those

who are presumptively impaired. Consequently, our legislature

could have reasonably concluded that no level of schedule I or

schedule II controlled substances can be acceptably combined

with driving a vehicle. Thus, it is rational for the legislature to

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impose the flat ban with regard to controlled substances while

not imposing the same ban with regard to alcohol.

Bennett, 801 N.E.2d at 176 (internal brackets and quotation omitted); see Shepler,

758 N.E.2d at 969–70 (reaching the same conclusion). We apply our

conclusions in Bennett and Shepler to the instant constitutional challenge and

reach the same conclusion. Hall’s constitutional challenge is without merit. 4

[19] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

May, J., concurs.

Mathias, J., dissents with opinion.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

John A. Kindley

South Bend, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Theodore E. Rokita

Indiana Attorney General

Megan M. Smith

4

We note that Hall does not cite to any relevant Indiana authority that supports her contention that Indiana

Code section 9-30-5-5 is unconstitutional. She instead relies on a dissent in a case that was decided by the

Iowa Supreme Court, see State v. Childs, 898 N.W.2d 177, 196–201 (Iowa 2017) (Appel, dissenting), and a

case decided by the Georgia Supreme Court, see Love v. State, 517 S.E.2d 53 (Ga. 1999). To the extent that

these cases may support Hall’s position, we note that while foreign authority may be considered persuasive, it

is not binding on Indiana courts. See generally Midwest Equip. & Supply Co. v. Garwood, 87 N.E.3d 33, 36–37

(Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (considering the parties’ arguments relating to Illinois and Iowa caselaw but finding the

non-binding authority to be unpersuasive).

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Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

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Mathias, Judge, dissenting.

[20] I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the State presented

sufficient evidence to show that Hall caused Womack’s death. 5

[21] The majority’s opinion disregards substantial uncontradicted evidence and, in

doing so, deviates from our well-established standard of review in such appeals.

See McIlquham v. State, 10 N.E.3d 506, 511 (Ind. 2014) (noting that we will

consider “substantial uncontradicted evidence” contrary to the judgment in

assessing “whether the evidence is sufficient to support” that judgment)

(quoting Holder v. State, 847 N.E.2d 930, 935 (Ind. 2006)). The majority’s

analysis fills those key evidentiary gaps with constitutionally insufficient

guesswork. See Vasquez v. State, 741 N.E.2d 1214, 1216 (Ind. 2001) (recognizing

that a conviction “cannot be based upon evidence which is uncertain or

speculative or which raises merely a conjecture or possibility”) (quoting Shutt v.

State, 233 Ind. 169, 174, 117 N.E.2d 892, 894 (1954)).

[22] Applying our standard of review appropriately here demonstrates that Hall’s

conviction is directly contrary to precedent of our Supreme Court explaining

causation under Indiana Code section 9-30-5-5. See Abney v. State, 766 N.E.2d

1175, 1177-78 (Ind. 2002).

5

I express no opinion on Hall’s alternative argument that Indiana Code section 9-30-5-5 is unconstitutional.

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1. The facts as understood through our standard of review.

[23] In South Bend, northbound traffic on 31st Street must yield to traffic on

Mishawaka Avenue where those two roads intersect. Mishawaka Avenue is a

single lane of travel in both the east and west directions and, at least at its

intersection with 31st Street, is a straight path of travel and perpendicular to

31st Street.

[24] Northbound traffic on 31st Street is met with a stop sign at Mishawaka Avenue,

while traffic on Mishawaka Avenue does not stop. As northbound motorists on

31st Street seek to enter that intersection, they must first stop at the stop sign,

which brings them “pretty much even” with a building to the west side of the

intersection. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 31. Thus, “[i]n order to be able to clearly see” around

that building, motorists must “edge forward a little bit[] and take a second look

to make sure [eastbound] traffic is clear.” Id. This brings northbound motorists

into a crosswalk and, if need be, a parking lane on Mishawaka Avenue and

then a bike lane before they may be able to determine the safety of proceeding.

One nearby business owner identified the intersection as “very dangerous.” Id.

at 162. The speed limit for traffic on Mishawaka Avenue near and through the

intersection is twenty miles per hour.

[25] Just after 5:00 p.m. on September 22, 2022, Hall operated a passenger vehicle

northbound on 31st Street and came to a stop at the stop sign at the intersection

with Mishawaka Avenue. In addition to the obstructed view created by the

building to the west of that intersection, at the time Hall came to a stop, there

also was a “big white truck” parked in the parking lane on Mishawaka Avenue

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in front of the building. Id. at 32. Accordingly, after two cars she saw went past

her, Hall “creeped out” and looked several more times for oncoming traffic, but

she “didn’t see anything so [she] went” into the intersection to make a left turn

onto westbound Mishawaka Avenue. Id. at 176.

[26] Around that same time, Womack left Dave’s Pub, which is on the north side of

Mishawaka Avenue and about 270 feet west of 31st Street. Womack was on a

motorcycle, his blood alcohol content at the time was 0.152 (approximately

twice the legal limit),6 and he was not wearing a helmet. He pulled out into

eastbound traffic on Mishawaka Avenue, causing westbound traffic to swerve

to avoid a collision, and he engaged his motorcycle in “heavy acceleration” to

between thirty-seven and forty miles per hour. Id. at 120. An investigating

officer would later testify that the fastest speed Womack could have possibly

reached on his motorcycle in the short stretch between Dave’s Pub and the

intersection with 31st Street was between forty and forty-two miles per hour.

[27] As Hall progressed into the intersection, Womack suddenly came upon her.

Thinking he did not see her, Hall tried to accelerate through the intersection,

but she was unable to avoid Womack. He struck the driver’s rear side of her

vehicle and was thrown approximately thirty-seven feet. The driver’s side airbag

in Hall’s vehicle deployed. Although “designed to protect” a driver’s “head and

neck area,” these airbags are known to be able to cause “something like

6

See Ind. Code § 9-30-5-1(a) (2022).

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horizontal whiplash” and “concussion[s] or concussion-like symptoms.” Id. at

57-58. Womack died at the scene.

[28] Mishawaka Police Department Officer Corey Cronk was one of several

responding officers to the crash. Hall admitted to him that she regularly used

marijuana but asserted it had been about one week since she last did so. About

thirty minutes after the accident but without Hall having been examined by

medical professionals for a possible concussion, Officer Cronk administered

several field sobriety tests to Hall. At the beginning of those tests, Hall “was

alert, conscious, [and] oriented.” Id. at 43. Her “face was normal. Her eye lids

were normal.” Id. However, while Cronk administered his tests over the course

of about thirty minutes, Hall’s focus and coordination appeared to diminish.

About one hour after the accident, “her mannerisms and her reflexes and her

face and eye lids all” went downhill. Id. at 48. Hall’s reactions “became very

slow. She became very relaxed. She became more droopy in her face” and “her

eye lids.” Id. Officer Cronk concluded that those symptoms demonstrated that

Hall was “impaired” by “cannabis” at the time of the accident, although he

later conceded that her symptoms could have been equally telling of a possible

concussion. Id. at 53, 64. An ensuing blood test identified a metabolite of

marijuana in Hall’s blood at the time of the accident. Hall was never evaluated

for a possible concussion. See id. at 186-87.

[29] The State charged Hall with Level 4 felony causing death when operating a

vehicle with a schedule I or II controlled substance in the blood; Level 4 felony

causing death when operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated; and Level 5

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felony reckless homicide. At her ensuing jury trial, the State’s evidence made

clear that Hall had not committed any traffic infractions at the time Womack

collided with her. The State also presented no evidence that Hall had

negligently or unreasonably entered the intersection when she did. And, while

the State presented evidence that Womack’s motorcycle was abnormally loud,

there is no evidence that Hall heard the motorcycle before the accident or, even

if she had, that she would have been able to locate the source of the sound of it.

Further, the State’s evidence made clear that Hall was lucid at the scene

immediately after the crash and only about one hour later did she appear

disoriented, which the State’s witnesses conceded was consistent with

concussion symptoms.

[30] Following the State’s close of its case-in-chief, the trial court granted Hall’s

motion for a directed verdict on the Level 5 felony reckless homicide charge.

Hall then testified in her defense and presented uncontradicted testimony that

she had come to a complete stop at the stop sign on 31st Street, slowly crept

forward and looked multiple times before proceeding into the intersection, and

did not see Womack until he suddenly came upon her in the intersection, at

which point there was nothing she could do to avoid a collision.

[31] The jury found Hall guilty of Level 4 felony causing death when operating a

vehicle with a schedule I or II controlled substance in the blood and not guilty

of Level 4 felony causing death when operating a motor vehicle while

intoxicated. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court entered its judgment of

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conviction against Hall and sentenced her to two years suspended to home

detention.

2. The evidence is not sufficient to show that Hall caused Womack’s

death.

[32] I consider only whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support Hall’s

conviction for Level 4 felony causing death when operating a vehicle with a

schedule I or II controlled substance in the blood. For challenges to the

sufficiency of the evidence, we consider only the probative evidence and the

reasonable inferences therefrom that support the judgment of the trier of fact.

Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2021). We will neither reweigh the

evidence nor judge witness credibility. Id. We will affirm a conviction unless no

reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a

reasonable doubt. Id.

[33] However, “our standard of review does not demand that we selectively read the

record and ignore ‘substantial uncontradicted evidence . . . contrary [to the

judgment] to decide whether the evidence is sufficient . . . .’” Fedij v. State, 186

N.E.3d 696, 708 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting McIlquham, 10 N.E.3d at 511).

Further, the State cannot premise a conviction “upon evidence which is

uncertain or speculative or which raises merely a conjecture or possibility.”

Vasquez v. State, 741 N.E.2d 1214, 1216 (Ind. 2001) (quoting Shutt v. State, 233

Ind. 169, 174, 117 N.E.2d 892, 894 (1954)). The requirement that we consider

substantial uncontradicted evidence and the prohibition against relying on

speculation are significant components of our standard of review; they ensure

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that our review of sufficiency questions remains constrained without making

the right to appellate review illusory. See, e.g., Galloway v. State, 938 N.E.2d 699,

709-10 (Ind. 2010) (noting that a standard of review “under which appellate

courts merely ‘rubber stamp’ the fact finder’s determinations, no matter how

unreasonable, would raise serious constitutional concerns because it would

make the right to an appeal illusory”).

[34] Indiana Code section 9-30-5-5(a) (2022) provides that “[a] person who causes

the death . . . of another person when operating a vehicle . . . with a controlled

substance listed in schedule I or II . . . or its metabolite in the person’s blood”

commits a Level 4 felony. As we have explained:

The concept of causation in criminal law is similar to that found

in tort law. Like in tort law, the criminal act must be both 1) the

actual cause (sometimes called the “cause-in-fact”); and 2) the

legal cause (sometimes called the “proximate cause”) of the

result. Cause-in-fact requires that “but for” the antecedent

conduct, the result would not have occurred. If there is more

than one cause which precipitates the result, the defendant’s

action is the cause-in-fact if it is a “substantial factor” in bringing

about that result.

Legal or proximate cause is a distinct concept, speaking not to

the physical relationship between the actor’s conduct and the

result[] but instead embodying a value judgment as to the extent

of the physical consequences of an action for which the actor

should be held responsible. Thus, proximate cause questions are

often couched in terms of “foreseeability”; an actor is not held

responsible for consequences which are unforeseeable. In

Indiana, a result is deemed foreseeable if it is a “natural and

probable consequence” of the act of the defendant.

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Bowman v. State, 564 N.E.2d 309, 313 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (citation modified),

summarily aff’d in relevant part, 577 N.E.2d 569, 571 (Ind. 1991).

[35] And in the context of Indiana Code section 9-30-5-5 specifically, the Indiana

Supreme Court has long held:

to sustain a conviction under section 9-30-5-5[, . . . the State

must] focus on the driver’s acts[.] If the driver’s conduct caused

the injury, he commits the crime; if someone else’s conduct

caused the injury, he is not guilty. This is simply a short-handed

way of stating the well-settled rule that the State must prove the

defendant’s conduct was a proximate cause of the victim’s death.

Abney, 766 N.E.2d at 1177-78 (citation modified). Although section 9-30-5-5

has been amended several times since 2002, nothing in the language of the

statute at issue here suggests any deviation by our General Assembly in our

Supreme Court’s articulation of causation under that statute.

[36] I would hold that the State failed to prove that Hall caused Womack’s death

under section 9-30-5-5.7 The State presented no evidence that Hall’s conduct

was the proximate cause of Womack’s death. Indeed, the evidence is

unambiguous that Womack’s conduct of operating a motorcycle without a

helmet at twice the posted speed limit and nearly twice the legal blood alcohol

content level, after pulling suddenly into traffic from a business 270 feet from a

7

Hall challenges both actual causation and proximate causation. I limit my analysis to proximate causation.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-868 | October 16, 2025 Page 22 of 25

dangerous intersection that he then quickly accelerated into, was the proximate

cause of his death. See id.

[37] The majority erroneously contends that “[t]he evidence indicates that Hall

failed to yield to oncoming traffic and pulled into the line of traffic in front of

Womack . . . .” Supra p. 10. To the contrary, there is no evidence that Hall

committed any traffic infractions, that she in any way operated her vehicle

unreasonably, or that she even could have seen Womack prior to the collision

given the reckless manner in which he operated his motorcycle. And, again,

there is no evidence that Hall could have located Womack’s motorcycle by its

sound, notwithstanding the majority’s assumptions to the contrary. Indeed, as

to her driving behavior, the trial court granted Hall’s motion for a directed

verdict on the State’s charge of reckless homicide. Hall was merely the unlucky

motorist who happened to be traveling through the intersection at the moment

Womack recklessly speeded into it, and that is not a basis for criminal

causation.

[38] The majority also concludes that Officer Cronk “observed signs of impairment

in Hall following the collision,” which the majority then uses to support Hall’s

conviction. Supra at 2. But the jury found Hall not guilty of driving while

intoxicated, and rightfully so. On that allegation, the State’s evidence was

unable to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that Hall was “impaired” by

“cannabis” during or within the hour following the collision. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 53.

Rather, the State’s witnesses made clear that, when Hall first manifested

disorientation and related symptoms about an hour after the collision, she may

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have been suffering the symptoms of a possible concussion given the

deployment of her vehicle’s driver’s side airbag. The majority appears to brush

that uncontroverted evidence aside on the theory that Hall was “not . . .

diagnosed with a concussion.” Supra at 6. But of course, she was not diagnosed;

she was never examined by a medical professional for a concussion.

[39] Taking the record as a whole and both including uncontradicted evidence and

also excluding mere guesswork, the State’s argument in support of Hall’s

conviction amounts to taking the position that it is sufficient to impose serious

criminal liability under section 9-30-5-5 on a motorist who played any

“contributing” part in producing another’s injury or death so long as, at some

point in her metabolically relevant past, that motorist had ingested a prohibited

controlled substance. See Abney, 766 N.E.2d at 1178. The State’s position is

directly contrary to our Supreme Court’s holding and reasoning in Abney as well

as well-established principles of criminal causation. I reject the State’s position

accordingly. See id.; Bowman, 564 N.E.2d at 313. I further note that the State

identifies no authority in its brief in which an Indiana appellate court has

affirmed a conviction under section 9-30-5-5 merely because the defendant was

a “contributing cause,” rather than the proximate cause, of another’s injury or

death. Cf. Gutenstein v. State, 59 N.E.3d 984, 996 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (noting

the State’s charges under section 9-30-5-5 were premised on the manner in

which the defendant had operated his vehicle), trans. denied.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-868 | October 16, 2025 Page 24 of 25

[40] Prosecutors are human. Prosecutors make mistakes in their charging decisions

from time to time.8 Juries are human. Juries make mistakes in their

deliberations and verdicts from time to time. That is why our system of justice

provides for appellate review.

[41] The facts of this case would not survive a legal analysis under the much lower

burden for comparative fault between the reckless decedent and Hall to impose

liability on Hall in a civil trial. These facts do not survive analysis under the

much more rigorous criminal standard of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

[42] For all of these reasons, I would reverse Hall’s conviction for Level 4 felony

causing death when operating a vehicle with a schedule I or II controlled

substance in the blood.

8

No grand jury was convened by the prosecutor to consider whether to charge Hall with any crime at all.

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