United States v. Jesus Alexander Guerrero-Rosario

USCA11 Case: 23-13342 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 10/16/2025 Page: 1 of 14

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-13342

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JEIFRY ANTONIO VASQUEZ,

a.k.a. Jeifry Vasquez,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 1:23-cr-20163-CMA-2

____________________

____________________

No. 23-13356

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-13342

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JESUS ALEXANDER GUERRERO-ROSARIO,

a.k.a. Jesus Guerrero,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 1:23-cr-20163-CMA-1

____________________

Before JILL PRYOR, LAGOA, and WILSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Appellants Jeifry Antonio Vasquez and Jesus Alexander

Guerrero-Rosario pleaded guilty to conspiring to possess with in-

tent to distribute cocaine on a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of

the United States. On appeal, they challenge their convictions. In

addition, Vasquez challenges his 78-month sentence. After careful

consideration, we affirm.

I.

In March 2023, a boat bearing no indicia of nationality was

spotted in the Caribbean Sea about 115 nautical miles off the coast

of Aruba. A Coast Guard team approached and boarded the boat.

They found two men—Vasquez and Guerrero-Rosario—aboard.

Nicholas Muzo, a member of the Coast Guard team who

spoke Spanish, questioned Vasquez and Guerrero-Rosario

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23-13342 Opinion of the Court 3

individually. He asked each man whether he was the master of the

boat, using the Spanish word for “captain.” Doc. 53 at 12. 1 Both

Vasquez and Guerrero-Rosario denied being the boat’s master.

Muzo then asked each man if he had “registration documents for

the boat for any country” or wanted “to claim any nationality for

the boat.” Id. at 33. Each man answered that he “did not have any

documentation and did not want to make a claim of nationality.”

Id. at 14. Based on these answers, the Coast Guard treated the boat

as a vessel without nationality. It recovered 941 kilograms of co-

caine from the boat.

A grand jury in the Southern District of Florida returned an

indictment charging Vasquez and Guerrero-Rosario with conspir-

acy to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of

cocaine while on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the

United States (Count One) and possession with intent to distribute

five kilograms or more of cocaine while on board a vessel subject

to the jurisdiction of the United States (Count Two).

Vasquez and Guerrero-Rosario moved to dismiss the indict-

ment. They argued that the court lacked jurisdiction over them be-

cause the government failed to prove that their boat was a vessel

without nationality under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement

Act (“MDLEA”), 46 U.S.C. §§ 70501–08. They asserted that Muzo

prevented them from making a “verbal claim of nationality or reg-

istry” and thus the government could not establish that their boat

1 “Doc.” numbers refer to the district court’s docket entries.

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was a stateless vessel. Doc. 18 at 6. They also argued that the gov-

ernment lacked the authority under the Constitution to punish

them because their conduct occurred in Venezuela’s exclusive eco-

nomic zone.

After a hearing at which Muzo testified, the district court de-

nied the motions to dismiss. It found that the government’s evi-

dence at the hearing established that the boat qualified as a stateless

vessel under the MDLEA. The court also rejected Vasquez and

Guerrero-Rosario’s constitutional challenge.

After the district court denied the motions to dismiss,

Vasquez and Guerrero-Rosario pleaded guilty to Count One in ex-

change for the government seeking dismissal of Count Two. The

district court sentenced each defendant to 78 months’ imprison-

ment. Because Vasquez challenges his sentence on appeal, we dis-

cuss in more detail the proceedings related to his sentencing.

Before Vasquez’s sentencing hearing, a probation officer

prepared a presentence investigation report (“PSR”). Based on the

drug quantity involved, the PSR applied a base offense level of 38.

After applying a two-level reduction to the offense level under the

Sentencing Guidelines’ safety-valve provision and a three-level re-

duction for acceptance of responsibility, see U.S Sent’g Guidelines

Manual §§ 3E1.1; 5C1.2, the PSR assigned Vasquez a total offense

level of 33. The PSR reported that Vasquez was in criminal history

category I and that his guidelines range was 135 to 168 months of

imprisonment.

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At the sentencing hearing, Vasquez objected to the PSR, ar-

guing that he should receive an additional two-level reduction to

his offense level because he played a minor role in the offense. See

id. § 3B1.2(b). He argued that he was simply a courier who trans-

ported the narcotics and was following orders from other individ-

uals who told him what to do and where to go.

The government opposed Vasquez’s request for a minor-

role reduction. It explained that Vasquez was being held accounta-

ble only for the drugs that he actually transported. And it asserted

that Vasquez played a critical role in transporting the nearly one

ton of cocaine found on the boat to its destination, explaining that

he and Guerrero-Rosario were equally responsible. The court over-

ruled Vasquez’s objection.

The court determined, however, that Vasquez was entitled

to a two-level reduction to his offense level because he had no crim-

inal history points. See id. § 4C1.1. As a result, the court determined

that Vasquez’s total offense level was 31 and his guidelines range

was 108 to 135 months. It then applied a downward variance and

imposed a sentence of 78 months.

Vasquez and Guerrero-Rosario appeal.

II.

“A district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of

law that we review de novo.” United States v. Canario-Vilomar,

128 F.4th 1374, 1378 (11th Cir. 2025). But we review a district

court’s “factual findings with respect to jurisdiction for clear error.”

United States v. Cruickshank, 837 F.3d 1182, 1187 (11th Cir. 2016).

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We “review de novo the constitutionality of a criminal stat-

ute.” Canario-Vilomar, 128 F.4th at 1378. But we review for plain

error when a defendant raises a constitutional challenge for the first

time on appeal. United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815, 820 (11th Cir.

2024). “Although a guilty plea generally waives a defendant’s right

to appeal his conviction, it does not waive the right to challenge

the constitutionality of the statute underlying the conviction.” Ca-

nario-Vilomar, 128 F.4th at 1378.

We review a district court’s denial of a minor-role reduction

at sentencing for clear error. Cruickshank, 837 F.3d at 1192. “Clear

error review is deferential, and we will not disturb a district court’s

findings unless we are left with a definite and firm conviction that

a mistake has been committed.” Id. (citation modified). We have

explained that a “district court’s choice between two permissible

views of the evidence as to the defendant’s role in the offense will

rarely constitute clear error so long as the basis of the trial court’s

decision is supported by the record and does not involve a misap-

plication of a rule of law.” Id. (citation modified).

III.

We begin by addressing Vasquez and Guerrero-Rosario’s

challenges to their convictions. We then consider Vasquez’s chal-

lenge to his sentence.

A.

The MDLEA makes it a crime to “knowingly or intention-

ally . . . possess with intent to . . . distribute[] a controlled sub-

stance” on board “a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United

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States,” and to conspire to do the same. 46 U.S.C. §§ 70503(a)(1),

(e)(1); 70506(b). The MDLEA defines “vessel subject to the jurisdic-

tion of the United States” to include “a vessel without nationality.”

Id. § 70502(c)(1)(A). The MDLEA’s prohibitions apply even when

the criminal conduct is “committed outside the territorial jurisdic-

tion of the United States.” Id. § 70503(b).

On appeal, Vasquez and Guerrero-Rosario challenge their

MDLEA convictions on the basis that (1) the record failed to estab-

lish that their boat qualified as a vessel without nationality under

the MDLEA and thus the district court lacked subject matter juris-

diction and (2) the application of the MDLEA to their conduct vio-

lates the Constitution.

In the first challenge, Vasquez and Guerrero-Rosario argue

that there was insufficient evidence to support the district court’s

determination that their boat was a vessel without nationality. We

disagree.

The MDLEA sets forth a non-exhaustive list of circum-

stances when a boat qualifies as a “vessel without nationality.” Id.

§ 70502(d); see United States v. Nunez, 1 F.4th 976, 984 (11th Cir.

2021). The definition of “vessel without nationality” includes “a

vessel aboard which the master or individual in charge fails, on re-

quest of an officer of the United States authorized to enforce appli-

cable provisions of United States law, to make a claim of nationality

or registry for that vessel.” 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(B). The term

also refers to “a vessel aboard which no individual, on request of

an officer . . . claims to be the master or is identified as the

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individual in charge, and that has no other claim of nationality or

registry under” the MDLEA. Id. § 70502(d)(1)(D).

The MDLEA also sets forth what is required to make a

“claim of nationality or registry.” Id. § 70502(e). A claim is made

only when (1) documents aboard the vessel “evidencing the ves-

sel’s nationality as provided in article 5 of the 1958 Convention on

the High Seas” are produced, (2) the vessel is “flying its nation’s

ensign or flag,” or (3) the master or individual in charge of the ves-

sel makes “a verbal claim of nationality or registry.” Id.

Based on the record evidence, the government established

that Vasquez and Guerrero-Rosario’s boat qualified as a “vessel

without nationality” under § 70502(d)(1)(B). Upon questioning by

Muzo, Vasquez and Guerrero-Rosario each denied being the cap-

tain of the boat. Muzo then afforded each man an opportunity to

make a claim of registry or nationality for the boat, but neither did

so. On top of that, the boat was flying no flag and had no markings

indicating its nationality, and no one aboard produced papers

showing the vessel’s nationality. Taken together, this record was

sufficient to show that the vessel qualified as a vessel without na-

tionality because it was “a vessel aboard which the master or indi-

vidual in charge fail[ed], on request of an officer of the United

States authorized to enforce applicable provisions of United States

law, to make a claim of nationality or registry for that vessel.” Id.

§ 70502(d)(1)(B). 2

2 We acknowledge that when Muzo questioned the men, he asked who was

the “captain” of the vessel rather than who was the “individual in charge.” But

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This determination is consistent with our precedent. Previ-

ously we have held that a boat qualified as a vessel without nation-

ality under the MDLEA when (1) the boat “flew no flag, carried no

registration paperwork, and bore no markings indicating its nation-

ality”; (2) the captain hid among the crew; and (3) when ques-

tioned, the crew “made no claims about the boat’s nationality or

registry.” United States v. De La Cruz, 443 F.3d 830, 832 (11th Cir.

2006).

Vasquez and Guerrero-Rosario resist this analysis. They say

that Muzo’s questions were inadequate because he asked each man

only about “registration documents” for the boat and never asked

whether he wished to assert “a claim of nationality.” Guerrero-Ro-

sario’s Appellant’s Br. 15. But Muzo repeatedly testified that he

asked each man both (1) whether he had “registration documents

for the boat” and (2) whether he “want[ed] to claim any nationality

for the boat.” Doc. 53 at 33. And each man answered that he “did

not have any documentation and did not want to make a claim of

nationality.” Id. at 14. Given this testimony, together with the

other evidence discussed above, the district court properly

we have recognized that even when a Coast Guard boarding team “did not

also ask who was ‘the individual in charge,’” its questions will be sufficient to

establish that a vessel was stateless under § 70502(d)(1)(B) if it asked questions

about the vessel’s nationality to everyone aboard the vessel and thus gave “any

individual who possessed the authority to make a claim of registry or nation-

ality for the vessel” an “opportunity to do so at the request of a duly authorized

officer.” United States v. Cabezas-Montano, 949 F.3d 567, 589 n.14 (11th Cir.

2020).

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determined that the boat was a vessel without nationality for pur-

poses of the MDLEA and concluded that it had subject matter ju-

risdiction.

We now turn to Vasquez and Guerrero-Rosario’s constitu-

tional challenges. They raise two constitutional challenges. Each

challenge is based, in whole or in part, on the Felonies Clause of

the Constitution, which authorizes Congress to punish certain of-

fenses committed on the high seas. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 10

(granting Congress the authority “[t]o define and punish Piracies

and Felonies committed on the high Seas”).

In the first challenge, Vasquez and Guerrero-Rosario argue

that the Felonies Clause did not authorize their prosecutions be-

cause the waters where they were arrested are part of the exclusive

economic zone of Venezuela. 3 Relying on customary international

law, they assert that when waters are part of another nation’s ex-

clusive economic zone, they are not part of the high seas and thus

the United States lacks jurisdiction to enforce the MDLEA over a

vessel located in those waters.

In the second challenge, Vasquez and Guerrero-Rosario ar-

gue for the first time on appeal that their prosecutions violated due

3 A nation’s exclusive economic zone sits beyond its territorial waters but

within 200 nautical miles of its coastal baseline. Alfonso, 104 F.4th at 821. We

have described the concept of an exclusive economic zone as of “relatively

modern vintage.” Canario-Vilomar, 128 F.4th at 1382; see also Alfonso, 104 F.4th

at 823 (explaining that at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, the con-

cept of an exclusive economic zone “did not exist”).

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process and exceeded Congress’s power under the Felonies Clause

because their offenses had no connection or nexus to the United

States.

Both challenges are foreclosed by precedent. First, we have

held that other countries’ exclusive economic zones are “part of the

‘high seas’ for purposes of the Felonies Clause” and thus “enforce-

ment of the MDLEA in [an exclusive economic zone] is proper.”

Alfonso, 104 F.4th at 823, 827. In reaching this conclusion, we re-

jected the argument that “Congress’s authority under the Felonies

Clause to define and punish felonies committed on the ‘high seas’

is limited by customary international law.” Id. at 825.

Second, we have rejected challenges to the application of the

MDLEA to a vessel on the high seas on the basis that the vessel

lacked a sufficient nexus to the United States and thus the prosecu-

tion violated principles of due process or was not permitted under

the Felonies Clause. See United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802, 809–

12 (11th Cir. 2014). “[W]e have long upheld the authority of Con-

gress to extend the criminal jurisdiction of this country to any state-

less vessel in international waters engaged in the distribution of

controlled substances.” Id. at 810 (citation modified). We have rec-

ognized that the prosecution of a noncitizen “captured on the high

seas while drug trafficking” does not offend due process because

the MDLEA “provides clear notice that all nations prohibit and

condemn drug trafficking aboard stateless vessels on the high seas.”

Id. at 812; see also Canario-Vilomar, 128 F.4th at 1382–83 (holding

that an identical nexus challenge was foreclosed by precedent).

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Both constitutional challenges here are foreclosed by prece-

dent. Our earlier decisions bind us because they have not been

overturned or undermined to the point of abrogation by the Su-

preme Court or this Court sitting en banc. See United States v.

Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008).

B.

We now turn to Vasquez’s challenge to his sentence. Under

the Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant is entitled to a two-level de-

crease in his offense level if he was a “minor participant” in the

criminal activity. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b). A “minor participant” is

someone “who is less culpable than most other participants in the

criminal activity, but whose role could not be described as mini-

mal.” Id. § 3B1.2 cmt. n.5. The decision whether to apply a minor-

role adjustment is “based on the totality of the circumstances and

involves a determination that is heavily dependent upon the facts

of the particular case.” Id. § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(C); see also United

States v. Rodriguez De Varon, 175 F.3d 930, 934 (11th Cir. 1999) (en

banc) (discussing a district court’s discretion in determining a de-

fendant’s role in the offense). The defendant bears the burden of

proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he had a minor

role. Rodriguez De Varon, 175 F.3d at 939.

We have instructed district courts to follow a two-step

framework when deciding whether to grant a minor-role adjust-

ment. First, the court considers “the defendant’s role in the rele-

vant conduct for which [he] has been held accountable at sentenc-

ing.” Id. at 940. This inquiry focuses on whether the defendant

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“played a relatively minor role in the conduct for which [he] has

already been held accountable—not a minor role in any larger

criminal conspiracy.” Id. at 944. Second, the court evaluates the de-

fendant’s “role as compared to that of other participants in [the]

relevant conduct.” Id. at 940.

The commentary to § 3B1.2 also guides district courts when

evaluating minor-role adjustments. It directs them to consider sev-

eral factors: “the degree to which the defendant understood the

scope and structure of the criminal activity,” “the degree to which

[he] participated in planning or organizing the criminal activity,”

“the degree to which [he] exercised decision-making authority,”

“the nature and extent of [his] participation in the commission of

the criminal activity,” and “the degree to which [he] stood to ben-

efit from the criminal activity.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(C).

We conclude that the district court did not clearly err in find-

ing that Vasquez did not have a minor role. He knowingly partici-

pated in a scheme to transport internationally a significant quantity

of cocaine, more than 900 kilograms. His role as one of two indi-

viduals aboard the vessel was important to this scheme. These facts

alone support an inference that Vasquez’s role was not minor. See

Rodriguez De Varon, 175 F.3d at 946 (recognizing that district court

had discretion to conclude that individual who transported a large

quantity of drugs “was central to the importation scheme”).

Vasquez nevertheless argues that he should have received a

minor-role reduction because his involvement was limited to trans-

porting the cocaine, and he was less culpable than others who

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obtained the drugs, funded the voyage, and determined the launch-

ing and docking spots. But given that the relevant conduct here was

limited to the transportation of the cocaine aboard the vessel and

Vasquez and Guerrero-Rosario played comparable roles in this

conduct, we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that the

district court committed a mistake in finding that Vasquez’s role

was not minor. After all, “it is possible that none [of the partici-

pants] are minor . . . participants.” Id. at 944; see also United States v.

Valois, 915 F.3d 717, 732–33 (11th Cir. 2019) (holding that the dis-

trict court did not clearly err in denying a minor-role reduction to

defendants found aboard a stateless vessel even though no one

aboard the vessel received a role reduction).

AFFIRMED.