ZACHEIS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

Cecil Z.,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 24-10936 (RK)

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, OPINION

Defendant.

KIRSCH, District Judge

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Cecil Z.’s1 (“Cecil” or “Plaintiff”) appeal

from the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration’s (the “Commissioner” or

“Defendant”) final decision, which denied Cecil’s request for Social Security disability insurance

benefits. (ECF No. 1.) The Court has jurisdiction to review this appeal under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)

and reaches its decision without oral argument pursuant to Local Civil Rule 78.1. For the reasons

below, the Court AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s decision.

I. BACKGROUND

In this appeal, the Court must answer the following question: does substantial evidence

support Administrative Law Judge Kenneth Ayers’s (“Judge Ayers”) determination that Cecil was

not disabled?

1 The Court identifies Plaintiff by first name and last initial only. See D.N.J. Standing Order 2021-10.

A. PROCEDURAL POSTURE

Cecil filed an application for disability insurance benefits on March 17, 2022.

(Administrative Record (“AR”) at 17, 64, 74.)2 The Social Security Administration (the

“Administration”) denied the request initially (id. at 101) and upon reconsideration (id. at 106).

Cecil then requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (Id. at 131.) On March

5, 2024, Cecil appeared at a telephone or video hearing before Judge Ayers,3 wherein he heard

testimony from Cecil, who was represented by counsel, and a vocational expert, Timothy

Andenmatten (“VE”). (Id. at 34–62.) On May 22, 2024, Judge Ayers issued a written decision

finding that Cecil was not disabled. (Id. at 17–33.) After receiving notice of the unfavorable

decision, Cecil requested review by the Appeals Council. (Id. at 193–94.) On October 16, 2024,

the Appeals Council determined that the reasons asserted by Cecil for appeal “do not provide a

basis for changing the Administrative Law Judge’s decision.” (Id. at 1.)

This appeal followed. (ECF No. 1.) The Administrative Record was filed on February 4,

2025. (ECF No. 4.) Cecil filed a moving brief (ECF No. 5, “Pl. Br.”), the Commissioner responded

(ECF No. 7, “Def. Opp.”), and Cecil replied (ECF No. 8). The appeal is now ripe for review by

this Court.

2 The Administrative Record (“AR”) is available at ECF Nos. 4-1 through 4-15. This Opinion will reference

only page numbers in the record without the corresponding ECF numbers. Regarding the filing date, one

document within record indicates that Cecil filed for benefits on March 23, 2022. (AR at 201–02.) The

exact date does not alter the Court’s analysis.

3 The ALJ’s decision indicates that the hearing was held via video. (AR at 17.) However, the hearing

transcript indicates that it held over the telephone. (Id. at 37.) Either way, Cecil did not object to the method

of the hearing. (Id. at 17, 37.)

B. JUDGE AYERS’S DECISION

On October 19, 2023, Judge Ayers issued a decision finding that Cecil was not disabled

from his alleged onset date of January 1, 2018 through the date of decision. (AR at 17–33.) At the

time of the alleged onset date, Plaintiff was forty-six-years old, had graduated high school and

attended some college, and had served in the Marine Corps and worked as a police officer in

patrolman and detective roles. (Id. at 23, 42.) At the hearing, Plaintiff’s attorney explained that

Plaintiff suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) stemming from a situation where

Plaintiff, as a police officer, arrested Joseph D’Amico (“D’Amico”) who later “put a hit out on”

Plaintiff. (Id. at 39; see also id. at 460–61.) Specifically, notes from a doctor evaluating Plaintiff

reveal that, while in prison, D’Amico asked members of the Aryan Brotherhood to kill Plaintiff.

(Id. at 461.) After the Mercer County Prosecutor’s Office learned of this, they placed an officer in

the prison to pose as a hitman. (Id.) Arrangements were made between the officer posing as a

hitman and D’Amico up until the point that D’Amico could not come up with the money to pay

the “hitman.” (Id.)4

Plaintiff testified that he suffers from flashbacks, intrusive thoughts, nightmares, episodes

of dissociation, and hypervigilance as a result of this event. (Id. at 45–49.) Plaintiff further

explained that the nightmares cause him to wake in a cold sweat and vomit about twice a week.

(Id. at 45.) When this happens, Plaintiff testified, he secludes himself from his wife and daughter

and does not leave the house for a few days. (Id. at 46.) During these periods, he explained that he

becomes depressed, he does not “have the energy to do much,” and his hygiene deteriorates. (Id.

at 46–47.) He further explained that his dissociative episodes occur about weekly. (Id. at 47.) He

does not realize that these are occurring while they happen. (Id. at 47–48.) He gets “a vacant

4 It is unclear if D’Amico faced additional charges stemming from this allegation. (AR at 461.)

expression on [his] face” and his wife, his daughter, or someone else has to “yell . . . a few times”

to get his attention. (Id. at 48.) Cecil testified that after these episodes he is “usually nauseous,”

“usually sweating,” and “very reticent to leave [his] house and be around people.” (Id.) He testified

that he is hypervigilant “all the time pretty much,” and that this causes him to make sure everyone

is secured, that windows and doors are locked, and that people are not following him while he is

driving. (Id. at 49.) It also causes him to dislike going to public places. (Id.) Plaintiff also testified

that his intrusive thoughts make it difficult for him to concentrate and maintain focus. (Id. at 49–

50.) Plaintiff further explained that he previously drank to “self-medicat[e]” and that he suffers

from a heart condition that causes physical limitations and episodes of irregular heart rhythm. (Id.

at 52–54.) Plaintiff testified that he has not worked since the alleged onset of his disability on

January 1, 2018. (Id. at 42.)

In reaching his determination that Cecil was not disabled, Judge Ayers applied the five-

step process for determining whether an individual is disabled as set forth in 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520(a). (Id. at 18–19.) At Step One, Judge Ayers found that Cecil had not engaged in

substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date, January 1, 2018.5 (Id. at 20 (citing 20

C.F.R. § 404.1571 et seq.).)

At Step Two, Judge Ayers found that Cecil suffered from five severe impairments: (1)

coronary artery disease, (2) status-post stenting, (3) posttraumatic stress disorder, (4) major

depressive disorder, and (5) anxiety disorder. (Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c)).) The ALJ also

analyzed six additional impairments and concluded that each one was non-severe. (Id.) The ALJ

first concluded that Plaintiff’s hypertension, high cholesterol, gastritis, and premature ventricular

5 While Cecil did earn $34,408 in 2018 and $59,229.58 in 2020, the ALJ concluded that those “earnings

represent[ed] accrued and/or short-term benefits from sick/vacation repayment and . . . not earnings from

work activity.” (AR at 20.)

contraction were non-severe because the medical record did not indicate any complications or

ongoing limiting physical symptoms related to those conditions. (Id. (citing id. at 1251–1317,

1505–21).) The ALJ next considered Plaintiff’s obesity and determined that it was non-severe

because “there [wa]s no indication that either singularly or in combination it would result in more

than de minimis functional limitations.” (Id.) Finally, the ALJ determined that alcohol abuse was

not a severe impairment because that condition was “in the remote past,” “in remission,” and

“mostly before the alleged onset day.” (Id.)

At Step Three, the ALJ determined that Cecil did not have an “impairment or combination

of impairments” that qualified under the Administration’s listed impairments. (Id. at 20–22 (citing

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526).)

Judge Ayers then moved to the precursor to Step Four where he accounted for Cecil’s

alleged symptoms and assessed whether those allegations were consistent with the medical

evidence in the record. (See id. at 22) In doing so, the ALJ followed a two-step process. (Id.) First,

the ALJ considered whether there was a “medically determinable physical or mental impairment[]”

(in other words, an impairment that could “be shown by medically acceptable clinical or laboratory

diagnostic techniques”) “that could reasonably be expected to produce [Cecil]’s pain or other

symptoms.” (Id.) Second, the ALJ evaluated “the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of

[Cecil]’s symptoms to determine the extent to which they limit [Cecil]’s work-related activities.”

(Id. at 23.) The ALJ ultimately determined that Cecil’s “medically determinable impairments could

reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms.” (Id.) However, the ALJ explained that

Cecil’s “statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms

are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record.” (Id.)

Regarding Cecil’s physical impairments, the ALJ noted that Cecil had suffered from chest

pain and underwent cardiac catheterization. (Id.) However, the ALJ cited records from an August

11, 2022 examination wherein Cecil denied chest pain, reported exercising an average of five times

per week, characterized his fitness and stamina as “very good,” and had a normal physical

examination. (Id. at 24 (citing id. at 705–41).) Additionally, in another examination on September

12, 2022, Cecil reported that he had not experienced chest pains in eleven months, indicated that

he was taking medication, and again had a normal physical examination. (Id. at 23 (citing id. at

748–52).) Indeed, the physician examining Cecil only diagnosed him with hypertension. (Id.

(citing id. at 748–52).) Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that the medical evidence did not support

a finding that his physical impairments constituted disabling limitations. (Id. at 25.)

Judge Ayers next turned to psychological impairments. Citing to Cecil’s Function Report,

Judge Ayers noted that Cecil claimed he could not leave his house and could not “go to crowded,

public places without people that he trusts, and only under the right circumstances.” (Id. at 23

(citing id. at 260–67).) Judge Ayers further explained that Cecil reported “horrible dreams,

intrusive thoughts, and [that] he sleeps on the floor with his dogs a lot.” (Id. (citing id. at 260–67).)

Judge Ayers concluded that the objective medical evidence confirmed Cecil’s

psychological impairments. (Id. at 24.) Judge Ayers first examined a May 13, 2018 evaluation

performed by Dr. Gary Glass. (Id.) During that evaluation, Cecil reported problems with

concentration, attention span, sleep, energy level, depression, “overwhelming” anxiety, episodes

of dissociation, and paranoia and fear, but he denied being irritable or having past or present

thoughts of suicide. (Id.) Dr. Glass observed that Cecil’s speech was clear and coherent, that he

was “sullen and depressed,” and that his cognitive functions and memory were “fine.” (Id.) Dr.

Glass ultimately assessed Cecil with “moderate to severe symptoms of PTSD,” opined that these

symptoms would likely interfere with his ability to “work as a police officer/detective and found

him unfit for duty,” and recommended treatment via medication and therapy. (Id.)

Judge Ayers also looked to a September 8, 2022 examination conducted by Dr. Zulfiqar

Rajput at the request of the Administration. (Id.) During that examination, Cecil complained of

nightmares and flashbacks, anxiety and nervousness, crying spells, feelings of hopelessness and

helplessness, and intrusive thoughts and dreams. (Id.) Notwithstanding, Dr. Rajput observed that

Cecil was fully oriented, behaved normally, had good eye contact, was able to concentrate on the

conversation, and had normal motor activity. (Id.) Dr. Rajput also noted that Cecil’s thought

processes were logical and goal directed, that his abstraction ability and insight were good, and

that his memory was good. (Id.) Although Dr. Rajput concluded that Cecil’s judgment was poor,

he attributed this to Cecil “not seeing a psychiatrist or following the recommendation of a

psychiatrist which was necessary for improvement of the PTSD and anxiety.” (Id.)

The ALJ also cited treatment records from Dr. Jeffrey Rednor. (Id. at 25.) These records

revealed that, while Cecil continued to suffer from anxiety, he had normal mood and affect, he

behaved normally, he was alert and fully oriented, and his thought content and judgment were

normal. (Id.) Furthermore, the ALJ observed that the treating records did not indicate that Cecil

required assistance with daily activities. (Id.)

Overall, Judge Ayers determined that “the medical evidence [did] not support a finding of

disabling limitations.” (Id.) Judge Ayers explained that the medical records showed that

medication had been effective at managing Cecil’s symptoms and that there had been “a

significant, though incomplete, improvement of his conditions.” (Id.) Although the record showed

that Cecil had problems with anxiety and stress, Judge Ayers found that the evidence did not

indicate that Cecil required any assistance with daily activities or that he was unable to

independently make or fulfill plans. (Id. at 26.) In sum, the ALJ underscored that “almost every

mental status examination submitted by his treating physician reflects that his cognitive

functioning is unimpaired.” (Id.)

The ALJ also noted that Cecil’s statements in his own Function Report contradicted his

position that he could not work due to his disability. (Id.) Specifically, Cecil represented in his

Function Report that he could take care of his personal needs, take care of his pets, prepare meals,

perform household chores, do his laundry, take his dogs out every day, go out alone, go to the

gym, go fishing, and travel by driving or riding his motorcycle. (Id. (citing id. at 260–67).)

Judge Ayers next evaluated the medical opinions and prior administrative medical findings

before him. (Id.) First, Disability Determination Service (“DDS”) found severe physical and

psychological impairments and severe impairments involving alcohol abuse. (Id.) The ALJ found

these opinions to be of reduced persuasiveness because “DDS consultants are non-examining

physicians” and they “did not review additional medical evidence submitted after earlier periods

of adjudication which” supported the ALJ’s determination. (Id. at 27.) Second, the ALJ examined

the medical opinions of Dr. Glass and Dr. Lewis Schlosser. (Id.) Both of these opinions stemmed

from evaluations conducted in 2018 and stated that Cecil could not perform his previous work as

a police officer. (Id.) The ALJ concluded that these opinions were not “inherently persuasive”

because they were “from very early in the period under consideration and they do not give specific

functional limitations regarding [Cecil]’s vocational abilities.” (Id.) Moreover, these reports were

drafted to determine Cecil’s fitness to continue as a police officer and simply indicated that he was

“not capable of performing his past work which is an issue reserved to the Commissioner.” (Id.)

Ultimately, Judge Ayers determined that Cecil had the following Residual Functional

Capacity (“RFC”):

to perform light work as defined in 20 [C.F.R. §] 404.1567(b) except [Cecil] can

work at unprotected heights occasionally and around hazardous moving mechanical

parts occasionally. Due to limitations in concentration, persistence or pace [Cecil]

can perform simple, routine tasks and make simple work-related decisions. He is

able to interact with supervisors occasionally. He is able to interact with coworkers

occasionally but can never interact with the public. He is able to tolerate no more

than occasional changes in routine work setting.

(Id. at 22.)

At Step Four, Judge Ayers found that Cecil was unable to perform his past work as a police

officer or detective. (Id. at 27–28 (20 C.F.R. § 404.1565).) Thus, despite finding their opinions

“not inherently persuasive,” the ALJ reached the same conclusion as Drs. Glass and Schlosser. (Id.

at 27.)

Finally, at Step Five, accounting for Cecil’s RFC, age, education, and work experience, in

conjunction with testimony offered by the VE at the March 5, 2024 hearing, Judge Ayers found

that there were jobs “that exist in significant numbers in the national economy” that Cecil could

perform. (Id. at 28–29 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1569, 404.1569a).) Specifically, the VE testified—

and the ALJ concluded—that Cecil could work as a marker, routing clerk, or mail clerk. (Id. at

29.) Accordingly, Judge Ayers found that Cecil had not been disabled from his alleged onset date

of January 1, 2018 through the date of his decision. (Id.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court reviews the Commissioner’s final decision to determine whether the

Commissioner’s findings are “supported by substantial evidence.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). If the

Appeals Council denies a claimant’s request for review, “the ALJ’s decision is the Commissioner’s

final decision.” Matthews v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 589, 592 (3d Cir. 2001). Substantial evidence is “more

than a mere scintilla but may be somewhat less than a preponderance of the evidence.” Zirnsak v.

Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 610 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552

(3d Cir. 2005)). Put differently, “[i]t means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 632, 633 (3d

Cir. 2010) (quoting Reefer v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 376, 379 (3d Cir. 2003)). This evidentiary

threshold “is not high.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019).

The scope of the Court’s review of the ALJ’s decision is “quite limited.” Rutherford, 399

F.3d at 552. On review, the Court may not “re-weigh the evidence or impose [its] own factual

determinations.” Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 359 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). “Where the ALJ’s findings of fact are supported

by substantial evidence, we are bound by those findings, even if we would have decided the factual

inquiry differently.” Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 38 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Hartranft v.

Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999)).

B. ESTABLISHING ELIGIBILITY FOR DISABILITY INSURANCE BENEFITS

A claimant may establish disability under the Social Security Act by proving that he is

unable to “engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable

physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can

be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).

The ALJ applies a well-established “five-step sequential evaluation process,” which requires

considering whether the claimant:

(1) is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) suffers from an

impairment or combination of impairments that is “severe”; (3)

suffers from an impairment or combination of impairments that

meets or equals a listed impairment; (4) is able to perform his or her

past relevant work; and (5) is able to perform work existing in

significant numbers in the national economy.

McCrea v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 370 F.3d 357, 360 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1520(a)–(f)). The claimant bears the burden at the first four steps, at which point it shifts

to the Commissioner at Step Five. Hess v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 201 (3d Cir. 2019)

(citing Smith, 631 F.3d at 634).

III. DISCUSSION

Cecil appeals Judge Ayers’s determination of non-disability. (See ECF No. 1.) He raises

three issues on appeal: first, that Judge Ayers failed to consider the treatment notes of Plaintiff’s

therapist, Pamela Brolin; second, that Judge Ayers acted inconsistently by discounting the medical

opinions of Drs. Glass and Schlosser but relying on their findings in conducting the Step Three

analysis; and third, that Judge Ayers failed to rule on his objection to the VE’s testimony. (Pl. Br.

at 8–16.) For the reasons explained below, the Court AFFIRMS.

A. BROLIN EVIDENCE

Cecil first argues that the ALJ erred in failing to consider medical evidence from Brolin,

Cecil’s treating therapist. (Pl. Br. 8–11.) The Commissioner responds that Cecil’s attorney

summarized the evidence for the ALJ, the list of exhibits that the ALJ considered in formulating

the RFC included the Brolin evidence, the ALJ need not discuss every piece of evidence in the

record, and the ALJ’s decision was reasonably discernable. (Def. Opp. at 8–9.)

As an initial matter, it is important to draw a distinction between considering evidence and

discussing evidence. An ALJ may consider the entire record without discussing each piece of

evidence contained therein. See Phillips v. Barnhart, 91 F. App’x 775, 780 n.7 (3d Cir. 2004)

(“[T]he ALJ’s mere failure to cite specific evidence does not establish that the ALJ failed to

consider it.” (emphasis added) (citing Black v. Apfel, 143 F.3d 383, 386 (8th Cir. 1998))). To that

end, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has explained that, while the ALJ

must “consider and evaluate the medical evidence in the record consistent with his responsibilities

under the regulations and case law,” the Court does “not expect the ALJ to make reference to every

relevant treatment note in a case where the claimant . . . has voluminous medical records.”

Fargnoli, 247 F.3d at 42. Put another way, “[t]here is no requirement that the ALJ discuss in its

opinion every tidbit of evidence included in the record.” Hur v. Barnhart, 94 F. App’x 130, 133

(3d Cir. 2004).

Of course, an ALJ decision that simply stated “I have considered all evidence and conclude

that the claimant is not disabled” could not stand. Some evidence must be discussed. Specifically,

certain types of evidence must be discussed by regulation, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b) (“We will

articulate in our determination or decision how persuasive we find all of the medical opinions and

all of the prior administrative medical findings in your case record.”), and the ALJ’s overall

discussion of the evidence must be robust enough to permit meaningful judicial review, see Burnett

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 220 F.3d 112, 119 (3d Cir. 2000); Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d

Cir. 1981). Cecil contends that the ALJ was required to discuss the Brolin evidence both by

regulation and to permit meaningful judicial review.

Cecil contends that the ALJ’s failure to discuss the Brolin evidence violated 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520c. (Pl. Br. at 11.) As an initial matter, Section 404.1520c applies only to “medical

opinions and prior administrative medical findings.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c. These are but two of

many categories of evidence that the ALJ must consider. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513. The Brolin

notes are clearly not “prior administrative medical findings” because they are not findings “about

a medical issue made by . . . Federal and State agency medical and psychological consultants at a

prior level of review in a [claimant’s] current claim.” See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a)(5). So, the

question becomes whether the Brolin evidence is a medical opinion. For claims filed on or after

March 27, 2017, such as Cecil’s:

A medical opinion is a statement from a medical source about what [the claimant]

can still do despite [his] impairment(s) and whether [he has] one or more

impairment-related limitations or restrictions in the following abilities: . . .

(i) [His] ability to perform physical demands of work activities, such

as sitting, standing, walking, lifting, carrying, pushing, pulling, or

other physical functions (including manipulative or postural

functions, such as reaching, handling, stooping, or crouching);

(ii) [His] ability to perform mental demands of work activities, such as

understanding; remembering; maintaining concentration,

persistence, or pace; carrying out instructions; or responding

appropriately to supervision, co-workers, or work pressures in a

work setting;

(iii) [His] ability to perform other demands of work, such as seeing,

hearing, or using other senses; and

(iv) [His] ability to adapt to environmental conditions, such as

temperature extremes or fumes.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a)(2); (see AR at 17, 64, 74 (noting that Cecil filed for benefits in March of

2022).) Conversely, “judgments about the nature and severity of [the claimant’s] impairments,

[his] medical history, clinical findings, diagnosis, treatment prescribed with response, or

prognosis” absent any discussion of work-related limitations are considered “[o]ther medical

evidence.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a)(3).

Here, Cecil highlights Brolin’s discussion of his symptoms, diagnoses, prognosis, and

Global Assessment Functioning (“GAF”) score. (Pl. Br. at 10 (citing AR at 1097, 1127, 1213,

1219, 1239, 1242, 1244, 1322, 1324).) However, none of these are tied to any functional work-

related limitation. Instead, they are general statements about Cecil’s condition. Accordingly, they

are best classified as “other medical evidence.” In fact, regarding the GAF score in particular, the

Administration now categorizes GAF scores “as other medical evidence.” Coats v. Kijakazi, No.

21-1762, 2023 WL 2706857, at *12 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted);

see Tiffany T. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 22-626, 2023 WL 10949091, at *11 (D. Conn. Sept. 1,

2023) (similar), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 1230256 (D. Conn. Mar. 22,

2024). Therefore, because the Brolin evidence was neither a prior administrative medical finding

nor a medical opinion, there was no requirement for the ALJ to discuss the Brolin evidence under

Section 404.1520c.

The Court now turns to Cecil’s argument that the ALJ was required to discuss the Brolin

evidence to facilitate meaningful judicial review. As stated, the caselaw makes clear that the ALJ

need not discuss every piece of evidence to facilitate review. What matters is that “the ALJ

articulates at some minimum level [his] analysis of a particular line of evidence.” Phillips, 91 F.

App’x at 780 n.7 (emphasis added) (citing Green v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 96, 101 (7th Cir. 1995)).

Therefore, there is no need for the ALJ to discuss every piece of “cumulative” evidence. Fisher v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 20-1467, 2021 WL 4288313, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 21, 2021) (citing

Phillips, 91 F. App’x at 780 n.7).

Cecil first points to the fact that Brolin diagnosed him, with “post-traumatic stress disorder,

panic disorder, and major depressive disorder.” (Pl. Br. at 10 (citing AR at 1097).) These diagnoses

were neither ignored nor overlooked as the ALJ acknowledged very similar diagnoses and even

determined that they amounted to “severe impairments” under Step Two. (AR at 20, 22.) There

was no dispute that Cecil suffered from mental illnesses such as those diagnosed by Brolin and it

is clear that the ALJ was aware of and considered same. Thus, there was no need for the ALJ to

discuss Brolin’s particular diagnoses. In any event, “[a] diagnosis alone . . . does not demonstrate

disability.” Foley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 349 F. App’x 805, 808 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Pet. of

Sullivan, 904 F.2d 826, 845 (3d Cir. 1990)).

Next, Cecil points to Brolin’s discussion of his various symptoms. (Pl. Br. at 10 (citing AR

at 1127, 1213, 1219, 1239, 1244, 1322, 1324).) Specifically, Brolin noted that Cecil had trouble

sleeping, nightmares, anxiety, flashbacks, hypervigilance, increased anger and disturbance, and

fear of harm to himself and family. She further noted that he was very emotional and socially

isolated and that he felt helpless, fearful, and worrisome. As an initial matter, Brolin’s notes, for

the most part, simply restated Cecil’s self-reported descriptions of his own symptoms. Brolin’s

recitation of these complaints “does not transform” them “into objective findings.” Hatton v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 131 F. App’x 877, 879 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585,

590 n.2 (4th Cir. 1996)). Regardless, the ALJ acknowledged Cecil’s symptoms, including many

of these very same symptoms that Brolin identified, in reaching his conclusion. (See, e.g., AR at

21 (discussing Cecil’s “depression, anxiety, frequent nightmares/flashbacks, intrusive thoughts,

dissociative episodes, paranoia, fear, social isolation, decreased sleep, hypervigilance, feelings of

helplessness, and constant worry”).) So again, there was no need for the ALJ to discuss Brolin’s

identification of these symptoms.

Cecil next highlights that Brolin referred to Cecil as “very symptomatic” and his anxiety

as “incapacitating.” (Pl. Br. at 10 (citing AR at 1097, 1242).) However, read in full context, the

notes reveal that Cecil “became very symptomatic . . . after viewing an incident that triggered

him,” (AR at 1242 (emphasis added)), and that he suffers from “incapacitating anxiety [at] times,”

(id. at 1097 (emphasis added)). Cecil has not shown how frequently these episodes occur or how

frequently they would interrupt his work. Accordingly, he has failed to carry his “burden” to show

harmful error. Holloman v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 639 F. App’x 810, 814 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing

Shineski v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409 (2009)). Moreover, the ALJ considered Cecil’s argument

that his anxiety prevented him from working but ultimately concluded that his level of functioning

as evidenced by the record was inconsistent with the claim that he was unable to work. (AR at 26.)

Cecil also mentions that Brolin assigned him a GAF score of 50 and the ALJ failed to

reference this score in its opinion.6 (Pl. Br. at 10 (citing AR at 1097).) This omission may

otherwise, and in different circumstances, provide some support for a remand to the ALJ. “A GAF

score of 50 or below indicates serious symptoms.” Rivera v. Astrue, 9 F. Supp. 3d 495, 504 (E.D.

Pa. 2014). Generally, an ALJ’s failure to discuss both a GAF score that supports serious limitations

and the medical records containing that score is cause for remand. See, e.g., Irizarry v. Barnhart,

233 F. App’x 189, 192 (3d Cir. 2007) (vacating and remanding case where ALJ failed to consider

GAF scores and the medical treatment leading to those GAF scores); Logan v. Colvin, No. 14-

4571, 2015 WL 5722391, at *8 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2015) (“[T]he failure to discuss a GAF score is

not by itself cause for remand, but the failure to discuss the medical records in which the GAF

score appears may be.”); Rivera, 9 F. Supp. 3d at 504–07 (“[D]istrict courts in the Third Circuit

have repeatedly held that the ALJ’s failure to specifically discuss a GAF score that supports serious

impairments in social or occupational functioning is cause for remand. . . . A failure to discuss

6 “A GAF score is a measurement[] of a person’s overall psychological, social, and occupational

functioning, and is used to assess mental health.” J.B. v. O’Malley, No. 22-4226, 2024 WL 4898059, at *3

n.10 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 26, 2024) (citing Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental

Disorders 34 (4th ed. text revision 2000)). “The GAF scale ranges from 1 to 100, with a score of 1 being

the lowest and 100 being the highest. A GAF score of 41–50 indicates an individual has serious symptoms

(e.g., suicidal ideation, severe obsessional rituals, frequent shoplifting) or any serious impairment in social,

occupational, or school functioning (e.g., no friends, unable to keep a job).” Rios v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

444 F. App’x 532, 534 n.3 (3d Cir. 2011) (cleaned up). Despite the GAF being removed from the DSM-5,

the Commissioner continues to consider GAF evidence. See Hughes v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 643 F. App’x

116, 119 n.2 (3d Cir. 2016). “[W]hile GAF scores can indicate an individual’s capacity to work, they also

correspond to unrelated factors, and absent evidence that a GAF score was meant to indicate an impairment

of the ability to work, a GAF score does not establish disability.” Bracciodieta-Nelson v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec., 782 F. Supp. 2d 152, 165 (W.D. Pa. 2011). GAF scores are not dispositive of disability, and “[l]ike

other evidence, a GAF score may be accorded little or no weight depending upon its consistency with the

other relevant evidence in the record.” Rivera v. Astrue, 9 F. Supp. 3d 495, 507 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (citing

Torres v. Barnhart, 139 F. App’x 411, 415 (3d Cir. 2005)).

GAF scores does not necessarily constitute error where the ALJ conducts a thorough analysis of

the medical evidence regarding plaintiff’s mental impairments.”).

Here, assuming arguendo that the ALJ erred by failing to discuss the GAF score or the

Brolin evidence, in light of the fulsome record and analysis provided by the ALJ, any such error

was harmless. “Ordinary harmless error review, in which the appellant bears the burden to

demonstrate harm, is applicable to” Social Security appeals. Holloman, 639 F. App’x at 814 (citing

Shineski, 556 U.S. at 409). Because of this, “[a]n ALJ’s failure to include a GAF score in his or

her discussion is considered to be harmless error where a claimant has not explained how the GAF

score would have itself satisfied the requirements for disability in light of potentially contradictory

evidence on record.” Bracciodieta-Nelson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 782 F. Supp. 2d 152, 165 (W.D.

Pa. 2011). Here, Cecil makes a brief mention of the GAF score in his listing of aspects of the

Brolin evidence that the ALJ failed to discuss and summarily states that “[t]his error is harmful to

the Plaintiff as it is clear that the treating evidence of Pamela Brolin supports a finding of disability

in this matter.” (Pl. Br. 10–11.) He does not explain “how the GAF score would have” altered the

analysis. Bracciodieta-Nelson, 782 F. Supp. 2d at 165. There was clearly “potentially contradictory

evidence on record,” id., as indicated by the ALJ’s citations to the other medical evidence in the

record and Cecil’s own Function Report in which he indicated that he could perform a myriad of

functions of daily living, (AR at 25–26.) Accordingly, Cecil has failed to carry his “burden” of

demonstrating that the error was harmful. Holloman, 639 F. App’x at 814. In fact, the Third Circuit

has explained that a GAF score of 50 indicates that a claimant can “perform some substantial

gainful activity.” Hillman v. Barnhart, 48 F. App’x 26, 29 n.1 (3d Cir. 2002).

The same harmless error analysis applies to any other potential errors stemming from the

ALJ’s failure to consider the Brolin evidence. Cecil simply states that the failure to consider the

evidence was harmful without explaining how it would have impacted the ALJ’s disability

determination. (Pl. Br. at 11.) This is not enough for Cecil to carry his “burden” of demonstrating

that the error was harmful. Holloman, 639 F. App’x at 814; see also Padgett v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec., No. 16-9441, 2018 WL 1399307, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 20, 2018) (“Because Plaintiff has

articulated no analysis of the evidence, the Court does not understand what argument Plaintiff has

made here. Plaintiff has done no more than thrown down a few pieces of an unknown jigsaw puzzle

and left it to the Court to put them together. The Court does not assemble arguments for a party

from fragments.”).

B. DRS. GLASS AND SCHLOSSER NOTES

Plaintiff next contends that the ALJ acted inconsistently by finding the medical opinions

of Drs. Glass and Schlosser not inherently persuasive while at the same time looking to the findings

of their examinations at Step Three.7 (Pl. Br. at 11.) This purported inconsistency is resolved by

the relevant regulations. For claims filed on or after March 27, 2017, such as Cecil’s, certain

categories of evidence are “inherently neither valuable nor persuasive to the issue of whether [a

claimant is] disabled.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520b(c); (see AR at 17, 64, 74 (noting that Cecil filed for

benefits in March of 2022).) This category includes “statements on issues reserved to the

Commissioner.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520b(c)(3) (cleaned up). As the ALJ correctly observed, the

opinions of Drs. Glass and Schlosser simply indicated that Cecil was incapable of performing his

past work as a police officer. (AR at 27, 467, 473–74.) That is an issue reserved for the

7 It does not appear that the ALJ actually discussed Dr. Schlosser’s notes at Step Three. (See AR at 21.)

Nonetheless, because the analysis is the same for the opinions of Drs. Glass and Schlosser, the Court will

indulge Cecil’s premise that the ALJ considered both at Step Three and discuss them together.

Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520b(c)(3)(vi). Accordingly, the ALJ properly concluded that

these opinions were “not inherently persuasive.” (AR at 27.)

However, just because the ALJ found the medical opinions unpersuasive, it does not follow

that he necessarily must disregard the medical evidence contained in the reports alongside the

opinions. Cf. Coria v. Heckler, 750 F.2d 245, 247 (3d Cir. 1984) (“[I]t is important to distinguish

between those portions of the physicians’ reports that represent the physician[s]’ medical findings

and those portions of the reports that represent conclusions as to the claimant’s disability for

purposes of worker’s compensation.”) Indeed, contrary to the view of Plaintiff, the ALJ properly

considered the medical findings of Drs. Glass and Schlosser. Cf. id. at 248 (vacating ALJ’s

decision due to failure to consider “medical findings set forth in the medical reports for submission

with the worker’s compensation claim”). Accordingly, the ALJ’s decision to look to the medical

findings of Drs. Glass and Schlosser at Step Three, while disregarding their ultimate medical

opinions, was proper.

C. VE TESTIMONY

After the hearing, Cecil objected to the testimony of the VE because the VE admitted that

he did not consider “Reasoning Codes” in providing his testimony. (AR at 313.) The ALJ did not

respond to this objection in his written decision—and the Commissioner does not argue otherwise.

(See Def. Opp. at 15–17.) Accordingly, Plaintiff argues that this omission violated his right to

respond to administrative action under Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 469 (1983) and the

ALJ’s requirement to address objections under the Administration’s Hearings, Appeals and

Litigation Law Manual. (Pl. Br. at 15.) The Commissioner responds that this was harmless error,

since it only implicated one of the three occupations identified by the VE. (Def. Opp. at 16–17.)

As explained above, “[o]rdinary harmless error review, in which the appellant bears the

burden to demonstrate harm, is applicable to” Social Security appeals. Holloman, 639 F. App’x

814 (citing Shineski, 556 U.S. 409); see Peterman v. Berryhill, No. 18-13751, 2019 WL 2315016,

at *7 (D.N.J. May 31, 2019) (applying harmless error analysis at Step Five). Harmless error has

been specifically applied in the context of an ALJ’s failure to respond to post-hearing objections

to a VE’s testimony. See Cortez v. Berryhill, No. 17-1493, 2018 WL 4103622, at *2–3 (S.D. Tex.

July 23, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 3863484 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 13,

2018). To show harmful error, Cecil “must clearly identify the error and explain how the error

actually ‘affected his substantial rights.’” Holloman, 639 F. App’x at 814 n.3 (cleaned up) (quoting

Shineski, 556 U.S. at 407); see also Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 553 (“[R]emand is not required here

because it would not affect the outcome of the case.”).

By way of background, the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) “lists and defines

all jobs available in the national economy and specifies what qualifications are needed to perform

each job.” Zirnsak, 777 F.3d at 616 (internal quotation marks omitted). The DOT provides

“[r]easoning levels” for each job. Id. These levels range from 1 at the lowest to 6 at the highest.

Id. As is relevant here, “jobs with a reasoning level of 3 require that an employee be able to ‘[a]pply

commonsense understanding to carry out instructions furnished in written, oral, or diagrammatic

form [and d]eal with problems involving several concrete variables in or from standardized

situations.’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Dictionary of Occupational Titles, app. C, 1991

WL 688702 (4th ed. 1991)).

Sometimes, an ALJ will consider both the DOT and testimony from a VE. Id. at 616–17.

When these two sources appear to conflict, the ALJ must “elicit a reasonable explanation” from

the VE and “explain in its decision ‘how the conflict was resolved.’” Id. at 617 (quoting Burns v.

Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 127 (3d Cir. 2002)). “An ALJ’s failure to comply with these requirements

may warrant remand in a particular case.” Id. However, remand is not required “so long as

‘substantial evidence exists in other portions of the record that can form an appropriate basis to

support the result.’” Id. (quoting Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 557).

Here, The ALJ found that Cecil had the RFC to “perform simple, routine tasks and make

simple work-related decisions.” (AR at 22.) Then, relying on the VE’s testimony, the ALJ found

that Cecil could work as a marker, routing clerk, and mail clerk. (Id. at 29.) The mail clerk job

requires a reasoning level of 3, while the marker and routing clerk jobs only require reasoning

levels of 2. Dictionary of Occupational Titles, 209.687-026 Mail Clerk, 1991 WL 671813 (4th ed.

1991); Dictionary of Occupational Titles, 209.587-034 Marker, 1991 WL 671802 (4th ed. 1991);

Dictionary of Occupational Titles, 222.687-022, Routing Clerk, 1991 WL 672133 (4th ed. 1991).

After the hearing, Cecil objected to the VE’s testimony. (AR at 313–14.)

Starting with the mail clerk job, Cecil objected that his limitation to simple tasks was

inconsistent with a job requiring a reasoning level of 3. (Id. at 314.) The Third Circuit has held

that there is not “a per se conflict between a job that requires level 3 reasoning and a finding that

a claimant should be limited to simple and routine work.” Zirnsak, 777 F.3d at 618. Instead, a court

should determine whether “the record establishe[s] that the claimant in question [can] perform a

level 3 reasoning job, despite a limitation to simple work.” Id. However, assuming arguendo that

Cecil is correct that he could not work as a mail clerk, any error was harmless for the reasons

discussed below.

This leaves the marker and routing clerk occupations, both with a reasoning level of 2. The

Third Circuit has explained that “[w]orking at reasoning level 2 would not contradict” a very

similar RFC allowing for work that is “simple, routine and repetitive” Money v. Barnhart, 91 F.

App’x 210, 215 (3d Cir. 2004); see also Zirnsak, 777 F.3d at 618 (noting that even courts that have

found that claimants limited to simple, repetitive tasks could not perform jobs requiring reasoning

level 3 have held that such claimants could perform jobs requiring reasoning level 2). Additionally,

other courts have concluded that RFCs identical in the relevant part to Cecil’s are consistent with

performing work at reasoning level 2. See Ariel R.L. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 23-1379, 2024

WL 4343573, at *4–5 (D.P.R. Sept. 30, 2024); DeLeon v. Kijakazi, No. 22-1387, 2023 WL

8242132, at *4, *7 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2023). Cecil has not explained why his RFC would prevent

him from performing jobs with a reasoning level of 2.

The ALJ found, and Cecil does not challenge, that the marker and routing clerk occupations

totaled approximately 286,421 jobs in the national economy. (AR at 29.) In fact, the one

occupation that Cecil’s objection would have plausibly required the ALJ to disregard, the mail

clerk occupation, only represented 12,746 jobs in the national economy. (Id.) It strains credulity

to think that this de minimis decrease in the number of jobs available nationally would have altered

the ALJ’s analysis, and Cecil does not argue that it would have. In fact, the Third Circuit has

repeatedly found that far fewer than 286,421 jobs were sufficient to support an ALJ’s finding that

significant jobs existed in the national economy. See, e.g., Lamoureux v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No.

21-1677, 2021 WL 5860738, at *2 (3d Cir. Dec. 10, 2021) (“[T]he vocational expert’s testimony

that nearly 36,000 jobs were available in the national economy supports a finding that work existed

in significant numbers.”); Sanchez v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 705 F. App’x 95, 99 (3d Cir. 2017)

(18,000 jobs was “sufficiently significant to support the ALJ’s decision” (internal quotation marks

omitted)); Young v. Astrue, 519 F. App’x 769, 772 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[T]he testimony from the

vocational expert that 20,000 jobs were available in the national economy is sufficient to support

a finding that work exists in significant numbers.”).

As is obvious, even removing the mail clerk job, significant jobs still existed in the national

economy to support the ALJ’s conclusion. Accordingly, the Court has little trouble concluding

that “substantial evidence exists in other portions of the record” to support the ALJ’s conclusion,

rendering any error from the ALJ’s consideration of the mail clerk job harmless. Rutherford, 339

F.3d at 557. Because Cecil’s objection would have simply required the ALJ to disregard the mail

clerk job, and any error stemming from consideration of that job was itself harmless, the ALJ’s

failure to address the objection was also harmless. See Stacey S. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 21-

20433, 2022 WL 16834673, at *8 n.9 (D.N.J. Nov. 8, 2022) (citing Rutherford, 399 F.3d at 553).

CONCLUSION

Having reviewed the record as a whole, the decision of the Commissioner is

AFFIRMED. An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.

/ C

\7

ROBERT KIRSCH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: October 14, 2025

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