BAGAL

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

ABHIJIT BAGAL,

Plaintiff,

Civil Action No. 24-11440 (ZNQ) (JBD)

v.

OPINION

RUTGERS, THE STATE UNIVERSITY

OF NEW JERSEY, et. al.,

Defendants.

QURAISHI, District Judge

THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon a Motion to Dismiss the First Amended

Complaint filed on March 24, 2025, by Defendants Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey

(“Rutgers”), Jonathan Holloway, Jeffrey Robinson, Enobong (Anna) Branch, Jacqueline S. Mattis,

Lucille Foster, Corrine Castro, and Audrey Truschke (collectively, “Defendants”). (“Motion”,

ECF No. 20.) In support of their Motion, Defendants filed a Brief in Support (Moving Br., ECF

No. 20-1) and the Declaration of Jeffrey Soos (ECF No. 20-2), along with five exhibits attached

to the Soos Declaration. (Soos Exs. 1-5, ECF Nos. 20-3–7.) On May 7, 2025, pro se Plaintiff

Abhijit Bagal (“Plaintiff”) filed an Opposition to the Motion (Opp’n. Br., ECF No. 24), to which

Defendants replied. (Reply, ECF No. 25.) On June 4, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Notice of

Supplemental Authority. (ECF No. 26.)

The Court has carefully considered the parties’ submissions and decides the Motion

without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78 and Local Civil Rule 78.1.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court will GRANT Defendants’ Motion.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

During labor union negotiations in 2023, Rutgers agreed to form a joint Task Force to

examine issues of potential caste discrimination impacting students and union members.1 The

Task Force was co-chaired by Defendant Professor Audrey Truschke (“Truschke”), who according

to Plaintiff, “has a well-documented history of discriminatory animus towards the Hindu religion

and has engaged in anti-Hindu hate speech and Hinduphobia on numerous occasions.” (First

Amended Complaint “FAC” ¶ 37.) In August 2024, the Task Force released a report (the “Report”)

where it recommended that Rutgers include the term “caste” as a protected category in Rutgers’s

Policy on Discrimination and Harassment (the “Policy”).2 (FAC ¶¶ 6, 35; see also Report, Soos.

Ex. 1.) In the Report, the Task Force defined caste as “an inherited and immutable social hierarchy

with uneven power relations between groups.” (Report at 11.) According to Plaintiff, the Report

is based on fraudulent caste data that was used to justify the inclusion of “caste” as a protected

category to target and discriminate against Hindus at Rutgers. (FAC ¶ 38.) Notably missing from

the Report however is any indication that caste-based discrimination is solely linked to Hinduism.

1 See University January 13, 2025 Response to Task Force on Caste Discrimination Report, University Labor

Relations Updates and Announcements, https://laborrelations.rutgers.edu/updates-announcements (last visited

September 29, 2025). The Court may take judicial notice of information published to government websites on a

motion to dismiss without converting it into a motion for summary judgment. See Hafez v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC,

666 F.Supp.3d 455, 457 n.2 (D.N.J. 2023).

2 The Court considers the contents of the Report that is attached as Exhibit 1 to the Declaration of Jeffrey Soos. See

Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Plaintiff’s claims are

based on the Report and the Task Force’s recommendation to include the term “caste” to Rutgers’s Policy. The

document is undisputedly authentic, and Plaintiff has not suggested otherwise in any of his filings. Given that the

Report is “an undisputedly authentic document” and the “Plaintiff’s claims are based on the document,” the Court

does not need to convert Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss into a Motion for Summary Judgment. Id.

Rather, the Task Force explicitly claims that caste-based discrimination occurs across multiple

religions, including Christians, Muslims, Sikhs, and Jews. (Report at 19.)

Following the release of the Report, on September 25, 20243, Plaintiff, a North Carolina

resident, enrolled in Rutgers’s online course titled “DEI for Public Managers.” (Moving Br. at 8,

FAC ¶¶ 9, 14.) Plaintiff does not allege to have ever been physically present on Rutgers’s campus

or to have discussed the Report with any Rutgers students or faculty. Nor does Plaintiff allege to

have taken any classes with Truschke. On January 13, 2025, Rutgers declined to add the term

“caste” to the Policy, instead “determin[ing] that current university policy and protected class

categories provide protections against caste discrimination.”4 Specifically, Rutgers determined

that the Policy’s prohibition of discrimination based on religion, ancestry, national origin, and race

already prohibit caste-based discrimination.5 Although Rutgers did not amend its Policy, Plaintiff

claims the Report discriminates against Hindus and individuals of Indian and South Asian descent

at Rutgers and has resulted in Plaintiff abstaining from practicing his religious beliefs. (See, e.g.,

FAC ¶ 118.) Defendants moved to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), arguing that

(1) Plaintiff lacks standing; and in the alternative, (2) Plaintiff’s claims fail as a matter of law.

(Moving Br. at 2–6.)

3 Plaintiff’s FAC does not include the date he enrolled in this course. The Court includes this date only for background

purposes and does not rely on it for purposes of deciding Defendants’ Motion.

4 See University January 13, 2025 Response to Task Force on Caste Discrimination Report, University Labor

Relations Updates and Announcements, https://laborrelations.rutgers.edu/updates-announcements (last visited

September 29, 2025).

5 Id.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. RULE 12(b)(1)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) allows a court to dismiss a complaint for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction because a party lacks standing. See Ballentine v. United States, 486

F.3d 806, 810 (3d Cir. 2007). Two types of challenges can be made under Rule 12(b)(1): a facial

attack or a factual attack. See In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d

625, 632 (3d Cir. 2017). A facial attack “challenges subject matter jurisdiction without disputing

the facts alleged in the complaint, and it requires the court to consider the allegations of the

complaint as true.” Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 346 (3d Cir. 2016) (citation modified).

A factual challenge “attacks the factual allegations underlying the complaint's assertion of

jurisdiction, either through the filing of an answer or ‘otherwise present[ing] competing facts.’”

Id. (quoting Const. Party of Pa. v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 358 (3d Cir. 2014)).

“In reviewing facial challenges to standing, [courts] apply the same standard as on review

of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” In re Horizon, 846 F.3d at 633. Courts “only consider

the allegations of the complaint and documents referenced therein and attached thereto, in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff.” Const. Party of Pa., 757 F.3d at 358 (citation modified). When

considering a factual challenge, by contrast, “a court may weigh and consider evidence outside the

pleadings.” Id. (citation modified).

B. ARTICLE III STANDING

“Article III of the United States Constitution limits the judicial power to the adjudication

of ‘cases’ and ‘controversies.’” Const. Party of Pa., 757 F.3d at 356–57. To that end, a litigant

must have standing to bring his claims. See Adam v. Barone, 41 F.4th 230, 233 (3d Cir. 2022).

Standing requires a plaintiff to demonstrate three familiar elements: (1) an injury in fact; (2)

causation; and (3) redressability. See Nat’l Shooting Sports Found. v. Att’y Gen. of New Jersey,

80 F.4th 215, 218 (3d Cir. 2023). The injury in fact must be “concrete, particularized, and

imminent rather than conjectural or hypothetical.” Id. (quoting Trump v. New York, 592 U.S. 125,

131 (2020)). An injury is imminent if it is “certainly impending” or if there is “a substantial risk

that the harm will occur.” Id. (quoting Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 158

(2014)). However, litigants cannot “manufacture standing merely by inflicting harm on

themselves based on their fears of hypothetical future harm that is not certainly impending.”

Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l. USA, 568 U.S. 398, 416 (2013).

The second element, causation, requires the injury to be “fairly. . .trace[able] to the

challenged action of the defendant, and not. . .th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third

party not before the court.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (citation

modified). Lastly, the injury must be “legally and judicially cognizable.” United States v. Texas,

599 U.S. 670, 676 (2023) (citation omitted). “That requires, among other things, that the dispute

is traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial process—in other words,

that the asserted injury is traditionally redressable in federal court.” Id. (citation modified). “The

party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these elements.” Lujan, 504

U.S. at 561; see also Rd.-Con, Inc. v. City of Phila., 120 F.4th 346, 354 (3d Cir. 2024) (“The

plaintiff bears the burden of showing these three elements. . .and likewise must demonstrate

standing separately for each form of relief sought.”).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants argue that Plaintiff does not have standing to bring any of his claims.6 (Moving

Br. at 14.) In doing so, Defendants argue that Plaintiff alleges two distinct injuries in the FAC: (1)

6 Plaintiff brings claims under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, the First Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, 42

U.S.C. § 1985(3), 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination.

Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff for his religious beliefs because the Report connects an

oppressive caste system with Hinduism; and (2) Plaintiff has refrained from engaging in certain

religious activities and from discussing his religious beliefs in class. (Id. at 15.) Defendants argue

that Plaintiff was only a remote participant in an online certificate program, so he has not suffered

any concrete injury as a result of the Report’s publication, and that Plaintiff’s allegations of harm

to other Hindu students at Rutgers is improper. (Moving Br. at 15–16.) Defendants further argue

that even if Plaintiff had an injury in fact, there is no causal connection between the alleged injuries

and Defendants’ conduct because the Report was a non-binding recommendation. (Id. at 17.)

Moreover, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s injuries cannot be redressed by this Court because

Defendants did not implement any policy changes in response to the Report and do not intend to

do so in the future. (Id. at 18.)

Rather than address these arguments, Plaintiff’s Opposition is full of generalized

grievances against Rutgers, Truschke, and the data that the Report was based on, none of which

relate to how Plaintiff himself has been injured by Defendants’ purported conduct. (See Opp’n.

Br. at 6 (discussing unrelated civil rights cases against Rutgers); Opp’n. Br. at 10 (stating that the

term “caste” is a “highly insulting slur like the ‘n-word’”); Opp’n. Br. at 18–19 (arguing the Report

relies on data that peddles a narrative of pervasive caste-based discrimination in the United States))

Buried within these general grievances, Plaintiff only conclusory states how he has personally

been harmed, arguing that the Report targets Hindus and is unconstitutionally vague, that Rutgers

has created a hostile school environment for Hindus, and that Plaintiff has had to refrain from

certain religious activities.

Given that Defendants attached the signed Declaration of Jeffrey Soos to its Motion, the

Court will consider the Motion to be a factual challenge to Plaintiff’s standing. See Davis, 824

F.3d at 346. The Court will now review Plaintiff’s alleged injuries arising under the First

Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and other anti-discrimination laws.

C. FIRST AMENDMENT STANDING

1. Free Exercise Clause

Plaintiff brings a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants are violating the

First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause, which prohibits any policy that acts as restraint on the

free exercise of religion. School Dist. of Abington Tp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222–23

(1963). Plaintiff argues that inclusion of the word “caste” in the Report ascribes an “oppressive

and discriminatory caste system to the entire Hindu religion”, caused him to refrain from certain

religious activities, and prevented him from expressing his religious beliefs in class out of fear the

Report will be enforced against him. (FAC ¶¶ 99, 118–120.) Plaintiff compares himself to the

plaintiffs in Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus and Ariz. Right to Life Pol. Action Comm. v.

Bayless, in which the Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit, respectively, held that the plaintiffs had

standing to bring pre-enforcement claims challenging the defendants’ conduct. (See id. ¶ 119.)

It is well-established that plaintiffs may “challenge the constitutionality of a regulation

before suffering an ‘actual’ injury arising from enforcement so long as the threatened injury is

‘imminent.’” Greenberg v. Lehocky, 81 F.4th 376, 384 (3d Cir. 2023) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at

560). And while “chilled speech or self-censorship” can establish an injury in fact, a “plaintiff

cannot manufacture standing merely by inflicting harm on himself based on his fears of

hypothetical future harm that is not certainly impending.” Id. at 388 (citation modified). “Rather,

a plaintiff’s self-censorship confers standing only where it is objectively reasonable and fairly

traceable to the challenged regulation.” Id.

Here, Plaintiff has not pled facts to demonstrate how the Report—which cannot be and will

not be enforced—is burdening Plaintiff’s ability to exercise his religious rights. The Report was

a non-binding recommendation that carries with it no disciplinary weight. And Rutgers expressly

declined to include the term “caste” in its Policy, so the complained of governmental action

apparently burdening Plaintiff’s religious activities does not exist. Stated differently, Plaintiff’s

self-censorship is based on “hypothetical future harm that is not certainly impending.” Id.; see

also Clapper, 568 U.S. at 419 (holding that plaintiffs cannot “establish standing simply by

claiming that they experienced a ‘chilling effect’ that resulted from a governmental policy that

does not regulate, constrain, or compel any action on their part”); Kumar v. Koester, 131 F.4th

746, 754 (9th Cir. 2025) (dismissing a free exercise claim for lack of standing where appellant did

not demonstrate that the inclusion of the word “caste” in a university anti-discrimination policy

actually burdened appellant’s ability to exercise his religion). Accordingly, Plaintiff lacks Article

III standing to bring his Free Exercise claim.

2. Establishment Clause

Plaintiff also brings a claim under the Establishment Clause, alleging that “Defendants,

through the caste report and elsewhere, have unilaterally determined that the contours of Hinduism

include caste and an oppressive and discriminatory caste system.” (FAC ¶ 178.) Plaintiff argues

that even though the term “caste” is facially neutral, the Report’s references to Hinduism and

Truschke’s past statements demonstrate that the Report was actually intended to target Hinduism.

(Opp’n. Br. at 16.) Although not clearly stated, Plaintiff’s alleged injury appears to be the stigma

associated with his membership in a religion that the Report has characterized and disapproves of.

“In a case arising from an alleged violation of the Establishment Clause, a plaintiff must

show, as in other cases, that he is ‘directly affected by the laws and practices against which [his]

complaints are directed.’” Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. 667, 698 (2018) (quoting School Dist. of

Abington Township, 374 U.S. at 224 n. 9) (alternation in original). This can be shown in various

ways, such as through the denial of a benefit because of an individual’s religion or by being forced

to recite a mandatory prayer in a public school. See Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563

U.S. 125, 129–30 (2011); see also Hassan v. City of New York, 804 F.3d 277, 289–91 (3d Cir.

2015) (holding plaintiff had standing to challenge public surveillance laws that targeted Muslims).

While “stigma can be a cognizable Establishment Clause injury” it must still “be concrete and

particularized.” Barber v. Bryant, 860 F.3d 345, 353 (5th Cir. 2017).

Here, Plaintiff has not sufficiently pled facts to show that he is “directly affected” by the

alleged stigmatization created by the Report. Trump, 585 U.S. at 698. Plaintiff is a North Carolina

resident and only attended one online course at Rutgers. (FAC ¶¶ 14–15.) Plaintiff fails to even

allege that the Report was discussed in his class or that he ever discussed the Report with any other

students or faculty. Moreover, the Report was a non-binding recommendation and Rutgers

expressly stated that it did not agree with or adopt the conclusions of the Report. (Soos Ex. 1 at

1.)

In any event, the Report did not establish any official policy or position of Rutgers.

Plaintiff cannot manufacture standing by alleging a stigmatic injury, when that alleged stigmatic

harm is not objectively reasonable based on the allegations. See Clapper, 568 U.S. at 418 (holding

that plaintiff’s subjective fears could not be substituted for a claim of a present objective harm).

Simply being offended by the Report and Truschke’s alleged statements connecting Hinduism to

the caste system are insufficient, without more, to confer Plaintiff with standing to bring his

Establishment Clause claim. See American Legion v. American Humanist Association, 588 U.S.

29, 80 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (holding that offense alone is insufficient to qualify as a

“concrete and particularized” injury); see also Hindu American Foundation, Inc. v. Kish, Civ. No.

22-1656, 2025 WL 2029733, at *11 (E.D. Cal. July 21, 2025) (holding that plaintiffs’ allegations

of “an abstract stigmatic injury” based on California’s Civil Rights Division’s enforcement of

caste-based discrimination against others was insufficient to establish standing under the

Establishment Clause). Given that Plaintiff has not even pled facts to demonstrate that he

discussed the Report with anyone or was physically present on Rutgers’s campus, he has failed to

establish how he has been “directly affected” by the publication of the Report. See Trump, 585

U.S. at 698. Thus, Plaintiff does not have Article III standing to bring his Establishment Clause

claim.

D. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT STANDING

1. Equal Protection Clause

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants have violated the Equal Protection Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment because they do not “enforce its anti-discrimination policies evenly and

uniformly” and “selectively target[] Hindu Americans.” (FAC ¶ 186.) Moreover, Plaintiff asserts

that the Report has “created de facto suspect classes” that target Hindus and individuals of Indian

and South Asian descent. (FAC ¶ 188.)

In the Equal Protection context, the Third Circuit has held that a “‘discriminatory

classification is itself a penalty,’ and thus ‘qualifies as an actual injury for standing purposes, where

a citizen’s right to equal treatment is at stake.’” Road-Con, Inc., 120 F.4th at 358 (quoting Hassan,

804 F.3d at 290). But “an injury resulting from governmental racial discrimination ‘accords a

basis for standing only to those persons who are personally denied equal treatment by the

challenged discriminatory conduct.’” Doe ex rel. Doe v. Lower Merion School Dist., 665 F.3d

524, 542 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755 (1984)) (emphasis added). In

other words, for a plaintiff to have standing he must demonstrate that he has personally been denied

equal treatment because of governmental discrimination. See id.

Here, the Court holds that Plaintiff has not pled facts to demonstrate that Defendants

enforce its anti-discrimination policies in a way that targets Hindu Americans, let alone Plaintiff.

As an initial matter, Rutgers did not adopt the Report’s recommendations so it not clear what

policy Plaintiff believes is being unequally enforced against him. If Plaintiff is suggesting that the

Report can be enforced against him, that is plainly contradicted by Rutgers’s announcement in

which it declined to include the term “caste” to its Policy. As has been explained, the Report was

a non-binding recommendation that Defendants cannot enforce. Regardless, Plaintiff has not pled

facts demonstrating that any policy of Rutgers is being enforced against him in a discriminatory

manner. Without more, Plaintiff cannot establish that he has standing to bring his Equal Protection

claim. See Hindu American Foundation, Inc., 2025 WL 2029733, at *14 (finding that plaintiffs

lacked standing to bring Equal Protection claim where they could not show how the complained

of policy was being applied in a discriminatory manner).

Insofar as the Plaintiff alleges he has suffered a stigmatic injury, “such injuries ‘accord[] a

basis for standing only to those persons who are personally denied equal treatment by the

challenged discriminatory conduct[.]” Hindu American Foundation, Inc., 2025 WL 2029733, at

*14 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 738 (1984)) (alterations in original); see also Kumar

v. Koester, 683 F. Supp. 3d 1108, 1114–15 (C.D. Cal. 2023) (finding that Hindu university

professors lacked standing to assert an equal protection challenge to an antidiscrimination policy's

use of the term “caste” where the plaintiffs merely alleged that “the Policy impermissibly

stigmatizes individuals of South Asian descent and Hindu practitioners” and that “the policy could

be enforced unevenly”), aff'd and remanded, 131 F.4th 746 (9th Cir. 2025). Plaintiff’s abstract

claim of stigmatic harm is insufficient to confer him standing. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755

(1984). Given that Plaintiff has not pled facts to demonstrate how he has personally been denied

equal treatment by any of the Defendants, he does not have standing to bring an equal protection

claim.

2. Due Process Clause

Plaintiff further contends his Due Process rights have been violated because “[t]he caste

report is so vague that people of ordinary intelligence do not know what conduct is prohibited by

the addition of caste to Rutgers Policy.” (FAC ¶ 195.) He further claims that the addition of the

term “caste” to Rutgers’s Policy will cause him to live in fear of being disciplined for

discrimination. (FAC ¶ 198.)

The Court reiterates that the Report was a non-binding recommendation and does not

prohibit any conduct. Rutgers cannot enforce the Report and has no intention of adding the term

“caste” to its Policy. (Soos Ex. 2.) And even if Plaintiff had concerns that Defendant could enforce

the Policy (which does not include the “caste” language) or another policy against him, Plaintiff

has not pled facts to demonstrate that he intends to engage in caste-based discrimination. Rather,

Plaintiff expressly denies engaging in discrimination of any kind and alleges that the Hindu

religion does not include or endorse a discriminatory caste system. (FAC ¶ 101.) Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s alleged fear of enforcement is imaginary and has no realistic possibility of occurring.

See Greenberg, 81 F.4th at 386 (finding that plaintiff failed to establish an injury in fact, as the

policy prohibited nothing plaintiff intended to do); Kumar, 131 F.4th at 753 (holding that litigants

“fear of prosecution must not be imaginary or wholly speculative” for them to have standing).

Because Plaintiff has not pled facts to demonstrate that his alleged fear of enforcement is imminent,

his Due Process claim is also dismissed for lack of Article III standing.

E. REMAINING CLAIMS

Plaintiff’s remaining claims are brought under Title VI (Count One), 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)

(Count Six), 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Count Seven), and N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 (Count Eight). Because these

claims all generally allege the same injury (i.e., discrimination), the Court will address them

together. See Quick v. Township of Bernards, Civ. No. 17-5595, 2024 WL 4024097, at *6 n.5

(D.N.J. Aug. 30, 2024) (citing Finkelman v. Nat’l Football League, 810 F.3d 187, 203 (3d Cir.

2016)).

Plaintiff generally alleges that Defendants are discriminating against him and other

students because of their “actual and/or perceived Hindu ancestry, race, ethnic characteristics,

religion, or national origin.” (FAC ¶ 155.) According to Plaintiff, this racial discrimination affords

him with an injury that satisfies Article III’s standing requirements. (Opp’n. Br. at 23.)

While discrimination of any kind can certainly satisfy the “injury in fact” requirement of

standing, Plaintiff has not pled facts to demonstrate how he has personally been discriminated

against. For example, he claims that “while Hindu students can in theory discuss their beliefs and

religious practices, they can do so only by renouncing or pretending to renounce an immutable

aspect of their identify or by remaining silent.” (FAC ¶ 158.) But allegations about injuries

incurred by other students are not “concrete and particularized” with respect to Plaintiff and do

not confer him with standing. See Associated Builders & Contractors Western Pa. v. Cmty. Coll.

of Allegheny Cnty., 81 F.4th 279, 287 (3d Cir. 2023) (holding that an injury “to some third party”

does not satisfy the injury in fact requirement).

Plaintiff’s barebone allegations about discrimination he has personally faced are similarly

insufficient to confer him with standing. The FAC alleges that “derogatory inquiries” have been

made regarding Plaintiff’s ethnicity and religious customs and that unnamed individuals speak to

Plaintiff with “moral indignation, often coercing him to denounce the Hindu caste system.” (FAC

¶¶ 126, 128.) But notably absent from these allegations is any mention of who these individuals

are or whether these alleged incidents have any connection to Defendants. Accordingly, Plaintiff

has not pled facts to demonstrate a causal connection between his alleged injury and the

Defendants’ conduct.

Plaintiff also alleges that “[i]n the Rutgers DEI classes, asserting opposition to a

hypothetical caste discrimination system has become the sole means by which Plaintiff is deemed

worthy to express an opinion, and its serves as an ongoing effort to affirm Plaintiff’s innocence.”

(FAC ¶ 129.) However, Plaintiff has not pled any facts that would provide context for this

allegation, such as what the question was, who asked the question, or whether the “hypothetical

caste discrimination” scenario had any connection to Hinduism. Moreover, it is not clear how

asserting opposition to a hypothetical caste system can form the basis of Plaintiff’s injury when

Plaintiff himself has asserted that it is his “sincerely held religious belief that the Hindu religion

in no way includes or endorses an oppressive and discriminatory caste system.” (FAC ¶ 101.)

Given that Plaintiff has denounced caste-based discrimination, he cannot claim to have an “injury

in fact” for apparently confirming that view in his class.

Plaintiff also alleges that “Rutgers selectively applies (or plans to apply) or enforces (or

plans to enforce) its caste report, student handbooks, guidelines, policies, procedures, course

catalogs, registration materials, bulletins, circulars, and regulations in bad faith and in a

discriminatory way.” (Id. ¶ 213.) But as the Court has already explained, the Report is a non-

binding recommendation that was not adopted by Rutgers. As such, Plaintiff’s alleged fear of

discrimination based on the Report is simply not plausible and he cannot manufacture Article III

standing with hypothetical allegations of discriminatory enforcement. See Clapper, 568 U.S. at

416 (2013). Because Plaintiff has not pled facts to demonstrate an injury in fact that can be fairly

traceable to Defendants’ conduct, the remainder of his claims must also be dismissed.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court will GRANT Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

without prejudice based on Plaintiff’s lack of standing. Under the circumstances, the Court finds

that further amendment to the Complaint would be futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp.,

293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). Accordingly, Plaintiff will not be granted leave to amend the

First Amended Complaint. An appropriate Order will follow.

Date: October 14, 2025

s/ Zahid N. Quraishi

ZAHID N. QURAISHI

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE