Bhargave

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

TAPAN BHARGAVE,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 2:25-cv-00258-JES-KCD

GENESEE REGIONAL BANK, WRM

HOLDINGS IV, LLC, as

assignee of GENESEE

REGIONAL BANK, and FEDERAL

NATIONAL MORTGAGE

ASSOCIATION, as Trustee,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on Genesee Regional Bank

(GRB) and WRM Holdings IV, LLC’s (WRM) (collectively the

Defendants) Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss (Doc. #23)1 filed on

May 20, 2025.2 Plaintiff Tapan Bhargave (Bhargave or Plaintiff)

1 “A defendant can move to dismiss a complaint under Rule

12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction by either facial

or factual attack.” Stalley ex rel. U.S. v. Orlando Reg'l

Healthcare Sys., Inc., 524 F.3d 1229, 1232 (11th Cir. 2008)(citing

McElmurray v. Consol. Gov't of Augusta–Richmond County, 501 F.3d

1244, 1250 (11th Cir. 2007)). When, as here, the movants do “not

present any outside evidence challenging the facts underlying

[Plaintiff]'s complaint, the difference is largely academic” and

the Court “need not decide” under which to proceed. Efron v.

Candelario, 110 F.4th 1229, 1234 n.5 (11th Cir. 2024), cert.

denied, 145 S. Ct. 1958, 221 L. Ed. 2d 738 (2025).

2 Defendants, along with Fannie Mae, also moved to dismiss

under Rule 12(b)(6). (See Docs. ##23-24.) Since the Court questions

its jurisdiction—its very power to hear the case— for reasons other

than stated in the motion, the Rule 12(b)(6) issues are not

reached. Jones v. State of Ga., 725 F.2d 622, 623 (11th Cir.

filed a Response in Opposition (Doc. #29) on June 5, 2025. For the

reasons stated below, the motion is denied, but the complaint is

dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction and plaintiff is given leave to file an amended

complaint.

I.

Bhargave and Defendants are involved in a foreclosure action

in state court. (Doc. #20, ¶ 11.) Bhargave lost and the state court

granted foreclosure. (Id. ¶ 12.) The sale is pending. (Id.)

Bhargave now sues Defendants in this court, raising claims of fraud

(Count I), breach of contract (Count II), and wrongful foreclosure

(Count III) because GRB allegedly does not actually own the

promissory note at issue in the foreclosure and because GRB

allegedly denied Bhargave’s request to be given reinstatement

amounts after the foreclosure was ordered. (Id. ¶¶ 9, 11.)

Defendants move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), arguing the Rooker-

Feldman doctrine deprives this Court of subject-matter

jurisdiction.

1984)(stating that courts should determine their jurisdiction

before deciding Rule 12(b)(6) motions); Hitt v. City of Pasadena,

561 F.2d 606, 608 (5th Cir. 1977)(stating that if jurisdictional

issues are present, “the court should dismiss only on the

jurisdictional ground under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), without

reaching the question of failure to state a claim under Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(b)(6).”).

II.

The “Rooker–Feldman [doctrine] raises a question about our

subject matter jurisdiction, an issue we are always obliged to

examine.” Target Media Partners v. Specialty Mktg. Corp., 881 F.3d

1279, 1284 (11th Cir. 2018). A relatively recent Supreme Court

decision changed how the Circuit applies the doctrine. Brown v.

R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 611 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir.

2010)(citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp.,

544 U.S. 280 (2005)). Exxon Mobil “clarified the scope of the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine by returning it to its roots, the facts of

the Rooker and Feldman cases.” Behr v. Campbell, 8 F.4th 1206,

1210 (11th Cir. 2021)(quoting Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 F.3d 1266,

1274 (11th Cir. 2009)). “In response, we abandoned the four-factor

test that had previously guided this Circuit's application of

Rooker-Feldman.” Id. “We chose instead to ‘adhere to the language

in Exxon Mobil, delineating the boundaries of the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine.’” Id. (quoting Nicholson at 1274).

Courts now “should follow a claim-by-claim approach” asking

one question: “[W]hether the [claim] has been ‘brought by state-

court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court

judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced

and inviting district court review and rejection of those

judgments.” Efron, 110 F.4th at 1235-36 (quoting Target, 881 F.3d

at 1285). Taken in parts, the reviewing court first asks whether

“the party against whom the doctrine is invoked” was the losing

“party to the underlying state-court proceeding.” Lance v. Dennis,

546 U.S. 459, 464 (2006). If so, the reviewing court next asks

“whether the substance—if not the form—of a plaintiff's claim

requires a district court to ‘review’ and ‘reject’ a state court

judgment.” Efron, 110 F.4th at 1238 (quoting Behr, 8 F.4th at

1211). If “a plaintiff's claim requires a federal district court

to review and reject a state court decision,” then Rooker-Feldman

bars plaintiff’s claim, regardless of how he styles it. Id. at

1236 n. 7.

“That, though, is as far as Rooker-Feldman goes.” Behr, 8

F.4th at 1210. Because Rooker-Feldman is so “limited” and “narrow”,

it “will almost never apply.” Efron, 110 F.4th at 1235 (quoting

Behr, 8 F.4th at 1211-12). “It does not prevent a ‘district court

from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction simply because a party

attempts to litigate in federal court a matter previously litigated

in state court.’” Id. (quoting Nicholson, 558 F.3d at 1274). “Nor

does Rooker-Feldman ‘block claims that require some

reconsideration of a decision of a state court if the plaintiff

presents some independent claim, albeit one that denies a legal

conclusion that a state court has reached in a case to which he

was a party.’” Id. (quoting Behr, 8 F.4th at 1212)(citation

modified). See also Mignott v. State Bar of Georgia Found., Inc.,

146 F.4th 1095, 1098 (11th Cir. 2025).

While Bhargave lost in state court, the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine does not apply here because none of his claims require

this Court to review and reject that state court’s judgments.

Count I seeks monetary damages for alleged fraud caused by

Defendants upon their false ownership representation of the

promissory note and failure to provide reinstatement amounts.

(Doc. #20, ¶¶ 14-16.) Count II seeks monetary damages for

Defendants’ alleged breach of the mortgage agreement by failing to

properly endorse or notify Bhargave of any note transfer. (Id. ¶¶

17-18.) Count III seeks monetary damages for an alleged wrongful

foreclosure due to Defendants’ lack of ownership of the promissory

note and their failure to provide reinstatement amounts. (Id. ¶¶

19-20.)

Bhargave’s claims do not require review and rejection of the

state court’s foreclosure judgment because they “seek[] damages

for some independent source of injury.” Efron, 110 F.4th at 1235.

All the claims seek monetary damages for injuries caused by

independent sources - the promissory note and the request for

reinstatement amounts. Thus, the claims fall outside the

boundaries of Rooker-Feldman. Id.; Behr, 8 F.4th at 1214 (“[C]laims

that seek only damages for . . . violations [by] third parties—

not relief from the judgment of the state court—are permitted” by

Rooker-Feldman.).

In Behr, a claim was similarly raised that defendants’ “use

of falsified . . . information as a basis for the [state court]

proceedings and decisions” injured the plaintiff. Id., 8 F.4th at

1213. The Eleventh Circuit held that alleged injuries “during the

proceedings and whether [a plaintiff] [is] entitled to damages for

those [injuries] . . . . [f]alls outside Rooker-Feldman’s

boundaries.” Id. That holding applies here, where Bhargave alleges

that he suffered damages because Defendants falsely asserted

ownership of the promissory note in the state proceedings.

Even if Bhargave “attempts to litigate in federal court a

matter previously litigated in state court” or “denies a legal

conclusion that a state court has reached,” Rooker-Feldman does

not impede such action. Efron, 110 F.4th at 1235. “To be sure,

other doctrines of preclusion, abstention, or comity may still bar

a plaintiff's claims—but they are separate and distinct from

Rooker-Feldman’s jurisdictional prohibition on appellate review of

state court decisions in federal district courts.” Behr, 8 F.4th

at 1210 (citing Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 292). Defendants’ Rule

12(b)(1) motion is denied.

While Defendants’ Rooker-Feldman challenge is denied, the

Court will sua sponte dismiss the Complaint for failure to properly

allege subject-matter jurisdiction based upon complete diversity

of citizenship. DeRoy v. Carnival Corp., 963 F.3d 1302, 1311 (11th

Cir. 2020)(“Federal courts have an obligation to examine sua sponte

their own jurisdiction over a case, notwithstanding the

contentions of the parties.” (citing Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am.

Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999))). The Complaint

identifies GRB as a corporation with New York as its principal

place of business, but it does not identify where it was

incorporated. (Doc. #20, ¶ 5.) This is deficient because, “[f]or

diversity purposes, a corporation is a citizen of both the state

where it is incorporated and the state where it has its principal

place of business.” MacGinnitie v. Hobbs Grp., LLC, 420 F.3d 1234,

1239 (11th Cir. 2005). The Complaint identifies WRM as a limited

liability company but fails to identify any of its members’

citizenship. (Doc. #20, ¶ 6.) This is deficient because, “[f]or

the purpose of determining diversity jurisdiction, ‘a limited

liability company is a citizen of any state of which a member of

the company is a citizen.’” Flintlock Const. Servs., LLC v. Well-

Come Holdings, LLC, 710 F.3d 1221, 1224 (11th Cir. 2013)(quoting

Rolling Greens MHP, L.P. v. Comcast SCH Holdings L.L.C., 374 F.3d

1020, 1022 (11th Cir. 2004). Given these defects, the Court cannot

determine if diversity jurisdiction is present.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED:

1. Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(1) motion in Doc. #23 is DENIED.

2. Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. #20) is DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE. Within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS of this Opinion and

Order, Plaintiff may file an amended complaint.

3. Defendants’ Rule 12(b) (6) motion in Doc. #23 is DENIED AS

MOOT.

4. Fannie Mae’s Rule 12(b) (6) motion (Doc. #24) is DENIED AS

MOOT.

DONE and ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this 14th day of

October 2025.

= Pe

JGH E. STEELE

5 IOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies:

Counsel of Record