Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

ORLANDO DIVISION

DEERFIELD AUTOMOTIVE,

LLC,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 6:25-cv-1307-PGB-LHP

HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA

CORPORATION,

Defendants.

/

ORDER

This cause is before the Court upon Defendant Hyundai Motor America

Corporation’s (“Defendant”) Motion to Transfer Venue to the Southern District

of Florida. (Doc. 14 (the “Motion”)). Plaintiff Deerfield Automotive, LLC d/b/a

King Hyundai (“Plaintiff”) filed a response in opposition. (Doc. 17 (the

“Response”)). Upon consideration, the Motion is due to be granted.

I. BACKGROUND

On June 10, 2025, Plaintiff initiated this action by filing its Complaint (Doc.

1-1 (the “Complaint”)) in the Ninth Judicial Circuit in and for Orange County,

Florida. Defendant removed the action to the instant Court on July 14, 2025. (Doc.

1).

As alleged in the Complaint, Plaintiff is a dealer of Hyundai motor vehicles

and Defendant is an importer and distributor of such vehicles. (Doc. 1-1, ¶¶ 1–2).

Plaintiff and Defendant are parties to a Hyundai Dealer Sales and Service

Agreement (the “Franchise Agreement”), “pursuant to which [Plaintiff]

operates a dealership for the sale and service of Hyundai Brand motor vehicles” in

Deerfield Beach, Florida (the “Dealership”). (Id. ¶ 3). Defendant’s parent

company, Hyundai Motor Company (“HMC”), manufactures both Hyundai and

Genesis motor vehicles. (Id. ¶ 9). Initially, Defendant produced Genesis motor

vehicles as part of the Hyundai line-make and thus permitted Hyundai dealers

such as Plaintiff to sell these vehicles. (Id. ¶ 11). However, in 2017, HMA announced

that it would create a subsidiary of HMA, Genesis Motor America, LLC (“GMA”),

that would become the sole distributor of Genesis motor vehicles. (Id. ¶¶ 10, 12–

13).

Ultimately, HMA’s plan was thwarted when the Florida Department of

Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (“FDHSMV”) rejected its application for a

license to distribute Genesis motor vehicles in Florida, finding the plan violated

Florida Statute § 320.6415. (Id. ¶¶ 15–16). That statute required HMA to “offer to

every existing Florida Hyundai dealer a Genesis Dealer Sales and Service

Agreement containing the same terms as existed in their respective Hyundai

Dealer Sales and Service Agreements.” (Id. ¶ 17). GMA subsequently agreed to offer

such agreements to all existing Hyundai dealers in Florida, and FDHSMV thus

granted GMA the sought-after license. (Id.).

Accordingly, Plaintiff and GMA executed a Genesis Dealer Agreement that

became effective on December 17, 2018. (Id. ¶ 18). However, Plaintiff alleges that:

Approximately one year later, HMA announced a radical

program [(the “Accelerate Program”)] unlawfully

designed to accomplish indirectly what HMA and GMA were

prohibited previously from achieving directly—taking the

Genesis line-make from the Hyundai dealer body, awarding

the Genesis line-make to only certain selected dealers, and

mandating that those selected dealers sell and service Genesis

motor vehicles in stand-alone facilities.1

(Id.). Additionally, in February 2020, Defendant implemented a complimentary

maintenance program (the “Complimentary Maintenance Program”) that

applies to sales of new Hyundai motor vehicles (Id. ¶ 50). Under the

Complimentary Maintenance Program, Hyundai dealers such as Plaintiff are

required to perform certain maintenance services on such vehicles for three years

or 36,000 miles. (Id.). However, Plaintiff alleges the reimbursement rates set by

Defendant are substantially below the rates permitted by law. (Id. ¶ 53).

Consequently, in Counts I through VII of the Complaint, Plaintiff brings

claims alleging Defendant’s Accelerate Program violates various subsections of

Florida Statute § 320.64. (Doc. 1-1, ¶¶ 54–118). Additionally, in Count VIII,

Plaintiff asserts the reimbursement rates Defendant has established under its

Complimentary Maintenance Program violate Florida Statute § 320.696. (Id. ¶¶

119–28). Finally, in Count IX, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant has breached the

Franchise Agreement through its implementation of the Accelerate Program and

its Complimentary Maintenance Program. (Id. ¶¶ 129–33).

1 For example, Plaintiff avers that the Accelerate Program “unlawfully conditions a majority of

dealers[’] gross margin on whether a dealer complies with or attains various unilaterally set

objectives or criteria, including the imposition of unreasonable facility requirements costing

dealers millions of dollars to implement and the elimination of the Genesis line[-]make from

the all Hyundai sales and service facility.” (Doc. 1-1, ¶ 19).

Now, Defendant asks the Court to transfer this action to the Southern

District of Florida. (Doc. 14). Plaintiff has filed a response in opposition and the

matter is thus ripe for review. (See Doc. 17).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion to transfer venue within the federal court system is governed by

28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). See Atl. Marine Const. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for W. Dist. of Tx.,

571 U.S. 49, 57–58 (2013). Under § 1404(a), a district court may transfer a civil

action “[f]or the convenience of the parties and witnesses, [and] in the interest of

justice . . . to any district or division where it might have been brought or to any

district or division to which all parties have consented.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).

When applying this statute, courts undertake a two-step analysis. Nat’l Tr.

Ins. Co. v. Pa. Nat’l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 223 F. Supp. 3d 1236, 1241 (M.D. Fla. 2016)

(citations omitted). First, the court must determine “whether the case could have

been filed in the proposed district.” Id. Second, the court must assess “whether the

transfer would be for the convenience of the parties and witnesses and in the

interest of justice.” Id. (quoting Eye Care Int’l, Inc. v. Underhill, 119 F. Supp. 2d

1313, 1318 (M.D. Fla. 2000)). In analyzing the second prong, courts in the Eleventh

Circuit traditionally consider the following factors:

1) the convenience of the witnesses; 2) the location of relevant

documents and the ease of access to sources of proof; 3) the

convenience of the parties; 4) the locus of operative facts; 5)

the availability of process to compel unwilling witnesses; 6)

the relative means of the parties; 7) a forum’s familiarity with

the governing law; 8) the weight accorded a plaintiff’s choice

of forum; and 9) trial efficiency and the interests of justice,

based on the totality of the circumstances.

Manuel v. Convergys Corp., 430 F.3d 1132, 1135 n.1 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation

omitted).

A court will not disturb a plaintiff’s choice of venue unless the movant can

demonstrate that the choice is outweighed by other considerations. Stewart Org.,

Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988). Therefore, the movant carries the

burden of establishing that the case should be transferred to the suggested venue

in the interest of convenience and justice. See In re Ricoh Corp., 870 F.2d 570, 573

(11th Cir. 1989). Ultimately, the decision to transfer a matter is within the sound

discretion of the district court. Roofing & Sheet Metal Servs., Inc. v. La Quinta

Motor Inns, Inc., 689 F.2d 982, 985 (11th Cir. 1982).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant moves for a transfer of this case to the Southern District of

Florida, citing that “[n]othing about the case—not the parties, claims, witnesses,

or evidence—has any connection to the Middle District of Florida.” (Doc. 14, p. 1).

Defendant further notes that Judge Gregory A. Presnell, of this Division and

District, recently granted its motions to transfer two cases that are closely related

to the instant case to the Southern District of Florida. (See id. at p. 2).

First, on May 29, 2025, Judge Presnell granted Defendant’s motion to

transfer venue in Potamkin Hyundai, Inc. v. Hyundai Motor America Corp., No.

6:25-cv-370-GAP-UAM (filed Mar. 3, 2025) (the “Potamkin HMA Action”).

The Potamkin HMA Action bears stark similarities to the instant case. Plaintiff in

the Potamkin HMA Action (the “Potamkin plaintiff”) was a Hyundai dealer

operating a dealership in the Southern District of Florida. (No. 6:25-cv-370-GAP-

UAM, Doc. 29, p. 2). The Potamkin plaintiff sued Defendant in Orange County,

Florida, and Defendant removed the action to the instant Division of this District.

(Id. at pp. 1–2). The Potamkin plaintiff “alleg[ed] eight claims under Florida law

related to the parties’ Hyundai Dealer Sales and Service Agreement, Plaintiff’s

ability to distribute Hyundai and Genesis vehicles, Defendant’s Accelerate

Performance Bonus Program, and Defendant’s Complimentary Maintenance

Program reimbursements.” (Id.). The Potamkin plaintiff’s remaining claim was for

an “alleged breach of the dealer agreement.” (Id. at p. 11).

After applying the § 1404 factors, Judge Presnell concluded that these

factors strongly supported transfer of the Potamkin HMA Action to the Southern

District of Florida. (See generally No. 6:25-cv-370-GAP-UAM, Doc. 29 (the

“Potamkin HMA Transfer Order”)). Further, on June 6, 2025, Judge Presnell

transferred a related action filed by the Potamkin plaintiff against GMA, Potamkin

Hyundai, Inc. v. Genesis Motor America, LLC, No. 6:25-cv-374-GAP-RMN (the

“Potamkin GMA Action”), to the Southern District of Florida for consideration

with the Potamkin HMA Action. (No. 6:25-cv-374-GAP-RMN, Doc. 28 (the

“Potampkin GMA Transfer Order”)). Of note, every attorney of record in the

instant case also served as counsel in both the Potamkin HMA Action and the

Potamkin GMA Action (collectively, the “Potamkin Actions”).

Despite the foregoing, in its Response, Plaintiff argues that Defendant has

not met its burden of establishing that transfer of venue is appropriate. (See

generally Doc. 17). For the reasons set forth below, this Court disagrees and finds

that the case should be transferred to the Southern District of Florida under § 1404.

A. Sufficiency of the Proposed Venue

Although Plaintiff does not consent to the requested transfer, Plaintiff does

not expressly dispute that venue of this action is proper in the Southern District of

Florida. (Doc. 17). Nonetheless, the Court must independently verify that the

Southern District of Florida has jurisdiction and offers a proper venue. See

Delorenzo v. HP Enter. Servs., LLC, 79 F. Supp. 3d 1277, 1280 (M.D. Fla. 2015)

(citation omitted) (noting that, absent unanimous consent to transfer, § 1404(a)

requires a proposed transferee court to have both personal and subject matter

jurisdiction in addition to offering a proper venue).

The Southern District of Florida has personal jurisdiction over Defendant

because it is the party requesting the transfer. (Doc. 14); see Delorenzo, 79 F. Supp.

35 at 1280. Moreover, under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, the Southern District of Florida has

subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims because they are before the Court

pursuant to the federal district courts’ diversity jurisdiction. (Doc. 1). Finally,

venue is proper in the Southern District of Florida under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2), as

the Dealership is located within Broward County, which falls within the Southern

District of Florida. Accordingly, the Southern District of Florida is “a judicial

district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the

claim occurred.” See § 1391(b)(2).

Thus, this “case could have been filed” in the Southern District of Florida

because it has jurisdiction and offers a proper venue. See Nat’l Tr. Ins. Co., 223 F.

Supp. 2d at 1241–42. As such, the first step of the § 1404(a) analysis is satisfied.

See id.

B. The Interests of Convenience and Justice

1. The Convenience of Witnesses

As to this factor, Defendant contends that “most, if not all, of the relevant . .

. witnesses reside [in] or regularly conduct business in the Southern District of

Florida.” (Doc. 14, p. 7). For example, Defendant cites that Plaintiff’s “President,

Russell King, and its VP and Treasurer, Jason Frieder,” whom Defendant notes are

“likely to be called as witnesses in this case,” are each located in the Southern

District of Florida. (Id.). Moreover, Defendant confirms it “is not aware of any

potential witnesses, documents, or facts connecting this dispute to the Middle

District of Florida.” (Id.). In its Response, Plaintiff notes that all of the fact

witnesses in this matter are employees of the parties, and “none of the [Defendant]

employee witnesses reside in either the Southern District or Middle District” of

Florida. (Doc. 17, p. 7). Plaintiff additionally asserts that Defendant has not

provided sufficient detail regarding the witnesses in the Southern District of

Florida to support this factor. (Id. at pp. 6–8).

Although the “convenience of witnesses” factor is typically considered an

important factor in the § 1404 analysis, its “significance is diminished” when the

subject witnesses “are employees of a party and their presence at trial can be

obtained by that party.” Trinity Christian Ctr. of Santa Ana, Inc. v. New Frontier

Media, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1327 (M.D. Fla. 2010). Further “vague

statements about the convenience of unknown and unnamed witnesses [are]

insufficient to convince’ a court to transfer venue.” Combs. v. Fla. Dep’t. of Corrs.,

461 F. Supp. 3d 1203, 1209 (N.D. Fla. 2020) (quoting Smith v. Colonial Penn Ins.

Co., 943 F. Supp. 782, 784 (S.D. Tex. 1996)).

The significance of this factor is diminished in this case, since neither party

has identified any nonparty witnesses who will testify at trial. (Docs. 14, 17).

However, Defendant’s Motion highlights what is apparent from the underlying

facts of this case—namely, that considering the location of the Dealership, there

are likely to be many witnesses in this matter with close ties to the Southern

District of Florida. (See Doc. 14, pp. 6–8). While Defendant does not provide great

specificity regarding such witnesses, “Plaintiff does not rebut ‘the contention that

the bulk of the relevant witnesses in Florida are located in the’ [Southern District

of Florida].” Potamkin Transfer Order, p. 6 (quoting Smith v. FAMU Board of

Trustees, 6:24-cv-457-PGB-RMN, 2024 WL 4150769, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 11,

2024)). Moreover, the Court notes that Defendant has provided “the only specific

evidence presented by either party regarding possible witnesses . . . .” Trinity, 761

F. Supp. 2d at 1328–29. Under the circumstances, this factor “tilts, if at all,” in

favor of transfer. Id. at 1329.

2. The Location of Relevant Documents and Ease of Access to

Sources of Proof

In assessing this second factor, the Court looks to the “ease of access to

sources of proof.” See Manuel, 430 F.3d at 1135 n.1. “As to photographic and

documentary evidence, in light of current technology that affords parties the ability

to transmit rapidly large volumes of data even to remote locations, courts tend to

give this factor relatively little weight.” Combs, 461 F. Supp. 3d at 1210 (collecting

sources).

Defendant contends this factor weighs in favor of transfer, citing the

Dealership’s presence in the Southern District of Florida and that Defendant is

unaware of any evidence residing in the instant District. (Doc. 14, pp. 6–8).

Plaintiff asserts this factor is neutral as discovery can be conducted electronically.

(Doc. 17, p. 10). Though Plaintiff’s point is well-taken, this consideration is already

baked into the weight afforded to this factor in the § 1404 analysis. See Combs, 461

F. Supp. 3d at 1210. To the extent that the Dealership where the subject programs

were implemented is found within the Southern District of Florida, and neither

party has pointed to the existence of any relevant evidence in the instant District,

this factor weighs in favor of transfer. See also Potamkin GMA Transfer Order, p.

8 (considering the same argument by the Potamkin plaintiff and finding that “the

fact that Plaintiff’s [principal place of business] is located in the [Southern District

of Florida], and that it has made no showing that any such documentary sources

of proof are located in the [Middle District of Florida]—or anywhere other than its

[principal place of business]—tips the balance slightly in favor of transfer for this

factor.” (citation omitted)).

3. The Convenience of the Parties

This factor “concerns the appearance of employees at court, and, to some

extent, the appearance of counsel.” Trinity, 761 F. Supp. 2d at 1328. However, “[o]f

the factors considered on a transfer motion, the location of counsel is entitled to

the least consideration.” Meterlogic, Inc. v. Copier Sols, Inc., 185 F. Supp. 2d 1292,

1304 (S.D. Fla. 2002).

Plaintiff and its counsel each have ties to the Southern District of Florida.

Plaintiff’s principal place of business is in the Southern District of Florida. (Doc. 1-

1, ¶ 1). While the office of Plaintiff’s counsel is in the Middle District of Florida,

counsel also has an office in the Southern District of Florida. (Doc. 14, pp. 8–9; see

Doc. 17, pp. 10–11). Further, Plaintiff’s counsel has recently filed suit in the

Southern District of Florida and is now litigating the Potamkin Actions in that

District. (Doc. 14, pp. 8–9). By contrast, neither Defendant nor its counsel have

ties to the instant District. Defendant is incorporated in California and has its

principal place of business in that state. (Doc. 1-1, ¶ 2). Further, Plaintiff highlights

that “none of [Defendant’s employees] who have an interest in this proceeding are

. . . in Florida at all.” (Doc. 17, p. 10). Plaintiff also cites that lead counsel for

Defendants in this case are based outside of Florida. (Id.). However, defense

counsel notes that they have offices in Miami, “making trial more convenient in the

Southern District of Florida.” (Doc. 14, p. 8). On balance, this factor weighs in favor

of transfer.

4. The Locus of Operative Facts

“The location of operative facts underlying a claim is a key factor in

determining a motion to transfer venue.” Harvard v. Inch, 408 F. Supp. 3d 1255,

1262 (N.D. Fla. 2019) (quoting Nat’l Tr. Ins. Co., 223 F. Supp. 3d at 1245). “In

determining the locus of operative facts, the court must look at the site of the events

from which the claim arises.” Id. (quoting Nat’l Tr. Ins. Co., 223 F. Supp. 3d at

1245).

Defendant asserts that the Southern District of Florida is the locus of

operative facts, citing that the Dealership is in that District, and that “[Plaintiff’s]

claims relate to the operation of that [D]ealership, and, in particular[,] the effect

of certain Hyundai programs on its [D]ealership . . . .” (Doc. 14, pp. 6–7). Plaintiff

asserts that this factor is neutral, and that there is “no specific locus of operative

facts” since Defendant’s subject programs were implemented nationwide. (Doc. 17,

p. 11). Judge Presnell, when confronted with the identical arguments in the

Potamkin HMA Action, found the Southern District of Florida to be the locus of

operative facts. Potamkin HMA Transfer Order, pp. 7–8 (emphasizing that

“Plaintiff is suing here because of the effect of nationwide programs on its

dealership in Miami Lakes”). This Court agrees, and thus finds this factor weighs

in favor of transfer.

5. The Availability of Process to Compel Unwilling Witnesses

The parties do not identify any unwilling witnesses. Consequently, the Court

finds this factor to be neutral in its analysis. See Fruitstone v. Spartan Race Inc.,

464 F. Supp. 3d 1268, 1281 (S.D. Fla. 2020) (quoting Legg v. Quicken Loans, Inc.,

No. 14-61116-CIV, 2015 WL 13753742, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 2015) (determining

that the fifth factor “does not weigh in either party’s favor at this early stage” where

“[n]either party has identified any witnesses that are potentially unwilling to

participate at trial and thus the availability of process to compel the attendance of

unwilling witnesses is a non-issue”)).

6. The Relative Means of the Parties

Neither party has asserted that this factor weighs in favor of either forum.

(Doc. 17, p. 12; see also Doc. 14). Accordingly, the Court finds this factor to be

neutral as to transfer.

7. The Forum’s Familiarity with the Governing Law

Similarly, neither party has argued this factor favors either forum. (Doc. 17,

p. 12; see also Doc. 14). Further, as Plaintiff notes, “[t]his case involves the

application of Florida law such that each [D]istrict would be equally familiar with

the governing law.” (Doc. 17, p. 12). The Court thus finds this factor to be neutral

as to transfer.

8. The Weight Accorded to a Plaintiff’s Choice of Forum

Ordinarily, a “plaintiff’s choice of forum should not be disturbed unless it is

clearly outweighed by other considerations.” Robinson v. Giarmarco & Bill, P.C.,

74 F.3d 253, 260 (11th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). “However, that choice alone,

without more, is not determinative, especially when the other considerations weigh

strongly in favor of transferring venue.” Byrd Bros., Inc. v. Weinstein, No. 3:05-

cv-294-J-20MCR, 2006 WL 8439168, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 27, 2006). Moreover,

“when a plaintiff is not a resident of the forum district . . . courts accord plaintiff’s

choice of a forum less weight.” Combs, 461 F. Supp. 3d at 1214 (collecting sources).

“Similarly, when the conduct at issue did not occur in plaintiff’s chosen forum,

courts give less deference to plaintiff’s desired forum.” Id. (collecting sources).

Here, there is no connection between Plaintiff’s choice of forum and the

events underlying the cause of action. (See generally Doc. 1-1). Likewise, Plaintiff

is not a resident of this District, and indeed, Plaintiff’s principal place of business

is in the Southern District of Florida. (Id. ¶ 1). Under these circumstances,

Plaintiff’s choice of forum is entitled to relatively limited weight. See Combs, 461

F. Supp. 3d at 1214.

Moreover, as was the case in the Potamkin HMA Action, the lone reason

given by Plaintiff for filing this case in the instant District is that “all of counsel

appearing on behalf of [Plaintiff] in this matter are in the Middle District making

the Middle District more convenient for [Plaintiff].” (Doc. 17, p. 10; see Potamkin

HMA Transfer Order, p. 13). As Judge Presnell found in that case, “[w]hen

juxtaposed against nearly every other factor of convenience, judicial efficiency, and

fairness pointing to the [Southern District of Florida] as ‘a better location to hear

the dispute’—and considering that Plaintiff’s counsel are voluntarily litigating

similar cases against the same defendant[] in the SDFL—any inconvenience to

Plaintiff’s counsel is clearly outweighed.” Potamkin HMA Transfer Order, p. 13

(first quoting Combs, 461 F. Supp. 3d at 1207 (emphasis added); then citing Byrd

Bros., 2006 WL 8439168, at *2). As such, the Court accords the requisite deference

to Plaintiffs’ choice of forum, but as discussed herein, this deference is “clearly

outweighed by other considerations.” See Robinson, 74 F.3d at 260.

9. Trial Efficiency and the Interests of Justice, Based on the

Totality of the Circumstances

The interests of justice factor in the § 1404 analysis “relates to the efficient

administration of the court system.” Combs, 461 F. Supp. at 1215 (quoting Rsch.

Automation, Inc. v. Schrader-Bridgeport Int’l, Inc., 626 F.3d 973, 978 (7th Cir.

2010)). “Because the ‘interest of justice’ factor is a distinct component of the §

1404(a) analysis, it ‘may be determinative in a particular case, even if the

convenience of the parties and witnesses might call for a different result.’” Id.

(quoting Coffey v. Van Dorn Iron Works, 796 F.2d 217, 220 (7th Cir. 1986)).

Transfer of this action would benefit judicial economy considering there are

multiple related cases pending in the Southern District of Florida. Indeed, not only

have the Potamkin Actions both been transferred to the Southern District of

Florida, but Judge Presnell transferred the Potamkin Actions, in part, due to the

pendency of additional related actions in that District. See, e.g., Potamkin HMA

Transfer Order, pp. 9–12 (finding that the related cases pending in the Southern

District of Florida and the Potamkin HMA Action “are obviously connected and it

is clear that proceeding simultaneously in two different forums risks prejudice to

the parties through inconsistent rulings and outcomes.”). Thus, based on the

totality of the circumstances, this factor weighs in favor of transfer.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

1. Defendant’s Motion to Transfer Venue to the Southern District of

Florida (Doc. 14) is GRANTED.

2. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to transfer this case to the United

States District Court for the Southern District of Florida for all further

proceedings and to thereafter close the file.

DONE AND ORDERED in Orlando, Florida on October 10, 2025.

PAUL G.

UNITED STATE ISTRICT JUDGE

Copies furnished to:

Counsel of Record

Unrepresented Parties