Farrell

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EDWARD FARRELL, : No. 1:28-CV-1916

Plaintiff : (Caraballo, M.J.)

Vv. :

FRANK BISIGNANO,! :

Commissioner of Social :

Security, :

Defendant :

MEMORANDUM

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Edward Farrell seeks judicial review of the final decision

of the Commissioner of Social Security (the “Commissioner”) denying

his application for disability benefits and supplement security income

under Titles II & XVI of the Social Security Act. The Court has

jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

This matter comes before the Court on Farrell’s claim that

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Michelle Wolfe erred when she

Frank Bisignano was confirmed as the Commissioner of the Social Security

Administration on May 6, 2025. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Frank Bisignano is substituted for Leland Dudek

as the defendant in this suit.

evaluated the medical opinion evidence of record. Doc. 13 at 6-10. The

matter is fully briefed and ripe for decision.

As explained below, the ALJ’s conclusions when addressing the

medical opinion evidence is supported by substantial evidence in the

record, coupled with sufficient reasoning to permit meaningful judicial

review. Accordingly, the Court will affirm the Commissioner’s decision

to deny Farrell’s claim for social security disability benefits and

supplement security income.

Il. Background

On October 28, 2021, Farrell applied for Title II social security

disability benefits and Title XVI supplement security income, alleging

complete disability from a myriad of impairments, including diabetes,

neuropathy, gout, hypertension, hypothyroidism, obesity, chronic pain,

and high cholesterol. Doc. 12 at 69, 217-84 (hereinafter referred to as

“Tr.”). The Social Security Administration initially denied Farrell’s

application in February 2022, and upon reconsideration in April 2021.

Tr. 103-18, 1238-388. Farrell thereafter requested a hearing before an

ALJ. Id. at 161.

On August 30, 2022, ALJ Wolfe presided over Farrell’s hearing.

The hearing concerned whether Farrell was disabled within the

meaning of the Social Security Act since June 26, 2020. Id. at 10. At the

hearing, ALJ Wolfe received various evidence of record, including

clinical records, medical history, medical expert reports, vocational

expert testimony, and Farrell’s own testimony. Jd. at 37-65.

On October 28, 2022, ALJ Wolfe issued a decision concluding that

Farrell was not disabled from June 26, 2020, to the date of the decision.

Id. at 7-9. ALJ Wolfe reached that conclusion by employing the five-

step analytical process required under the Social Security Act to

evaluate disability insurance and supplement security income claims.

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).

The process requires sequential consideration of: (1) whether the

claimant is engaged in substantial gainful work activity; (2) the medical

severity of the claimant’s impairments; (3) whether the impairment

meets or equals a defined list of impairments; (4) a comparison between

the claimant’s past relevant work and residual functional capacity, 1.e.,

the most work that a claimant can perform despite his or her

limitations on a regular and continuing basis, see 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1545(a); and (5) an assessment of the claimant’s residual

functional capacity and his or her age, education, and work experience.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)G)-(v). Should a claimant proceed past the

first three steps of the analysis, the Commissioner will not find the

claimant disabled when he or she can perform past relevant work, or

adjust to other work, under the third and fourth steps, respectively. Id.

at § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv)—-(v), (f), (2).

Applying that analysis, ALJ Wolfe first determined that Farrell

met the insurance requirements of the Social Security Act, see 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.130, through December 31, 2025. Tr. 13. ALJ Wolfe also found

that Farrell had not engaged in substantial gainful activity between

June 26, 2020, through the date of the decision. Jd.

At the second step of the analysis, ALJ Wolfe found that Farrell

suffered from three severe impairments: diabetes, obesity, and

neuropathy. Jd. ALJ Wolfe also identified several non-severe

impairments, including syphilis; gout; hypertension; partial thickness

burn on fingers; hypothyroidism; hypercholesterolemia; alcohol abuse;

and a history of tobacco abuse. Jd. She found that Farrell either

suffered from these latter impairments for an insufficient duration, i.e.

less than a year, that they failed to “cause any functional limitations],]”

or that treatment had all but resolved the conditions. Jd. ALJ Wolfe

therefore concluded that the record established “these impairments

have [no] more than a minimal effect on the claimant’s ability to

perform basic work activities.” Id.

Moving to the third step of the analysis, ALJ Wolfe determined

that Farrell’s severe impairments failed to meet or medically equal one

of those listed in the Social Security Administration’s regulations. Id. at

14. Farrell thus did not automatically qualify as disabled. See 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii) (Tf you have an impairment(s) that meets or equals

one of our listings in appendix 1 of this subpart and meets the duration

requirement, we will find that you are disabled.”).

Accordingly, ALJ Wolfe proceeded to determine Farrell’s residual

functional capacity, before addressing the final two steps in the

sequential analysis. Based on the evidence of record, ALJ Wolfe

concluded that Farrell could perform sedentary work, subject to

additional limitations:

The claimant is limited to no more than occasional balancing;

stooping; crouching; crawling; kneeling; and climbing of

ramps and stairs, but may never climb on ladders, ropes, or

scaffolds. Additionally, the claimant is unable to push or pull

with the lower extremities including foot controls. Further,

the claimant is limited to frequent exposure to temperature

extremes of cold, wetness, vibrations, and hazards including

- moving machinery and unprotected heights.

Tr. 15.

In reaching that conclusion, ALJ Wolfe analyzed one area in

particular that is germane to this opinion. Specifically, ALJ Wolfe

evaluated several medical opinions in determining the limitations

imposed by Farrell’s physical impairments. In doing so, the ALJ

identified which aspects of the opinions she found consistent or

inconsistent with the medical evidence of record:

The undersigned considered the state agency opinions of Dr.

Angela Teresa Walker and Dr. Crescenzo G. Calise and found

them partially persuasive (Exhibits 3A, 4A, 5A, 6A). The

doctors indicate the claimant is able to lift and carry in the

light exertional range, but standing and walking is limited to

2 hours, with a handheld assistive device being necessary for

ambulation. They also note that the claimant could frequently

stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl, occasionally climb ramps and

stairs and balance, but may never climb ladders, ropes, or

scaffolds. Lastly, they indicate the claimant is to avoid

concentrated exposure to extreme cold, vibration, and

hazards. To the extent the reduced walking and standing

lower the claimant to sedentary work, and they indicate that

the claimant requires postural and environmental

limitations, their opinions are consistent with the

longitudinal record. However, the lifting and carrying in the

light exertional class is an overestimate of the claimant’s

capabilities when the longitudinal record is examined.

Supporting a limitation to sedentary, is the claimant’s

diabetes, obesity, and neuropathy. Specifically physical

examination findings of edema in his legs and loss of

sensation in his feet, an elevated AlC throughout the relevant

time, and the claimant’s reports of numbness and tingling in

his feet support the same. In regards to their indication that

the claimant needs a cane to ambulate, the record, does not

support the same. Specifically, the only examination the

claimant presented to with a cane was the consultative

examination. Notably, all of the claimant’s examinations note

no atrophy, cyanosis, or clubbing, and the only examination

that noted an abnormal gait was when the claimant presented

to his primary care physician for a disability evaluation. That

said, his primary care physician did not recommend or

prescribe a cane after that examination. Thus, while a lower

extremity limitation is necessary, having the claimant limited

to jobs that do not involve pushing or pulling with the lower

extremities, or operate foot pedals, adequately protects the

claimant. Accordingly, the record does not support the need

for a cane or assistive device. Moreover, the mentioned

findings relative to the claimant’s diabetes, neuropathy, and

obesity support limiting the claimant to no more than

occasional postural maneuvers, except climbing of ladders,

ropes, or scaffolds, and frequent exposure to extremes of cold,

wetness, vibrations, and hazards. For these reasons, the

doctor’s opinions are partially persuasive.

The undersigned considered the opinion of CRNP Cywinski

from January 14, 2022 and did not find it persuasive (Exhibit

3F). CRNP Cywinski indicates the claimant is able to lift and

carry up to 20 pounds occasionally, and can sit for a half hour,

stand for 15 minutes, and walk 10-15 during an 8-hour

workday. She also indicates that the claimant requires the

use of a cane to ambulate. Further, she notes that the

claimant can use both of his hands frequently to handle,

finger, and feel, and occasionally to reach in all directions, and

push and pull. Also, she indicates the claimant is able to use

both of his feet occasionally to operate foot controls.

Environmentally, she indicates the claimant can occasionally

climb ramps and balance, but may never climb ladders or

scaffolds, stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl. Furthermore, she

notes that the claimant is limited to loud heavy traffic. Lastly,

she indicates that the claimant is unable to walk a block at a

reasonable pace on rough or uneven surfaces or climb a few

steps at a reasonable pace with the use of a single handrail.

CRNP Cywinski’s opinion is not consistent with the

longitudinal record, nor is it supported by her own

examination. Here, while the claimant has diabetes and his

BMI classifies him as obese throughout the relevant time, and

his examinations noted findings consistent with neuropathy

. as of December 2021, and he has edema in his legs and loss of

sensation in his feet, as there is no atrophy, ulcers, or wounds,

no slow healing infections, no diabetic retinopathy, no cardiac

arrhythmia or heart failure, and no cognitive impairments,

the limitations outlined by CRNP Cywinski are not consistent

with the longitudinal record. These mentioned findings

support a limitation to sedentary, but the sit, stand, and walk

limitations outlined by CRNP Cywinski would eliminate

sedentary work, as they result in the claimant only being able

to work for one hour a day. Relative to the same, the

instructions on the form advise the provider that if the sit,

stand, and walk limitations do not total 8 hours, that they are

to indicate what the claimant would be doing for the

remaining time, but CRNP Cywinski does not address the

same. The undersigned also notes that this reasoning applies

to a finding that the limitations that the claimant is unable to

walk a block on rough or uneven surfaces or climb a few steps

at a reasonable pace with the use of a single handrail are not

supported. In regards to her indication that the claimant

needs a cane to ambulate, the record, and her own

examination findings do not support the same. Specifically,

the only examination the claimant presented to with a cane

was the consultative examination. Notably, the examinations

before the consultative examination and after, note no

atrophy, cyanosis, or clubbing, and the only examination that

noted an abnormal gait was when the claimant presented to

his primary care physician for a disability evaluation. That

said, his primary care physician did not recommend or

prescribe a cane after that examination. Thus, while a lower

extremity limitation is necessary, having the claimant limited

to jobs that do not involve pushing or pulling with the lower

extremities, or operate foot pedals, adequately protects the

claimant. Furthermore, the reach, finger, handle, feel, and

push/pull limitations outlined by CRNP Cywinski relative to

her upper extremity are not supported by her own

examination which notes no upper extremity strength deficit

or sensation loss. Also, the only examination that reflected

any upper extremity weakness was done after her

consultative examination was performed, when the claimant

presented to her primary care physician for a disability

evaluation in July of 2022. Even so, this one examination does

not support these limitations. Moreover, the mentioned

findings relative to the claimant’s diabetes, neuropathy, and

obesity support limiting the claimant to no more than

occasional postural maneuvers, except climbing of ladders,

ropes, or scaffolds, and frequent exposure to extremes of cold,

wetness, vibrations, and hazards, but do not support the

extremely limited postural maneuvers outlined by CRNP

Cywinski, or the additional environmental limitations,

especially the noise limitation.

Id. at 19-20. In consideration of these findings, the objective medical

evidence, and Farrell’s statements concerning his symptoms, ALJ Wolfe

concluded that:

Overall, the objective evidence does not support the alleged

intensity and persistence of symptoms. Therefore, the

undersigned finds that the claimant is capable of performing

work in accordance with the residual functional capacity

described above.

Id. at 20-21.

Having determined Farrell’s residual functional capacity to

perform sedentary work subject to limitations, and rejected several

grounds for further limitation, including the use of a cane, ALJ Wolfe

proceeded to the fourth step of the analysis to determine whether

Farrell was disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act.

Here, with assistance from a vocational expert’s testimony, ALJ Wolfe

compared Farrell’s past relevant work and residual functional capacity,

finding that Farrell was able to perform his prior employment as an

adjustment clerk, night auditor, and produce buyer. Id. at 21. Moreover,

the ALJ found that, even if she had incorporated more extensive

limitations into Farrell’s residual functional capacity, such as the

aforementioned use of a cane, the vocational expert testified that

Farrell would still be able to perform those three jobs. Id. at 22.

In accordance with her step four finding that Farrell could

perform his past relevant work, ALJ Wolfe concluded that Farrell was

not disabled and denied his application for disability benefits. Jd. The

evaluation thus did not proceed to the fifth step of the sequential

analysis. Farrell unsuccessfully appealed the decision to the Social

Security Administration’s Appeals Council, which denied his request to

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on August 31, 2023. Id. at 1. Having exhausted his administrative

remedies, Farrell’s instant appeal to the district court followed.

Farrell initiated this action with the Court on November 17, 2028.

Doc. 1. The Commissioner filed an answer denying Farrell’s claim of

error and provided the operative transcripts from the disability

proceedings on January 8, 2024. Docs. 11, 12. The parties filed their

respective briefs on February 6, 2024, and February 22, 2024. Docs. 18,

15. The matter is thus ripe for decision.

In his brief, Farrell alleges two interrelated errors that warrant

reversal or remand. Doc. 13 at 6-10. Specifically, Farrell alleges that

ALJ Wolfe’s evaluation of the medical opinion evidence was contrary to

regulation, and that her evaluation of the opinion of consultative

examiner CRNP Tara Cywinski was not supported by substantial

evidence. Id.

III. Discussion -

A. Standard of Review

Review of the Commissioner’s decision denying a claimant’s

application for social security disability benefits is limited to

determining whether the factual findings of the final decisionmaker are

11

supported by substantial evidence in the record. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);

Johnson v. Comm’ of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 200 (8d Cir. 2008).

Substantial in this context is “more than a mere scintilla of evidence

but may be less than a preponderance.” Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211,

1213 (8d Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). Put more pointedly, it is “such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

support a conclusion.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988)

(quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). In an

adequately developed record, this can mean “something less than the

weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent

conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [an ALJ’s decision] from

being supported by substantial evidence.” Consolo v. Fed. Mar.

Comm 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966) (citations omitted).

Under this deferential standard, “[f]actual findings which are

supported by substantial evidence must be upheld.” Ficca v. Astrue, 901

F. Supp. 2d 533, 536 (M.D. Pa. 2012) (citations omitted); 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(¢). This Court’s role is not to reweigh the evidence and make

factual determinations, but to simply review the record and ensure that

the ALJ provided “a discussion of the evidence and an explanation of

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reasoning for his conclusion sufficient to enable meaningful judicial

review.” Diaz v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 577 F.3d 500, 504 (8d Cir. 2009)

(citations and quotations omitted). An ALJ meets that standard by

stating “in his decision which evidence he has rejected and which he is

relying on as the basis for his finding.” Schaudeck v. Comm’ of SSA,

181 F.3d 429, 483 (8d Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). Moreover, when

there is countervailing evidence, an ALJ must “give some reason for

discounting the evidence she rejects.” Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422,

429 (8d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted); Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058,

1064 (8d Cir. 1993) (holding that substantial evidence standard is

unmet when ALJ fails to resolve conflicts created by countervailing

evidence).

Here, ALJ Wolfe’s factual findings were supported by substantial

evidence in the record, and the reasoning underlying those conclusions

was sufficient to enable judicial review.

B. The ALJ’s Evaluation of the Medical Opinions

Farrell challenges ALJ Wolfe’s determination that CRNP

Cywinski’s opinion was unpersuasive, because ALJ Wolfe failed to

recontact Cywinski for clarifying information. Doc. 13 at 6—7. Farrell

13

also contends that ALJ Wolfe generally erred in evaluating the opinions

of Dr. Angela Walker, Dr. Crescenzo Calise, and CRNP Cywinski

because, instead of assessing the supportability and consistency of these

opinions, the ALJ allegedly and “impermissibly inserted her own lay

opinion” to discard their limitation findings. Id. at 9-10. But Farrell’s

disagreement with the ALJ’s assessment of those opinions does not

warrant remand where, as here, those evaluations are supported by

substantial evidence and comported with all applicable regulatory

requirements.

On January 14, 2022, CRNP Cywinski examined Farrell and

completed a medical source statement form. Tr. 488-54. Of relevance,

she described Farrell as being obese and suffering from diabetes,

hypertension, hypothyroidism, high cholesterol, unstable gait, edema

from the ankles to the mid-calves, and with a past history of gout, but

also presenting with normal skin, no muscle atrophy, healthy eyes, and

a regular heart rhythm. Id. at 440—42. In consideration of these

findings, CRNP Cywinski opined that Farrell could sit for one-half-

hour, stand for 15 minutes, and walk for 10-15 minutes during an eight-

hour workday, although she failed to indicate what activities Farrell

14

would do in lieu of these three things for the remaining workday. Jd. at

444, Additionally, CRNP Cywinski opined that Farrell required the use

of a cane to ambulate, that he was unable to walk a block ata

reasonable pace on rough or uneven surfaces, and that he was unable to

climb a few steps at a reasonable pace even with the assistance of a

handrail. Id. at 448.

On January 26, 2022, Dr. Walker evaluated the medical evidence

- pertaining to Farrell’s conditions and found that Farrell could

frequently lift and carry 10 lbs., occasionally lift and carry 20 lbs., sit

for six hours of an eight-hour workday, and walk or stand for two hours

of an eight-hour workday with the use of an assistive device. Jd. at 71—

72. The doctor also found that Farrell was limited to frequently

stooping, kneeling, crouching, and crawling; occasionally balancing and

climbing ramps or stairs; never climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds;

and that he should avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold,

vibration, and hazards. Id. at 72. On April 28, 2022, Dr. Calise likewise

reviewed the medical evidence pertaining to Farrell’s conditions and

made identical findings to those of Dr. Walker. Tr. 83-84.

15

Under the current regulations, medical opinions are not entitled

to any specific weighting, and are instead evaluated based on their

persuasiveness. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a), 404.1520c(b). An ALJ

determines the persuasiveness of a prior medical finding or medical

opinion by assessing five factors: (1) supportability; (2) consistency; (8)

relationship with the claimant; (4) specialization; and (5) other factors.

20 C.F. R. § 404.1520c(a)—(c). The factors related to the substance of

medical opinions—supportability and consistency—are the “most

important factors” for consideration. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2).

Examining supportability entails a review of the opinion’s basis in

relevant “objective medical evidence and supporting explanations

presented by a medical source”; consistency is assessed based on how

consistent a finding or opinion is “with the evidence from other medical

sources and nonmedical sources in the claim|[.]” 20 C.F-.R.

§ 404.1520c(c)(1)—-(2).

The Court of Appeals explained in Cotter v. Harris that when

weighing the record, an ALJ “cannot reject evidence for no reason or the

wrong reason” and must explain “why probative evidence has been

rejected ... so that a reviewing court can determine whether the

16

reasons for rejection were improper.” 642 F.2d 700, 706—07 (8d Cir.

1981). This does not mean, however, that the ALJ must undertake an

exhaustive discussion of all of the evidence. See, e.g., Fargnoli, 247 F.3d

at 42; Hur, 94 F. App’x at 1383 (‘There is no requirement that the ALJ

discuss in her opinion every tidbit of evidence included in the record.”).

Here, ALJ Wolfe found Dr. Walker’s and Dr. Calise’s opinions

partly persuasive. She explained that their sitting, walking, standing,

and postural limitations, to the extent they limited Farrell to sedentary

work, were consistent with and supported by the longitudinal evidence

of record, including Farrell’s symptoms of edema, loss of sensation and

tingling in the feet, and elevated blood sugar levels caused by his

diabetes, obesity, and neuropathy. Tr. 19. By contrast, the ALJ found

that the physicians’ lifting, carrying, stooping, kneeling, crouching, and

crawling limitations were inconsistent with and unsupported by the

record, because they overestimated Farrell’s capabilities in light of his

symptoms and impairments. Id.

Moreover, ALJ Wolfe concluded that the physicians’ findings that

Farrell required the use of a cane to walk or stand was not supported by

the record, because he was never prescribed a cane, he presented to a

17

medical source with a cane only once, and he did not have symptoms

usually associated with use of a cane, like atrophy, clubbing, or

cyanosis. Id. Instead, based on the evidence, ALJ Wolfe concluded that

Farrell was limited to no pushing or pulling with the lower extremities

and no operating foot pedals. Id. Accordingly, the ALJ found the two

physicians’ opinions partly persuasive. Jd.

In comparison, ALJ Wolfe found the opinion of CRNP Cywinski

unpersuasive. The ALJ first explained that although the evidence

showed Farrell was obese, had diabetes, and suffered from neuropathy

and edema, this evidence did not support the severe limitations found

by Cywinski; particularly, limitations of sitting, standing, and walking

for one hour out of an eight-hour workday, and restrictions on walking a

block on rough or uneven surfaces or climbing stairs at a reasonable

pace. Id. at 20. In fact, ALJ Wolfe found that the severe limitations

suggested by Cywinski were wholly inconsistent with record evidence,

including Cywinski’s own examination of Farrell, which showed he had

healthy eyes, normal skin, a regular heart rhythm, and that he had no

muscle atrophy or cognitive impairments. Tr. 20, 440—42.

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Moreover, the ALJ took issue with Cywinski’s failure to explain

what activities Farrell would do for those seven hours of the workday he

could not sit, stand, or walk, as required by the medical source

statement form. Id. at 20, 444. Likewise, for the same reason that ALJ

Wolfe rejected Dr. Walker’s and Dr. Calise’s suggestion that Farrell

needed a cane, she rebuffed CRNP Cywinski’s parallel recommendation.

Id. at 20. Finally, the ALJ dismissed Cywinski’s finding that Farrell

had upper extremity limitations, given that Cywinski’s own

examination of Farrell showed he had no strength deficits or loss of

sensation. Id. Thus, based on the medical evidence surrounding

Farrell’s impairments and symptoms, ALJ Wolfe rejected Cywinski’s

“extremely limited postural maneuver[]” limitations and additional

environmental limitations in favor of her own more moderate

limitations in those areas. Id. Taken together, ALJ Wolfe found CRNP

Cywinski’s opinion unpersuasive. Id.

In light of the above, Farrell’s contention that ALJ Wolfe

“impermissibly inserted her own lay opinion” instead of sufficiently

evaluating the medical opinions under the factors of supportability and

consistency (Doc. 13 at 9-10), is without merit. First, as the

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Commissioner correctly notes (Doc. 15 at 14-15, 21-22), Farrell's

challenge that ALJ Wolfe failed to match her own limitation findings to

those of the medical opinions yields no relief. “The ALJ is not bound to

accept the opinion or theory of any medical expert, but may weigh the

medical evidence and draw its own inferences.” Kertesz v. Crescent Hills

Coal Co., 788 F.2d 158, 163 (3d Cir. 1986). Importantly, “[t]here is no

legal requirement that a physician have made the particular findings

that an ALJ adopts in the course of determining an RFC.” Titterington

v. Barnhart, 174 F. App’x 6, 11 (8d Cir. 2006). As such, the mere fact

that ALJ Wolfe’s findings are not identical to those in the medical

opinion evidence cannot be error.

Farrell also seeks to leverage Metzger v. Berryhill, 2017 WL

1483328, at *5 (M.D. Pa. 2017), for the proposition that when an ALJ

finds less restrictive limitations than those set forth in the medical

opinions, that specific finding is subject to greater scrutiny. Doc. 16 at 4.

However, as the Commissioner correctly notes (Doc. 15 at 20 n.4),

except for a cane-related limitation, the ALJ’s own limitation findings

either matched those of Dr. Walker and Dr. Calise, or were more robust.

Compare Tr. 15 with Tr. 71-78, 83-86.

20

Additionally, although ALJ Wolfe did not include a cane-related

limitation in Farrell’s residual functional capacity, the vocational expert

testified that sufficient jobs in the national economy remained for

Farrell, even with a cane-related limitation. Jd. at 22. Thus, even if ALJ

Wolfe’s exclusion of a cane-related limitation from Farrell’s residual

functional capacity was in error, it was harmless. See Rutherford v.

Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 553 (8d Cir. 2005) (“[R]emand is not required

here because it would not affect the outcome of the case.”).

Second, Farrell’s contention that ALJ Wolfe made “speculative

inferences” while evaluating the medical opinions, and thus inserted

her own lay opinion rather than assessing supportability and

consistency (Doc. 13 at 9-10), does not jibe with the record. ALJ Wolfe’s

evaluation of the medical opinion evidence, as described supra,

exhaustively compared the objective medical evidence with those

opinions in determining their consistency and support, ultimately

finding the opinions’ respective persuasive values.

Specifically, Farrell charges that ALJ Wolfe made speculative

inferences when evaluating CRNP Cywinski’s opinion by concluding

that Farrell had no “atrophy, ulcers, or wounds, no slow healing

21

infections, no diabetic retinopathy, no cardiac arrhythmia or heart

failure, and no cognitive impairments.” Doc. 13 at 9. That

determination, however, was not premised on mere speculation, but

rather on CRNP Cywinski’s own examination. In particular, ALJ Wolfe

highlighted CRNP Cywinski’s findings that showed Farrell had healthy

eyes, normal skin, a regular heart rhythm, and that he had no muscle

atrophy or noted cognitive impairments. Compare Tr. 20 (“there is no

atrophy, ulcers, or wounds, no slow healing infections, no diabetic

retinopathy, no cardiac arrhythmia or heart failure, and no cognitive

impairments,”) with Tr. 440-42 “Skin exam within normal limits”;

“Tflundi normal’; “[r]egular [heart] rhythm”; “[nJo muscle atrophy

evident.”); see also Tr. 424, 438, 464, 494-95, 620, 624, 628-29.

It was well within ALJ Wolfe’s authority to “weigh the medical

evidence and draw [her] own inferences.” Kertesz, 788 F.2d at 163.

Indeed, in combination with the other objective medical evidence of

record, several conclusions are readily apparent, including that: a

finding of normal skin necessarily means having no wounds, no slow

healing infections, and no ulcers; a finding of healthy eyes necessarily

means no diabetic retinopathy; a finding of a regular heart rhythm

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necessarily means no cardiac arrhythmia and suggests no heart failure;

a finding of no muscle atrophy necessarily means no atrophy; and a

diagnosis of no cognitive disorders necessarily means no cognitive

impairments. Tr. 20. In other words, ALJ Wolfe did not displace the

objective medical evidence with her own opinion to draw speculative

inferences; rather, she largely drew from the objective medical findings

in CRNP Cywinski’s own examination of Farrell to help evaluate the

consistency and supportability of Cywinski’s recommended limitations.

Farrell’s contention that the ALJ erred by not recontacting CRNP

Cywinski is similarly flawed. As the Commissioner correctly notes (Doc.

18 at 23-26), ALJ Wolfe was under no obligation to recontact CRNP

Cywinski. For one, the regulations only provide for re-soliciting a

medical source when there is insufficient evidence for an ALJ to

determine disability status, or the medical evidence as a whole is

inconsistent. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520b(b)(2), 416.920b(b)(2). Given the

breadth of evidence here, and the relative consistency of the evidence in

establishing that Farrell is diabetic, obese, and that he suffers from

neuropathy and edema (see Tr. 424, 440-42, 464, 494-95, 620, 624,

628-29), that standard is not met.

23

Moreover, the regulations make clear that, in the event the

evidence of record is inconsistent or insufficient, an ALJ may recontact

a medical source, not that they must. See 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1520b(b)(2)G), 416.920b(b)(2)(i) (‘we may re-contact your medical

source”); 404.1520b(b)(2) Gv), 416.920b(b)(2)(iv) (“[w]le may ask you or

others for more information”). As such, ALJ Wolfe had no regulatory

duty to recontact CRNP Cywinski, and there is no respective error.?

Finally, Farrell’s contention that ALJ Wolfe’s evaluation of CRNP

Cywinski’s opinion is not supported by substantial evidence

misapprehends the evaluation process. Rather than require an ALJ to

elaborately evaluate a medical opinion, the regulations only require

that an ALJ analyze an opinion’s supportability and consistency against

the objective medical evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2). Here, as

discussed at length, the ALJ comprehensively evaluated the consistency

and supportability of Cywinski’s opinion against the objective medical

evidence (Tr. 19-20, 424, 440-42, 464, 494-95, 620, 624, 628-29), and

2 Farrell cites Johnson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198 (8d Cir. 2008) and

Hariman v. Colvin, 2014 WL 1784084 (W.D. Pa. 2014) in support of his position.

But, as explicitly recognized in Hartman, both those cases involved claims lodged

prior to March 26, 2012, when the regulation’s recontact provision was amended to

change the language from mandatory to permissive. 2014 WL at *9 n.3. Thus,

neither case applies here, as Farrell’s claim was filed in 2021.

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therefore her conclusion that the opinion did not merit persuasive

weight satisfied her regulatory duty. See, e.g., Jones v. Sullivan, 954

F.2d 125, 129 (8d Cir. 1991) (holding medical opinions that are

inconsistent with and unsupported by the medical evidence are not

persuasive or controlling); Wright v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 675, 683 (8d Cir.

1990) (same). As ALJ Wolfe, at a minimum, relied on “such relevant

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusionJ,|” Pierce, 487 U.S. at 565 (quoting Consol. Edison Co., 305

U.S. at 229), her finding that CRNP Cywinski’s opinion was not

persuasive is supported by substantial evidence.

To be clear, this Court’s role is not to reweigh the evidence to

make its own factual determinations. Diaz, 577 F.3d at 504. Rather, it

is simply to review the record and ensure that the ALJ provided “a

discussion of the evidence and an explanation of reasoning for his

conclusion sufficient to enable meaningful judicial review.” Id.

Consequently, because ALJ Wolfe evaluated the relevant opinion

evidence pursuant to her regulatory duty to assess persuasiveness, and

her findings are supported by substantial evidence, they will not be

disturbed.

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IV. Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court will affirm the decision of the

Commissioner and deny the Plaintiff's request for relief. A separate

order shall be issued.

Date: October 14, 2025 s/ Phillip J. Caraballo

Phillip J. Caraballo

United States Magistrate Judge

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