United States v. Gaffney

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v. No. 25-cr-00282-SLS-1

ENJOLI JAMES GAFFNEY,

Defendant.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Enjoli James Gaffney seeks to dismiss the impending charges based on alleged violations

of the Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment; Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq.;

prosecutorial vindictiveness; and government misconduct that warrants exercise of the supervisory

power of this Court. See Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss 1, ECF No. 12. The undersigned recommends

GRANTING Gaffney’s motion based on a Sixth Amendment violation1.

I. BACKGROUND

On June 25, 2025, Metropolitan Police Department officers approached and questioned a

man about whether an open container contained alcohol. See Det. Hr’g. Tr. 4:12–16, ECF No. 14.

Gaffney was seated about ten feet away from this container. See id. at 7:12–14. Officers claimed

that they stopped Gaffney for questioning because they saw him push his hand into his pocket. See

Mot. to Supp., 5, ECF No. 11. However, body-worn camera footage appears to contradict this

testimony. See id.; Det. Hr’g. Tr. at 5:17–21. The officers then told Gaffney to show them his

waistband and empty his pockets. See Det. Hr’g. Tr. at 5:17–24. Gaffney complied and officers

1

The Court need not reach the other bases for dismissal given that the Sixth Amendment question

is dispositive.

1

recovered contraband. See Mot. to Supp. at 8–10; Det. Hr’g. Tr. at 7:19–21. The officers then

seized a firearm from Gaffney pursuant to a search incident to arrest. See Indictment, ECF No. 1.

The government filed a criminal complaint in the Superior Court of the District of

Columbia. See Compl., 1–2, United States v. Gaffney, 2025-CF2-00719 (Sup. Ct. D.C. 2025). In

it, the government charged Gaffney with unlawful possession of a firearm (based on a prior

conviction), in violation of D.C. Code § 22-4503(a)(1); carrying a pistol without a license, in

violation of D.C. Code § 22-4504(a)(1); and possession of a prohibited weapon, in violation of

D.C. Code § 22-4514(a)(c)(1). See id.

On June 27, 2025, the D.C. Superior Court judge held a preliminary hearing and a pretrial

detention hearing. See Minute Entry, Jun. 27, 2025, United States v. Gaffney, 2025-CF2-00719

(Sup. Ct. D.C. 2025). The judge ordered Gaffney detained pending trial. See id. The court

scheduled the trial for October 2, 2025. See Minute Entry, Jul. 7, 2025, United States v. Gaffney,

2025-CF2-00719 (Sup. Ct. D.C. 2025). This trial date was within the statutorily set deadline of

100 days. See D.C. Code § 23-1322(h)(1).

On September 12, 2025, Gaffney filed a motion to suppress the search of his person. See

Def.’s Mot. to Supp., United States v. Gaffney, 2025-CF2-00719 (Sup. Ct. D.C. 2025). That same

day, the government presented testimony before a federal grand jury and returned a federal

indictment. See Indictment, ECF No. 1. The federal indictment re-charged violations of D.C. Code

§§ 22-4503(a)(1) and 22-4514(a)(c)(1) and added a related violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). See

id. On September 12, 2025, this Court issued a warrant for Gaffney’s arrest. See Arrest Warrant,

ECF No. 4.

On September 16, 2025, the government moved to dismiss the pending D.C. Superior Court

case without prejudice. See Dismissal Praecipe, United States v. Gaffney, 2025-CF2-00719 (Sup.

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Ct. D.C. 2025). The Superior Court judge granted this request and ordered Gaffney’s release. See

Minute Entry, Sept. 16, 2025, United States v. Gaffney, 2025-CF2-00719 (Sup. Ct. D.C. 2025).

However, Gaffney remained at the D.C. jail pursuant to the federal arrest warrant. See Minute

Entry, Sept. 16, 2025.

On September 16, 2025, the parties appeared before this Court for an initial appearance.

The government then moved for Gaffney’s continued pretrial detention. Id. On September 22,

2025, the Court began a detention hearing. Id. The Court continued resolution of the detention

question to October 9, 2025. See Minute Entry, Oct. 7, 2025.

On September 26, 2025, Gaffney filed a motion to dismiss this case and a motion to

suppress, repeating prior allegations from the Superior Court motion. See Mot. to Supp., ECF No.

11 and Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 12. The government opposed both motions. See Memo. in Opp.,

ECF No. 13 and ECF No. 15.

On October 9, 2025, the Court ordered Gaffney held pursuant to the Bail Reform Act.

However, the Court informed Gaffney that the Court believed the government’s actions violated

his Sixth Amendment rights. In total, Gaffney has spent 112 days at the D.C. Jail in pretrial

detention, all while attempting to exercise his right to a speedy trial.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Constitutional Standard

“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial.”

U.S. Const. Amend. VI. The right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right. It is not derived from

statutory implementation, but rooted in “the very foundation of our English law heritage.” Klopfer

v. State of N.C., 386 U.S. 213, 223 (1967). Indeed, it “is one of the most basic rights preserved by

our Constitution.” Id. at 226.

3

The Sixth Amendment speedy trial right has always been flexible, adapting to the

circumstances of each case. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). There is “no

constitutional basis for holding that the speedy trial right can be quantified into a specified number

of days or months.” Id. at 523.

The Supreme Court has held that it “can do little more than identify some of the factors

which courts should assess in determining whether a particular defendant has been deprived of his

right.” Id. at 530. Accordingly, courts approach speedy trial claims on an “ad hoc basis” using “a

balancing test, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed.” Id.

This balancing test involves four factors: (1) length of delay, (2) justification for delay,

(3) defendant’s assertion of their right to a speedy trial, and (4) prejudice to the defendant. See id.

The four factors “are related [] and must be considered together with such other circumstances as

may be relevant.” Id. at 533. But “none of the four factors” are “necessary or sufficient” to find a

Sixth Amendment violation. Id.

States “are free to prescribe a reasonable [speedy trial] period consistent with constitutional

standards.” Id. at 523. However, the Sixth Amendment remains independent of these statutory

deadlines. See United States v. Mills, 964 F.2d 1186, 1193 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

B. Statutory Standard

The federal government codified the right to a speedy trial in the Speedy Trial Act. The

Act requires that trial “commence within seventy days from the filing [of an indictment or

information].” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1).

“[T]he Act is triggered only by arrests that are accompanied by the filing of a federal

complaint against the defendant.” Mills, 964 F.2d at 1189 (emphasis in original). The meaning of

“arrest” for defendants prosecuted by the D.C. U.S. Attorney’s Office was hotly contested during

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the Act’s adoption and in subsequent cases. This is because the D.C. U.S. Attorney’s Office

prosecutes both federal and local offenses. See United States v. Knight, 824 F.3d 1105, 1109 (D.C.

Cir. 2016). This dual nature creates the potential for a prosecutor to “manipulate the order of

arrests, so as to intentionally avoid the Act, without having to obtain the cooperation of an

independent local prosecutor.” United States v. Robertson, 810 F.2d 254, 258 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

But courts were reluctant to believe that prosecutors might subject defendants civil liberties to a

shell game.2

The D.C. Code requires that detained defendants “shall have trial of the case commence

before the expiration of 100 days.” D.C. Code § 23-1322(h)(1).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Length of Delay

“The length of the delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism. Until there is some

delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors

that go into the balance.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. But a numerical comparison does not end the

2

The rationale for treating arrests arising from charges brought in D.C. Superior Court differently

from those initiated in federal court have continued to evolve. See United States v. Robertson, 810

F.2d 254, 257–58 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (distinction supported by concerns about overcrowding federal

court dockets and preventing federal intrusion into D.C. affairs beyond Congress’s intent); contra

United States v. Mills, 964 F.2d 1186, 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (distinction necessary to support

(1) increased political autonomy for the District and (2) federal disengagement from local court

affairs).

But these justifications overlook the troubling reality on the ground, as witnessed in this case.

Congress worried that the “U.S. Attorney [might] engage in [such] ‘forum shopping’, given his

overlapping D.C. and federal jurisdiction,” but warned that if this occurred, “Congress would have

an obligation . . . to remedy the situation through future legislation.” See id. at 1193 (quoting H.R.

Rep. No. 1508 at 49, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7441). Thankfully, we do not have to wait

for a statutory fix given the constitutional protections at play. Not to mention this review of the

legislative history appears incomplete as noted by the dissent in Mills. See id. at 1202–03 (Sentelle,

J., dissenting) (discussed below).

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inquiry. That is “because of the imprecision of the right to speedy trial,” and because “the length

of delay that will provoke such an inquiry is necessarily dependent upon the peculiar circumstances

of the case.” Id. at 530–31. Courts must be wary of adopting a “mechanical approach to the

application of basic constitutional guarantees.” United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 333 (1971)

(Douglas, J., concurring). Ultimately, whether “the length of delay [is] tolerable in a particular

case depends largely on the reason for the delay.” Brian P. Brooks, A New Speedy Trial Standard

for Barker v. Wingo: Reviving a Constitutional Remedy in an Age of Statutes, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev.

587, 609 (1994) (“New Speedy Trial” hereinafter) (citing Marion, 404 U.S. at 333).

Although Gaffney’s delay awaiting trial3 is less than the delays addressed in other Sixth

Amendment cases, the circumstances and reason for his delay are more egregious.

A primary consideration in evaluating the length of delay is the complexity of the alleged

offense. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. A “delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is

considerably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge.” Id.; Compare Doggett v. United

States, 112 U.S. 2686, 2691 (1992) (finding an eight and a half year delay “between indictment

and arrest clearly suffices to trigger the speedy trial inquiry” due to the complexity of the

conspiracy charge and investigation) with United States v. Strunk, 467 F.2d 969, 971–72 (7th Cir.

1972) reversed on other grounds by Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434 (1973) (finding the ten-

month length of delay “critical [] in light of the simple nature of the case” involving a single count

of transporting a stolen vehicle). Relatedly the government should be prepared to bring to trial

offenses involving a single defendant more quickly than one with multiple defendants. Barker,

407 U.S. at 531.

3

The parties agree that the ultimate length of delay until trial is unknown. Yet, it is undeniable that

the federal court trial will occur after the original October 2, 2025, Superior Court trial date.

6

Here, we have a run-of-the-mill felon-in-possession case. By the government’s own

admission, this case required no investigation. See Memo. in Opp. at 10. The sum total of the

government’s evidence—“body-warn camera footage and a firearm found on the Defendant’s

person”—was collected over 100 days ago. Id. This is about the simplest case you can have in

federal court; certainly, simpler than the crime of interstate transportation of a stolen vehicle in

Strunk. See supra.

The government attempts to erase from history Gaffney’s 82 days of detention at the D.C.

jail on his nearly identical Superior Court case. See Memo. in Opp. at 8. That is possible for Speedy

Trial Act computation; but impossible for constitutional computation. See Mills, 964 F.2d at 1193.

In Mills, the court held that “an arrest in connection with federal charges triggers § 3161(b) of the

Speedy Trial Act.”4 So, the court denied the defendants’ Speedy Trial Act claims. But that is not

the end of the story. The court remanded to the district court for consideration of defendants’ Sixth

Amendment claims. See id. Congress similarly recognized that these are two distinct rights. The

Act explicitly states: “No provision of [the Act] shall be interpreted as a bar to any claim of denial

of speedy trial as required by amendment VI of the Constitution.” 18 U.S.C. § 3173.

4

The legislative history of the Act animated the majority’s decision to not apply the Act to similar

Superior Court charges. See Mills, 964 F.2d at 1193. But the dissent in Mills provides a powerful

rebuttal. The majority only cited “a snippet of legislative history focusing on the Act’s application

to Superior Court.” Id. at 1202 (Sentelle, J., dissenting). Although “Congress intended that the Act

not apply to cases pursued entirely in D.C. Superior Court,” “this does not suggest, as the majority

infers, that the U.S. Attorney need not abide by the Act when he moves a case from D.C. Superior

to U.S. District Court.” Id. “Turning directly to the Committee Report upon which [the majority

relies], we acknowledge that Congress did discuss the possibility of ‘forum shopping’ by the U.S.

Attorney to avoid the Act’s restrictions and concluded that the benefits of the local exemption—

such as respect for local courts and political institutions—justified the risk.” Id. “[R]ead in context,

the reference to forum shopping appears directed at the U.S. Attorney’s opting out of federal court

entirely and proceeding exclusively in local court, rather than by transferring cases from local into

federal court without regard to the Act’s time limits. Avoidance of the former sort would not harm

local institutions or evidence any disrespect.” Id. at 1202–03.

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Gaffney’s 82-day detention is entirely appropriate to consider when deciding his Sixth

Amendment claim. The Sixth Amendment does not limit its protections only to “arrests.” Instead,

“it is either a formal indictment or information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and

holding to answer a criminal charge that engage the particular protections of the speedy trial

provision of the Sixth Amendment.” Marion, 404 U.S. at 320 (emphasis added). “[W]hen

defendants are not incarcerated or subjected to other substantial restrictions on their liberty, a court

should not weigh that time towards a claim under the Speedy Trial Clause.” United States v. Loud

Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 312 (1986). The Supreme Court’s decision to highlight what is actually

happening to a detainee reflects a pragmatic approach, not hyper-technical. See United States v.

Black, 918 F.3d 243, 257–58 (2d Cir. 2019). For example, “the period between a withdrawn

indictment and a reindictment does not count [toward delay] for Sixth Amendment purposes” so

long as the defendant is not still detained. United States v. Jackson, 549 F.3d 963, 971 (5th Cir.

2008).

The D.C. Superior Court’s “release” after the government’s dismissal of its case was

meaningless. Gaffney was immediately federally “re-detained” without leaving the D.C. Jail. In

fact, he continued to occupy the same exact cell during this supposed “release” and

“re-detention.” See Det. Hrn’g. (Oct. 9, 2025). Thus, Gaffney’s “actual restraint” date back to his

June 25, 2025 arrest.5

5

Gaffney’s restraint on liberty began when the United States arrested and detained him as part of

the Superior Court proceedings. See United States v. Gaffney, 2025-CF2-00719 (Sup. Ct. D.C.

2025). The transfer of the case from local to federal court did not change the prosecuting sovereign.

That distinction is important for speedy trial calculation.

The Supreme Court has held that “an arrest or indictment by one sovereign would not cause the

speedy trial guarantee to become engaged as to possible subsequent indictments by another

sovereign.” United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 10 n.11 (1982) (finding no Sixth Amendment

speedy trial violation). Thus, courts will not count time detained on a state court charge towards

8

To recap, we have a detention period exceeding 100 days stemming from a simple gun

possession case, with no additional investigation, a single defendant, and likely only a few

government trial witnesses. There was prosecutorial gamesmanship to restart the clock as the

100-day mark neared, which happened after the defense filed a motion to suppress. This was done

by the prosecutors in the same office whose actions ensured Gaffney remained in the same jail

cell. Given all of this, Gaffney has made an initial showing of presumptively prejudicial delay as

to require consideration of the other Barker factors.

B. Governmental Justifications for Delay

“The flag that all litigants seek to capture is the second factor, the reason for delay.” Loud

Hawk, 474 U.S. at 315. This factor asks, “whether the government or the criminal defendant is

more to blame for [the] delay.” United States v. Rice, 746 F.3d 1074, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 2014)

(quoting Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651). “While a ‘deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to

hamper the defense,’ would be weighed heavily against the Government, a delay from

‘overcrowded courts’ . . . would be weighed ‘less heavily.’” Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. at 315 (quoting

Barker, 504 U.S. at 531); see also Diggs v. United States, 28 A.3d 585, 600 (D.C. 2011) (finding

no violation where government delay was not “due to deliberate obstruction, procrastination, or

speedy trial time for a federal court charge. See United States v. Dowdell, 595 F.3d 50, 62 (1st Cir.

2010). This rule rests on the principle that “both the Federal Government and the States wield

sovereign powers, and that is why our system of government is said to be one of ‘dual

sovereignty.’” Gamble v. United States, 587 U.S. 678, 689 (2019).

But the “anomalous position” the District of Columbia finds itself in exempts it from this general

rule. United States v. Shepard, 515 F.2d 1324, 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Unlike the states, the District

of Columbia is not a separate sovereign from the federal government. As the D.C. Circuit has

recognized in the Double Jeopardy context, “[a] person acquitted of a crime under District law

may not be charged with that same crime under federal law in a successive prosecution (or vice

versa); the same sovereign may not take a second bite at the apple.” United States v. Sumler, 136

F.3d 188, 191 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (emphasis added). Thus, the “dual sovereignty” concerns animating

MacDonald do not apply here.

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gamesmanship on the part of the government,” but instead difficulties locating witnesses,

scheduling conflicts, medical emergencies, and competency issues). “Justice Brennan underscored

the idea that ‘deliberate governmental delay’ is one of the most significant dangers addressed by

the Sixth Amendment—so significant, in fact, that [Justice] Brennan characterized the prevention

of such governmental misconduct not as an individual defendant’s interest but as a ‘common

interest.’” New Speedy Trial at 608–09 (quoting Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 43 (1970)

(Brennan, J., concurring)).

The government stopped its analysis at the first factor. See Memo. in Opp. at 9. As such

the government offers no reason for its delay. But the Court, not the government, decides when

the analysis ends.

It is worse to offer no justification for the delay rather than an unpersuasive one. Cf.

Doggett, 505 U.S. at 657 (“[N]egligence is obviously to be weighed more lightly than a deliberate

intent to harm the accused’s defense, [but] it still falls on the wrong side of the divide between

acceptable and unacceptable reasons for delaying a criminal prosecution once it has begun.”). This

is especially so given that “the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the

government rather than with the defendant.” United States v. Sarvis, 523 F.2d 1177, 1183 (D.C.

Cir. 1975). It is not the Court’s job to guess the reason for the delay.

In any case, the Court cannot think of a legitimate reason here.6 The government conceded

that the delay did not relate to “secur[ing] any additional evidence for federal prosecution.” See

6

To be clear: “flood[ing] the federal district court with [gun] cases,” to make a show is not a

legitimate reason. See Scott MacFarlane, Acting U.S. Attorney for D.C. Ed Martin stirs controversy

with prosecutor demotions, messages to “thugs”, CBS News (Mar. 3, 2025),

https://perma.cc/JF8U-AZY4.

10

Memo. in Opp. at 10. Its case-in-chief appears elementary. So why did the government park

Gaffney’s case in Superior Court for 82 days? The silence from the government is deafening.

Regardless of the reason, the delay here was entirely in the government’s control. They

unilaterally chose after 82 days to move the case to federal court. This was 82 days after they first

chose to charge it in Superior Court. This “oppressive delay[] manufactured by the [government]”

violates the Sixth Amendment. Petition of Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183, 197 (D. Md. 1955); cf. United

States v. Hensley, No. 18-cr-00270, 2024 WL 3673612, at *8 (D.D.C. Aug. 5, 2024) (refusing to

fault government where it was not responsible for the delay).

The government’s retort is that it has the power to transfer cases on a whim and at any

time. See Memo. in Opp. at 6. It has flexed this power at an increased rate as of late. See e.g.,

United States v. Wright, No. 25-cr-104 (D.D.C.) (in response to Superior Court judge dismissing

Wright’s case on the 100th day of his detention, the government recharged his case in federal court,

thereby thwarting Wright’s release and request for trial). The government’s bravado is particularly

concerning given the unprecedented times we are in.7 But the government is wrong. Transferring

cases may violate the Sixth Amendment. See United States v. Lara, 520 F.2d 460, 464 (D.C. Cir.

7

Courts have long assumed by default that the government acts in good faith. See United States v.

Chem. Found., 272 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1926). This is based in “[t]he presumption of regularity.” Id.

This presumption holds that “in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, courts presume that

[government official] have properly discharged their official duties.” Id. This thinking has applied

to constitutional speedy trial analysis as well. See Petition of Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183, 198 (D. Md.

1955); (quoting Constitutional Limitations (8th Ed., 1927), Vol. 1, p. 645, et seq.). But these are

“unprecedented” times. See United States v. Beidleman, No. 25-cr-270, 2025 WL 2803850, at *1

(D.D.C. Oct. 1, 2025) (cataloging litany of missteps and prejudicial conduct by government during

the federal takeover of Washington, D.C.). Indeed, “the irregular is now the regular.” United States

v Stewart, No. 25-mj-225, 2025 WL 2754480, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 29, 2025) (citing Fed. Educ.

Ass’n v. Trump, No. 25-1362, 2025 WL 2355747, at *11 (D.D.C. Aug. 14, 2025) (Judge Friedman,

a renowned former prosecutor and judge, recently collected cases addressing this topic, and

concluded that “[i]n just six months, the President of the United States may have forfeited the right

to [ ] a presumption of regularity.”)).

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1975). In Lara, the government engaged in “court shopping” by re-charging a case in Florida after

the court dismissed the case in Washington, D.C. See id. The transfer of the case caused an undue

delay, violating defendants’ constitutional speedy trial right. See id. The court warned that

“[w]henever the Government’s action at any stage of the proceeding indicates bad faith, neglect,

or a purpose to secure delay itself or some other procedural advantage, the resulting [speedy trial]

delay is not justified.” Id. at 464 (quoting United States v. Bishton, 463 F.2d 887, 890 (D.C. Cir.

1972)).

The government’s actions appear to be neglect at best: they failed to re-charge Gaffney in

federal court until 82 days after their initial decision to charge him in Superior Court. See United

States v. Vasquez, 918 F.2d 329, 338 (2d Cir. 1990) (negligent delay in carrying out competency

exam was a result of “institutional dysfunction” rather than “deliberate wrongdoing or bad faith.”).

And bad faith at worst: they are making a show of taking cases federally and/or delaying

adjudication of a likely successful motion to suppress. See Petition of Provoo, 17 F.R.D. at 202

(court finding prosecutors’ decision to charge case in questionable venue “deliberate,” causing “as

much oppressive delay and damage to the defendant as it would have cause if it had been made in

bad faith.”). Either way, this violates the Sixth Amendment.

On the flip side, the government cannot blame Gaffney for any delay. Cf. United States v.

Goss, 646 F. Supp. 2d 137, 141–42 (D.D.C. 2009) (defendant’s withdrawal of guilty plea,

changing attorneys, and requesting more time to prepare for hearings all undermine any claim that

government was to blame for delay). Gaffney was prepared for his October 2, 2025, trial date.

Accordingly, this factor is squarely in Gaffney’s favor.

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C. Defendant’s Assertion of Right to Speedy Trial

Throughout the proceedings in Superior Court, Gaffney asserted his right to a speedy trial.

Evidence of this invocation lies in Gaffney’s rejection of a plea offer and request to set a trial date

in October. See Minute Entry, Jul. 7, 2025, United States v. Gaffney, 2025-CF2-00719 (Sup. Ct.

D.C. 2025). As soon as the government transferred Gaffney’s case to District Court, he again

invoked his right to a speedy trial. See Def. Mot. to Dismiss at 4. Such continual assertion of the

speedy trial right “is entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining whether the defendant is

being deprived of the right.” See Barker, 407 U.S. at 531–32. Accordingly, this factor is squarely

in Gaffney’s favor.

D. Prejudice to the Defendant

In assessing prejudice to the defendant, one must consider the interests the speedy trial

right was designed to protect, including “(i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to

minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will

be impaired.” Id. at 532. Notably, however, defendants are “not required to show prejudice in fact.

Prejudice may arise from the restraint on liberty for an unreasonable length of time before a

conviction, from the harassment of criminal prosecution and anxiety resulting therefrom, and from

the possible loss of witnesses by reason of faded memory and inability to locate them.” Petition of

Provoo, 17 F.R.D. at 198.

“[P]reventing government abuse of the power of imprisonment is often thought to be at the

core of the [Sixth Amendment’s] speedy trial guarantee.” New Speedy Trial at 596–97.

Indisputably, the “time spent in jail awaiting trial has a detrimental impact on the individual” and

“[i]mposing those consequences on anyone who has not yet been convicted is serious.” Barker,

407 U.S. at 532–33. “And while it might be argued that a person already in prison would be less

13

likely than others to be affected by ‘anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation,’ there

is reason to believe that an outstanding untried charge (of which even a convict may, of course, be

innocent) can have fully as depressive an effect upon a prisoner as upon a person who is at large.”

United States v. Brown, 520 F.2d 1106, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1975). “Though we cannot measure in an

accurate manner the degree of personal prejudice to [a defendant], we cannot ignore it,” because

“a man isolated in prison is powerless to exert his own investigative efforts” and “mitigate these

errosive [sic] effects of the passage of time.” Id.

Gaffney has endured months of pretrial detention at the D.C. jail, which undoubtedly

caused him harm. See United States v. Akers, No. 11-cr-313, 2025 WL 2611703, at *3 (D.D.C.

Sept. 10, 2025).8 Among other harms, the longer Gaffney stays detained pretrial, the more likely

he is to succumb to a plea given that “[p]retrial detention frequently spurs people to plead guilty,

if only to remove themselves from dangerous jail conditions.” See Nazish Dholakia, How The

Criminal Legal System Coerces People into Pleading Guilty, Vera Institute of Justice (Apr. 4,

2024), https://perma.cc/JK3Z-QCCZ. Such actions would be at odds with Gaffney’s unwavering

stance that he wants a speedy trial. Accordingly, this factor is also in Gaffney’s favor.

8

The harms of pretrial detention are magnified given the current conditions at the D.C. jail. See

Akers, 2025 WL 2611703 (citing New Report on Jail Confirms Unsafe Conditions and Rising

Deaths, Calls for Immediate Action, Council for Court Excellence (May 28, 2025),

https://perma.cc/4SPB-XD9U (“This audit offers the most comprehensive review to date of facility

operations, documenting a crisis marked by rising deaths, structural decay, staff shortages, and

inadequate medical and behavioral health care.”)); Washington Post Editorial Board, D.C.’s jail is

a disgrace. Still., The Washington Post (June 4, 2025), https://perma.cc/LZ46-AUNQ (“The rate

of death at the D.C. jail is three times the average of U.S. jails. For overdose deaths, the rate is 10

times the national average. The facility — especially its main building that opened in 1976 — is

ridden with cockroaches, mice, and mold. In the span of just a year, an audit recorded almost 1,600

maintenance reports posing immediate health or safety risks. Most have to do with plumbing

issues, which at times have resulted in “toilet water commingled with feces spewing onto residents

and their living areas. Inmates are often subjected to extreme heat or cold due to poor climate-

control systems.”).

14

E. Application of the Factors

All four factors are in Gaffney’s favor. As such, the appropriate consequence is dismissal

with prejudice. Any alternative remedy, including dismissal without prejudice, would rubberstamp

prosecutorial gamesmanship that unduly burdens presumed innocent defendants and society as a

whole. See New Speedy Trial at 601 (discussing how speedy trials serve the best interests of both

defendants and society). The House Committee on the Judiciary agrees. They stated that “the only

effective remedy for denial of speedy trial is absolute and complete discharge.” United States v.

Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 353 n.5 (1988) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 93-1508, p. 37 (1974), U.S. Code

Cong. & Admin. News 1974, p. 7430). They further stated that if the “prosecution is free to

commence prosecution again for the same offense, subject only to the running of the statute of

limitations, the right to speedy trial is largely meaningless.” Id.

The government suggests that the appropriate remedy for a speedy trial violation would

instead be release from custody. Memo. in Opp. at 10. But this would fail to cure “an emotional

stress that can be presumed to result in the ordinary person from uncertainties in the prospect of

facing public trial[,] . . . uncertainties that a prompt trial removes.”9 See Strunk, 412 U.S. at 439.

Moreover, the government had the chance at the initial appearance in federal court to not seek

re-detention. But it did not then. And is too late to do so now. Dismissal with prejudice, which is

9

The government laments that dismissal impacts its “opportunity to fully litigate these

[suppression] issues.” Mot. in Opp. at 15. This argument is tone-deaf. First, the government is not

entitled to litigate Gaffney’s Fourth Amendment rights. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,

494 U.S. 259, 260 (1990) (“The Fourth Amendment’s drafting history shows that its purpose was

to protect the people of the United States against arbitrary action by their own Government.”).

Second, any harm to the government is self-inflicted. The government could have litigated this

question in Superior Court, with the same evidence, witnesses, defendant, prosecutors, and

standards of law. But the government chose not to.

15

“not unique in the application of constitutional standards,” remains the only appropriate remedy

here. Id.

F. If not now, then when?

The Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is not a subordinate right. Yet, this right does

not enjoy the same abundance of caselaw as the Fourth Amendment. Perhaps this is because courts

have found it easier to apply the Speedy Trial Act which provides a clear numerical baseline for a

violation. See New Speedy Trial at 587. This dearth of caselaw is particularly striking considering

how far back the right to a speedy trial dates. “Its first articulation in modern jurisprudence appears

to have been made in Magna Carta (1215).” Klopfer, 386 U.S. at 223.

Despite this, prior court rulings have at times “portrayed the right as somehow less

fundamental and more contingent than other procedural safeguards in the Bill of Rights. This

treatment reflects the orthodoxy that the right to a speedy trial is the one criminal procedural

guarantee in the Constitution that must be limited by the countervailing demands of ‘public

justice.’” See New Speedy Trial at 587. But any assertion that a defendant’s interest in the right to

a speedy trial is opposed to society’s interest is unfounded. In fact, it is the opposite. The public

has a vested interest in effective prosecution, which “does not consist of convicting all defendants

through any means possible.” Id. at 598. Especially in these unprecedented times, courts must be

vigilant that the rule of law acts as a check against the government putting prosecutions above all

else. See Beidleman, 2025 WL 2803850, at *1 (noting that “prosecutors have [recently] rushed to

charge cases before properly investigating them”).

This court’s rejection of local-to-federal case transfers is limited to a narrow band of cases

where: the federal and state prosecutor are one in the same; that single prosecutor’s office decided

to charge locally and then waited months until re-charging federally; there is no legitimate reason

16

for the delay created by the government; the defendant is detained during the initial local case and

then again in the federal case; and the crime charged is as basic as can be. On the other hand, the

government’s preferred alternative is one with no limits on transfers. Any and all D.C. defendants

are subject to up to 100 days of detention in purgatory. After that, the government can effectuate

a federal arrest, which begins—not continues—the constitutional speedy trial clock. The

government’s paradigm places D.C. defendants’ constitutional speedy trial clock at a 100-day

deficit as compared to all other Americans. That is unacceptable. Cf. United States v. Brown, 483

F.2d 1314, 1318 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (when applying federal rules, D.C. defendants in federal court

should not be treated more harshly than defendants in other federal courts). You need look no

further than Enjoli James Gaffney to see the cruelty of this paradigm. The harm to him is

compounded every minute he remains charged and incarcerated.

IV. CONCLUSION10

The government’s actions have awakened the Sixth Amendment from its hibernation.

Zia Digitally signed by Zia

M.Faruqui

Date: October 14, 2025

M.Faruqui Date: 2025.10.14 19:12:49

-04'00'

___________________________________

ZIA M. FARUQUI

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

10

The parties are advised that, under the provisions of Local Rule 72.3(b), any party who objects

to the Report and Recommendation must file a written objection thereto with the Clerk of this

Court within fourteen days of the party’s receipt of this Report and Recommendation. The written

objections must specifically identify the portion of the report and/or recommendation to which

objection is made and the basis for such objections. The parties are further advised that failure to

file timely objections to the findings and recommendations set forth in this report may waive their

right of appeal from an order of the District Court that adopts such findings and recommendation.

See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 144–45 (1985).

17