Bell v. Oama Coronado LLC

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6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

7 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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9 MICHAEL BELL AND LISA PHILLIPS, Case No.: 3:25-cv-02227-RBM-MMP

10 Plaintiffs,

ORDER:

11 v.

(1) GRANTING MOTION TO

12 OAMA CORONADO LLC, et al.,

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

13 Defendants. [Doc. 3]

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(2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT ON

15 SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) [Doc. 1]

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17 (3) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S EX

PARTE APPLICATION FOR

18

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING

19 ORDER [Doc. 2]

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This action allegedly concerns an unlawful detainer matter adjudicated in the

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Superior Court of California, County of San Diego (“San Diego Superior Court”),

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captioned Oama Coronado LLC v. Bell, Case No. 25UD010130C (the “Unlawful Detainer

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Action”). (See Doc. 1-2 at 2, 8.)1 On August 27, 2025, Plaintiffs Michael Bell and Lisa

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1 The Court cites the paragraph numbers of the Complaint and the CM/ECF electronic

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1 Phillips (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed the instant Complaint (“Complaint”), accompanied

2 by several supporting documents and declarations. (Doc. 1 [“Compl.”].) Along with their

3 Complaint, Plaintiffs filed an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP

4 Application”). (Doc. 3.) Plaintiffs also filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order

5 (“TRO Motion”). (Doc. 2.)

6 For the reasons discussed below, the Court (1) GRANTS Plaintiffs’ IFP Application

7 (Doc. 3); (2) DISMISSES the Complaint on screening without prejudice; and (3) DENIES

8 Plaintiffs’ TRO Motion (Doc. 2).

9 I. BACKGROUND2

10 Plaintiffs bring the instant action against the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department

11 (the “Sheriff” or “Sheriff’s Department”), Deputy Does 1–5 (“Deputy Does”) (collectively,

12 the “Sheriff Defendants”), and several private individuals and entities including

13 Defendants Oama Coronado LLC, Todd Brisco & Associates, Veronica Guzman, and

14 Sirem Roman (collectively, the “Private Defendants”). (Compl. at 2.)

15 The San Diego Superior Court entered judgment against Plaintiffs on July 23, 2025

16 in the Unlawful Detainer Action and issued the Writ of Possession of Real Property (“Writ

17 of Possession”) on July 31, 2025. (Doc. 1-2 at 49.) The Sheriff’s Department’s authorized

18 agent issued a Notice to Vacate stating that possession of the property must be turned over

19 on August 19, 2025 pursuant to the Writ of Possession issued by the San Diego Superior

20 Court. (Doc. 1-2 at 5, 8.)

21 On August 15, 2025, Plaintiff Michael Bell (“Plaintiff Bell”) filed a Chapter 7

22 voluntary bankruptcy petition for relief. (Doc. 1-2 at 1.) That same day, Plaintiff Bell

23 alleges that he “faxed the bankruptcy case notice directly to the Sheriff’s Civil Division,”

24 and deputies later claimed they did not receive the notice. (Doc. 1-2 at 20.) On August

25 19, 2025 at 8:45 a.m., the San Diego Superior Court issued a minute order deeming the

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2 The Court’s summary of Plaintiff’s Complaint below reflects Plaintiffs’ factual and legal

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1 Unlawful Detainer Action stayed as to Plaintiff Bell only and directed Plaintiff Bell to file

2 a Notice of Stay. (Doc. 1-2 at 2.)

3 The Sheriff’s Department executed the eviction on August 20, 2025. (Doc. 1-2 at

4 20.) Plaintiffs allege that Deputy Does “dragged [Plaintiff Bell] from his bed in pajamas,

5 placed him in excessively tight handcuffs, rifled through his wallet, and forcibly removed

6 him from his residence.” (Compl. at 5; see Doc. 1-2 at 21.) Plaintiffs also allege that a

7 Deputy Doe “deliberately knocked [Plaintiff Bell’s] phone out of his hands inside the

8 apartment, preventing the call” he was placing to the “Coronado police to report the

9 [Deputies Doe] as trespassers.” (Doc. 1-2 at 20.) The Deputy Does then “pulled him by

10 one arm into the hallway, dragging him” out from the property. (Id.) Plaintiffs allege the

11 Deputy Does also threatened Plaintiff Lisa Phillips (“Plaintiff Phillips”) “with handcuffs

12 when she attempted to retrieve her belongings.” (Id. at 21.) The Deputy Does also “strip-

13 searched [Plaintiff Bell] in the parking lot” and “never read [him] his [Miranda] rights.”

14 (Doc. 1-4 at 1.)

15 After the arrest, the Deputy Does “transported [Plaintiff Bell] to [the] San Diego

16 County Jail where he was confined for 16 hours under inhumane conditions: overcrowded

17 cells, human feces, broken toilets, no food or water, no sanitary supplies, and denial of

18 telephone access.” (Compl. at 6; Doc. 1-2 at 21.) Plaintiff Bell had a “wide open cut on

19 [his] foot” and was “placed in a 10x8 foot cell with approximately 12–14” detainees who

20 appeared under “the heavy influence of fentanyl and street drugs,” and were exhibiting

21 “erratic and threatening behavior.” (Doc. 1-5 ¶¶ 6, 9.) Plaintiff was issued a $10,000 bail

22 fee (see Doc. 1-2 at 27) and was subsequently released several hours after a bond was

23 posted. (Doc. 1-5 ¶ 21.)

24 Since August 20, 2025, Plaintiffs have been allowed only one 20-minute supervised

25 visit to the property to retrieve their belongings. (Doc. 1-4 at 2.) On August 21, 2025, the

26 Sheriff’s Department’s authorized agent signed and executed the Return on Writ of

27 Possession. (Doc. 1-2 at 48.) On August 22, 2025, the bankruptcy court issued an

28 “Amended Plaintiff’s Notice of No Automatic Stay in Place by Operation of Law.” (Doc.

1 1-2 at 30–32.) On August 26, 2025, the San Diego Superior Court issued a minute order

2 finding that based on the bankruptcy court’s ruling, there is no automatic stay as to Plaintiff

3 Bell. (Doc. 1-2 at 19.)

4 Plaintiffs filed the instant Complaint on August 27, 2025, alleging the following

5 constitutional and state law claims: (1) violation of an automatic bankruptcy stay under 11

6 U.S.C. § 361 (“First Cause of Action”); (2) violation of the Fourth Amendment under 42

7 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Second Cause of Action”); (3) violation of the Eighth Amendment under

8 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Third Cause of Action”); (4) denial of due process based on the

9 Fourteenth Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Fourth Cause of Action”); (5) violation

10 of California’s Bane Act under Civil Code § 52.1 (“Fifth Cause of Action”); and (6)

11 common law claims for conversion and trespass to chattels (“Sixth Cause of Action”).

12 (Compl. at 5–7.) Plaintiffs request monetary and injunctive relief, including “at least

13 $15,000 immediately . . . , $10,000 bail bond, plus additional damages to be proven at

14 trial.” (Id. at 10.)

15 II. IFP APPLICATION

16 All parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in a District Court of the

17 United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of

18 $405.3 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). A court may authorize the commencement of a suit

19 without prepayment of the filing fee if the plaintiff submits a signed affidavit “that includes

20 a statement of all assets[,] which shows [an] inability to pay initial fees or give security.”

21 S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 3.2(a). The facts of an affidavit of poverty must be stated “with some

22 particularity, definiteness, and certainty.” Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234

23 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. McQuade, 647 F.2d 938, 940 (9th Cir. 1981)).

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3 Civil litigants must pay an administrative fee of $55 in addition to the $350 filing fee.

27 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee

Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2023)). The additional $55 administrative fee does not apply

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1 The determination of indigency falls within the district court’s discretion. Cal. Men’s

2 Colony v. Rowland, 939 F.2d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 1991), rev’d on other grounds, 506 U.S.

3 194 (1993) (“[§] 1915 typically requires the reviewing court to exercise its sound discretion

4 in determining whether the affiant has satisfied the statute’s requirement of indigency.”).

5 It is well-settled that a party need not be completely destitute to proceed IFP, but he must

6 adequately prove his indigence. Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331,

7 339–40 (1948).

8 To satisfy the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), “[a]n affidavit in support of an

9 IFP [motion] is sufficient where it alleges that the affiant cannot pay the court costs and

10 still afford the necessities of life.” Escobedo, 787 F.3d at 1234 (citing Adkins, 335 U.S. at

11 339); see also McQuade, 647 F.2d at 940 (an adequate affidavit should state supporting

12 facts “with some particularity, definiteness and certainty”). No exact formula is “set forth

13 by statute, regulation, or case law to determine when someone is poor enough to earn IFP

14 status.” Escobedo, 787 F.3d at 1235. Consequently, courts must evaluate IFP requests on

15 a case-by-case basis. See id. at 1235–36 (declining to implement a general benchmark of

16 “twenty percent of monthly household income”); see also Cal. Men’s Colony, 939 F.2d at

17 858 (requiring that district courts evaluate indigency based upon available facts and by

18 exercise of their “sound discretion”), rev’d on other grounds, 506 U.S. 194 (1993) (citation

19 omitted).

20 In their IFP Application, Plaintiffs list $1,596 as their monthly income from self-

21 employment and $292 from public assistance (i.e., food stamps). (Doc. 3 at 1–2.) Plaintiffs

22 declare that they have $626 in a checking account with Chase Bank as of August 27, 2025.

23 (Id. at 2.) Plaintiffs also list $3,739 in monthly expenses, including $2,908 per month on

24 rent payments. (Id. at 4–5.) Specifically, Plaintiff Bell lists that he spends $98 per month

25 on medical and dental expenses, $150 per month on transportation expenses, $178.59 per

26 month on renter’s and motor vehicle insurance, and $405 per month on motor vehicle

27 installment payments. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff Bell also declares that he has filed for Chapter

28 7 bankruptcy. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff Phillips lists that she spends $55 per month on medical

1 and dental expenses and $500 per month in credit card installment payments. (Id.)

2 Plaintiffs further declare that they have spent, or will be spending, $2,000 in

3 conjunction with this lawsuit. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiffs are not owed any money, do not have

4 any dependents who rely on them for financial support, and do not anticipate any changes

5 to their income or expenses in the next twelve months. (Id. at 2–3.) Based on their IFP

6 Application, Plaintiffs’ monthly expenses, $3,739, exceed their monthly income of $1,888.

7 Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently shown an inability to pay the

8 $405 filing fee pursuant to § 1915(a) and Plaintiffs’ IFP Application is GRANTED.

9 III. SCREENING UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)

10 A complaint filed by any person proceeding IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) is

11 subject to mandatory, sua sponte review and dismissal by the Court if the action: “(i) is

12 frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii)

13 seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C.

14 § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (“1915(e) not

15 only permits but requires a district court to dismiss an [IFP] complaint that fails to state a

16 claim.”). “[T]he sua sponte screening and dismissal procedure is cumulative of, not a

17 substitute for, any subsequent Rule 12(b)(6) motion that the defendant may choose to

18 bring.” Teahan v. Wilhelm, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1119 (S.D. Cal. 2007).

19 In addition, “[f]ederal courts have an independent obligation to ensure that they do

20 not exceed the scope of their jurisdiction, and therefore they must raise and decide

21 jurisdictional questions that the parties either overlook or elect not to press.” Henderson

22 ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 434 (2011); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3)

23 (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must

24 dismiss the action.”). Courts address the issue of subject matter jurisdiction first, as “[t]he

25 requirement that jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter ‘spring[s] from the nature

26 and limits of the judicial power of the United States’ and is ‘inflexible and without

27 exception.’” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94–95 (1998) (quoting

28 Mansfield, C. & L.M. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884)).

1 A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

2 “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction” and “possess only that power

3 authorized by Constitution and statute . . . .” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,

4 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, district courts lack subject

5 matter jurisdiction to review de facto appeals from state court judgments. See Rooker v.

6 Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415–16 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S.

7 462, 483 (1983). A federal action is a “de facto appeal” of a state court decision when the

8 plaintiff “complains of a legal wrong allegedly committed by the state court, and seeks

9 relief from the judgment of that court.” Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1163 (9th Cir. 2003).

10 Lower federal courts cannot adjudicate actions brought by “state-court losers” seeking

11 relief from “state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings

12 commenced.” Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 460 (2006) (quoting Exxon Mobile Corp. v.

13 Saudi Basic Indus., Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). This is true even when the challenge

14 to the state court decision involves federal constitutional issues. See Dubinka v. Judges of

15 the Superior Ct., 23 F.3d 218, 221 (9th Cir. 1994); Worldwide Church of God v. McNair,

16 805 F.2d 888, 891 (9th Cir. 1986).

17 District courts must also refuse to decide any issue raised in the suit that is

18 “inextricably intertwined” with the state court proceedings. Noel, 341 F.3d at 1158; see

19 also Bell v. City of Boise, 709 F.3d 890, 897 (9th Cir. 2013) (“The ‘inextricably

20 intertwined’ language . . . is not a test to determine whether a claim is a de facto appeal,

21 but is rather a second and distinct step in the Rooker-Feldman analysis.”). “Where the

22 district court must hold that the state court was wrong in order to find in favor of the

23 plaintiff, the issues presented to both courts are inextricably intertwined.” Doe & Assocs.

24 Law Offices v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001).

25 Both conditions are present here. First, this action constitutes a de facto appeal of

26 the San Diego Superior Court’s judgment in the Unlawful Detainer Action. In the

27 Complaint, Plaintiffs request “immediate restoration of possession of [their] home” or

28 alternatively “30 days 24/7 access to pack and move [their] belongings.” (Compl. at 10.)

1 In the Declaration of Michael Bell and Lisa Phillips, Plaintiffs further request that the Court

2 “requir[e] the Sheriff and Coronado Police to stand down” and “prohibit[ ]Defendants from

3 re-leasing or disposing of [their] property.” (Doc. 1-4 at 3.) Because Plaintiffs seek a

4 remedy by which this Court would invalidate and reverse a state court’s judgment in the

5 Unlawful Detainer Action, they ask the Court to “review the final determinations of a state

6 court in judicial proceedings,” which is at the core of Rooker-Feldman’s prohibition. In re

7 Gruntz, 202 F.3d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 2000); see Richards v. Mercy Hous. Cal., No. C 12-

8 00234 JW, 2012 WL 174186, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2012) (“[I]nsofar as he requests that

9 the Court ‘stop’ the eviction,” Plaintiffs are evidently “seeking relief from the state court

10 judgment.”). As such, the Court lacks jurisdiction to grant the relief requested.

11 Additionally, Plaintiffs’ claims are “inextricably intertwined with the merits of a

12 state-court judgment” because they “succeed[] only to the extent that the state court

13 wrongly decided the issues before it.” Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 779 (9th Cir. 2012)

14 (quoting Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 25 (1987) (Marshall, J., concurring)).

15 Indeed, Plaintiffs allege the “eviction was void by law.” (Compl. at 5.) Although Plaintiffs

16 claim the eviction violated their constitutional rights, such claims “rely on the premise that

17 Plaintiff . . . [was] in fact entitled to remain in possession,” meaning the state court’s

18 judgment was “wrongful.” Koshak v. Cnty. of Orange, No. SACV 13-01732-CJC(ANx),

19 2014 WL 12626351, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2014), aff’d, 637 F. App’x 323 (9th Cir.

20 2016). Accordingly, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims

21 arising from the state court’s judgment in the Unlawful Detainer Action and its subsequent

22 enforcement. See Iula v. Voos, No. 23-CV-2277 JLS (AHG), 2024 WL 171395, at *7 (S.D.

23 Cal. Jan. 16, 2024) (“The issue of enforcing an unlawful detainer judgment is inextricably

24 intertwined with the judgment itself.”). To the extent such claims are inextricably

25 intertwined with those adjudicated in the Unlawful Detainer Action, the First, Second,

26 Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Causes of Actions are DISMISSED without leave to amend.

27 B. Failure to State a Claim

28 “[S]ection 1915(e) not only permits but requires a district court to dismiss an [IFP]

1 complaint that fails to state a claim.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000).

2 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which

3 relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil

4 Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108,

5 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) requires a

6 complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief

7 that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up). A

8 claim is facially plausible when the factual allegations permit “the court to draw the

9 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. A

10 pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

11 entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While “detailed factual allegations” are not

12 required, a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts that, if true, “raise a right to relief above the

13 speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007).

14 The Court “ha[s] an obligation where the petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil

15 rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of

16 any doubt.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman,

17 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)). However, the Court may not “supply essential

18 elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of

19 Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

20 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that a specific

21 defendant deprived him of a right guaranteed under the Constitution or a federal statute

22 and “that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state

23 law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). “A person deprives another ‘of a

24 constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act,

25 participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally

26 required to do that causes the deprivation of which [the plaintiff complains].’” Leer v.

27 Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743

28 (9th Cir. 1978). “The ‘under color of state law’ requirement of § 1983 is equivalent to the

1 ‘state action’ requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment.” United States v. Price, 383 U.S.

2 787, 794, n. 7 (1966).

3 1. Private Defendants

4 Plaintiffs assert their Fourth Cause of Action for violation of their Fourteenth

5 Amendment Due Process rights against the Private Defendants. (Compl. at 5.) Although

6 the Court has determined that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ due

7 process claim pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the Court further notes that

8 Plaintiffs fail to state their Fourteenth Amendment claim against the Private Defendants

9 because § 1983 reaches only actions taken “under color” of state law and generally does

10 not apply to private individuals. See Taylor v. First Wyo. Bank, N.A., 707 F.2d 388, 389

11 (9th Cir. 1983). “A private action may constitute an action under color of state law if the

12 private person willfully participates in joint action with the state or its agents. . . . [or] if it

13 constitutes the exercise of ‘some power delegated to [the private person] by the state which

14 is traditionally associated with sovereignty’ or is ‘traditionally exclusively reserved to the

15 state.” Id. (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974)).

16 Here, Plaintiffs assert their due process claims against Defendants Oama Coronado,

17 LLC, Sirem Roman, attorney Veronica Guzman, and her law firm Todd Brisco &

18 Associates, based on their participation in the Unlawful Detainer Action.4 However, their

19 participation in state court proceedings does not demonstrate action under color of state

20 law. The Court also finds that Plaintiffs fail to allege any facts which adequately link the

21 Private Defendants to any specific deprivation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, as

22 required to state a plausible § 1983 claim. See Jones v. Cmty. Redevelopment Agency of

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25 4 Defendant Oama Coronado, LLC is the landlord who initiated the Unlawful Detainer

Action against Plaintiffs in San Diego Superior Court. (Doc. 1 at 2, 5.) Defendant Sirem

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Roman appears to be the “Community Director” of Defendant Oama Coronado, LLC. (Id.)

27 Attorney Veronica Guzman, and her law firm Todd Brisco & Associates, represented

Defendant Oama Coronado, LLC as the landlords’ counsel in the Unlawful Detainer

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1 City of Los Angeles, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984) (“The plaintiff must allege with at

2 least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in that support the

3 plaintiff’s claim.”). The Fourth Cause of Action must therefore be DISMISSED as to the

4 Private Defendants on this basis.

5 2. Municipal Defendant

6 Plaintiffs bring their Second Cause of Action for violation of their Fourth

7 Amendment rights and Third Cause of Action for violation of their Eighth Amendment

8 rights against a municipal agency—the Sheriff’s Department. (Compl. at 5.) To assert

9 claims against a municipal agency, Plaintiffs must allege that a constitutional violation was

10 committed pursuant to a “formal governmental policy or a longstanding practice or custom

11 which constitutes the standard operating procedure of the local government entity.”

12 Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346 (9th Cir. 1992) (cleaned up); see also Monell v.

13 Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378,

14 385 (1989). Plaintiffs must also show the policy was “(1) the cause in fact and (2) the

15 proximate cause of the constitutional deprivation.” Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th

16 Cir. 1996).

17 In this case, Plaintiffs do not identify or mention any “formal governmental policy

18 or a longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the standard operating procedure of

19 the local government entity.” Gillette, 979 F.2d at 1346 (cleaned up). Nor do Plaintiffs

20 plead that the alleged constitutional violations were committed pursuant to any such

21 policies, practices, or customs. Plaintiffs therefore fail to state a claim against the Sheriff’s

22 Department under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Accordingly, the Second and Third Causes of Action

23 as to the Sheriff’s Department are DISMISSED with leave to amend.

24 3. Deputy Does

25 a. Fourth Amendment (Second Cause of Action)

26 Plaintiffs allege that the Deputy Does engaged in conduct that constituted an

27 “unlawful seizure” in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. (Compl. at 7.)

28 The Fourth Amendment, which applies to the states through the Fourteenth

1 Amendment, protects against unreasonable searches and seizures by law enforcement

2 officers. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). “All claims that law enforcement

3 officers have used excessive force—deadly or otherwise—in the course of an arrest must

4 be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its ‘reasonableness’ standard.” Smith v. City

5 of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 700 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395

6 (1989)); see also Ward v. City of San Jose, 967 F.2d 280, 284 (9th Cir. 1992), as amended.

7 “Reasonableness” is determined by an objective standard. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 397.

8 To determine whether a use of force was objectively reasonable, a court must balance the

9 “nature and quality of the intrusion” on a person’s liberty with the “countervailing

10 governmental interests at stake.” See id. at 396. “The question is not simply whether the

11 force was necessary to accomplish a legitimate police objective; it is whether the force used

12 was reasonable in light of all the relevant circumstances.” Hammer v. Gross, 932 F.2d

13 842, 846 (9th Cir. 1991).

14 Based on Plaintiffs’ factual allegations, the Court finds that: (1) Plaintiffs fail to state

15 a Fourth Amendment claim based on an “unlawful search”; (2) Plaintiff Phillips fails to

16 individually state a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim; and (3) Plaintiff Bell fails

17 to individually state a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim.

18 First, Plaintiffs allege that five Deputy Does “entered [their] home without valid

19 authority or warrant” and that their actions in effectuating the eviction constituted “an

20 unlawful seizure of [their] home and property in violation of the Fourth Amendment.”

21 (Compl. at 5; see Doc. 1-2 at 21.) However, for the reasons previously discussed (see

22 Sec.III.A), the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims that are

23 premised on the legality of the eviction and enforcement of the Writ of Possession issued

24 by the San Diego Superior Court.

25 Next, Plaintiff Phillips alleges that the Deputy Does “threatened [her] with handcuffs

26 and barred [her] from re-entering [the Property] to collect her belongings.” (Compl. at 5.)

27 Although it appears that Plaintiff Phillips attempts to state an excessive force claim, she

28 does not allege that she was arrested, searched, or that any Deputy Doe used any force on

1 her. Plaintiff Phillips therefore fails to state a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim.

2 Finally, as to Plaintiff Bell, the Deputy Does allegedly “dragged [him] from his bed

3 in pajamas, placed him in excessively tight handcuffs, rifled through his wallet, and

4 forcibly removed him from his residence.” (Id.) He also claims the Deputy Does “strip-

5 search[ed] him in the public parking lot” and that “no [Miranda] rights were ever read at

6 any time.” (Doc. 1-2 at 20, 21.) Excessively tight hand cuffs may be objectively

7 unreasonable force in some circumstances. See Wall v. Cnty. of Orange, 364 F.3d 1107,

8 1112 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding excessively tight handcuffing that caused permanent nerve

9 damage violated the Fourth Amendment); Gregory v. Adams, No. CIV S-05-1393 FCD

10 EFB P., 2008 WL 486013, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2008) (finding tight handcuffing in

11 violation of the Eighth Amendment was a triable issue of fact where the defendant

12 handcuffed the plaintiff, who was wearing a wrist brace due to his arthritis and tendinitis,

13 despite the plaintiff’s pleas that he was in pain), adopted by 2008 WL 780672 (E.D. Cal.

14 Mar. 21, 2008).

15 Here, Plaintiff Bell fails to provide any context regarding the “facts and

16 circumstances” surrounding the arrest, the alleged strip search, or the allegedly tight

17 handcuffing sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (stating the

18 standard “requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case,

19 including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat

20 to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or

21 attempting to evade arrest by flight”). In the Complaint, Plaintiff Bell alleges that the

22 handcuffs cut and bruised his wrists (Doc. 1-4 at 1), but he does not describe how the

23 handcuffs caused him to suffer unconstitutional levels of pain, or that he communicated

24 such concerns to any of the Deputy Does. Plaintiff Bell also fails to describe the alleged

25 strip search and does not provide any facts to support his claim that it constituted an

26 unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment, as opposed to a less intrusive

27 search. See United States v. Palmer, 575 F.2d 721, 723 (9th Cir. 1978) (distinguishing

28 “between a search of pockets and a strip search [because] there can be a wide variety of

1 types of intrusion, with varying degrees of intrusiveness”). His threadbare allegations are

2 therefore insufficient to state a claim for excessive force based on tight handcuffing and

3 the alleged strip search. See Petros v. Duncan, Case No. 1:19-cv-00277-SAB, 2019 WL

4 3459094, at *3 (E.D. Cal. July 31, 2019) (holding that plaintiff failed to state claim for

5 excessive force under the Fourth Amendment where plaintiff alleged only that he told

6 officer that handcuffs were too tight); Devore v. Dominguez, 2020 WL 7223261, at *4

7 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (dismissing Fourth Amendment excessive force claim where the plaintiff

8 only alleged that he told officers the handcuffs were too tight because he did not “allege

9 any facts describing the way in which he was handcuffed or any facts establishing how the

10 handcuffs caused [the plaintiff] to suffer unconstitutional levels of pain, bruises, or any

11 other injury.”), adopted by 2021 WL 1554062 (Apr. 20, 2021). Plaintiff Bell therefore fails

12 to state a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim.

13 Based on the foregoing reasons: (1) Plaintiffs’ Second Cause of Action for unlawful

14 seizure under the Fourth Amendment is DISMISSED without leave to amend; (2)

15 Plaintiff Phillips’ Second Cause of Action for excessive force under the Fourth

16 Amendment is DISMISSED without leave to amend; and (3) Plaintiff Bell’s Second

17 Cause of Action as to the Deputy Does for excessive force under the Fourth Amendment

18 is DISMISSED with leave to amend.

19 b. Eighth Amendment (Third Cause of Action)

20 Plaintiff Bell asserts an Eighth Amendment claim against the Sheriff Defendants

21 based on jail conditions he experienced after his arrest on August 20, 2025, which he claims

22 “amount to cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.” (Compl. at 6;

23 Doc. 1-5 ¶¶ 22.) Specifically, Plaintiff Bell alleges the Deputy Does “transported him to

24 San Diego County Jail where he was confined for 16 hours under inhumane conditions:

25 overcrowded cells, human feces, broken toilets, no food or water, no sanitary supplies, and

26 denial of telephone access.” (Compl. at 6.) While Plaintiff Bell references the Eighth

27 Amendment’s “cruel and unusual” language, the Court liberally construes Plaintiff’s claim

28

1 under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Bernhardt v. Cnty. of

2 Los Angeles, 339 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Courts have a duty to construe pro se

3 pleadings liberally, including pro se motions as well as complaints.”). The Ninth Circuit

4 generally looks “to the Eighth Amendment as a starting point for determining the rights of

5 pretrial detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Sandoval v. Cnty. of San Diego, 985

6 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2021).

7 The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment imposes

8 a duty on prison officials to “provide humane conditions of confinement.” Farmer v.

9 Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). These include “food, clothing, shelter, sanitation,

10 medical care, and personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir.

11 1986), abrogated in part on other grounds by Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472 (1995); see

12 also Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000). To plead a claim based on “cruel

13 and unusual” punishment, a plaintiff must allege facts to demonstrate he was confined

14 under conditions posing a risk of “objectively, sufficiently serious” harm and that the

15 prison officials he seeks to hold liable had a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Wallis

16 v. Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074, 1076 (9th Cir. 1995). “A prison official cannot be found liable

17 under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause for denying an inmate humane conditions

18 of confinement ‘unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate

19 health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be

20 drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.’”

21 Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1068 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Farmer, 511

22 U.S. at 837).

23

24

25 5 The Eighth Amendment applies to convicted prisoners, while the Fourteenth Amendment

applies to claims concerning conditions of confinement raised by pretrial detainees. See

26

Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979) (noting “the Due Process Clause” is

27 applicable to pre-trial detainees because “Eighth Amendment scrutiny is appropriate only

after the State has complied with the constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with

28

1 In this case, Plaintiff Bell alleges that he had a “wide open cut on [his] foot” and was

2 “placed in a 10x8 foot cell with approximately 12–14” detainees who appeared under “the

3 heavy influence of fentanyl and street drugs,” and were exhibiting “erratic and threatening

4 behavior.” (Doc. 1-5 ¶¶ 6, 9.) He also alleges the “cell contained only one broken toilet,

5 which overflowed with human waste [and the] floor was contaminated with human feces,

6 filth, and blood stains.” (Id. ¶¶ 9–10.) Plaintiff Bell concludes that these conditions made

7 him fear for his safety and health (id. ¶ 7), hold his “bowels for more than 14 hours,

8 enduring severe pain, humiliation, and extreme distress,” (id. ¶ 12), “forced [him] to urinate

9 in public, . . . and exposed [him] to disease with an open foot wound” (Compl. at 6).

10 However, Plaintiff Bell does not allege any facts to support that the Deputy Does

11 knew or should have known of the open wound on his foot or of any other substantial risk

12 to Plaintiff Bell’s health and safety. See, e.g., Sanders v. Sacramento Sheriff’s Dep’t, No.

13 2:22-cv-01232-TLN-CKD PS, 2022 WL 14126233, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2022)

14 (dismissing constitutional claim based on conditions of confinement where the plaintiff

15 stated “he was without water and unable to flush the toilet for three days” but did “not

16 identify any individual defendants allegedly responsible for these deprivations or explain

17 what those defendants did or failed to do to cause the violations.”). Although Plaintiff Bell

18 alleges the Deputy Does ordered him to remain seated despite his “obvious fear of

19 exposure,” he does not plausibly allege that any Deputy Does “knew of and failed to

20 respond reasonably to a substantial threat to [his] health.” Cf. Flourney v. Diaz, Case No.:

21 3:21-cv-01767-RBM-BGS, 2022 WL 4544715, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2022) (finding

22 allegations in support of an Eighth Amendment claim were “sufficient to survive the ‘low

23 threshold’ for proceeding past the sua sponte screening” where plaintiff alleged that he

24 informed defendants about the risks to his health on several occasions).

25 Accordingly, Plaintiff Bell’s Eighth Amendment claim against the Deputy Does is

26 DISMISSED with leave to amend.

27 C. Immune Defendants

28 Plaintiffs assert several constitutional claims against the Sheriff Defendants arising

1 out of their enforcement of the Writ of Possession. In general, “[a] public official is entitled

2 to immunity from suit for civil rights claims arising out of his or her execution or

3 enforcement of a facially valid court order.” Ezor v. McDonnell, No. CV 19-8851-JVS

4 (AGR), 2020 WL 2813538, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2020) (citing Engebretson v.

5 Mahoney, 724 F.3d 1034, 1039–41 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2013)). Under California law, the

6 Sheriff is statutorily required to levy on a writ of possession and is thereby “immune from

7 liability in the execution of ‘all process and orders regular on their face and issued by

8 competent authority, whatever may [be] the defect in the proceedings upon which they

9 were issued.’” Lyons v. Santa Barbara Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 231 Cal. App. 4th 1499, 1503

10 (2014) (citing Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 262.1; George v. Cnty. of San Luis Obispo, 78 Cal.

11 App. 4th 1048, 1054–1055 (2000)). Indeed, the Supreme Court “has long expressed the

12 general idea that public officials who ministerially enforce facially valid court orders are

13 entitled to absolute immunity.” Engebretson, 724 F.3d at 1038.

14 In this case, the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Causes of Action against the Sheriff

15 Defendants are based on their enforcement and execution of judicial orders. (See Compl.

16 at 5–6.) The Second Cause of Action is also partially based on the Sheriff Defendants’

17 enforcement and execution of judicial orders. (Id. at 5.) However, Plaintiffs do not allege

18 any factual basis to support that the state court’s orders are facially invalid. See

19 Engebretson, 724 F.3d at 1039–41 n.7 (holding officials immune for executing facially

20 valid court order); George, 78 Cal. App. 4th at 1054 (immunizing Sheriff from liability for

21 executing orders, including writ of possession of real property, that “are regular on their

22 face”). Rather, Plaintiffs’ allegations and supporting documents attached to the Complaint

23 show that Plaintiff Bell’s bankruptcy petition did not automatically stay the eviction. (See

24 Doc. 1-2 at 30–32, 49.) As the bankruptcy court informed Plaintiffs (id.), Plaintiff Bell’s

25 bankruptcy petition did not act as an automatic stay because the San Diego Superior Court

26 entered judgment against Plaintiffs on July 23, 2025—thus terminating Plaintiffs’

27 possessory interests in the property—several weeks before he filed the bankruptcy petition.

28 See In re Perl, 811 F.3d 1120, 1127 (9th Cir. 2016) (the “entry of judgment and a writ of

1 possession following unlawful detainer proceedings extinguishes all other legal and

2 equitable possessory interests in the real property at issue.”). The Sheriff Defendants are

3 therefore entitled to immunity from § 1983 liability for enforcing the Writ of Possession.

4 See Ezor, 2020 WL 2813538, at *5 (“A public official is entitled to immunity from suit for

5 civil rights claims arising out of his or her execution or enforcement of a facially valid

6 court order.”).

7 To the extent Plaintiffs claim the Sheriff Defendants waived immunity by ignoring

8 the automatic stay arising from Plaintiff Bell’s bankruptcy petition, their claim similarly

9 fails. Plaintiffs cite no authority, and the Court has located none, that would impose a legal

10 duty on the Sheriff to investigate the legality of court orders before enforcement. See

11 Engebretson, 724 F.3d at 1039–41 & n.7 (rejecting argument that officials have

12 independent duty to investigate legality of court order before enforcing it); see also Arrieta

13 v. Mahon, 31 Cal. 3d 381, 392 (1982) (noting the Sheriff’s function is to execute writ or

14 other orders that are “regular on their face and issued by competent authority” and does not

15 “include a determination of the merits of the underlying action”).

16 Accordingly, the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Causes of Action against the Sheriff

17 Defendants must be DISMISSED for seeking relief from immune defendants pursuant to

18 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(iii). See Brincken v. Royal, No. 2:12–cv–2599–MCE–CKD

19 PS, 2013 WL 211245 at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2013) (finding sheriff deputies were entitled

20 to immunity and dismissing § 1983 claims based on their service of an eviction notice and

21 writ of possession pursuant to a court order). The Second Cause of Action is also

22 DISMISSED to the extent it is based on the Sheriff Defendants’ enforcement and

23 execution of judicial orders.

24 D. Leave to Amend

25 As previously discussed (see Sec.III.A), the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction

26 over Plaintiffs’ claims arising from the state court’s judgment in the Unlawful Detainer

27 Action and its subsequent enforcement because such claims are barred by the Rooker-

28 Feldman doctrine. Accordingly, the First, Fourth, and Sixth Causes of Actions are

1 DISMISSED without leave to amend. See In re Dynamic Random Access Memory

2 Antitrust Litig., 546 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding amendment is futile where

3 plaintiff could not plead subject matter jurisdiction); see, e.g., Arellano v. Lamborn, No.

4 3:19-CV-02360-JAH-LL, 2020 WL 376148, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2020) (dismissing

5 the action on screening for lack of subject matter jurisdiction without leave to amend where

6 certain claims were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine).

7 For the same reasons, the Court also dismissed the Second and Fifth Causes of

8 Action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, to the extent such claims arise from

9 the Unlawful Detainer Action, the Second and Fifth Causes of Action are DISMISSED

10 without leave to amend. However, Plaintiffs assert other possible factual bases for their

11 Second, Third, and Fifth Causes of Action that do not arise from the Unlawful Detainer

12 Action. (See Sec.III.B.2–3.) Given their pro se status, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs leave

13 to amend the Second, Third, and Fifth Causes of Action to the extent such claims are not

14 premised on the legality and enforcement of the state court’s judgment in the Unlawful

15 Detainer Action. See Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (“A district

16 court should not dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend [pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

17 § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)] unless ‘it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could

18 not be cured by amendment.’”) (quoting Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir.

19 2012)).

20 IV. TRO APPLICATION

21 In the TRO Application, Plaintiffs request that this Court stay “all enforcement

22 proceedings related to the Writ” and “[t]ransfer appellate review from the Appellate

23 Division of the Superior Court to the Fourth District Court of Appeal.” (Doc. 2 at 4.) As

24 the Complaint has been dismissed (see Sec. III.A–C), the Court finds the TRO Application

25 is moot because the there is no underlying operative complaint. See Jones v. Fed. Corr.

26 Ctr. Med. Dep’t, No. 20-CV-1385 JLS (BLM), 2020 WL 6942519, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Nov.

27 25, 2020) (denying prisoner’s IFP motion and denying the TRO motion as moot); Olajide

28 v. Brown, Case No. 18-cv-03991-CRB, 2018 WL 3328227, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 6, 2018)

1 (dismissing the complaint and denying the TRO motion as moot). Nonetheless, for the

2 reasons set forth below, the Court finds the TRO Application lacks merit.

3 A. Legal Standard

4 Rule 65(b) governs the issuance of a temporary restraining order (“TRO”). The

5 “underlying purpose” of a temporary restraining order is to preserve the status quo and

6 prevent irreparable harm before a preliminary injunction hearing may be held. See Granny

7 Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers, 415 U.S. 423, 439

8 (1974). The standard for a TRO is identical to the standard for a preliminary injunction.

9 Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001).

10 Injunctive relief is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear

11 showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,

12 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008) (citation omitted). To obtain a TRO or a preliminary injunction,

13 Plaintiffs “must establish that [they are] likely to succeed on the merits, that [they are]

14 likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of

15 equities tips in [their] favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Herb Reed

16 Enters., LLC v. Fla. Ent. Mgmt., Inc., 736 F.3d 1239, 1247 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Winter,

17 555 U.S. at 20 (the “Winter factors”)). The “[l]ikelihood of success on the merits ‘is the

18 most important’ Winter factor[.]” Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 856

19 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 2015)).

20 B. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

21 In the TRO Motion, Plaintiffs request: (1) immediate restoration of possession and

22 delivery of all keys; (2) 30 days of unrestricted 24/7 possession (through September 26,

23 2025) to reside, pack, and move belongings with dignity; (3) that the Sheriff’s Department

24 and Coronado police stand down from any further removal, arrest, or intimidation, (4) a

25 written stipulation of compliance signed by Defendants; (5) a judicial finding that Plaintiffs

26 have not abandoned their property; (6) recognition that the residence contains belongings

27 equivalent to a fully furnished three-bedroom household; (7) immediate reimbursement of

28 hotel costs already incurred, the bail bond, and continuing hotel costs until full possession

1 is restored; and (8) that Defendants be barred “from leasing, advertising, or disposing of

2 property until Plaintiffs vacate. (Doc. 2 at 4 (cleaned up).) In the alternative, Plaintiffs

3 request at a minimum 24/7 possession through September 12, 2025 without office-hour or

4 supervised limitations. (Id.)

5 For the reasons discussed supra (see Sec. III.A), the Court concludes it does not have

6 the authority to grant Plaintiffs’ requested relief under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. As

7 the Court has no jurisdiction to review or invalidate the state court’s judgment, Plaintiffs

8 cannot demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, or even a “serious question,” as

9 to their claims. See Pimentel v. Dreyfus, 670 F.3d 1096, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[A]t an

10 irreducible minimum the moving party must demonstrate a fair chance of success on the

11 merits, or questions serious enough to require litigation.”); see, e.g., In re Bauman, No.

12 3:24-CV-1564 JLS (BLM), 2024 WL 4647299, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2024) (holding

13 Rooker-Feldman precluded TRO as plaintiff sought to prevent “the state court’s eviction

14 order from being carried out,” and his challenge was based on the court clerk’s error); Lara

15 v. Servs., No. 12cv904-LAB (POR), 2012 WL 12872451, at *1 (S.D. Cal. June 5, 2012)

16 (denying injunction where “[plaintiff] had the opportunity to contest his eviction in San

17 Diego Superior Court, and he lost. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars him from seeking

18 relief from that loss in federal court.”). Where, as here, the moving party fails to meet his

19 burden on the threshold inquiry of likelihood of success on the merits, “the court need not

20 consider the other factors.” Disney Enters., 869 F.3d at 856 (cleaned up). Accordingly,

21 the TRO Motion is DENIED.

22 V. CONCLUSION

23 For the reasons set forth above, the Court ORDERS as follows:

24 1. Plaintiffs’ IFP Application (Doc. 3) is GRANTED.

25 2. The Complaint is DISMISSED under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for lack

26 of federal subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

27 Procedure 12(h)(3), for failure to state a claim, and for seeking relief against

28 immune defendants. Specifically:

] a. The First, Fourth, and Sixth Causes of Actions are DISMISSED

2 without leave to amend.

3 b. The Third Cause of Action is DISMISSED with leave to amend.

4 c. The Second and Fifth Causes of Actions are DISMISSED with leave

5 to amend only to the extent such causes of action are not premised on

6 the legality or enforcement of the state court’s judgment in the

7 Unlawful Detainer Action. The Second and Fifth Causes of Actions

8 are otherwise DISMISSED without leave to amend.

9 3. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint that cures the deficiencies identified

10 above on or before October 24, 2025.

11 4. Plaintiffs’ TRO Motion (Doc. 2) is DENIED.

12 If Plaintiffs fail to timely file an amended complaint on or before October 24, 2025,

13 || the Court will enter a final Order dismissing this civil action based both on failure to state

14 claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), and

15 || failure to prosecute in compliance with a court order requiring amendment. See Lira v.

16 || Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If a plaintiff does not take advantage of

17 ||the opportunity to fix his complaint, a district court may convert the dismissal of the

18 ||complaint into dismissal of the entire action.”’).

19 IT IS SO ORDERED.

20 || DATE: October 8, 2025

Fe bormads, Moat

9 HON. RUTH BERMUDEZ MONTENEGRO

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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