Nichols v. Whitney Oil & Gas, LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

KRISTIN NICHOLS, ET AL. CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS CASE NO. 25-533

WHITNEY OIL & GAS, LLC, ET AL. SECTION: “G”(1)

ORDER AND REASONS

This civil action was originally filed on January 23, 2025, in the Civil District Court for

the Parish of Orleans by the surviving family members of Joshua Nichols, who died in an explosion

involving a gas lift line in Garden Island Bay.1 Plaintiffs Kristin Nichols and Lauren O’Neill, on

behalf of Mr. Nichols’s three minor children (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), assert claims under the

Louisiana Wrongful Death and Survival Statutes and, alternatively, under the Jones Act.2 On

March 18, 2025, Defendant Whitney Oil and Gas, LLC (“Whitney”) removed the action to this

Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1452(a) and 1334, asserting federal jurisdiction on the basis that

the claims are related to a pending bankruptcy proceeding.3 Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion

to Remand.4 For the reasons discussed in more detail below , the Court finds that it has jurisdiction

over this matter under 28 § U.S.C. 1334(b). Additionally, mandatory abstention does not apply,

and permissive abstention is not appropriate in this case. Accordingly, having considered the

motion, the memoranda in support and in opposition, the record, and the applicable law, the Court

denies the motion.

1 Rec. Doc. 1-1.

2 Id.

3 Rec. Doc. 1.

4 Rec. Doc. 9.

I. Background

On October 25 and 26, 2023, certain named Defendants herein, Whitney and Trimont

Energy (NOW), LLC (“Trimont (NOW)”), together with non-Defendants Trimont Energy (GIB),

LLC (“Trimont (GIB)”) and Trimont Energy Limited, Inc. filed petitions for relief in the

Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana under Chapter 11 of Title 11 of the United

States Code (“Bankruptcy Code”).5 In the Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases, the debtors received

approval to sell certain property of the debtors’ estates to interested purchasers pursuant to Sections

363 and 365 of the Bankruptcy Code. On May 29, 2024, the Bankruptcy Court approved the sale

of certain property from Trimont (GIB) to a named Defendant in this matter, Spectrum AR, LLC

(“Spectrum AR”).6 The sale included mineral leases, wells, facilities, and equipment related to the

production and transportation of hydrocarbons located in the Garden Island Bay area (“GIB

Assets”), as well as the assignment of related executory contracts to Spectrum AR.7

The Purchase and Sale Agreement (“PSA”) for the GIB Assets maintained and created

mutual obligations.8 Under the PSA, Trimont (GIB) retained liability “to third parties for personal

injury or wrongful death to the extent attributable to Seller’s ownership and operation of the Assets

prior to the Effective Time.”9 The PSA obligates Spectrum AR to indemnify Trimont (GIB) and

its “agents, partners, … affiliates, subsidiaries, successors, and assigns” for losses relating to the

5 In re Whitney Oil & Gas LLC, No. 23-11873 (Bankr. E.D. La. Oct. 26, 2023) (Rec. Doc. 1); In re Trimont

Energy (GIB) LLC, No. 23-11869 (Bankr. E.D. La. Oct. 25, 2023) (Rec. Doc. 1); In re Trimont Energy (NOW) LLC,

No. 23-11868 (Bankr. E.D. La. Oct. 25, 2023) (Rec. Doc. 1); In re Trimont Energy Limited Inc., No. 23-11872 (Bankr.

E.D. La. Oct. 26, 2023) (Rec. Doc. 1).

6 In re Whitney Oil & Gas LLC, No. 23-11873 (Bankr. E.D. La. May 29, 2024) (Rec. Doc. 281).

7 Id.

8 In re Whitney Oil & Gas LLC, No. 23-11873 (Bankr. E.D. La. May 29, 2024) (Rec. Doc. 281 at 26–99);

Rec. Doc. 11-1.

9 Rec. Doc. 11-1 at 29.

GIB Assets, to the extent a claim arose after effective date of the sale.10

Following the sale of the GIB Assets, on August 17, 2024, Joshua Nichols died in a pipeline

explosion that occurred while he was investigating a gas lift line leak from aboard a vessel in the

Garden Island Bay.11 On January 23, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a petition in the Civil District Court for

the Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana asserting claims “under the Louisiana Wrongful Death

Action, and the Louisiana Survival Action statutes.”12 Plaintiffs also stated, “[a]lternatively, this

claim is maintained under the Jones Act (46 U.S.C. § 30104) and/or the general maritime law of

the United States.”13

On March 18, 2025, Whitney removed the case to this Court.14 The Notice of Removal

alleges that the case is removable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and 1452 because “[t]he State

Court Action concerns and relates to a Chapter 11 case that was administered before Judge

Meredith Grabill of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana

entitled In re Whitney Oil & Gas, LLC, No. 23-11873.”15

On April 17, 2025, Plaintiffs filed the instant Motion to Remand.16 On May 6, 2025,

Whitney, Trimont (NOW), Trimont Energy, LLC, DP Gulf Coast, LLC, and DP Louisiana, LLC

(collectively, the “Whitney Defendants”) filed an opposition to the motion.17 The same day

10 Id. at 31.

11 Rec. Doc. 1-1 at 6.

12 Id. at 4.

13 Id.

14 Rec. Doc. 1.

15 Id. at 1–2.

16 Rec. Doc 9.

17 Rec. Doc. 10.

Defendants Spectrum Energy Holdings, Inc. and Spectrum Energy Oil & Gas Holdings, LLC

(collectively, the “Spectrum Defendants”) filed an opposition to the motion.18 On May 9, 2025,

Plaintiffs filed a reply brief in further support of the motion.19

Following the filing of the Motion to Remand, Defendant Spectrum AR and another

Spectrum entity, Spectrum OpCo, LLC, filed a Complaint for Exoneration from or Limitation of

Liability in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, Civil Action No.

25-1506. On July 25, 2025, the Court granted a motion approving the Limitation Petitioner’s ad

interim stipulations, directing the issuance of notice, and restraining the prosecution of any other

claims pending against the Limitation Petitioners.20

II. Parties’ Arguments

A. Plaintiffs’ Arguments in Support of Remand

Plaintiffs argue that this matter must be remanded for three reasons: (1) Whitney failed to

meet its burden to prove that removal was proper; (2) the elements for mandatory abstention under

28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2) are satisfied; and (3) even if the elements for mandatory abstention are not

met, the factors for permissive abstention and equitable remand weigh in favor of remand.21

First, Plaintiffs contend that Whitney failed to carry its removal burden.22 According to

Plaintiffs, the notice of removal failed to explain how Plaintiffs’ claims are “related to” Whitney’s

Chapter 11 bankruptcy case.23 Plaintiffs assert the conclusory allegation that “[t]he State Court

18 Rec. Doc. 11.

19 Rec. Doc. 14.

20 In re Spectrum AR, LLC, No. 25-1506 (E.D. La. Jul. 25, 2025) (Rec. Doc. 5).

21 Rec. Doc. 9 at 1.

22 Rec. Doc. 9-1 at 3.

23 Id.

Action concerns and relates to a Chapter 11 case that was administered before Judge Meredith

Grabill” is insufficient.24 Plaintiffs contend that Whitney has failed to explain how the outcome of

this case could “alter the rights, obligations, and choices of action of the debtor” or “have an effect

on the administration of the estate.”25

Second, Plaintiffs argue that the Court should remand the case under the mandatory

abstention doctrine.26 Plaintiffs argue that the four factors for mandatory abstention are satisfied:

(1) the action could not have been commenced in federal court absent bankruptcy jurisdiction; (2)

the claims are not core bankruptcy claims; (3) the action was filed in state court, and (4) the action

can be timely adjudicated there.27

Third, even if mandatory abstention does not apply, Plaintiffs argue that the Court should

exercise its broad discretion to permissively abstain and equitably remand the case to state court.28

Plaintiffs emphasize that the factors of comity, judicial economy, and state law weigh heavily in

favor of remand.29

B. The Whitney Defendants’ Arguments in Opposition to Remand

In opposition, the Whitney Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ claims relate to the

bankruptcies of Whitney and Trimont (NOW).30 The Whitney Defendants also suggest that the

claims relate to the bankruptcy of Trimont (GIB), who has not been named as a defendant in this

24 Id. at 4.

25 Id.

26 Id. at 4–5.

27 Id. at 5–8.

28 Id. at 8.

29 Id. at 9–10.

30 Rec. Doc. 10 at 1.

matter.31 The Whitney Defendants point out that Plaintiffs’ claims arose on August 17, 2024, over

10 months after the bankruptcies.32 Therefore, the Whitney Defendants contend the Court has

jurisdiction over the claims because they relate to the bankruptcies.33 Additionally, the Whitney

Defendants argue that a determination of whether Whitney and Trimont (NOW) are liable for the

claims will likely in part depend on an interpretation of the sale agreement between Trimont (GIB)

and Spectrum AR, which was reviewed and approved by the Bankruptcy Judge who retained

jurisdiction to interpret disputes relating to the contract.34 Additionally, the Whitney Defendants

argue that the Court has jurisdiction over the entire case, including the claims against the non-

debtor defendants, because those claims could impact the bankruptcies.35

Second, the Whitney Defendants argue that mandatory abstention does not apply for two

independent reasons: (1) the Court has admiralty jurisdiction over this case and (2) the state court

action was filed after the bankruptcy petitions.36 Defendants contend that Mr. Nichols’s death

occurred aboard a vessel in the navigable water of Garden Island Bay, and the work being

performed––pipeline maintenance from vessels––constitutes traditional maritime activity.37 The

Whitney Defendants also argue that mandatory abstention only applies when the state court action

was pending prior to the bankruptcy filing.38

31 Id. at 1, 2.

32 Id. at 6.

33 Id.

34 Id. at 6–7.

35 Id. at 8.

36 Id. at 9–13.

37 Id. at 9–10.

38 Id. at 13.

Third, the Whitney Defendants contend that permissive abstention is only appropriate in

rare cases and does not apply here.39 Because the incident occurred in this judicial district, all

defendants are subject to jurisdiction here, and discovery had not begun when the case was

removed, the Whitney Defendants argue that judicial efficiency and convenience favor federal

jurisdiction.40 The Whitney Defendants contend that all claims can be adjudicated together in

federal court, avoiding duplicative proceedings and inconsistent judgments.41 The Whitney

Defendants assert this case should remain in federal court because it involves federal law claims,

asserted against two bankrupt entities, and relating to assets that were sold as part of the

bankruptcy.42

Finally, the Whitney Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ demand for a jury trial does not

mandate remand.43 They contend that the case was removed under bankruptcy jurisdiction, not

admiralty alone, and that a jury demand made in state court carries over to federal court under Rule

81(c).44 Even in admiralty cases, the Whitney Defendants point out that jury trials are not

prohibited where joined with non-admiralty claims.45

C. The Spectrum Defendants’ Arguments in Opposition to Remand

In opposition, the Spectrum Defendants argue that this Court has “related to” bankruptcy

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) to hear Plaintiffs’ claims against Spectrum and Spectrum

39 Id. at 14.

40 Id. at 15.

41 Id.

42 Id.

43 Id. at 16–17.

44 Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(c)).

45 Id.

AR, as they implicate the mutual indemnity obligations as between Spectrum AR and the Debtor-

seller of the GIB Assets.46 The Spectrum Defendants assert that the facts alleged in the Petition

are sufficient to raise the prospect of a post-petition indemnity obligation, flowing either from the

Debtor-seller’s bankruptcy estate or from Spectrum AR to the Debtor-seller.47

The Spectrum Defendants contend that mandatory abstention does not apply because this

Court has admiralty jurisdiction over the claims and because the state court suit was filed after the

bankruptcy case.48 Finally, the Spectrum Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to meet their

burden of showing that permissive abstention should apply.49 According to the Spectrum

Defendants, severing Plaintiffs’ claims between the Debtor-Defendants and the Spectrum

Defendants would be inefficient, wasteful, and risk inconsistent judgments.50

D. Plaintiffs’ Arguments in Further Support of Remand

In reply, Plaintiffs point out that the Notice of Removal cited only one bankruptcy case,

while the opposition to the Motion to Remand cites four bankruptcy cases.51 Plaintiffs claim that

“Whitney should not be allowed to remove a case and then, when faced with a remand motion,

change the basis of its removal at a time when it is impractical for Plaintiffs to properly respond.”52

Plaintiffs contend that Whitney’s initial removal did not satisfy the procedural requirements

46 Rec. Doc. 11 at 4.

47 Id. at 6.

48 Id. at 7.

49 Id. at 8.

50 Id.

51 Rec. Doc. 14 at 2.

52 Id. at 3.

necessary to remove this case, and Plaintiffs argue that the Court should remand the case on that

ground alone.53

Even assuming that this case “relates to” the bankruptcy case, Plaintiffs repeat their

argument that mandatory abstention applies.54 Because this case was not filed in federal court “in

admiralty,” Plaintiffs argue it does not trigger federal jurisdiction.55 Additionally, Plaintiffs assert

the state court lawsuit is not required to be filed prior to the bankruptcy proceeding.56 Finally, even

if mandatory abstention is not required, Plaintiffs argue that the Court should exercise its broad

discretion to permissively abstain.57

III. Law and Analysis

A. “Related To” Bankruptcy Jurisdiction

To invoke jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b), the removing party must establish that

the claims are “related to” a pending bankruptcy proceeding or Title 11.58 A proceeding is “related

to” a bankruptcy case if the outcome “could conceivably affect the estate being administered in

bankruptcy.”59 Additionally, the Court must consider whether the outcome of the case “could alter

the debtor’s rights, liabilities, options, or freedom of action (either positively or negatively) and

which in any way impacts upon the handling and administration of the bankrupt estate.”60 More

53 Id.

54 Id.

55 Id. at 4.

56 Id.

57 Id. at 6.

58 See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b); In re TXNB Internal Case, 483 F.3d 292, 298 (5th Cir. 2007).

59 In re TXNB Internal Case, 483 F.3d at 298.

60 In re Walker, 51 F.3d 562, 569 (5th Cir. 1995) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

precisely, courts ask whether the outcome of the litigation could “alter the debtor’s rights,

liabilities, options, or freedom of action” and thereby impact the handling and administration of

the estate.61

“To fall within the court’s jurisdiction, the plaintiffs’ claims must affect the estate, not just

the debtor.”62 The Supreme Court has cautioned that federal courts’ “related to” bankruptcy

jurisdiction is not “limitless.”63 The Fifth Circuit has clarified that “related to” is a “term of art in

bankruptcy jurisdiction, where its meaning is not as broad as it is in ordinary parlance where it

means ‘having some connection with.’”64 According to the Fifth Circuit, the “related to” provision

includes a causal component, whereby the instant proceeding “must be capable of affecting the

bankruptcy estate for it to be ‘related to’ the bankruptcy.”65

In the instant case Plaintiffs argue that Defendants have not demonstrated a sufficient

connection to the bankruptcy estate, especially because the wrongful death claims arise from post-

petition conduct. However, Defendants contend that the claims may give rise to administrative

expense claims or trigger contractual indemnification obligations under an asset purchase

agreement executed during bankruptcy proceedings.

If it is determined that Mr. Nichols’s death was caused by the negligence of any of the

defendants, the bankruptcy estates of Whitney and Trimont (NOW) will be impacted. The PSA for

the GIB Assets, which the Bankruptcy Court approved, maintained and created mutual

61 In re Bass, 171 F.3d 1016, 1022 (5th Cir. 1999).

62 In re Wood, 825 F.2d 90, 94 (5th Cir. 1987).

63 Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 308 (1995).

64 In re Bass, 171 F.3d at 1022.

65 Id. at 1022–23.

obligations.66 Under the PSA, Trimont (GIB) retained liability “to third parties for personal injury

or wrongful death to the extent attributable to Seller’s ownership and operation of the Assets prior

to the Effective Time.”67 The PSA obligates Spectrum AR to indemnify Trimont (GIB) and its

“agents, partners, … affiliates, subsidiaries, successors, and assigns” for losses relating to the GIB

Assets, to the extent a claim arose after effective date of the sale.68 Due to this indemnity

agreement, the outcome of this litigation could conceivably affect the administration of the

bankruptcy estates. The facts alleged in the Petition are sufficient to raise the prospect of a post-

petition indemnity obligation, flowing either from the debtor-seller’s bankruptcy estate, which

would diminish the estate to the detriment of creditors, or from Spectrum AR to the debtor-seller,

which would increase the estate to the benefit of creditors. Because the facts alleged in the Petition

give rise to an inference that Plaintiffs’ claims will have a “conceivabl[e] affect” on the debtors’

bankruptcy cases, this Court has “related to” jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims against both the

Whitney Defendants and the Spectrum Defendants.69

B. Mandatory Abstention

Even when “related to” jurisdiction exists, a federal court must abstain under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1334(c)(2) if the following conditions are met: “(1) [t]he claim has no independent basis for

federal jurisdiction, other than § 1334(b); (2) the claim is a non-core proceeding, i.e., it is related

66 In re Whitney Oil & Gas LLC, No. 23-11873 (Bankr. E.D. La. May 29, 2024) (Rec. Doc. 281 at 26–99);

Rec. Doc. 11-1.

67 Rec. Doc. 11-1 at 29.

68 Id. at 31.

69 In re TXNB Internal Case, 483 F.3d at 298.

or in a case under title 11; (3) an action has been commenced in state court; and (4) the action

could be adjudicated timely in state court.”70

In this case, there is an independent basis for federal jurisdiction under 28 § U.S.C. 1333.

Section 1333 provides that federal district courts have original jurisdiction over “[a]ny civil case

of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they

are otherwise entitled.” This case involves a maritime tort––a wrongful death occurring aboard a

vessel on navigable waters. Plaintiffs do not dispute that the Court has admiralty jurisdiction over

this case. In fact, the Petition cites the Jones Act and general maritime law as an alternate basis for

Plaintiffs’ claims.71 Therefore, there is an independent basis for federal jurisdiction over this case

under Section 1333.

Plaintiffs argue that mandatory abstention should apply because the case could not have

been removable solely on the basis of admiralty jurisdiction. Plaintiffs are correct that removal of

an admiralty action filed in state court is possible only if jurisdiction is based on other grounds.72

However, “it is also well-established that the saving clause does not prevent the removal of

maritime claims when original jurisdiction is based on something other than admiralty.”73 This

case was not removed on the basis of admiralty jurisdiction, it was removed because it is related

70 Id. at 300.

71 Rec. Doc. 1-1 at 4. The parties agree that Plaintiffs cannot maintain a Jones Act claim because none of the

defendants were Nichols’s employer.

72 Tennessee Gas Pipeline v. Houston Cas. Ins. Co., 87 F.3d 150, 153 (5th Cir. 1996) (“It is well-established

that maritime claims do not arise under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States for purposes of federal

question and removal jurisdiction.”).

73 Id.

to a bankruptcy proceeding. Nevertheless, the fact that the Court also has admiralty jurisdiction

over the case means that the first requirement for mandatory abstention is not met.74

Additionally, the state court action was filed after the initiation of the bankruptcy

proceeding. “Many courts have held that, for the [mandatory abstention] to be applicable, the cause

of action must have been commenced prior to the filing of the petition commencing the title 11

case.”75 This interpretation is consistent with the plain language of the statute. “[A] forebear of

section 1334(c)(2) referred to a state court action that ‘has been or will be timely instituted.’”76

The current version of the statute states, “the district court shall abstain from hearing such

proceeding if an action is commenced, and can be timely adjudicated, in a State forum of

appropriate jurisdiction.”77 This language supports a finding that the case must be pending in state

court prior to initiation of the bankruptcy proceeding for mandatory abstention to apply.78

Therefore, the prerequisites to mandatory abstention under Section 1334(c)(2) are not met, and the

Court finds mandatory abstention is not required in this case.

C. Permissive Abstention and Equitable Remand

Even when a court has jurisdiction over a proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b), it

may elect to abstain from hearing that proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1), which states:

74 See Bender Shipbuilding & Repair Co. v. Caterpillar, Inc., No. 10-0092, 2012 WL 1372199, at *5 (S.D.

Ala. Apr. 16, 2012) (holding that the requisites for mandatory abstention were met because the claim did not give rise

to admiralty jurisdiction); In re Gibson & Cushman Dredging Corp., 100 B.R. 634, 638 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (“Because

the mandatory abstention provision of Section 1334 applies only to related proceedings based upon State Law that

could not have been commenced in Federal Court, that provision has no application to the admiralty claim presented

by Milam.”).

75 1 Collier on Bankruptcy P 3.05 (16th 2025) (collecting cases).

76 Id.

77 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2) (emphasis added).

78 Doe v. Roman Cath. Church of the Archdiocese of New Orleans, 588 F. Supp. 3d 698, 714–715 (E.D. La.

2022).

Except with respect to a case under chapter 15 of title 11, nothing in this section

prevents a district court in the interest of justice, or in the interest of comity with

State courts or respect for State law, from abstaining from hearing a particular

proceeding arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title 11.

“[C]omity requires federal respect for state courts’ competency to conduct proceedings and enter

judgments.”79 In interpreting whether this standard is met, courts look to the factors that govern

mandatory abstention under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2), and the Court may permissibly abstain from

a case where a party is asserting “related to” jurisdiction and some of the requirements for

mandatory abstention are met.80 Additionally, permissive abstention may be appropriate when the

plaintiff’s claims “hinge solely on questions of state law and invoke no substantive right created

by federal bankruptcy law.”81

This permissive abstention provision is implemented in conjunction with 28 U.S.C.

§ 1452(b), which provides that “[t]he court to which such claim or cause of action is removed may

remand such claim or cause of action on any equitable ground.” 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c) and 28 U.S.C.

§ 1452(b) are “kindred statutes.”82 Both statutes evince a congressional policy to allow state court

trials involving state law to proceed absent countervailing circumstances, at least where Section

1334 is the only basis for federal jurisdiction and the litigation can be timely completed in state

court.83 “Because the statutes are similar in purpose and spirit, circumstances which weigh in favor

79 Gulf Fleet Tiger Acquisition, L.L.C. v. Thoma-Sea Ship Builders, L.L.C., 282 F.R.D. 146, 159 (E.D. La.

2012) (internal citations omitted).

80 Gober v. Terra + Corp. (In re Gober), 100 F.3d 1195, 1206–07 (5th Cir. 1996) (“Nothing [ ] prevents a

court from permissively abstaining under [Section] 1334(c)(1) where some, but not all, of the requirements for

mandatory abstention are met.”).

81 Id. at 1207.

82 Hills v. Hernandez, No. 98-1108, 1998 WL 241518, at *3 (E.D. La. May 12, 1998) (quoting In re Rodham,

193 B.R. 971, 976 (N.D. Ala. 1996)).

83 Id.

of discretionary abstention or dictate mandatory abstention under the subsections of section

1334(c), likewise weigh in favor of or constrain remand under section 1452(b).”84

In Browning v. Navarro,85 the Fifth Circuit listed eight considerations for equitable

remand: (1) forum non conveniens; (2) if the civil action has been bifurcated by removal, the entire

action should be tried in the same court; (3) whether a state court is better able to respond to

questions involving state law; (4) the expertise of a particular court; (5) duplicative and

uneconomic effort of judicial resources in two forums; (6) prejudice to the involuntarily removed

parties; (7) comity considerations; and (8) a lessened possibility of an inconsistent result.86 For the

reasons discussed herein, on balance, these factors do not favor equitable remand and permissive

abstention.

The first factor, regarding convenience of the forum, is neutral because the case was

originally filed in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, which is located in the same

area as this Court. The second factor regarding bifurcation weighs against abstention because the

entire action can be tried in this Court. In fact, remanding this matter to state court would cause

bifurcation of the issues, as certain claims must be brought in the limitation of liability action filed

in this Court. The third factor, regarding the state court ruling on issues of state law, and the fourth

factor, regarding expertise of the courts, both weigh against abstention because this matter involves

maritime law.

84 Id. (quoting In re Rodham, 193 B.R. at 976).

85 743 F.2d 1069, 1076 n.21 (5th Cir. 1984).

86 When the issue is equitable remand and the appropriateness of permissive abstention under § 1334(c)(1),

some district and bankruptcy courts cite these eight factors, others cite a list of 14 factors which include the

requirements for mandatory abstention, and some cite both sets of factors. See Regal Row Fina, Inc. v. Washington

Mutual Bank, No. 04-1033, 2004 WL 2826817, 8–9 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 9, 2004); In re Ballard, No. 12-30138, 2012 WL

4162382 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Tex., Sept. 19, 2012); Sonnier v. Hesco Bastion USA, LLC, No. 12-728, 2013 WL 5350853

(M.D. La., Sept. 23, 2013).

The fifth factor weighs against abstention because there will not be duplicative litigation if

the case remains in this Court. The sixth factor weighs against abstention because Plaintiffs have

not shown they will suffer prejudice litigating in this Court. The seventh factor, comity

considerations, weigh against remand as this case involves maritime law. The policy “in favor of

deciding questions of federal law in federal forums militates against permissive abstention.”®’

Finally, the eighth factor weighs against abstention because there is not the possibility of an

inconsistent result if all matters are litigated in this Court. Therefore, each of the eight factors is

either neutral or weighs against abstention. Accordingly, permissive abstention is not appropriate

in this case.

¥. Conclusion

For the reasons discussed above, the Court finds that it has jurisdiction over this matter

under 28 § U.S.C. 1334(b). Additionally, mandatory abstention does not apply, and permissive

abstention is not appropriate in this case. Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand and for Abstention®® is

DENIED.

NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, this 10th day of October, 2025.

\canettn \pbueit

NANNETTE J VETTE BROWN ow

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

87 Pharmacia LLC v. Grupo De Inversiones Suramericana S.A., No. 15-920, 2016 WL 5387776, at *2 (E.D.

Tex. Sept. 27, 2016).

88 Rec. Doc. 9.