Henson, Sr. v. Lucas County Sheriff's Office

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

DARNELL L. HENSON, SR., CASE NO. 3:24 CV 2089

Plaintiff,

v. JUDGE JAMES R. KNEPP II

HUNTER BAUM, et al.,

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND

Defendants. ORDER

INTRODUCTION

Currently pending in this civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is

Defendant Sgt. Don Comes’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Darnell L. Henson’s Amended

Complaint as against him. (Doc. 30). Plaintiff has not filed a response to the motion and the time

in which to do so has expired. See Local Rule 7.1(d) (providing 30 days to respond to a

dispositive motion). Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. For the reasons set forth

below, the Court grants Sgt. Comes’s motion.

BACKGROUND

This case arises out of a September 3, 2023, traffic stop of a vehicle driven by Plaintiff.

In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges two Lucas County Sheriff’s Office Deputies stopped

him. (Doc. 11). He asserts the Deputies “prolonged the traffic stop” to involve Sgt. Comes, who

himself “was out of his jurisdiction[,]” to “perform an[] unlawful and unconstitutional search of

[Plaintiff] and [his] property[.]” Id. He references the case of Rodriguez v. United States. Id. In a

supplement, Plaintiff asserts the Deputies “held [him] ‘against [his] will’” for “approximately 45

min[utes].” (Doc. 12).

Although the Amended Complaint does not reference it, Sgt. Comes points out Plaintiff’s

original Complaint alleged Sgt. Comes was called to the scene with his canine to perform a sniff

of the vehicle and that Sgt. Comes had indicated the dog “hit on something.” (Doc. 1, at 27).1

The passenger in the vehicle also filed her own cases relative to the same traffic stop,

each of which was also removed to this Court. See Walker v. Danielski, et al., No. 24 CV 2091

(N.D. Ohio); Walker v. Comes, et al., No. 25 CV 35 (N.D. Ohio); Walker v. Lucas Cnty. Sheriff’s

Dep’t., No. 25 CV 36 (N.D. Ohio). This Court previously granted a motion to dismiss similar

claims the passenger asserted against Sgt. Comes. See Walker v. Danielski, 2025 WL 2021396,

at *9-11 (N.D. Ohio).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Civil Rule 12(c) is reviewed under

the same standard as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Coley v. Lucas Cnty., 799 F.3d 530, 536-37 (6th

Cir. 2015). When considering either a Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c) motion, this Court presumes all

well-pleaded factual allegations of the pleadings are true and draws all reasonable inferences in

the non-moving party’s favor. Total Benefits Plan. Agency v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield,

552 F.3d 430, 434 (6th Cir. 2008). “[O]nly a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief

survives a motion to dismiss.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)).

Additionally, pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings

drafted by lawyers. See El Bey v. Roop, 530 F.3d 407, 413 (6th Cir. 2008). However, the “lenient

treatment generally accorded to pro se litigants has limits.” Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413,

1. Sgt. Comes states that “[d]ue to the ‘less stringent’ pleading standard for pro se filings, Sgt.

Comes will address the Amended Complaint as if the K-9 sniff allegations from the original

Complaint were incorporated.” (Doc. 30, at 5).

416 (6th Cir. 1996). Liberal construction for pro se litigants does not “abrogate basic pleading

essentials[.]” Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989). The Court is not required to

“conjure up unpleaded facts” or construct claims against defendants on behalf of a pro se

plaintiff. Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 577 (6th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation and citation

omitted); Bassett v. Nat’l Coll. Athletic Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 437 (6th Cir. 2008); Pliler v. Ford,

542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004) (district courts “have no obligation to act as counsel or paralegal to pro

se litigants”); Payne v. Sec’y of Treasury, 73 F. App’x 836, 837 (6th Cir. 2003) (district courts

are not “required to create” a pro se litigant’s claim for him). Rather, the complaint must give the

defendants fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. Lillard

v. Shelby Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 724 (6th Cir. 1996). The complaint must still “contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Barnett v. Luttrell, 414 F. App’x 784, 786 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).

DISCUSSION

Sgt. Comes moves to dismiss the claims against him, arguing Plaintiff has not pled a

plausible constitutional claim. See Doc. 30, at 4-5. He further contends he is entitled to qualified

immunity for any claim that he acted outside his jurisdiction. Id. at 6-7. Sgt. Comes cites this

Court’s prior opinion in Walker v. Danielski and its determination that he was entitled to

dismissal of claims based on factually similar allegations by the passenger in the vehicle. The

Court agrees that Sgt. Comes is entitled to dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims here as well.

To state a cause of action under § 1983, a plaintiff must plead two elements: “(1)

deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States (2) caused by a

person acting under color of state law.” Hunt v. Sycamore Cmty. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 542

F.3d 529, 534 (6th Cir. 2008). To sufficiently plead the second element, a plaintiff must allege

“personal involvement[.]” Grinter, 532 F.3d at 575 (citation omitted). To do so, “a plaintiff must

[allege] that the official either actively participated in the alleged unconstitutional conduct or

‘implicitly authorized, approved[,] or knowingly acquiesced in the alleged unconstitutional

conduct of an offending subordinate.’” Webb v. United States, 789 F.3d 647, 659 (6th Cir. 2015)

(quoting Scott v. City of Cleveland, 555 F. Supp. 2d 890, 896 (N.D. Ohio 2008)); see also Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 676 (“A plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the

official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”) (emphasis added).

The defense of qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary

functions where their “conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,

818 (1982). This defense “can be raised at various stages of the litigation including at the

pleading stage in a motion to dismiss[.]” English v. Dyke, 23 F.3d 1086, 1089 (6th Cir. 1994).

When a defendant raises qualified immunity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show “both that

the challenged conduct violated a constitutional or statutory right, and that the right was so

clearly established at the time of the conduct ‘that every reasonable official would have

understood that what he was doing violated that right.’” T.S. v. Doe, 742 F.3d 632, 635 (6th Cir.

2014) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)) (citation modified).

Three principles guide the Court’s analysis here. First, “[g]enerally, a dog sniff does not

require separate reasonable suspicion because it is not a search under the Fourth Amendment.”

United States v. Stepp, 680 F.3d 651, 663 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S.

405, 409 (2005)). Second, however, officers may not prolong a traffic stop to have a drug dog

sniff a car—a crime detecting action not ordinarily incident to a traffic stop—absent independent

reasonable suspicion to detain the motorist. Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354-57

(2015). Third and finally, “[a]n alert to the presence of drugs by a properly trained narcotics

detection dog is sufficient to establish probable cause to search a vehicle.” United States v.

Sharp, 689 F.3d 616, 618 (6th Cir. 2012); Nykoriak v. Wileczek, 666 F. App’x 441, 445 (6th Cir.

2016) (“[T]he positive indication by the canine was sufficient to establish probable cause for the

presence of a controlled substance to justify the warrantless search of [the] vehicle.”) (internal

quotations and citation omitted).

The specific allegations Plaintiff asserts as to Sgt. Comes are simply that Comes arrived

at the request of Lucas County Deputies and, if considering the allegations in the original

complaint, had his canine officer conduct a sniff of the vehicle. He asserts the Lucas County

Deputies “prolonged the traffic stop” to involve Sgt. Comes, who himself “was out of his

jurisdiction[,]” to “perform an[] unlawful and unconstitutional search of [Plaintiff] and [his]

property[.]” (Doc. 11).

First, as in the Walker cases, although Plaintiff alleges the stop was unlawfully prolonged

for the dog sniff, “a canine sniff is not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment[.]”

United States v. Reed, 141 F.3d 644, 650 (6th Cir. 1998); Stepp, 680 F.3d at 663. Thus, to the

extent Plaintiff alleges there was a dog sniff and the sniff itself violates the Fourth Amendment,

such a claim does not state a constitutional violation.

Second, Plaintiff cites Rodriguez, which stands for the proposition that police may not

extend an otherwise-completed traffic stop, absent reasonable suspicion, in order to conduct a

dog sniff. 575 U.S. at 354-57. But the Complaint contains no factual allegations plausibly

alleging Sgt. Comes took any action that unreasonably prolonged the stop; instead, it simply

alleges Sgt. Comes arrived at the Lucas County Deputies’ request. Plaintiff’s allegations place

responsibility for the alleged prolonging of the stop on the County Deputies who initiated it.

Thus, the Court finds Plaintiff has not plausibly pled a clearly established constitutional violation

to support a § 1983 claim against Sgt. Comes. Cf. Lea v. Conrad, 2022 WL 4279728, at *7

(W.D. Ky.) (finding, albeit at the summary judgment stage, that the plaintiff “ha[d] not pointed

to evidence in the record that [the officer], arriving to the scene after the stop in a support role as

a K9 handler, reasonably knew that he was extending the traffic stop beyond a constitutionally

permissible length. [The officer] is therefore entitled to qualified immunity.”).

Further, Sgt. Comes is also entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s claim that he

acted outside of his territorial jurisdiction. As the Court explained in the Walker cases, even

assuming Sgt. Comes acted outside his territorial jurisdiction, he violated no clearly established

constitutional right in doing so. The Ohio Supreme Court has held that a law enforcement officer

who observes a traffic violation outside his jurisdiction has probable cause to make a traffic stop

and such a stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment. State v. Jones, 121 Ohio St. 3d 103,

106-09 (2009). And various courts have explained that, even if a traffic stop violates state law,

that does not mean it violates the federal Constitution. See, e.g., Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164,

172 (2008) (noting that while local law enforcement practices might “vary from place to place

and from time to time, Fourth Amendment protections are not so variable[.]”) (internal quotation

and citation omitted); id. at 176 (“[L]inking Fourth Amendment protections to state law would

cause them to vary from place to place and from time to time.”) (internal quotation and citation

omitted). Plaintiff has pointed to no clearly established law holding otherwise. As such, the

Court finds Sgt. Comes is entitled to qualified immunity and dismissal of any claim based on

allegations he was acting outside his territorial jurisdiction.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, good cause appearing, it is

ORDERED that the Sgt. Comes’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 30) be, and the same hereby

is, GRANTED; and the Court

FURTHER CERTIFIES, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this

decision could not be taken in good faith.

s/ James R. Knepp II

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: October 10, 2025