Conley v. Department of Veterans Affairs

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

WESTERN DIVISION

)

LOUVISIA CONLEY, )

A/K/A ELENE K, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 2:23-cv-02756-SHM-cgc

)

DEPT. OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, VA )

MEMPHIS MEDICAL CENTER, DENIS )

R. MCDONOUGH, SECRETARY, )

JOSEPH P. VAUGHN, DIRECTOR, )

GINA RAYMOND, SUPERVISOR, )

KATHLEEN POHLID, ATTORNEY, )

EBONY DALVIA, EEO AGENCY )

MANAGER, AND VA POLICE )

OFFICE, )

)

Defendant. )

)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION

Before the Court are two motions filed by pro se Plaintiff

Louvisia Conley. On September 9, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion

for reconsideration of the Court’s September 2, 2025 Order

adopting the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation. (ECF

No. 74.) On September 11, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion under

Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) to alter or amend the Court’s judgment,

which was based on the September 2, 2025 Order. (ECF No. 81.)

For the reasons below, both motions are DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Plaintiff is a former employee of the Department of Veterans

Affairs (“VA”) Medical Center in Memphis, Tennessee. (ECF No.

1.) On January 26, 2017, she filed an employment discrimination

claim against the VA and requested a hearing before the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). (ECF Nos. 1, 53.)

On May 7, 2021, Plaintiff entered into a Settlement

Agreement with the VA. (ECF No. 53.) Under that agreement, the

VA agreed to (1) compensate Plaintiff in the amount of $250.00

and (2) notify her “within ten working days of the effective

date … that she has been selected and offered [a] Program Support

Assistant (PSA) position at [the] GS-7, Step 1 level.” (Id.) On

May 19, 2021, Plaintiff received an email that she had been

selected for the PSA position in accordance with the agreement.

(Id.) She also received the payment of $250.00 required under

the agreement. (Id.)

On May 10, 2022, Plaintiff filed a second employment

discrimination claim, alleging discrimination “on the basis of

race, color, age, sex, and disability.” (Id.) She was terminated

from her PSA position on June 10, 2022. (Id.) After her

termination, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the VA, alleging

that the agency had breached the May 7, 2021 Settlement

Agreement. (Id.) The VA Office of Resolution Management (“ORM”)

reviewed her complaint and determined that no breach had

occurred. (Id.)

After a series of unsuccessful appeals, Plaintiff filed a

civil action in this Court on December 6, 2023. (ECF No. 1.) On

December 14, 2023, the EEOC dismissed Plaintiff’s final

administrative appeal, explaining that the pending civil action

had terminated the EEOC’s jurisdiction. (ECF No. 38.) On February

2, 2024, the VA issued a final agency decision dismissing

Plaintiff’s administrative case for lack of jurisdiction. (Id.)

This action is the only pending case. (ECF No. 72.)

B. Procedural Background

On July 30, 2024, Plaintiff filed a document titled “Amended

Definitive Statement,” which the Court construed as an Amended

Complaint. (ECF No. 32.) Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint listed

the following individuals and entities as Defendants:

“Department of Veteran Affairs Agency,” “Denis R. McDonough, VA

Memphis Director,” “Joseph R. Vaughn, Agency Local EEO,” “Gina

Raymond, VA Director Agency HR,” “EEO Manager Ebony Dalvia,”

“Attorney Kathleen Pohlid, Agency Attorney,” and “VA Memphis

Veteran Police Office.” (Id.)

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint alleged that Defendants had

breached the May 6, 2021 Settlement Agreement by failing to offer

her a new position within the agreed time. She cited numerous

federal employment laws she claimed were violated. (Id.) Because

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint was disorganized, the factual

bases for Plaintiff’s claims were unclear, as were the specific

code sections she alleged were violated. Liberally construed,

the Amended Complaint asserted claims for slander, breach of

settlement agreement, and violations of the Family and Medical

Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601, et seq., the Whistleblower

Protection Act (“WPA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1121-1219, 2302, Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§

2000e, et seq., and the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”), 29 U.S.C. § 206.

(Id.)

On October 18, 2024, Defendants filed a “Partial Motion to

Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment.”

(ECF No. 38.) On March 4, 2025, the Magistrate Judge issued a

Report and Recommendation (“the R&R”), recommending that

Defendants’ Motion be granted. (ECF No. 53.) On March 11, 2025,

Plaintiff filed an objection to the R&R. (ECF No. 54.) Between

March 14 and July 9, 2025, the parties filed thirteen additional

documents addressing issues related to the R&R (collectively,

the “Pending Motions”) without leave of court. (ECF Nos. 55-71.)

On September 2, 2025, the Court adopted the Magistrate

Judge’s R&R. (ECF No. 72.) The Order dismissed Plaintiff’s FMLA,

WPA, and Slander claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

(Id.) The Order dismissed the Equal Pay Act, Title VII

Compensation, and Breach of Settlement claims for failure to

state a claim on which relief may be granted under Rule 12(b)(6).

Judgement was entered on September 2, 2025 (ECF No. 73.)

Plaintiff filed her motion for reconsideration on September

8, 2025. (ECF No. 74.) That filing contains four separate

documents, titled “Motion of Appeal and Request for

Reconsideration,” “Motion for Reconsideration Under Fed. R. Civ.

P. 59(e),” “Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment,” and

“Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for

Reconsideration.” The documents make numerous overlapping

arguments about the substance of the September 2, 2025 order

underlying the Court’s judgment. (Id.) Plaintiff filed another

motion on September 11, 2025, asking the Court to amend the

September 2, 2025 judgment based on the September 2, 2025 order.

(ECF No. 81.)

II. Standard of Review

“Motions for reconsideration generally are construed as

motions to alter or amend the judgment under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 59(e).” Waid v. Snyder, No. 18-1960, 2019 WL

4121023, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 19, 2019); see also Moody v. Pepsi-

Cola Metro. Bottling Co., 915 F.2d 201, 206 (6th Cir. 1990)

(construing a motion for reconsideration as a Rule 59(e) motion

to alter or amend a judgment). The purpose of Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 59(e) is to allow a district court to correct

its own mistakes. White v. New Hampshire Dep’t of Emp’t Sec.,

455 U.S. 445, 450 (1982).

The Court will consider Plaintiff’s motions for

reconsideration as motions to alter or amend the September 2,

2025 judgment under rule 59(e). Although Plaintiff occasionally

asserts that she is asking the Court to reconsider its September

2, 2025 Order, rather than its judgment, Plaintiff uses the terms

interchangeably and makes her arguments under the rule 59(e)

standard. (ECF No. 74.)

Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) permits the court to alter or amend

a final judgment if there is “(1) a clear error of law; (2) newly

discovered evidence; (3) an intervening change in controlling

law; or (4) a need to prevent manifest injustice.” Betts v.

Costco Wholesale Corp., 558 F.3d 461, 474 (6th Cir. 2009)

(quoting Henderson v. Walled Lake Consol. Sch., 469 F.3d 479,

496 (6th Cir. 2006)). Granting a Rule 59(e) motion is an

extraordinary remedy that lies in the court’s discretion. See

McConocha v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield Mutual of Ohio, 930

F.Supp. 1182, 1184 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (“[motions to alter or amend]

are extraordinary in nature and, because they run contrary to

notions of finality and repose, should be discouraged”); see

also Huff v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 675 F.2d 119, 122 (6th Cir,

1982) (“The grant or denial of a Rule 59(e) motion is within the

informed discretion of the district court, reversible only for

abuse”).

“Motions for reconsideration are disfavored because they

consume scarce judicial resources on matters already decided.”

Oden v. Warden, North Central Correctional Complex, No. 1:18-

cv420, 2020 WL 419749 at *1 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 27, 2020). “It is

not appropriate to use a motion for reconsideration to revisit

arguments already made and rejected.” Id. “Such a motion is not

intended to relitigate matters already decided by the Court but,

rather, is designed to correct manifest errors of fact or law

which led to the entry of judgment.” Windsor v. A Fed. Exec.

Agency, 614 F. Supp. 1255, 1264 (M.D. Tenn. 1983), aff'd, 767

F.2d 923 (6th Cir. 1985); see also Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of

Chippewa Indians v. Engler, 146 F.3d 367, 374 (6th Cir. 1998)

(“A motion under Rule 59(e) is not an opportunity to re-argue a

case”).

III. Analysis

Plaintiff does not assert newly discovered evidence or a

change in controlling law in her two motions. (ECF Nos. 74, 81.)

The Court, therefore, considers whether there are clear errors

of law or manifest injustice given Plaintiff’s arguments and the

standard in Betts.

Plaintiff’s initial objections to the Magistrate Judge’s

R&R relied on three central arguments: (1) failure to apply

proper legal standards, (2) judicial bias, and (3) substantive

legal error. (ECF No. 72.) In her pending motions, Plaintiff

makes the first and third arguments to support the specific

claims the Court dismissed when it adopted the R&R.

A. Family and Medical Leave Act

Plaintiff argues that the Court made a clear legal error in

dismissing Plaintiff’s claims under the FMLA. (ECF No. 81 at 3.)

Plaintiff again fails to engage with the Magistrate’s reasoning

that her FMLA claims are barred because government employees

with more than 12 months of service do not have a private right

of action to address FMLA violations. (ECF No. 53 at 9-10.)

Plaintiff does not dispute her dates of service, but merely

restates broadly that she was terminated in violation of the

FMLA. (ECF No. 81 at 3.) The Court finds no clear legal error or

manifest injustice in dismissing Plaintiff’s FMLA claims.

B. Whistleblower Protection Act Claims

Plaintiff asserts that the Court erred in dismissing

Plaintiff’s WPA claims for lack of jurisdiction. The Court

concluded that Plaintiff had failed to exhaust her administrative

remedies and failed to seek relief in the United States Court of

Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of

competent jurisdiction. (ECF No. 72 at 10-11.) Plaintiff raises

no substantive arguments in her motion for reconsideration

addressing these jurisdictional issues. (ECF No. 81 at 3-4.) The

Court finds no clear error of law or manifest injustice in

dismissing Plaintiff’s WPA claims.

C. Slander Claims

The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s slander claims because the

United States had not waived its sovereign immunity for slander.

(ECF No. 72 at 10-11.) Plaintiff asserts that the Court erred in

failing to exercise jurisdiction over her slander claims. (ECF

No. 81 at 4.) Liberally construed, Plaintiff’s motion for

reconsideration appears to argue that the EEOC’s September 11,

2023 “Right to Sue” letter to Plaintiff waived the government’s

sovereign immunity for her slander claims. (Id.) It did not. It

only addressed Plaintiff’s breach of settlement agreement

claims, giving her the right to bring her breach of settlement

claims in a civil action. (ECF No. 1 at 7-8.) The caselaw

Plaintiff cites, Lynn v. City of Jackson, 63 S.W.3d 332 (Tenn.

Ct. App. 2001), does not discuss slander or defamation. The

Court finds no clear legal error of law or manifest injustice in

dismissing Plaintiff’s slander claims.

D. Title VII Pay Discrimination Claims

In her motions for reconsideration, Plaintiff does not argue

that her Title VII claims against employee-defendants were

improperly dismissed. She does not argue that her pay-based

Title VII claims were improperly dismissed. Therefore, the Court

need not reconsider its ruling on those claims.

E. Equal Pay Act Claim

In her motions to reconsider, plaintiff argues that she

“alleged…unequal pay” under the EPA and that her claim was,

therefore, improperly dismissed. (ECF No. 81 at 6.) In her

report, the Magistrate Judge concluded that, “[w]hile Plaintiff

does mention the Equal Pay Act…in her Amended Complaint, the

Court cannot clearly discern the factual bases for these claims.”

(ECF No. 53 at 13.) In her motions, Plaintiff nowhere cites her

Amended Complaint to properly object to the Magistrate Judge’s

conclusion or the Court’s Order. The caselaw Plaintiff cites,

Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002), considers Title

VII, not the Equal Pay Act. Despite her bare assertion,

Plaintiff has not shown that she properly alleged a violation of

the EPA in her Amended Complaint. The Court finds no clear error

of law or manifest injustice in dismissing Plaintiff’s EPA claim.

F. Breach of Settlement Agreement Claim

“It is not appropriate to use a motion for reconsideration

to revisit arguments already made and rejected.” Oden, 2020 WL

419749 at *1.

Plaintiff addresses her breach of settlement claim, but her

arguments are difficult to follow. She generally fails to cite

new law, and she makes the same arguments made in her initial

objections to the R&R. (compare ECF No. 81 at 2, 6, 8-9 and ECF

No. 74 at 10, 12-13, 17 with ECF No. 54 at 4, 12, 21-22, 29, 37-

38.) Those arguments were considered and rejected by the

Magistrate Judge and by the Court in its September 2, 2025 Order.

Therefore, they are not addressed here. The same analysis

applies to Plaintiff’s “wrongful hiring” claim, which relies on

the facts in her breach of settlement claim. (ECF No. 81 at 4).

Plaintiff does cite one new case: Shaffer v. GTE N., Inc.,

284 F.3d 500, 503–04 (3d Cir. 2002). That case and Plaintiff’s

argument relying on it address jurisdictional issues about EEOC

settlement agreements. Plaintiff’s breach of settlement claim

was dismissed for failure to state a claim, not for lack of

jurisdiction. (ECF No. 72 at 16.) The Court declines to

reconsider its dismissal of the breach of settlement agreement

claim.

Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion in her motion for

reconsideration, in adopting the R&R, the Court did not “ignore”

the breach of settlement agreement. (ECF No. 81 at 8.) The R&R

properly analyzed Plaintiff’s claims and recommended dismissal

under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. (ECF No. 53 at

14-15.)

G. General Arguments Raised by Plaintiff

1. Bias

“It is not appropriate to use a motion for reconsideration

to revisit arguments already made and rejected.” Oden, 2020 WL

419749 at *1.

In her motions to reconsider, Plaintiff makes the same

vague, conclusory arguments alleging bias that the Court rejected

in adopting the R&R. (Compare ECF No. 81 at 9 with ECF No. 54 at

11.) Having considered and rejected those arguments (ECF No. 73

at 14-15), the Court finds no reason to reconsider them here.

2. Mootness

Plaintiff asserts in her motion for reconsideration that

the Court made a clear legal error in “[d]ismissing her claims

as ‘moot.’” (ECF No. 81 at 7.) Plaintiff misconstrues the Court’s

holding. Plaintiff’s other motions pending when the Court

adopted the R&R were denied as moot. (ECF No. 72 at 2.) None of

the claims raised in her Amended Complaint was dismissed as moot.

(Id.)

3. Other Title VII and ADA Claims

In her motions to reconsider, Plaintiff cites authorities

to support various additional claims under the Americans with

Disability Act (“ADA”) 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. and Title VII,

referring to statutory sections and subsections and cases. (ECF

No. 81.) Plaintiff asserts generally that her claims under those

authorities were improperly dismissed. She offers minimal

analysis. The R&R addressed the specific violations of Title

VII that Plaintiff claimed and that are addressed above. It did

not address any claims under the ADA.

The supposed additional Title VII claims and ADA claims

were never properly presented to the Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and Opposition to the Motion to

Dismiss did not adequately cite specific legal authority or link

specific allegations to the broad authorities it did cite.

Plaintiff never presented arguments supporting the supposed

claims.

Although pro se filings are construed liberally, “trial and

appellate courts should not have to guess at the nature of the

claim asserted.” Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir.

1989); see also Kafele v. Lerner, Sampson & Rothfuss, L.P.A.,

161 F. App'x 487, 491 (6th Cir. 2005) (“pro se litigants are not

relieved of the duty to develop claims with an appropriate degree

of specificity”). As the Magistrate Judge correctly pointed

out: “due to the manner in which Plaintiff has organized her

Amended Complaint, it is difficult to decipher the factual bases

of [Plaintiff’s] claims.” (ECF No. 53 at 2.) The Amended

Complaint was disorganized and incoherent.1

In subsequent filings, including the motions before the

Court and Plaintiff’s objections to the R&R, Plaintiff cites

more specific sections in Title VII and the ADA. There are two

problems with this. First, the new filings do not restate or

refer to factual allegations in the Amended Complaint so that

the allegations are supported by newly cited authorities. (ECF

Nos. 74, 81.)

Second, even if the supposed claims were properly stated,

as raised they would be untimely. “Issues raised for the first

time in objections to the magistrate judge's recommendation are

deemed waived.” Green v. FedEx Supply Chain, Inc., No. 2:21-CV-

1 For instance, at multiple points, the Amended Complaint states that

the case is “not an employment discrimination case” (ECF No. 32 at 2

and 8.) but goes on to allege employment discrimination. The

Amended Complaint purports to allege breach of a settlement

agreement, (Id. at 1.) but later refers to the same settlement

agreement Plaintiff seeks to have enforced as “fraudulent” (Id. at

11, 23, and 25.) and “not a binding contract.” (Id. at 11.)

02518-JPM-TMP, 2023 WL 2302036, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 1, 2023)

citing Ward v. United States, 208 F.3d 216, *1 (6th Cir. 2000).

“The Magistrate Judge Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 631 et seq. does not

allow parties to raise at the district court stage new arguments

or issues that were not presented to the magistrate.” Murr v.

United States, 200 F.3d 895, 902 n. 1 (6th Cir. 2000). Allowing

new claims to be raised in objections would “reduce [the

Magistrate Judge’s role] to that of a mere dress rehearsal.”

Johnston v. Hamilton Cnty. Just. Ctr., No. 1:18-CV-864, 2021 WL

1250955, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 5, 2021), report and

recommendation adopted, No. 1:18-CV-864, 2022 WL 4554117 (S.D.

Ohio Sept. 28, 2022).

The additional ADA and Title VII claims Plaintiff raises in

the pending motions have been waived and are not addressed here.

The Court finds no clear error or manifest injustice in its

decision not to address the supposed claims.

4. Pro Se Prejudice

Plaintiff asserts that the Court erred in applying a “strict

pleading standard,” prejudicing her as a pro se litigant. (ECF

No. 81 at 8.) Plaintiff is correct that pro se complaints are

entitled to liberal construction. Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482

F. App'x 975, 976 (6th Cir. 2012). However, although “courts

must apply less stringent standards in determining whether pro

se pleadings state a claim for which relief can be granted…pro

se plaintiffs are not automatically entitled to take every case

to trial.” Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir.

1996) (internal citations omitted). Even the less stringent

standards “ha[ve] still required basic pleading standards,”

including adherence to Rule 12(b)(6). Martin v. Overton, 391

F.3d 710, 714 (6th Cir. 2004)

The R&R explicitly stated that it construed Plaintiff’s

Amended Complaint with deference given her pro se status. (ECF

No. 53 at 13.) The R&R applied the proper 12(b)(6) pleading

standards in recommending dismissal of Plaintiff’s EPA, Title

VII Compensation, and breach of settlement claims. (ECF No. 53

at 11-15.) The Court did so as well. Neither the Court nor the

Magistrate Judge erred in applying the proper standard to

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint.

Plaintiff argues that she was generally prejudiced as a pro

se litigant. (ECF No. 81 at 8, and ECF No. 74 at 4, 12, and 18).

Plaintiff’s broad assertion of prejudice appears to apply to the

entire course of proceedings. She does not refer to specific

portions of any Court document.

“The leniency granted to pro se petitioners…is not

boundless.” Martin, 391 F.3d at 714. “Liberal construction does

not require a court to conjure allegations on a litigant's

behalf.” Erwin v. Edwards, 22 F. App'x 579, 580 (6th Cir. 2001).

The Court has liberally construed Plaintiff’s filings in

its September 2, 2025 Order adopting the R&R and in this Order

denying Plaintiff’s motions for reconsideration. Plaintiff has

found the limits of leniency given pro se litigants and has

surpassed them, regularly filing disorganized documents

improperly. (See, e.g., ECF No. 72 at 6-7.) The Court finds no

clear error of law or manifest injustice based on Plaintiff’s

pro se status.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff fails to satisfy

the Rule 59(e) standard for altering or amending the Court’s

judgment. Defendant’s motions for reconsideration are DENIED.

So ordered this 10th day of October, 2025.

/s/ Sameul H. Mays, Jr.

SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE